00059899

THE
ASIATIC SOCIETY OF BOMBAY
TOWN HALL, BOMBAY-400 023.

Digitized with financial assistance from the
Government of Maharashtra
on 17 February, 2016

AN HISTORICAL AND CRITICAL VIEW

OF THE

SPECULATIVE PHILOSOPHY OF EUROPE

IN THE

NINETEENTH CENTURY.

59899

BY

J. D. MORELL, A.M.

VOLUME II.

LIBRARY OF THE ROYAL BOMBAY BRANCH OF THE ASIATIC

7.6.10

LONDON:
WILLIAM PICKERING.
1846.

00059899

CHAPTER V.

CHARACTERISTICS OF MODERN IDEALISM.

In tracing the progress of idealism from the revival of modern philosophy to the opening of the present century, we described four different movements, which it exhibited respectively in four different parts of Europe. The French movement was seen to develop itself in the school of Descartes, and to evaporate at length either into the revived Platonism of Malebranche, or the realistic pantheism of Spinoza. The English idealism, polemical in its origin, and living a life of contest rather than one of calm and lofty repose, we saw gradually retiring before the power of its adversary, and ere the eighteenth century was ended, well nigh extinguished under the advancing sensationalism of the successors of Locke. The German idealism, on the contrary, seemed destined to realize nobler fortunes. Sent forth under the auspices of Leibnitz, the greatest scholar and perhaps thinker of his age, it enjoyed, during its infancy, a prosperous career in connexion with the logical order of the Wolfian

school; then, taking another direction, it poured astonishment over Europe, through the works of the immortal Kant; and at the close of the century only seemed preparing for a still grander development, and a still bolder flight. Lastly, the philosophy of Scotland, although perhaps most vigorous and most original when in the hands of Reid, its real founder, yet appeared at the close of the last century to promise for the present a development of its resources, in some measure corresponding to the victory it had already achieved over the pretensions of scepticism.

The two anti-sensational forces, therefore, which meet our view on stepping over the threshold of the nineteenth century, are the respective philosophies of Scotland and Germany. Upon these it devolved to carry on the combat against the materialism of England and France; and from these were derived the fruitful germs of thought, which have now succeeded in producing a re-action in favour of idealism in both those countries. In pursuing, then, the history of the idealistic tendency through our own age, we must first look to Scotland and Germany, as the sources of its chief movements; having done this, we shall be the better able to estimate their effect upon our own country, and their share in the rise of the modern eclecticism of France. This sketch, as far as Scotland, Germany, and England are concerned, we shall assign to the present chapter; the history

of modern eclecticism, although strictly anti-sensational, yet, as presenting several peculiarities, we must reserve for a separate consideration.

SECT. I.—*The Scottish School of the Nineteenth Century.*

The rise and progress of the Scottish metaphysics during the *last* century have been already noticed in a former chapter. Up to the time of Reid, as we then saw, the representationalist theory of perception, though not in its strictly Aristotelian form, was the general belief of the philosophical world; and upon its foundation the edifice of scepticism, as erected by Berkeley and Hume, mainly rested. Against this system the philosophy of Reid was the natural reaction; and as the effect of all scepticism is to send us back again to first principles, so it was only a thing to be reasonably expected, that the bold and sweeping scepticism of Hume should give rise to a proportionably deep and thorough revision of the fundamental principles of human knowledge. The key to all that Dr. Reid ever wrote upon these topics may be found in the one consideration, that he stood forth as the professed opponent of philosophical scepticism, and had from the first determined to devote his whole life, to tear up the very deepest roots, from which it sprung. Hence arose his attack upon the doctrine of ideas, as being the πρωτον ψευδος of his adversaries; hence

his opposition to the empirical tendency of Locke's refutation of innate ideas; hence his assertion of the immediatecy of our knowledge of the external world; hence, in a word, his principle of common sense, by means of which he sought to enlist the universal consent of man's intelligence against the subtle, and sweeping conclusions of a false philosophy. The very position, in which Reid was placed, threw him back upon the only true method of all metaphysical investigation, that of inward observation and analysis. Once taught rightly to interpret the observed facts of our consciousness, he found it no insuperable task to overturn the false hypotheses which had up to that time held an undisputed place in most metaphysical systems.

The polemical character, however, of Reid's philosophy necessarily gave it a peculiarity unfavourable to its systematic development. Occupied as he was in pulling down, he had but little time to build up; and even that which he did succeed in erecting had rather the character of an outpost strongly placed to defend the citadel of truth, than of fresh turrets tending to beautify or enlarge it. Moreover, the opposition he was called upon to sustain against the almost universal voice of authority both in ancient and modern philosophies, naturally led him to underrate a correct knowledge of their nature and history, and to deprive himself of many of the aids which a more extensive study of the best metaphysical writings would have afforded.

All this tended to give an air of incompleteness to his system; so much so indeed, that he appeared before the world not exactly as a philosopher, but rather in the character of an earnest mind, contending only for a few great principles of truth, and willing, when those main positions were gained, to rest content with the first great victory, and leave to his successors the task of following it up into all its legitimate consequences. The more immediate successors of Reid, however, failed to do this. Furnished with their new philosophical organon, that of common sense, they did little more than celebrate a kind of perpetual ovation over the conquest which their great predecessor had by its means achieved; or, if they ever attempted themselves to wield it against other enemies, they did so with far less nerve and proportionally small success.

Amongst the successors of Reid, however, there was one disciple, inspired with profound veneration for his master, and deeply imbued with his spirit, who rose to a distinction far above the rest, and succeeded in giving to his country's philosophy a popularity, which, in the want of such an advocate, it would, in all probability, never have obtained. The reader will at once perceive that I refer to Dugald Stewart, of whose writings we must now take a brief review.

This celebrated author, whose works form so large an item in the philosophical history of Scotland during the present century, was born in the

year 1753. In 1773, he became professor of mathematics, in the university of Edinburgh, and in 1785, was raised to the chair of moral philosophy. His first work, entitled, "Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind," was published in 1792, and obtained considerable celebrity as a clear and eloquent exposition of the philosophy of Dr. Reid. It was translated into French by M. Provost, of Geneva, and extensively read on the Continent as well as in our own country. In the next year he published his "Outlines of Moral Philosophy," which comprehended the chief results of the Scottish school on the moral phenomena of the human mind, and which have been more recently translated by M. Jouffroy, with a most invaluable preface as an introduction. In the year 1810, appeared his "Philosophical Essays," in which many of the points at issue between the philosophy of Locke, and that of Reid, are very clearly pourtrayed, and a lengthened disquisition added on the philosophy of taste. This work was introduced to the French public by M. Huron. In the year 1814, appeared the second volume of the "Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind," comprehending his analysis of the intellectual powers, and a very full exposition of the fundamental laws of human belief, an expression which he substituted for Reid's "Principle of Common Sense." The next two years were occupied in writing his "Preliminary Dissertation

on the Progress of Metaphysical, Ethical, and Political Philosophy," the first part of which was published in the supplement to the "Encyclopedia Britannica," in the year 1816, the second part in the year 1821. So clear, so elegant, and, in many respects, so learned is the exhibition there given of the gradual development of metaphysical philosophy in Europe, and so acute the strictures on the different systems which it details, that many ground his chief claim to a lasting reputation upon these rather than upon any of his more systematical writings. The third volume of the "Elements" was published in the year 1827, and in 1828, the year of his death, came out his last work, entitled, "Philosophy of the Active and Moral Powers of Man." *

Respecting Stewart's ability as a writer, there never has been, as far as we know, but one opinion, and that decidedly favourable. His reading upon all metaphysical subjects, (with the exception of the more modern German philosophy,) appeared to be almost as extensive as the literature itself; his judgment upon the merits of the different authors was, for the most part, clear and comprehensive; his own mind exhibited all the traces of the scholar and the man of taste, while his easy and

* The second volume of the "Elements" was translated into French by M. Farcy; the preliminary discourse, by M. Buchan; and the "Philosophy of the Active and Moral Powers," by MM. Simon and Huron.

attractive style seemed to throw a charm, and an interest around the most abstruse, and forbidding subjects. There can be little doubt, but that the Scottish metaphysics, while they derived their bone and sinew from Dr. Reid, yet owed to the labours of his successor all that mould and symmetry, that order and beauty, which have given them a popularity greater than any philosophical treatises in the English language, which have appeared in modern times.

To give a criticism on Stewart's philosophy, as a whole, would be, in fact, nothing more than to repeat what we have already said of his predecessor and instructor, Dr. Reid; the points in which he has departed from Reid's opinions being comparatively very few, and those few but of slight importance. It may be useful, however, to mention one or two particulars, in which Stewart may be said to have rendered essential service to the philosophy of Scotland, and to have excelled all those who preceded him in the same department.

1. He introduced many great improvements into the metaphysical *phraseology* of his school. The most prominent instance of this is seen in the fact of his discarding the term "principles of common sense," (the very term by which Reid and his immediate successors had chiefly characterized their system,) and conveying the same idea under the more dignified expression, "Fundamental Laws of Human Belief." The term, "principles of

common sense," was in many respects objectionable: it appeared to place common sense in direct opposition to philosophy, and by implication, to assert that the two were altogether irreconcileable. Stewart perceived the disadvantage which arose from this circumstance, and proceeded with a laudable zeal to remove it.

To accomplish this end, he analysed more closely than had been done before, the notions which Reid intended to convey under the expression itself, and shewed that, properly speaking, they refer to the *primary elements of our reason*, rather than (as Reid imagined) to the principles upon which *reasoning* is conducted. Common sense, we know, in the popular use of the term, is opposed to an incorrect and an untenable method of inference, to the habit of drawing false conclusions, or of admitting premises on slight evidence. On the other hand, the primary elements of man's reason are altogether of a different nature; their absence would imply absolute insanity; so that, instead of terming them principles of common sense, they should rather be designated *fundamental laws of human belief*, without which it were impossible for the mind to perform one of the intellectual operations, for which it is destined. "The former expression," Stewart remarks, "would only imply that we were apt to fall into absurdities and improprieties in the common concerns of life; but to denominate such laws of

belief as we have been considering, '*constituent elements of human reason*,' while it seems quite unexceptionable in point of technical distinctness, cannot justly be censured as the slightest deviation from our habitual forms of speech." We give this as a specimen (perhaps the most striking one which could be brought forward) of the care, which our author bestowed on his philosophical phraseology. He well knew that nothing tended so much to raise metaphysical speculations above objections and misunderstanding, nothing to commend it so much to the common intellect of man, nothing so much to place it on a firm and lasting basis, as to clothe it in distinct appropriate and intelligible language.

2. Another service, which Stewart rendered, was to revise the *classification*, which Reid had left behind him, of the phenomena of the human mind. The fundamental principle of classification is the same in each, that, namely, which divides all mental phenomena into *intellectual* and *active* powers. Under each of these two heads Reid drew out a long list of faculties or feelings, which he hastily set down as original and peculiar facts of our mental constitution, apparently with little attempt to resolve them into any more primary elements. The instinctive principles especially were very imperfectly classified in Reid's philosophy, since they were made so numerous and complicated, that the effect was rather to perplex, than to throw any additional

light upon the subject. Stewart, though far from giving a classification, which can be considered unobjectionable, yet thoroughly revised that of his predecessor; applied to many parts of it a closer and better analysis; and if he did not accomplish all that could be wished on this head, yet pointed out the way to those who soon after succeeded him. No doubt the excessive simplification of the sensationalist school was the ground of Reid's jealousy against resolving the phenomena of mind into a very small number of original elements; neither with the absurd conclusions of the French materialists before his eyes was Stewart very likely to venture with much boldness upon any speculations of the same nature. Notwithstanding this, however, he furnished many instances of elegant analysis, which not only introduced decided improvements into Reid's classification, but prepared the way for others to proceed still further on the same road.

3. But one of the greatest services which Stewart rendered to the philosophy of his country, is due to the manner, in which he illustrated, confirmed, and adorned it by his *learning*. Reid seemed as if he gloried in standing directly opposed to the authority of more than two thousand years. Stewart, on the contrary, rather sought to prove, that the philosophy of other ages and other nations often tended to support their own. The former had to fight the battle for first principles so

sternly, that he hardly thought of proceeding further when the victory was once achieved; the latter came forward when the contest was already over, and had abundant leisure to confirm the main conclusions they had educed by an appeal to extraneous sources.

Than Stewart, few men, perhaps, were ever better enabled to carry on this kind of research. Devoted exclusively to philosophical studies, holding a position which gave abundant leisure from professional duties, situated in a literary capital where books to any extent were at his command, he enjoyed every facility which was needed to aid him in mastering the history of philosophy and in applying it to the enlargement and perfection of his own system. Learning always inspires confidence; we naturally place reliance upon those, who build upon the well-known experience of past ages; and this was, doubtless, one of the methods by which Stewart gained the confidence of so many of his contemporaries upon most of the questions which involve metaphysical analysis. He appeared evidently writing upon topics, which he had thoroughly mastered, respecting which he knew the universal voice of history; and this alone was sufficient to give him a power to influence the opinions, and to gain the suffrages of mankind, which a more original and a less learned philosopher would probably have wanted.

Whilst, however, we can easily find so much to

commend in the writings we have been thus briefly reviewing, there are points of no little consequence, to which we might make equally decisive objections. There are certain theories, for example, involved in his classification of the powers of the human mind, which, if strictly followed out, would have gone far to despoil his philosophy of its peculiar excellence. The classification itself is as follows:— 1. Consciousness; 2. Perception; 3. Attention; 4. Conception; 5. Abstraction; 6. Association of Ideas; 7. Memory; 8. Imagination; 9. Judgment or Reasoning.

Now, first of all, to make *consciousness* a separate faculty perfectly collateral with the others, involves a principle, which would soon have reopened the floodgates of scepticism, and contravened the very conclusions, which both Reid and himself with so much labour had established. Consciousness, as viewed by Stewart, is defined to be "*the faculty by which we are cognisant of our other mental operations.*" If this limitation of the term be correct, then, of course, we can never be conscious of any objective reality; all we can be directly conscious of, is the process of knowing, never of the thing known. Now, the great and fundamental principle of the school of Reid is, that we perceive external things *immediately*, that we need no image, or idea, or modification of mind as the medium; but that the common belief of mankind (namely, that we really see, feel, &c., external

things themselves) is literally correct. Once admit that, after I have perceived an object, I need another power termed consciousness, by which I become cognisant of the perception, and by the medium of which the knowledge involved in perception is made clear to the thinking self, and the plea of "*common sense*" against scepticism is cut off. On this principle we are only conscious, after all, of a subjective state; the objective reality, which we suppose it to involve, may still be a delusion, and we are just as far from controverting the pretensions of the sceptic as ever.

Perception, as we have before shewn, involves a relation between my subjective self and an objective reality: take away either of the terms and the perception is no more; so that, to be conscious of a perception evidently involves a direct consciousness of the object, as well as the subject. If this be true, it follows at once, that consciousness cannot be a fact of mind resting on the same footing and collateral with perception; that is to say, it cannot be co-ordinate generally with the other intellectual faculties. Were this the case we should have in each instance two faculties to perform the same office—a redundancy which would be sufficient to condemn any classification that could for a moment admit it. Consciousness, then, ought on Reid's principles to have been explained, not as a separate faculty, but as a more universal term, implying the general condition of reflective intelligence. I am

conscious of self, and I am conscious of not-self; my knowledge of both in the act of perception is equally direct and immediate; on the other hand, to make consciousness a peculiar faculty, by which we are simply cognisant of our own mental operations, is virtually to deny the immediatecy of our knowledge of the external world, and to restore the representationalist's hypothesis in a more subtle form. Hence, we maintain, that, had Reid or Stewart carried out their doctrine of consciousness to its full results, they would have completely subverted their original conclusions, and lost the victory, which they seemed to have won.

The second of Stewart's original faculties is perception: and here, again, we much doubt whether the analysis he has given us is sufficiently searching. Taking the fact of sensation on the one hand, and judgment on the other, we are at a loss to know what middle point there is between them in perception, which deserves the name of a peculiar faculty. If the term perception be used simply to signify a primitive judgment in opposition to an experimental one, we are content thus to employ it; but this is hardly sufficient to justify us in making our judgment in the two cases separate and distinct faculties. Perception, therefore, we conceive, may be easily reduced to the two faculties above stated, namely, sensation and judgment, being, in fact, the judgment we pass upon our sensations with reference to their external cause. The term sensational-

perception might, perhaps, be conveniently employed at once to designate and explain the process.

The four next faculties, namely, attention, conception, abstraction, and association, we should likewise reduce to more primitive elements, as, indeed, has been done by several of the more modern writers of the Scottish school. The three former resolve themselves into other primitive *powers*, the last indicates an ultimate *law* of mind, that regulates the flow of all our ideas and feelings, rather than a separate intellectual power by which we acquire any distinct and peculiar species of knowledge. Whilst, however, we should offer these objections to Stewart's system as a whole, it must be admitted, that he made considerable improvements upon that of his predecessor, and in many respects pointed out the road of analysis to those who succeeded him.

Upon the whole, we consider that Stewart's philosophy, like that of Reid, was too primary. He was so much employed in defending the outposts which had been won, in strengthening them against any fresh attacks, and in ornamenting them by his learning and taste, that comparatively little progress was made in building up a complete system. He was rather the acute and elegant critic, than the profound systematic philosopher; and his labours, perhaps, are more highly to be estimated by the ardour and enthusiasm, with which they were calculated to inspire others in the pursuit of intel-

lectual science; than by the actual results which they themselves succeeded in educing. The sentiments expressed by Thos. Carlyle, nearly twenty years ago, in the "Edinburgh Review," we regard as one of the most accurate judgments which has been passed upon Stewart as a philosopher. "The name of Dugald Stewart is a name venerable to all Europe, and to none more dear and venerable than to ourselves. Nevertheless his writings are not a philosophy, but a making ready for one. He does not enter on the field to till it, he only encompasses it with fences, invites cultivators, and drives away intruders; often (fallen on evil days) he is reduced to long arguments with the passers-by to prove that it is a field, that this so highly-prized domain of his is, in truth, soil and substance, not clouds and shadow. We regard his discussions on the nature of philosophic language, and his unwearied efforts to set forth and guard against its fallacies, as worthy of all acknowledgment, as, indeed, forming the greatest, perhaps the only true improvement which philosophy has received among us in our age. It is only to a superficial observer, that the import of these discussions can seem trivial: rightly understood, they give a sufficient and final answer to Hartley's and Darwin's and all other possible forms of materialism, the grand idolatry, as we may rightly call it, by which, in all times, the true worship, that of the Invisible, has been polluted and withstood."

The tendency of the Scottish philosophy, up to the point where we have now arrived, was clearly and decidedly anti-sensational. The main efforts, both of Reid and Stewart, were directed to the establishment of certain fundamental truths (whether termed principles of common sense or primary laws of belief), which could not be subjected on the ground of their empirical origin to the bold attacks of the sceptic. There can be no doubt but that both those writers, with so many evil examples of over-simplification before their eyes, were restrained from carrying out their analysis to the extent they would otherwise have done, and that they were thus led to assign a far greater number of original powers or instincts than were necessary to account for all the phenomena of the case. At the same time the error was on the safe side, especially in an age when everything in the form of philosophy, both in England and France, was rapidly assuming a materialistic and empirical character. The tone of Scottish philosophy, however, was now destined to undergo a very considerable change. Already in the writings of Stewart there were manifested, as we have before remarked, some attempts at a more searching analysis; and these attempts were not likely to be lost upon the ardent minds, which succeeded him, — minds deeply imbued with the empirical spirit of the age.

From the close of Stewart's career, indeed, downwards to the present time, we may consider

that the tendency of the Scottish metaphysical school has been somewhat in the opposite direction from that, which it manifested under its earlier supporters. Not, indeed, that it has ever run into those more extreme conclusions of sensationalism, which we have noted in the writings of Mill; but still, in its zeal for completing the analysis of the human consciousness, and correcting the errors or imperfections, with which the works we have already noticed are characterized, it has incurred some danger, lest, once on the descent towards simplification, it should not know where to stop in order to avoid the evils of the opposite extreme. We must now proceed to exemplify this, by sketching the history of philosophy in Scotland from the decline of Stewart to the present day.

Amongst the youthful minds, which the Edinburgh professor inspired with a love for philosophical research, there was *one*, who at an unusually early age shewed the marks of an extraordinary genius, and who afterwards rose to an eminence which did not disappoint the expectations he had excited. Dr. Thomas Brown, to whom we allude, was born in the year 1778, and having received a liberal education in England, entered, while yet very young, upon the studies of the University of Edinburgh. At the age of sixteen he commenced the study of moral philosophy, under the tuition of Dugald Stewart; and was even then distinguished for the acuteness, with which he entered into the

most abstruse questions of metaphysics that were brought before the class. Before he attained his nineteenth year he undertook to examine, and refute the sophistry of Darwin, in his "Zoonomia," and with such clearness did he unravel the web, and expose the fallacies it contained, that the work (published anonymously) was universally attributed by the "Reviews" to some philosopher of high standing and matured ability. His next work, published in 1804, was "On Cause and Effect," a subject which he was led to undertake from some illiberal remarks made upon Mr. Leslie, on account of his favouring the theory of Hume. In 1810 he was elected professor of moral philosophy, in conjunction with Mr. Stewart, and it is upon the lectures, which in that capacity he delivered, although published posthumously, without having received their last touches from his own hand, that his fame as a metaphysician has chiefly rested. He died April 2, 1820, beloved by many, regretted by all, in the very ascendancy of his genius and reputation.

As a writer, Brown must be regarded as eminently successful. Inferior to Stewart in classic chasteness of diction, and philosophic elegance of style, yet his mind was of that poetic order, which can throw a luxuriance, perhaps we might say a redundancy, of imagery and illustration, around every subject, that it undertakes. From this, mainly, has arisen the great popularity of his

lectures, which have not only passed through many editions, but are now, after more than twenty years, in almost as great request as they were at first. Our chief object, however, at present, is to consider Brown as a *philosopher*, which we shall attempt to do without being drawn away, either by the depreciation of his opponents, or the excessive commendation of his admirers.

That Brown possessed splendid abilities, and that his writings generally are marked with superior excellence, every candid reader must admit. The most distinctive feature of his mind is generally allowed to have been *the power of analysis*, in which he greatly transcended all philosophers of the Scottish school who preceded him. On this point we fully concur in the words of his admiring biographer, where he says, "No intricacy was too involved for him to unravel; no labyrinth too mazy for him to explore. The knot that thousands had left in despair, as too complicated for mortal hand to undo, and which others, more presumptuous, had cut in twain, in the rage of baffled ingenuity, he unloosed with unrivalled dexterity. The enigmas which a false philosophy had so long propounded, and which, because they were not solved, had made victims of many of the finest and highest gifted of our race, he at last succeeded in unriddling."

Endued by nature with so acute an analytic faculty, and not being restrained from its exercise by so strong motives, as had operated in the case of the earlier metaphysicians of Scotland, it is not

surprising, that he became convinced, even while his powers were yet immature, of the necessity there was for a complete revision of the current philosophy of his country. Educated under the influence of Reid's anti-sensational principles, on the one hand, and drawn, both by his own peculiar genius as well as the tendency of the age, to a more refined analysis on the other, he stood in a position admirably adapted to bring the classification of mental phenomena to a high degree of perfection. His reverence for the school to which by birth and education he belonged, secured him against the extravagancies of the French ideologists, while yet he was impelled onwards, by the other circumstances we have mentioned, to commence a kind of secret revolt against his preceptors, in behalf of a more profoundly analytic system. With the example of his countrymen before him, he was impressed with the absolute necessity of admitting certain fundamental principles of belief; on the other hand, he was evidently charmed with the many successful attempts of the school of Hartley, to resolve complex phenomena into simpler elements by means of the laws of association. To these circumstances we may trace almost all the peculiarities, which are to be found in his philosophy, only considering that his views are worked up with singular clearness and sagacity into a complete system of psychology.

We are far, therefore, from attributing to Brown all the *originality*, which has been claimed for him

by some of his warmest admirers. Taking the influence of the Scottish school into consideration, he could hardly fail to retain his hold on some few original principles of man's belief, lest he should again open a door for the re-introduction of the sweeping scepticism of Hume. Taking into account, on the other hand, his native power of analysis, aided and abetted by the current philosophy both of France and England, he was almost necessarily led to adopt some of the conclusions of the sensational school; yet still in such a form, that they should not contradict and overturn the main points, which had been gained by the polemical ardour of his own countrymen. He knew how to adopt Hartley's excellencies without his errors; at the same time he clearly saw how far it was possible to depart from Stewart without proclaiming against him an open hostility; and thus from a mind so admirably balanced between the two extremes, there emanated a classification which, avoiding the evils of both sides, came upon the whole nearer to perfection than any British philosopher had succeeded in bringing it before him. In thus extolling Brown's classification of the phenomena of the human mind, we would by no means represent it as unobjectionable, either in principle or in phraseology; all that we intend to convey is, that he was so far successful in his attempt as virtually to arrive at the three great divisions of our mental states, to which all the best analyses of

more modern times have manifestly tended, namely: Sensation, Intellection, and Emotion.

But whilst we thus award to Brown the merit of great sagacity, and an admirable power of analysis, we must not lose sight of the defects, by which his works are characterized, some of the most grave and serious description.

1. We would point out his peculiar *phraseology* as by no means calculated to add perspicuity or strength to his philosophy. There is something objectionable in the terms, by which his very classification is expressed, namely, *external and internal states.* An external state, taken strictly, is an absurdity; for sensation is as much in the mind as

* It is hardly necessary to state that Brown divides mental phenomena into external and internal states, the latter comprehending intellectual states and emotions, the intellectual states again comprehending simple and relative suggestions, thus:—

- Mental phenomena include
  - External states.
    - All the variety of sensations.
  - Internal states.
    - Intellectual.
      - Simple Suggestion.
      - Relative Suggestion.
    - Emotional.
      - Passions and Desires.

Sensation, intellection, and emotion, which the above classification evidently includes, may, without much difficulty, be shewn to run parallel with the modern French division into sensitivity, intellection, and will.

is memory, and judgment, or any of the emotions. We are willing to admit, however, that Brown only intended to convey by the phrase "external and internal states," those, which are preceded in the one case by an outward, and in the other by an inward cause; still there arise two objections against such a classification—first, that in a proper classification our mental phenomena ought to be designated by something that is characteristic of themselves, and not merely of the circumstances which may precede them; and, secondly, that the arrangement, even allowing its principle to be admissible, still fails of accuracy in the case of the emotions, many of which, though they are all denominated internal states, are immediately preceded by an external cause; such as those, for example, which are termed instinctive.

Again, we have never been able to see the propriety or the desirableness of using the terms *simple and relative suggestion*, instead of the much more intelligible terms, which others have always employed to express virtually the same phenomena. The whole attempt, in fact, to account for the powers of memory and judgment by the laws of suggestion we cannot but regard as utterly useless. Admit that memory and suggestion are fundamentally the same thing, what is gained in point of analysis by blotting out one original faculty and substituting for it another? It simply comes after all to a question of phraseology. Here is a fact of

mind that all admit; hitherto it has been called memory; now, says Brown, we must call it simple suggestion. What benefit, we ask, is conferred upon philosophy by the change? Perhaps it may be replied, that by pointing out the two kinds of suggestion, namely, simple and relative, you reduce the phenomena of memory and judgment to one law. Not at all. Judgment can never be reduced to the general law of suggestion; the very element which separates it from this general law has to be superadded, even by Brown himself, by prefixing the term *relative;* so that, although we cast away the old-standing terms, yet we are obliged to admit the same things under two other names. Simple suggestion is nothing else than an awkward name for memory, and relative suggestion nothing else than a still more awkward one for judgment; neither is the real nature of the one process or the other made at all clearer by changing the ordinary into the new and less intelligible phraseology.

Still, further, we should contend strongly against giving up the use of the words power, faculty, and other similar expressions, which keep constantly before our view the native activity or spontaneity of the human mind, and substituting in their place the phraseology, which represents all mental phenomena as states produced by extraneous causes. Either style of expression, no doubt, might be defined, so as to convey a correct notion, whichever notion may be correct; but to us it seems, that the

phrases intellectual and active *powers* give, according to the common use of language, a far more truthful representation of the real character of the facts themselves, than does the philosophical vocabulary for which they have been exchanged. The tendency of this exchange is most evidently of a sensational character; it diminishes the intensity of our notion of self, as an independent source of power, and contemplates the mind rather as a passive existence, moulded into its different states either by the force of circumstances on the one hand, or by its own inevitable and unalterable laws on the other. Unless far better reasons are given for so important a change of language, than any that are to be found in Brown's own writings, we must regard it as a serious defect, and calculated rather to retard than advance the progress of intellectual science.

2. Another defect in the works now before us, arises from the historical inaccuracies, and misconceptions with which they abound. Brown possessed an ardent mind, rapid in its operations, vivid in its conceptions, and far more adapted to grasp the whole extent of a theory by one intellectual effort, supplying whatever was obscure by his own ready invention, than to develop it to himself by long and patient research. He was accustomed to read books with astonishing rapidity, and his retentive memory easily preserved the most important ideas for his future use. But it is

evident, that this method of acquiring knowledge, however appropriate in the case of ordinary works, was by no means calculated to give deep and comprehensive views of those philosophical systems, which can only be mastered by close and prolonged reflection. Accordingly, we soon discover, that Brown's knowledge of the philosophy of the ancient world was rather popular than profound. He could describe in his own easy and lively style, some of the prominent features of the academy, or the porch, of Epicurus, or the Stagyrite, but he had not studied these various systems in their deeper conceptions, their finer shades, or their historical development. The method, in which the controversy regarding the ideal system is treated in his lectures, is a striking instance of the deficiency we are now describing. He accounts for the errors, which arose on this subject among the ancient philosophers, from their supposed indefinite use of the word *idea*, applying it, as he affirms they were accustomed to do, sometimes to the mental affection, sometimes to the organic affection, and sometimes to both. A theory more gratuitous and more inconsistent with facts could hardly have been proposed. It is evident that our imaginative author, having got a general notion of the peripatetic doctrine of images, species, and phantasms; having taken for granted that it was held universally, and in the same manner by the schoolmen; having supposed, further, that the word *idea*

was the one employed in both cases to explain their opinions, hastily jumped at the conclusion, that all the errors involved must have arisen from misconceptions connected with that one word. Now let us learn, from the pen of one who has not inappropriately been termed "the greatest critic of our age," what was the real state of the case. "In the first place," says Sir Wm. Hamilton, "the term idea was never employed in any system previous to the age of Descartes to denote little images derived from objects without. In the *second*, it was *never* used in any philosophy prior to the same period to signify the immediate object of perception. In the third, it was not applied by the peripatetics or schoolmen to express an object of human thought at all. In the fourth, ideas (taking this term for species) were not in all the dark ages of the scholastic followers of Aristotle regarded as little images derived from without, for a numerous party of the most illustrious schoolmen rejected species not only in the intellect, but in the sense. In the fifth, phantasm, in the old philosophy, was not the external cause of perception, but the internal object of imagination. In the sixth, the term shadowy film, which here and elsewhere he constantly uses, shews that Dr. Brown confounds the matterless species of the peripatetics with the substantial effluxions of Democritus and Epicurus." The instance we have here of historical inaccuracy and misconception is by no means a

solitary one in Dr. Brown's writings; indeed, if we compare the knowledge he manifested generally of the philosophers of antiquity with that possessed by Cudworth, Berkeley, or Henry More, with Cousin in France, or the modern idealists of Germany, we at once become sensible of his great deficiency. So far, then, respecting his knowledge of the ancient philosophers: it is equally evident, however, that there is a similar want of profundity in his estimate of the more abstruse of the modern metaphysical systems. His conception of the real nature and spirit of Cartesianism was extremely meagre. In that feature of the Cartesian doctrines, to which he particularly refers, namely, the theory of occasional causes, he has evidently misunderstood the whole bearing of the question; nay, he argues that Descartes himself was clear to lucidity upon this very doctrine which was the basis of the greatest controversy among his immediate followers.

The same deficiency is manifest when he treats of the philosophy of Leibnitz. To comprehend and dress up the popular idea attached to his theory of pre-established harmony was sufficiently easy, but we gain not the faintest glimmering from Brown's writings of the fundamental principles of the dynamical philosophy, as developed by that author; so that the theory in question, severed from the system of which it forms a necessary portion, appeared but the monstrous production of a half-crazy brain, instead of being the matured

opinion of one of the greatest men in Europe, and the inventor of the differential calculus. Let any one place by the side of Brown's almost ludicrous exposition of this doctrine, that of his French contemporary, Maine de Biran, and then judge which mind had dived most deeply into the spirit of the Leibnitzian philosophy. It would not be difficult to shew, that Brown entered with a like hasty partiality into the views of Locke, and that he greatly misunderstood the scepticism of Hume; as the natural consequence of which he rejected the claims of Reid to the victory he won over the conclusions of that modern pyrrhonist. This, however, would lead us into a too lengthened discussion, and is the less necessary, as we have already lightly touched upon the perceptionalist controversy, and shall elucidate it still further in our succeeding remarks.

3. We proceed, therefore, next, to notice Brown's theory of cause and effect, which we regard as the foundation of much that is erroneous throughout his whole system. There are two classes of phenomena in nature, mental and material; otherwise termed internal and external. In both instances we observe change, succession, effects; and consequently, in both cases, we acknowledge, in some sense or other, the existence of causes. In the case of mental phenomena, however, we have means of understanding the process of these changes (or, in other words, the nature of causes), which means,

in the phenomena of matter, entirely fail us. In the latter case we observe simply the succession of events (and observation can shew us no more); in the former case, however, we possess a consciousness, which gives us, in addition to successive phenomena, the distinct idea of effort or power, excited by our will, as the intermediate step by which the two events are conjoined.

Now, in reasoning out a theory of causation, either we may begin with observing material changes, may ground our chief view of the case upon them, and from that view proceed to the explanation of spiritual ones; or, we may begin with internal phenomena, and carry over the notion we derive from thence, as to the existence of power, into the material world. Those whose philosophy is formed mainly upon the plan and the habit of physical investigations, starting from the external world, are naturally led to deny the existence of power altogether, inasmuch as they find no *sensible* trace of it in nature: on the contrary, those who start from purely internal and spiritual phenomena, have no difficulty in admitting the real existence of power, though invisible to the senses, wherever changes are seen to take place. First, the pure idealist, bending his whole attention upon his internal consciousness, transforms all nature into a system of dynamical forces. Secondly, the moderate idealist, admitting the reality of passive substance, yet maintains that there must be certain

forces at work to produce the phenomena in it, which we constantly observe around us. Thirdly, the philosopher of the common sense school, like Reid and Stewart, though virtually denying the objective reality of power, yet admits, that we have a distinct metaphysical conception of it subjectively in the operations of our own mind. Fourthly, the incipient sensationalist, like Brown, is too much charmed with his method of physical inquiry to give any heed to this metaphysical notion, and hence denies its existence in any other sense than that of "immediate invariable antecedence," still admitting, however, the instinctive necessity of our belief in the perpetual uniformity of cause and effect in nature. And, lastly, the complete sceptic like Hume, as also the complete materialist like Priestley, and the French ideologists, not only deny the notion of efficiency or power, but refer our very belief in the constancy of cause and effect to the influence of experience and association. The position of Brown in the controversy, is thus sufficiently indicated, as one in which the existence of power, delegated from the Deity, is altogether denied; the idea of any efficient causes operating in nature rejected; adaptation in causality entirely lost sight of; and the whole phenomena of mind and matter reduced to a series of events, the fact of whose connexion we see, the uniformity of which we believe in, but the bond of which is entirely unknown. Brown's first error on this subject is his overlooking our own

personal consciousness of effort, from which, in fact, he ought to have started; once convinced of this, it would easily have become the type upon which he would have conceived the notion of efficient causes (modifications, indeed, of the Divine power) in nature also.

The effect of this theory, which Brown matured in early life, upon his subsequent philosophy is sufficiently manifest. It clearly suggested the rejection of the terms intellectual and active *powers;* it led him to view mental phenomena as a succession of changes, for which no cause whatever could be assigned, beyond their invariable antecedence and subsequence; it materialized his whole system, and struck so hard a blow at the foundations of human liberty, that had he undertaken to develop this part of our nature, there can be no doubt, but that his philosophy would have led him to the firm support of the ultra-necessarian hypothesis. But without dwelling longer on this topic, which has been ably answered by Herschell, Ballantyne, Cousin, and others, we must go on to consider

4. Brown's support of the representationalist theory of perception, as another imperfect feature in his philosophy. This theory has been maintained at different times and by different schools in a vast variety of forms. The most simple forms are those of the Epicureans and Peripatetics, the former of whom supposed that the mind comes to a knowledge of material things by means of refined substantial

effluxions from them—the latter, that it does so by means of immaterial species or shadowy films bearing an exact resemblance to the external object. A more subtle, though perhaps more reasonable form of the same theory has been held by many philosophers of later times, (of whom Descartes stands in the foreground,) who have supposed the inward representation to be not a separate existence, but a modification of the mind itself, produced, it may be, by the direct intervention of the Deity, as in the doctrine of occasional causes; or by a pre-established harmony, as maintained by Leibnitz; or by other means which it is not worth while to enumerate. These are, in fact, the particular forms of representationalism, with which Dr. Reid was acquainted, and against which he directed the chief strength of his argumentation.

There is, however, another view that many have taken of the same hypothesis, which makes the representative object *a modification of the mind*, not produced by any extraneous source, but involved in the very act of perception itself. The process of vision, for example, would be explained, on this principle, in the following manner:—The rays of light come from the object to my eye, and impress an image on the retina: this impression is conveyed by the optic nerve to the brain, and the brain produces a change or modification of my mind. The real object of perception, therefore, it is argued, is the change that takes place in the mind; so that,

instead of perceiving the external world itself, we only view its forms and changes shadowed forth in our own mental modifications. This was apparently the opinion of Locke; this, the foundation principle of Berkeley's reasoning; and this, likewise, the theory distinctly asserted and maintained by Brown. Let any one carefully peruse his 25th Lecture, and he will find it stated, as clearly as words can state it, that the whole object of our perception is *the mind as affected in a certain manner, and existing in certain states.*

The singularity of the case, however, is that he was not himself aware of the difference between Reid's doctrine of immediate intuitive perception and his own doctrine of representationalism; and hence the complicated series of errors and misconceptions, into which he fell, in denying Reid's claim to the refutation of the ideal system. Had Brown fully understood his own philosophy, he must have seen, that it could lead to nothing less than a species of subjective idealism; that cut off by it from any direct knowledge of the world without, and confined to the perception of our own mental states, we must totally fail of substantiating our faith in external realities against the arguments of the sceptic. The practical effect of this doctrine, it is true, so far as our belief in the material world is concerned, could not be very serious, since our daily necessities would oblige us to act in contradiction to it; but its effect upon our confidence in

the validity of human knowledge in general, must, if carried out, become lamentable. The instinctive conviction of mankind is, that they perceive the very object itself, which is before them, and not a mere representation of it within themselves: once shew that this conviction, resting as it does upon our direct consciousness, is false, and on what grounds can we be justified in trusting the evidence of consciousness in other matters? All necessary and universal truth (which rests upon the evidence of consciousness) is from henceforth rendered uncertain; the foundations of our knowledge are undermined; and we cannot, in any case, give a reason for our belief, which same reason in other cases does not prove entirely fallacious. Brown denies, that the evidence of consciousness respecting the real object of perception is to be trusted; but notwithstanding, he trusts that same evidence implicitly, when it asserts the objective existence of the material world, or the other primary laws of belief; which denial and trust being put together evolve the conclusion, that our primary beliefs may be inconsistent with each other, that they are not uniformly valid, and that, therefore, nothing can ever be believed at all with an unflinching certainty.

The great argument, upon which the representationalist system rests is this—that things which are not homogeneous can have no mutual influence upon each other; that the relation of knowledge implies an identity of existence; in plainer words, that

matter and mind cannot mutually affect each other *directly*, just because they are not both matter or both mind. This argument, we contend, is purely assertative; it entirely fails of support from reason or fact, and therefore, until some plea for it is produced, hardly requires any to be urged against it. The nature of causality in the one case is just as intelligible as in the other: we can as easily imagine the power of mind impressing its influence upon matter, as upon another mind like itself. On the other hand, the system of representationalism in any form is beset with difficulties. The chief of these we have already given in the review of Locke, and to them, therefore, for brevity's sake, we must now refer the reader. If any one, however, wishes to see the whole subject discussed fully and satisfactorily, we recommend him to consult the "Edinburgh Review," No. 103, where the philosophy of perception is developed with greater depth, and learning, than perhaps in any other work in our own language.

After what we have said about the metaphysical philosophy of Brown, it is hardly worth while to make any distinct reference to his ethics. The deepest questions in ethical philosophy he has left untouched, since in no place has he boldly approached the subject of human liberty or necessity; but the conclusions to which he has come respecting the nature and ground of morals, we believe, are almost universally regarded as unsound, even by

those who are the greatest admirers of his metaphysics. His principle here seems to be, that virtue cannot exist independently of virtuous agents; that in itself it is a mere abstraction, expressing simply the relation between certain actions, and certain emotions, which we feel in contemplating them. To this conclusion of course his theory of cause and effect was naturally adapted to lead. If events are known simply as successive, it is folly to seek for any *adaptation* in the one to bring about the other. Now in morals an action is one event, and a certain emotion is the succeeding one; the former is the universal antecedent, the latter the universal consequent. According to Brown's philosophy, we have no ability to inquire further into the matter; the cause of the emotion is no better known than efficient causes in nature are; the word virtue, which men assign as an objective reality, is in fact a mere abstraction expressing the relation between the two events, just as gravitation is an abstraction expressing the unknown relation between two phenomena in the natural world. This conclusion, it is evident, at once interdicts the great question in morals, What is the *cause* of virtuous emotion? or what is the ground of moral approbation?—it tells us that there is no such cause, no such ground to be discovered; that there is nothing in the nature of vicious conduct to produce remorse, nothing in the nature of virtuous conduct to produce approbation; that the Deity has so simply fixed the succes-

sion of events, and that when we have well observed this succession we have arrived at the ultimatum of our possible knowledge. Of course, if this be true, virtue and vice *might* be interchangeable; and if the mind become so hardened as to approve of sin, sin must at once become virtue! The ground of all rectitude being *our own personal feeling of approbation*, once let that approbation be reversed, and the relations of right and wrong are reversed also.

We might have selected other points from the writings of Brown to comment upon, but those we have already discussed comprehend the most important instances, in which his system appears to us to be defective or erroneous. While we admit the great merit which is due to him on account of his classification, and cannot but admire the beauty of many of his analyses, still in many other, and those some of the most fundamental points, we consider his philosophy to have been a step *backwards*, rather than *onwards* towards the perfection of the science to which he was devoted.

Whilst Brown was thus engaged in remodelling the philosophy of his country, several other minds were employed in the same work, although, perhaps, with less genius, yet, certainly, with more caution. It was not to him alone that the importance of a closer analysis of our mental phenomena suggested itself: we find a similar tendency decidedly manifested in various other writers of the

same period. Amongst these we might particularly point out Dr. John Young, professor of moral philosophy in Belfast, who had virtually completed his system, and delivered it, indeed, to his class, before the publication of Brown's lectures, although it was not published till the year 1835. Dr. Young, though by no means equal to Brown in natural acuteness or in brilliancy of style, yet added to a clear and comprehensive intelligence great steadiness, and patience in research. This is proved by the fact, that he arrived quite independently of Brown at a classification virtually the same, though unencumbered by any kind of novel phraseology. He reduced all *intellectual* phenomena to the three heads of sensation, memory, and judgment, steering a medium course with considerable skill between the more complicated systems of Reid and Stewart, and the over-simplification of Hartley. We have, in fact, in Dr. Young another instance of the gradual reaction, which has been experienced in Scotland, since the time of Stewart, in favour of a more sensational form of metaphysical philosophy; for, although he did not give up his hold upon the fundamental laws of man's belief, yet, he everywhere exhibited a strong inclination to derive many of our primary notions from other, and those experimental sources.

It might be remarked, however, in justice to another metaphysician of great ability, who was long known as a lecturer, but who never appeared

prominently in the literature of his country as an author, I mean Dr. Mylne, the late professor of moral philosophy at Glasgow, that Young unquestionably borrowed much of his system from the class-room of that distinguished philosopher. From what I have learned of those who attended his lectures, and what I have seen of the impulse they gave in prosecuting the work of intellectual analysis, I think there can be little doubt, but that his mind told forcibly upon the philosophy of Scotland during the many years of his professorship. The tendency of his influence, as of those before mentioned, was decidedly sensational: of this character were his analyses of many of our intellectual ideas; of this character, also, was his firm support of utilitarianism in morals; yet, we believe, he explained his views in such a manner, as not materially to injure those great principles of belief, for which Reid had so earnestly contended. Somewhat of a similar tendency is the work of the Rev. John Ballantyne on the human mind, the whole of which is marked with great analytical acumen, and a corresponding tendency to reduce the laws of thought to a few simple elements. At the same time care is taken, here also, not to open the door to scepticism by invalidating our primary beliefs; and the conclusions, even of Brown himself, in some points, especially that of causation, are very forcibly repelled.

Whilst the writings of Ballantyne may be truly

said to be less popular than they deserve, we must mention another philosopher of the Scottish school, who, we consider, has, on the contrary, obtained a philosophical reputation considerably beyond his real merits, I mean the late Dr. Abercrombie. That there is great intelligence, a tone of lofty morality, and much sincere piety pervading his writings we are glad to admit, but as works of philosophy, they can never occupy any other than a very inferior position. With the real history of metaphysics, with its more lofty speculations, with its sublimest theories, the author was manifestly entirely unacquainted. He looked upon every question simply from the point of view afforded by the school of "*common sense;*" and whatever lay without its precincts was set down as vague and uncertain hypothesis, whose mists were for ever dispersed by a purer light. Laying aside the use, which the Doctor makes of his medical knowledge, and of the facts which have come under his notice, his works only remind us of Reid without his depth, of Stewart without his learning, of Brown without his genius. They might tend to popularize the study of intellectual science, by diluting it down to the requirements of the weakest digestions, but could never advance the knowledge of abstract truth, either by aiding us in philosophising on the past, or by suggesting new fields of investigation for the future.

We shall now attempt to sum up our sketch of

the Scottish philosophy by a few remarks, which may tend to illustrate its general nature, and point out the position it holds in connexion with the other systems, which history or personal observation present. And, first of all, its great excellency, we imagine, consists in its having confirmed and perfected the true method of metaphysical research. Bacon destroyed the influence which the syllogistic organum had exercised upon the minds of men for centuries past, and furnished the right key to the temple of knowledge. Descartes applied the Baconian principles to the study of metaphysics, but was too much encumbered with a mass of *à priori* assumptions (though delivered in the form of arguments) to make steady progression in the science. Locke employed the Baconian method with far more success, having first learned to reject the most material errors of the Cartesian philosophy; but he, too, was still confused by the phraseology of former systems, and biassed by the representationalist hypothesis concerning ideas. Reid was one of the first, who taking the inductive method for his guide, applied it, though somewhat clumsily, yet in its complete form to the investigation of intellectual science.

The long-standing doctrine of ideas, the empirical scepticism of Hume, the lingering remnants of the Cartesian assumptions, all fell one after the other before him; and upon their ruins he laid the foundations of a new system of mental philosophy,

based entirely upon the actual and observed facts of our inward consciousness. Just as the students of physical science before Bacon, — not content with the simple employment of collating and interpreting facts,—sought some hypothetical explanation of them, quite independent of all actual experience; so, the mass of intellectual philosophers previous to Reid, were not able to divest their minds of the necessity of explaining the simple facts of sensation, intellection, &c. by some theory which could never be verified. Reid performed an inestimable service to philosophy when he shewed, that such simple processes must be viewed as ultimate and primitive facts in our constitution, which carry with them their own evidence, and admit of no explanation; nay, that the very attempt to interpret them only plunges us farther into darkness and uncertainty. The illustration and full application of the true psychological method, then, we regard as the main service of the Scottish philosophy,—a service, which has not been lost upon the age, and the ulterior benefit of which has yet to be developed in coming generations.

On the other hand, the main defect of the Scottish school lies in the fact, that it has never taken a sufficiently comprehensive view of the legitimate objects and extent of philosophy in general. It regards intellectual science as a coordinate branch of knowledge with the other

sciences; it supposes them each to have their separate objects; and labours to shew that the same method is in every respect applicable to them all. It takes for granted, that as the march of the natural sciences mainly consists in observing facts, and then classifying them into groups by virtue of certain similarities, so likewise we are fulfilling all the conditions of intellectual philosophy, by giving a simple classification of the facts of our consciousness; and forgets, in the meantime, that the full analysis of reason leads us from the region of mere subjective phenomena into that of real existence itself, and that the highest aim of philosophy is to discover *necessary* truth, by grounding the observed facts in *principles*, which are absolute and unalterable. "When," observes Cousin, "on the occasion of a finite contingent and relative existence, which experience attests, I conceive the infinite, the necessary, the absolute, the universal; when in presence of the phenomena which I observe in the world, I contemplate the great laws of that world, those laws which make the harmony of its movements, the order and beauty of its plan; when, in retiring within the precincts of my own nature, I attach the phenomena so variable and evanescent which I behold there to one simple, identical and immoveable essence, I do not *imagine*, I do not *dream*, I do not *compose*, I simply *conceive*. My conception is a necessary and legitimate act of my mind, as much as the most simple perception."

On what authority, then, we ask, do these pure conceptions rest? what is it that separates them from the fictions of imagination? why do I *know* my imaginations to be mere fictions, whilst I attribute a real objective existence to the Infinite Being, to the laws of the universe, to the essence of the soul? Here are questions grounded indeed upon the facts of our consciousness, but requiring as answer, somewhat more than a mere classification of facts; requiring, in truth, nothing less than a critique of those purely rational, or metaphysical *deductions*, in which the first principles of ontology are grounded.

Viewed, then, in this light, metaphysical philosophy, instead of being a science having its own separate objects, and co-ordinate with other sciences, is really a kind of "prima philosophia," which underlies all the rest. It is conversant, in a sense, with every object; it touches upon the whole matter of human knowledge; only it seeks to trace it up to first principles, to exhibit the abstract forms under which it must be viewed, and to shew the primary laws from which it springs. In this sense there is a philosophy of nature, a philosophy of art, a philosophy of religion, a philosophy of history, as well as a philosophy of mind; every branch of human knowledge may, in fact, be traced back till it come within that small circle of the sphere which metaphysical science claims as its own peculiar province. Hence philosophy, in its highest appli-

cation, is the reference of the contingent to the absolute, the grounding of facts in their necessary principles; it is the science, which looks beneath the phenomenal world either of matter or mind, and inquires into the stern ultimate realities of both.

We must proceed, however, to make good our view of the Scottish school in this particular, by a little closer examination of its main positions. The primitive elements of all our knowledge, as we have often repeated, are finite mind, nature, and God. The Scottish philosophy contains all three of these ideas reflectively, but it regards them all from an experimental, rather than an abstract or a fundamental point of view; and on that account cannot be viewed as sufficiently deep in its researches.

1. Let us view this as it regards the notion of finite mind. This forms, without doubt, the chief element in their metaphysics (and on this ground it is that we have classed them under the head of idealism); but what have we from that school which can answer to the idea of being a philosophy of human nature, spiritually considered, in its fullest extent? The phenomena of mind, it is true, *as they appear in the individual*, are investigated and classified by it, with much patience and success; but this being done, little attempt is made to refer such phenomena to their fundamental principles. In this respect it differs widely from the critical philosophy of Kant. Kant began his critique

by investigating the conditions, on which philosophy at all is possible; he undertook to survey the whole extent of our consciousness, to shew the grounds of all human knowledge, and the limits to which it is confined. To accomplish this, it was not sufficient either to reduce our various mental states to a few general heads, or to enumerate a number of primitive facts attested by common sense to be infallibly true; it was necessary to go a step further, and to discover the very laws of our mental constitution, upon which these primitive beliefs rest. In doing this he took care to separate the subjective element from the objective in all our conceptions; he shewed how much of every notion comes from without, and how much from within; what portion of it is due to the external phenomenon, and what is due to the mind itself, by means of which it is comprehended; and thus he arrived (we will not now determine how correctly) at the subjective conditions under which everything is necessarily viewed, at the very forms or categories of the understanding. Whatever opinion we may have of Kant's peculiar theory in this respect, unquestionably it was an aim worthy his all-comprehensive genius, to seek for the groundwork of our universal notions in the depths of our own being, and thus to refer all the principles of common sense, all the primary laws of belief back to their source in the subjective forms of the understanding and the reason. On this point, however, we shall not insist;

many, perhaps, may still prefer to stop short with the Scottish mode of classification rather than to seek for more scientific formulas, by which to express the results of their investigations.

There is another point, to which we must next refer, in respect of which the Scottish school has ever been defective. While it has investigated the phenomena of the individual mind with much ability, it has neglected the phenomena of mind in the aggregate, as seen in the historical development of humanity at large. The philosophy of history is one of the most interesting branches of intellectual science. We look back to the earlier periods of the world, and we see men existing in a primitive state with none of the arts of life, none of the results of science, none of the refinements of society. We see them soon combining for mutual benefit or defence into larger communities, and beginning to cultivate some of the simple branches of literature and philosophy. The Asiatic monarchies, after having thus gradually risen and played their part in the destinies of the world, are overthrown by a more energetic race, among whom poetry, eloquence, and philosophy is brought to a hitherto unknown degree of perfection. These again are swallowed up by the gigantic power of the Roman empire, which having itself been imbued with a new element by the power of Christianity, casts the seed of moral and spiritual vitality among the rude barbarian tribes by which it is itself overwhelmed,

and thus prepares the way for the grand display of moral and intellectual power which the Christian civilization has exhibited upon the theatre of the modern world. It is the part of intellectual philosophy to trace the great ideas which have aided, or rather forced onwards the advancement of mankind; to shew under what mental circumstances every nation has emerged from its darkness; by what laws it has progressed; and how each one has in its turn contributed to the development of the mighty elements, which ever lay potentially in the bosom of humanity. The history of civil institutions, of art, of science, of literature, nay, the history of philosophy itself, each has its philosophy; all, in fact, being so many different phenomena, which the human mind *viewed in the aggregate* presents, and which must be carefully taken into account, if we would rightly estimate its capacity, and trace the influences under which it has been unfolded.

This again leads us to the great problem of human life, and of human destiny. What purpose is the mind of man intended to answer in the world? and to what point is it tending? If there be one fact of our consciousness more manifest than another, it is that the spirit finds not its full satisfaction upon earth. Why are we placed, then, in a state where suffering is certain, more or less, to embitter our days, and where joy, when we obtain it, is but a transitory glimpse of a happiness which

we may conceive of, but may never obtain? Generation after generation has passed away; their minds, like our own, have formed plans and purposes, which they were never destined to execute, and which, if they had been accomplished, would only have increased, instead of satiating, the thirst for happiness and immortality; their hearts, like our own, have beat high with hopes and expectations which never could be fulfilled. What is the interpretation of all these phenomena? Does philosophy tell us anything or nothing of human destiny here and hereafter? These inquiries are not satisfied by a reference simply to the immateriality, or to the inferred immortality of the soul; we need to rise to a higher view of human life; to interpret it by an appeal to the whole stream of history; to probe the depths of our being by a solemn reflection upon all the facts it presents, and the conclusions to which those facts seem necessarily to lead us.

To do this, of course, man's religious nature must be appealed to; and this appeal leads us into a region of internal facts, as veritable as any of the others which reflection unfolds to us—facts which we cannot leave out of our estimate of the human mind, without robbing it of one of its most remarkable and most distinctive features. All great and deep-searching systems of philosophy have struggled at the solution of these questions; they have all attempted to explain the ground of human duty, human suffering, and human destiny; and if the

problem has never been fully solved, yet it cannot be denied that much light has been thrown upon it by the investigations to which it has been subjected. In one word, every great system of philosophy has included, as an essential part of its whole structure, the *philosophy of religion.* Admit, as we freely do, that revelation here comes to our aid, and sheds a flood of light upon the whole subject, still that does not repress or render useless the researches of our own understanding on the subject. For, in the first place, revelation puts everything before us in its popular and practical aspect, and leaves very much on all speculative questions to be elucidated by our own thinking; and then, even supposing we accept a truth on the ground of its being revealed, yet still it is an object of no little interest to shew, that the same truth is not only consistent with, but may be actually deduced from, the axioms of a sound philosophy. We feel convinced, therefore, that the Scottish philosophy will never take a firm and lasting hold upon mankind, until it points us to the solution of some at least of the great questions, which ever and anon rise up before our view, with which we are from time to time tormented and perplexed, but which, when once conceived, we can never again bid depart from our thoughts.

2. But we must refer next to the second of the primitive notions, which lie at the foundations of human knowledge, that of *nature*, and consider in what manner our northern metaphysicians have dealt

with this idea. To determine the objective reality, which we attach to this notion, was one of the chief objects of Reid's philosophy; but this aim having been accomplished, the subject has rested, with little exception, in the same position ever since. The investigation of the *laws* of the material world, of course, comes under the department of physical science. On the other hand, the great metaphysical question, which it behoves philosophy to grapple with, is this,—What is it, in the state of mind called *perception*, that comes from the objective reality, and what is it that comes from the laws of our own intellectual nature? It is pretty generally admitted, that this state of consciousness arises from the union of the subjective with the objective, that it is a felt relation between nature and self. What, then, in every case is due to the subjective, and what to the objective element, and what conclusion does this lead us to draw with regard to the nature of matter in general?

Now every ontological question of this nature is virtually proscribed by the Scottish school. Instead of doing this, our aim should be, beginning with the experimental or psychological method, to find a legitimate passage from psychology to ontology, and to determine, as far as we are able, the mode and the nature of material existence. After all the disputes about infinite divisibility on the one hand, and ultimate atoms on the other, it may perhaps at length be found, that a system of

monadology is the most intelligible theory; that the most correct notion of matter is that of a combination of forces, which produce certain impressions upon our minds, and to which those minds necessarily attribute certain material properties. Thus it may turn out that the mode, in which we are now accustomed to view material masses in physical science, namely, as powers acting in certain directions, is *metaphysically*, as well as mechanically true.

Again: when we view the variety of the material universe—when we perceive the order, harmony, and beauty which everywhere subsist, when we rise to contemplate its immensity, until the mind is lost in the unending series of system upon system, which reveal themselves in the boundless fields of space—the great problem unfolds itself before us, What purpose is all this gigantic machinery now accomplishing? and what is its final destiny? We admit that this problem has never yet received its complete answer from the efforts of philosophy; but yet we say, that the purpose and destiny of nature, viewed in her mysterious existence, in her endless forms of beauty, in her profusion of glory, in her solemn movements, and in her inconceivable immensity, present a subject of philosophic speculation too real, too awful, and too sublime to be hurried off the stage of inquiry, as lying beyond the reach of our present faculties to fathom. Generally, then, we cannot but feel that the phi-

losophy of Scotland has been deficient in explaining the proper existence of matter, and casting light upon the great idea of nature herself.

3. The last idea which the Scottish philosophy, in common with every true philosophy, contains, is, that of the infinite, absolute, unconditioned existence, *i. e.*, of God. This idea gives rise to natural theology, which is treated of with considerable success by some of the northern metaphysicians, so far at least as their researches reach. The point here, which needs taking up more fully, is the relation of the divine power and energy to man, on the one hand, and to nature, on the other. In God "we live, and move, and have our being;" this is a truth, which has more meaning in it than the cursory reading of it gives us; it evidently has a reference to the mysterious dependance of the human spirit upon the divine, shewing us that we are all emanations from the infinite essence, and though gifted with a distinct personality, yet that we are but waves in the great ocean of existence, ever rolling onwards to our eternal home in the bosom of God. In the same manner as God holds an intimate relationship with all mental, so also does he with all material dependant existence—a relationship which it is the endeavour of every comprehensive system of philosophy to explain. It is true, the Scottish philosophy has somewhat touched upon this point in discussing the question of efficient and secondary causes, but yet so imperfectly, that it is impossible

to derive either light, or satisfaction from its conclusions. There is perhaps no point which more requires to be elucidated, and none which comes more within the compass of metaphysics, as acknowledged in Scotland, than the theory of what we should term the secondary and delegated powers of nature. We are aware that revelation may cast light upon this, and many other of the questions we have mentioned, and that in some instances it affords a very distinct answer to them; but the object of philosophy, as applied to these subjects, is to place them upon another footing, to deduce them in a connected chain of reasoning from generally admitted facts and principles, to make them the objects, not of faith, but of science, and thus to shew the unity, as far as the parallel can be traced, between the conclusions of reason, and the dictates of revelation. Thus, in fine, the Scottish school of metaphysics, though containing all the fundamental ideas of human knowledge, and consequently the germs of a most complete system, yet appears wanting in *comprehensiveness* as it regards each separate department. It answers, in a word, to the description given of it by the celebrated reviewer before referred to; that, namely, of a preparation for philosophy, rather than a philosophy itself.

Before we close our remarks, however, upon Scotland, we must not forget to mention one publication to which Europe itself is indebted as a literary organ, and which, though partaking pre-

dominantly of the mind of the country, in which it originated, yet has ever looked upon philosophical questions with an enlarged and liberal spirit. The "Edinburgh Review," to which it will be at once seen that we refer, has been the channel, through which some of the master minds of Scotland as well as England have from time to time given their thoughts to the world. Among the philosophical writers, who have enriched its pages, we shall mention two, one living, and one some years since gone to his rest, who have contributed not a little to keep alive in our country the declining spirit of metaphysical research.

Sir James Mackintosh, the latter of those to whom we refer, possessed all the qualifications for a philosopher of the highest order. Educated originally as one of the Scottish school, he soon learned, on leaving his native country, to overstep the limits to which he was there confined; and amidst the labours of an arduous professional life, devoted what time he could spare from his duties to a most widely-extended course of philosophical reading and study. It is chiefly as a moralist that Sir James Mackintosh stood pre-eminent; and the ardour, the depth, and the learning with which he combated the selfish systems, and pleaded for the authority and sanctity of the moral faculty in man, contributed perhaps more than any single cause not of a religious nature, to oppose the bold advances of utilitarianism, and infuse a healthier tone into

the moral principles of the country. Without signifying our adherence to his peculiar theory respecting conscience, we still regard his thoughts and speculations as taking eminently the right direction; and had he obtained leisure to mature his views, and give them to the world in his own forcible and glowing style, it is the opinion of some best able to judge upon the subject, (*e. g.*, Robert Hall and Dr. Chalmers,) that he would have placed the whole theory of morals upon a higher and more commanding position, than it had ever occupied before in this country. With the exception of his admirable dissertation on ethical philosophy in the "Encyclopedia Britannica," his chief metaphysical writings are to be found in the pages of the "Edinburgh Review," where the practised eye can easily detect his articles by the combination of profuse learning, and profound thought, with a brilliancy of style, and a gentleness of criticism, alike significant of his intellectual power and his kindly affections. As a metaphysician, Mackintosh tended decidedly to the more spiritual school of philosophy, and had he read as deeply into the German authors as he himself projected, would undoubtedly have given a great spur to the renewed study of the higher metaphysics. As it is, however, he can never fill that space in the philosophical history of our country, for which his genius eminently fitted him.

Respecting the other writer, to whom we have alluded, namely, Sir William Hamilton, we shall

say less than we should feel inclined to say, were he not a living author, from whom we believe the public has still some expectations, and were it not improper to remark upon theories, which as yet have not appeared beyond the privacy of the lecture-room. We only venture to ask him, through these pages, why he has neglected the office (for which we believe him fully qualified) of raising Scotland again to that high rank of reputation, which it formerly enjoyed among the philosophical countries of Europe. Widely as the articles on the philosophy of perception, on Cousin's eclecticism and on modern logic may have been circulated, both in Europe and America, there is not much difficulty in prophecying for a more enlarged monument of his philosophical ability, should it appear, a still wider range of readers among the élite of the philosophical world. We say this, not from an entire coincidence with his views, (of which more anon, when we come to the French eclectic school,) but from the confidence we feel in the universality of his metaphysical reading, and the extent of his ability, as a critical philosopher.

Sect. II.—*The German School of the Nineteenth Century.*

We come now to that branch of the idealistic school, which, if it has exceeded all others in obscurity, has also far excelled them in depth and

originality. In entering upon the field of modern German metaphysics, we must bespeak beforehand the good-will of the reader, that he may not be easily offended with the strangeness of the phraseology, or the dryness of the abstractions; trusting that the pleasure of any new idea that is gained will compensate for the uninviting manner, in which it may be communicated. On our own parts, we shall divest the subject of its bristling formulas as far as we are able, and use the ordinary language of philosophy, whenever it can be done with advantage, without making the obscurity of the original still more obscure.

It should ever be kept in mind, that the great aim of the German philosophy is, in many respects, very different from the main purpose of intellectual science in our own country. The analysis of the powers and faculties of the human mind, which with us is the chief point, is among the Germans comprehended in one very subordinate division, generally termed psychology; while their *chief* endeavours are directed to the solution of the three great problems, which relate to the existence and the nature of *God*, of the *universe*, and of *human freedom*. The phenomena, both of the internal and external world, are ever shifting; what exists this moment is gone the next; what is true for to-day, is not true for to-morrow. Now, our own philosophy, whether physical or mental, attempts not, for the most part, to go beyond the limits of

this scene of phenomena, but taking its position in the centre of it, seeks to observe the generic characters, which the phenomena themselves present, and arrange them in the most convenient order. Not so the philosophy of Germany. Convinced that mere phenomena cannot be self-existent realities, it begins by inquiring after the *principle*, from which they spring; it seeks for a uniform and unchangeable basis, which underlies all the fleeting appearances of things; it demands truth which must be eternally truth, and from which, as the prime unconditioned existence, everything else has proceeded. The very first requisite, therefore, in understanding the rationale of the German philosophy, is to fix the eye of the mind upon the notion of "*the absolute*," and thus to pass mentally beyond the bounds of changing, finite, conditioned existence into the region of the unchangeable, the infinite, the unconditioned.

That we have some idea (positive or negative) of an independent and absolute existence, from which all finite and dependent being has emanated; that we have some notion of a first cause, from which all secondary causes are derived; that our reason struggles to look beneath the veil of phenomena, that is spread before our senses, to the abiding reality in its eternal repose, which sustains them, is undeniable. Revelation *cannot* unfold to us the existence of this great first cause, since its whole authority rests upon that very fact, and

it *does* not unfold to us the nature and constitution of the universe. If we would understand these things we must philosophize; we must look out upon the changing world, and our reason must there see the unchangeable basis which upholds it; we must look in upon our finite and dependent minds, and view there the indestructible evidence for an infinite and independent Being, by which they are sustained. The philosophy of the absolute—that which seeks to penetrate into the *principles* of things,—although it may seem strange to our modes and habits of thought, yet has played a great part in the scientific history of the world. It formed the basis of the early speculations of the Asiatic world. It characterized some of the most remarkable phases of the early Greek philosophy, particularly that of the Eleatic school. Plato, with all the lofty grandeur of his sublime spirit, sought for the absolute, in the archetypes existing in the Divine mind. The Alexandrine philosophers aimed at the solution of the same problem; mingling their theories with the mysticism of the East, and calling, even, to their aid, the lights of the Christian revelation. In more recent times Spinoza originated similar investigations, which were soon moulded into a system of stern and unflinching pantheism; and in him we see the model, upon which the modern idealists of Germany have renewed their search into the absolute ground of all phenomena. It is, in fact, in the various methods, by which it is

supposed, that we are conducted to the absolute, whether by faith, intuition, or reason, that the different phases of the German metaphysics have originated; and, consequently, it is by keeping our eye upon this point, that we shall possess the most ready key to their interpretation.

Before we proceed, however, to the exposition of the modern idealism, we must concentrate in a few lines the chief results of the Kantian philosophy, in order that we may thus keep up the historical connexion, and shew the process, by which the systems, that have flourished during the present century, have been developed.

According to Kant, there are three great faculties which compose our intellectual nature; sense, understanding, and reason. All the *material* of our knowledge comes to us through the medium of the first, but it comes in a chaotic mass, without form and void. The faculty, which gives shape and distinctness to this material, and which thus forms it into notions, is the understanding. Then, lastly, the reason is ever employed in generalizing our notions, in making them as abstract as possible, and thus in giving to them a systematic unity. From this it follows, that the only true knowledge having objective reality answering to it, is that which lies within the bounds of our sense-perceptions; that all else is merely *formal*, and, if supposed to be otherwise, must prove delusive and contradictory. It follows, moreover, that, as

the bare matter of our notions comes from without, and everything which shapes them into distinct conceptions is communicated by the forms of our own understanding within, therefore all our knowledge of things beyond the mere fact that *they are*, is purely subjective, and, were our understandings differently constituted, might be entirely altered. The real objects we know to be actually present, otherwise all our knowledge would be formal, as in logic; but they can only be *to us* what we feel them. Nothing can ever come to our knowledge at all except through the medium of the laws of our own subjective faculties; so that, what we see in matter is not its real qualities, but a reflection of the forms of our own understanding. It is to be remembered, also, that when we speak of the *material* of our knowledge coming through the senses, all we are to understand by this material is bare phenomenon; for Kant proceeded to shew that the purely rational ideas of substance, of the soul, and of God are but personifications of our own modes of thinking, and cannot be shewn *scientifically* to have any objective reality answering to them; although it is quite conceivable that this *may* be the case, and quite impossible to prove ought to the contrary.*

* It will be remembered that Kant counteracted the scepticism to which his theoretic philosophy led, respecting morals and natural theology, by the conclusions of his practical philosophy.

Now, in these conclusions there is a twofold element involved; there is, on the one hand, something without, which is independent of our subjective activity, and which exerts a direct influence upon our minds (for Kant assumed as indisputable the veracity of our sense-perceptions); and on the other hand there is the strongest possible tendency to pure subjective idealism; for the element given in sensation was not only regarded as mere phenomenon, but also as having in it no distinctness, no form, no property, nothing, in fact, by which it could be marked, known, or defined, until it was shaped into notions by means of the understanding and in accordance with its subjective laws. These two points, then, in the Kantian philosophy have given rise to a double stream of speculation in the more modern metaphysical schools of Germany. Jacobi, on the one side, laid hold of the *realistic* element, and strove to assign it a still higher place amongst the first principles of human knowledge than was allowed by Kant himself; and Herbart carried out the tendency thus commenced by making the real objective fact given in perception (das faktish Gegebene) the very foundation-stone of his system. On the other side Fichte, developing Kant's subjective and *idealistic* tendency, easily snapped asunder the slender thread by which the objective world retained its hold upon our theoretical belief, and made all existence absolutely synonymous with *thought.* This branch has

been since followed up by the still more extraordinary speculations of Schelling and Hegel. These six names, then, Kant, Jacobi, Herbart, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel stand at the head of well-nigh all that is original and peculiar in German philosophy; the other writers have merely afforded different phases of the same ideas, or applied them to other objects, or attempted a reconciliation between the different schools above indicated.

As the idealistic side of the Kantian philosophy is, without question, the more pre-eminent, it will, perhaps, be most natural to commence with the great branch of metaphysical speculation, which we have regarded as having taken its rise from that source. Jacobi would, doubtless, have claimed the prior notice chronologically considered; but the element of *faith* which he introduced to supply the deficiency of reason, removes him more properly to the ranks of the mystics; while Herbart, who came much later, is scarcely intelligible, until we know something of the purer idealistic systems against which his whole philosophy was directed. In the present section, therefore, we shall first trace the regular development of the ideal philosophy from the close of the last century to its culminating point as seen in Hegelianism; next, we shall exhibit the method, by which Herbart sought to uphold a realistic philosophy in direct opposition to the other prevailing systems; and, lastly, we shall allude to the still more recent

manifestations, which speculative philosophy has exhibited on the ever fruitful soil of Germany. The consideration of Jacobi we must, of course, reserve for the chapter on mysticism, where we shall find the faith-element he introduced, combining with the other rationalistic systems, and thus filling up a very considerable space in the philosophical history of the present century.

The intelligent reader can now start, we trust, with a distinct idea of the position which Kant holds in the road to subjective idealism. The prevailing and most fruitful notion in his philosophy is that of *self;* for, although the idea of a really existing not-self in nature is allowed, yet all we know of it is, as it were, a mere surface without any characters, which reflects back the subjective forms of our own understanding; and, although the conception of God is also acknowledged, yet, scientifically, it cannot be regarded as anything else than the generalizing power of our own reason personified. Still, with all this, so long as the veracity of our sense-perceptions and, consequently, the reality of outward phenomena was accepted as a fact, resting without need of further proof, upon the direct testimony of our consciousness, there was, of course, an *empirical* as well as a *rational* element in his philosophy.

Reinhold, however, perceiving that there were two original elements of consciousness admitted by Kant as the basis of his philosophy, namely,

the forms of our personal activity on the one side, and the material of our thoughts as given in perception on the other, proposed to supply an analysis of consciousness itself; to attain in that way a single instead of a double basis for philosophy, and thus to complete the system which Kant had so skilfully commenced. This proposition of Reinhold, to find the foundation-principle of all philosophy in the depths of our own consciousness, proved in fact, the transition-point between the doctrine of Kant and that of Fichte, whose first idea was not by any means to introduce a new theory, but only to shew how the Kantian metaphysics, which had been attacked by the scepticism of Schulz and Maimon, might obtain a solid and uniform foundation. To this celebrated author, then, we must now revert.

John Gottlob Fichte, was born at Rammenau, in the year 1762; became a student at Jena in 1780; from 1784 to 1793 was occupied in private tuition; and then received an appointment as professor of philosophy in Zurich, where he married a relation of the poet Klopstock. After remaining there only one or two sessions, he was invited to a chair in Jena, where he enjoyed a few sessions of happiness in conjunction with some of the first minds of the age, which were then gathered together at that university. In 1795 he relinquished his post at Jena, and became editor of the "Niethammer Philosophical Journal." This

office he held till the year 1798, when, in consequence of an article, which appeared to savour of atheism, he was frowned upon by the Weimar Government, and, consequently, took up his residence in the Prussian states. His arrival in Berlin excited some attention, and his lectures were attended by men of the first rank and ability, until he was induced to leave that place also, by an invitation to the chair of philosophy at Erlangen. The French war next unsettled his repose, and obliged him to fly successively to Königsberg and Copenhagen, in order to avoid all connection with a nation and an enemy, for whom, in common with every true German, he had the greatest abhorrence. In 1807 he returned to Berlin, and undertook, in connexion with many others, who were appointed for that purpose, the organization of the university; in the precincts of which he delivered, during the first winter his celebrated "Addresses to the German Nation." He remained there occupying some of the most important and responsible stations in the university, until the freedom war broke out in 1812, by which he was excited in behalf of his country to the highest pitch of enthusiasm. He was not destined, however, long to take his share in the struggles of his beloved fatherland; for his wife, having taken fever from her attention to the sick and the wounded, he only witnessed her recovery in order himself to fall a victim to the same

disease, which took place on the 12th of January, 1814, in the fifty-second year of his age. Such was the eventful life of one of the greatest thinkers which Germany ever produced.

In attempting to explain, connectedly, Fichte's philosophical principles, we must remember, that in early life he had entered fully into that portion of the Kantian metaphysics, which teaches us to regard all the properties of external objects as determined by the laws of our own understanding. According to this, we know every thing only as, by virtue of our faculties, we *represent* it to our minds. The forms of our sensational faculty, the categories of the understanding, the conceptions of pure reason—these are, in the Kantian view, the necessary and unalterable ideas under which every thing, both in the material and spiritual world, is viewed. Having been for some time, however, a consistent Kantist, the sceptical writings of Schulz and Maimon at length convinced him, that Kant had not built his system upon a foundation sufficiently deep and immoveable. The objective reality of our sense-perceptions, was, on his hypothesis, *taken for granted*, without any reason being assigned for it; so that here was one whole branch of that system resting upon an empirical basis, and therefore, as he supposed, lying out of the region of strict scientific truth. Fichte's object was to find out what we can be said absolutely to *know*, and having discovered this, to erect a system, not of philosophy, but of

rigid scientific knowledge, against which no scepticism could possibly rear an objection. Hence it was that, in place of "*Philosophy*," he assumed the term "Wissenschaftslehre," as most designative of his great purpose.

Scientific truth, according to Fichte, is that which, starting from *one* self-evident basis, infers every succeeding position, step by step, with demonstrative certainty. But then the question is, where must we start from, in order to be perfectly secure in every succeeding deduction? Not, as Kant did, from the supposition of an objective world standing co-ordinate, and as though it were equally certain with the facts of consciousness; but simply and solely from those facts themselves. All we are immediately conscious of, argues Fichte, are the states and processes of our own thinking self. Our sensations, perceptions, judgments, impressions, ideas, or by whatever other name they are designated, these form the material of all the knowledge which is immediately given us—knowledge which no sceptic, not Hume himself, ever disputed; nay, which cannot be disputed without our performing in order to do so, one of the very processes, and admitting some of the very conceptions whose existence we dispute.

Knowledge, therefore, that which has about it no element of mere faith, must commence absolutely and solely with my subjective self. Whatever I experience immediately, *i. e.*, whatever forms a part

of my own direct consciousness, is surely and certainly known—known in a manner, in which nothing whatever can possibly be, that does not pass through my real mental experience. Suppose, for a moment, that there were an objective world: how could we know this to be the case, when everything, that lies without us, can only become known at all by passing through our own consciousness? If it be said, that our inner consciousness is so formed as to give us a perfect representation of the world without, then we may reply, How can you verify this fact? The means of verifying it, if they exist at all, must arise from the capacity of comparing the reality with the representation—a process which implies (what has just been given up) the power of perceiving things out of the consciousness without any representation at all. We can only attempt to verify our first representation of things, by making another representation of them; try as we will, we must, after all, confess that we have an immediate consciousness, and consequently an immediate knowledge, *only* of our subjective states; and that if anything do lie beyond them, we can only come to the knowledge of it through their medium. Such is Fichte's first position.

But it might be urged, again, that our intelligence is so formed, that we are obliged to accept our inner consciousness as a veritable picture of the external world. To this, Fichte rejoins, that the very intelligence which obliges us to do so is purely subjective;

it is but the name we give to our own mental constitution; so that, after all, we do not get a step beyond the circle of our own selves. And if, lastly, the opponent should give up all idea of representation, and urge that we are so constituted, that it is absolutely necessary to suppose the real existence of material things around us, then our philosopher reiterates the same argument as before, and urges in reply, that we do so only as necessitated by our own inward faculties, or the laws of our own subjective reason; so that we find ourselves still confined within the circle of our subjectivity, without the possibility of getting a sure passage into the external world. What we *know* is simply the contents of our own consciousness; if there *is* an objective world, it can only exist to us when it becomes part and parcel of those contents.

Now, in pursuing this line of argument, Fichte did not intend to deny practically the reality of external things; all he intended was to give an exact natural history of the human mind; to shew in what its knowledge commences; of what it consists; and within what limits it is confined. In other sciences men may *assume* the objective, and proceed accurately enough on that assumption; but in philosophy, properly so called, (*i. e.*, in Wissenschaft,) where nothing is to be assumed, and every point *known*, he considered that a rigid consecutive method did not allow us to go a single step beyond what is to us absolutely real, namely, the facts of

our own mental experience. He imagined the mind to be, as it were, an intelligent eye, placed in the central point of our inward consciousness, surveying all that takes place there, and it was from that point of view (the only absolute and scientific one) that he wished to give an account of our moral and intellectual history, detailing the rise, the progress, and all the events of our real inward life, from its commencement to its maturity. Whether the scenes, which take place within this subjective circle, betoken any objective existence or not, that was to him a matter of no consequence; well he knew that, if this were the case, it was only just in proportion as the objects could lay aside, as it were, their objectivity, and transport themselves within the subjective sphere of the mind's vision, that they could be observed and known; or what is the same thing, that *to us* they could *exist*. The real history of every man, urged Fichte, is the history of his mind, the flow of his conscious existence; for what are to us woods, mountains, trees, or stars, but names we attach to certain facts of our consciousness? what are all forms of the material world, but certain visions which have passed through our own minds—sensations which we have inwardly experienced?

This being the case, the next enquiry is, Are we, in proceeding scientifically, to regard the supposed objective reality around us as the *generative principle* of our subjective states; or are we to consider our

subjective states as the generative principle of the supposed objective reality? Do we experience subjective phenomena (as, *e.g.*, sensations) because there are objective existences around us? or do we suppose objective existences to exist, because we experience certain subjective phenomena? Scientifically speaking, there can be no doubt but that to us the subjective is the primitive; from this we take our start; on the ground of this we proceed; and if we believe in an objective world at all, it is only because our subjective states or laws of thought have led us to do so. What is immediately true to us, are our *sensations* and *perceptions*,—it is our reason which *supposes* an external world, in order to account for them. Whatever, therefore, the real fact may be to the eye of the creator, the only scientific plan *we* can proceed upon, is to analyze our own consciousness, to regard *self* as the absolute principle, and to view everything else as constructed, so far as we are concerned, by the necessary exertion of its own subjective laws. Man begins by observing the facts of his consciousness; on the faith of those facts he conceives for himself all the forms of the external world; in those facts he remains shut up till he leaves the stage of his earthly existence. Philosophy, therefore, must disregard everything else, and confine itself simply to this subjective sphere. To it nature is nothing, mind is everything, for nature is only known as imaged in the mind.

In constructing, then, a science upon these principles, we must first look attentively at the consciousness itself in its primitive state. We find, in doing so, that as far back as our recollection goes, sensations, perceptions, representations of various kinds, and in various degrees of intensity, have ever existed there. How they have come, it is not for us to explain; all we know is, that they are there, apparently in accordance with the original constitution of the active, thinking principle, which we term mind, or self. In some of our mental processes we are conscious of putting forth our own free activity; but in the case now before us—that of our sensations—the mind is not free; on the contrary, it feels itself constrained, opposed, determined. We are *obliged* to have certain feelings, and to possess certain objects in our consciousness; and the only reason we can give for it is, that we are so formed by nature, and that the spontaneous activity of our minds is such as necessarily to produce them. Feeling ourselves, however, thus circumscribed, we imagine that an actual reality out of us exists, from which this resistance proceeds; in other words, we objectify the laws by which our activity is limited, in order to explain the phenomena of that limitation, and call it *matter*.

Let any one regard the facts of our experience from the subjective point of view we have above explained, and see whether what we have just written is not the true description of them. The

ordinary procedure of philosophers has usually been exactly the reverse. They have first *assumed* an external world, and then from that assumption have explained all those facts of our consciousness, which come within the limits of sensation. The true scientific procedure, however, is undoubtedly this: I am conscious of certain feelings, certain representations, certain inward pictures so to say; and in order to account for them, I *infer* the existence of external things. To say first that the objects exist, and then that our sensations come from them, just reverses the chronological order of the process, and is no other than involving ourselves in a vicious circle, by reasoning first, that our sensations exist because there are objects present to cause them, and then, that real objects must be present *because* we have the sensations. Two realities cannot be mutually generative of each other; the one must be the antecedent, the other the consequent; and in this case there can be no hesitation in assigning the fact of consciousness as the antecedent, since it is only through it, that we could ever come to have the slightest idea of any objective reality.

The true history of our inner life's experience, then, from the subjective point of view is the following. The mind is first of all unconsciously active; in this unconscious or spontaneous activity, we soon find ourselves limited by the laws of our being; and then, ere we come to the idea of self as the real subject of all these experiences, we throw

ourselves entirely into the contemplation of these limitations, objectify them, and term them an external world. After a time, however, the spontaneous action of the mind begins to give way to the reflective; we become gradually conscious of our own activity; we recall our thinking self from its absorption in what it regards as an outward world; we commence reading the contents of our own consciousness *as such;* and at length find that the mind alone is the sphere of its own operations; that it is at once subject and object, the absolute starting point, and the sole sphere of all theoretic knowledge.

The necessity of certain limitations existing to the mind's activity is seen from the fact, that were it not so, we should lose ourselves in the infinite; we should never come to a resting point, never have any clear and defined perceptions; all this, however, is prevented by the original constitution of our being, which keeps us within proper bounds, and stops us at certain limits, which limits we term outward and material reality. This is what Fichte means when he speaks of those " inexplicable absolute limitations," which in his system are to take the place of external things; he puts the inward conscious reality in the place of what is with other philosophers the outward object; he puts the perception in place of the thing perceived; the feeling of resistance or limitation in place of the matter which resists and limits; in a word, he views everything

subjectively from the central point of his own consciousness, describes everything as it appears from thence, and makes that point the pedestal of his whole system.

Let it be remembered, however, that it is only in the theoretical point of view, that we are compelled to this rigid course of reasoning. If we are required to describe what we can positively know, all we can do is to give the history of our consciousness. Whatever has passed there we know to have been, as far as we are concerned, A REALITY; whatever lies beyond it can be the object of faith, but not of science. In the practical point of view, however, where we can step from the region of knowledge into that of faith, external things again find their real meaning and importance, they become then the work-tools of our life's activity, the instruments by which we perform our duty and attain our destiny.

Having given this general description of the nature and spirit of Fichte's subjective idealism, we shall just point out the formal and technical method by which he expressed and systematized these results.

First of all, he shews that the *absolute* principle of all philosophy must be found within us, since it is our subjective states alone, which we can know immediately, and which can afford, therefore, a certain ground to start from. Moreover, when we look within, all we are conscious of are certain *acts*

or *processes;* of the substance of the mind, of pure essential spirit, we know absolutely nothing. The clearest notion, then, which we have of the mind is that it is the *power of thinking;* the clearest that we have of the consciousness, that it is the point or focus in which all our thoughts and sensations unite, and from which they appear to emanate.

The mind, however, is at first unconscious of its real movements; it is entirely sunk in its own involuntary representations, as though they were external objects; its whole being is altogether of the spontaneous kind; it is as yet only potentially that, which it may afterwards by reflection become actually.

The first step, then, into the reflective life (which must also be the first step in philosophy) is that, by which the mind becomes conscious of itself, by which it affirms its own existence. This first step of all actual knowledge, the most certain truth in the world, is expressed by Fichte, thus, "*Das ich setzt sich selbst*,"—the *me* affirms itself, which when expressed more abstractedly becomes Ego = Ego or A = A. By this act of self-consciousness, "*the me*" separates itself as the acting and knowing subject, from itself as the perceived or represented object; it holds up itself as the image, which it contemplates, and learns to view itself as the matter of its own spiritual vision.

The second step which is ever connected and synchronous with the first is that, by which the

consciousness separates itself from everything else which is not at that moment in it, and which is expressed by Fichte in the sentence, "Das ich setzt ein Nicht-ich," the me affirms a not-me, which might be reduced to the form Non-ego = Non-ego or — A = — A. Of these two formulas of thought the one affirms a positive existence, the other affirms a negation; there is still need of another formula, in which the me and the not-me, the positive and the negative, should unite. Now the union of the positive and the negative gives us the notion of *limitation*, a notion which partakes of both, and consequently the third formula of fundamental philosophy may be thus expressed, "Das ich setzt sich als bestimmt durch Nicht-ich," the me affirms itself to be determined by a not-me. The meaning of this is, that the general or abstract power of knowing or thinking, which was our first idea of self, now becomes determined or brought into the state indicated by some particular sensations or perceptions, by the affirmation of something else which we term an external world; although it is still conscious that this affirmation is purely an act of its own, and that the whole representation is but a particular modification of itself. Such were the absolute judgments all springing forth from the original formula A = A, on which Fichte proposed to ground his whole system. In this way he proposed to do away with all empiricism in philosophy, and reduce the whole to one rationalistic principle.

By so doing he considered that the problem of realism and idealism was fully resolved, inasmuch as the nature of the relation, that subsists between the perceiving mind and the object of its perceptions, is at length unfolded. The mind itself is the absolute principle and source of everything; by its original and spontaneous movement it constructs for itself the notion of an external world, and again by its reflective movement it comes back to the perception of its own personal exertion put forth in the whole process. The idea of the objective arises from the limitation of our own free activity, and answers to a mental *affection;* the idea of the subjective arises from the direct consciousness of our free activity, and answers to a mental *exertion.* The one serves to develop the notion of the other; without subject there is no object perceived, without object there is no subject. The me affirms or constructs the not-me, and the not-me, on the other hand, determines the me; and consequently the claims of realism and idealism here unite, and the absolute principle of all knowledge is discovered in the centre of our own consciousness. Thus, at length, the great fundamental question of philosophy, that which seeks to determine the relation of thought and existence, is settled, because all existence is shewn to be synonymous with thought, and the union of the two notions is found in the spontaneous movement of the mind itself.

From these principles, again, Fichte derives a

psychological explanation of all the different phenomena of the human mind. If we reflect upon the laws, by which our activity is limited, the result is termed *feeling* or *emotion;* if anything is viewed independently of the operation which originates it, the consciousness is termed *sensation;* and when the mind loses itself in the object perceived, a feeling of force or compulsion is produced, as in all our *perceptions* of the external world. The power by which our sensations are fixed and retained is that usually termed the *understanding.* The act of self-determination is that, which is understood by the word *thinking.* The *judgment* is that which unites the free working of the mind, termed imagination, with the understanding; producing a free decision upon the various objects which our understanding creates; and, lastly, if we overcome all limitations, and view the mind alone in its free all-producing power, we have the highest faculty in man, that denominated *pure reason.* To attain this point is not possible in the theoretical, but is seen first in the practical, branch of philosophy.

The system we have just described gives, as succinctly as we were able to make it, the main features of Fichte's original doctrine, as developed in his "Wissenschaftslehre." Before we point out in what way his later opinions differed from these, we shall advert to his practical philosophy—the part which he appears most of all to have elaborated.

In the theoretical part of Fichte's system we have seen that *The Me* is determined by a *not-me;* that there are certain limitations of its own free and intelligent activity, certain resistances to its own powers of conception, which are personified and regarded as external realities. This circumscribing of our freedom, and the consequent necessity of imagining a material world around us, we are unable *theoretically* to account for: all we can say is, that such is the constitution of our consciousness, such the truth of things as given in our own experience, and that we can go no further towards an explanation of the phenomenon. In the practical view of the case, however, we can go one step further back, we can shew that the limitation of our free intelligence does not arise from any foreign source, but may be deduced from the original, though unconscious activity of the mind itself.

To shew this, we must observe that mind, though positively free, though viewed abstractedly only in the light of pure spontaneous activity, whose essence is independence and self-existence, yet is not by any means a vague, aimless, useless activity. It has a purely rational nature, by virtue of which it sets before itself its own aim, the object of its own free activity. To deny this would be to deny the very existence of mind itself: to ask why it is so would be to ask why truth is truth. The mind, or, as Fichte always terms it, *the me*, ever strives after self-development; it seeks to realize fully its own

nature, and to bring into actual existence all that lies potentially in its consciousness. This perpetual striving after self-development is the most profound and essential truth of our existence, it is the centre of our activity, the one realistic point around which all that activity revolves, and for which it is all put forth.

Here, then, we can shew the *reason* of the limitation of our free intelligence. The mind striving after its self-formed aim would proceed onwards in its progress into infinity—it would thus find no point at which to stop, nothing to give a determination to its activity, no means of becoming a cause of something else. Accordingly, to prevent this, it places an obstacle in its own way—it supposes a real objective existence, and in this manner gives definiteness and satisfaction to its own inward practical impulse. From this point we see the utility, yea, the necessity, of supposing a material world around us. Without it we could never realize our duty, or have the material necessary for working out our destiny. "The world," says Fichte, "is the sensized material of our practical life, the means by which we place before us, as object, the aim and end of our existence."

The whole principle of practical or moral philosophy, then, is easily deduced from the original activity of *the me*, as the absolute, the self-determined existence. The law of our duty, the categorical imperative, as Kant has it, is the original striving

of mind after self-development; and since activity is both the essence and the end of our being, everything else is constructed by it in order to subserve this great purpose. We would not convey, however, the notion that Fichte, in his practical philosophy, completely subverts the idealism of his theoretical; all we mean is, that the practical view of the question gives us the reason or ground of the phenomenon which we term *matter;* shewing us that the limitations of our intelligence or the obstacles to our activity, (which in his system take the place of objective reality,) are the necessary product of the mind itself in its attempts to accomplish its duty, and at length to realize its final destiny.

That such a system of subjective idealism as we have just portrayed, can arrive at no conclusion respecting the existence of God, is almost self-evident. If we look out into the universe, what do we see? Simply the reflex of our own activity, the objectified laws of our own being. If we ask after the creator of the universe, therefore, the answer returned is, that it is created *by ourselves* for the sake of realizing our own self-development. Self being once laid down as the absolute principle of all philosophy, we can never get beyond it so as to affirm the objective reality of aught, either in the material or spiritual world. The only God we can affirm is simply the idea of moral order—an idea to which we can only by a logical fallacy append the notion of any essential and personal

existence. To have an idea of God, is to limit him, that is, to destroy the very notion of an infinite being; so that in fact every notion we form of God must be *an idol.* It was from this conclusion that originated the reputation of atheism which Fichte incurred, and which drew down upon him the enmity and opposition of many both of the learned and the great.

It will be seen from the above sketch, that the philosophy of Fichte brought to a complete consummation the subjective idealistic tendency. With him the idea of nature, and the idea of God absolutely vanished: self became the sole existence in the universe, and from its own absolute power and activity everything else, human and divine, was constructed. Notwithstanding the results, to which his philosophy led, it is still impossible to read any of his more celebrated writings without being struck with admiration at the powerful eloquence, the unwearied energy of thought, the close and almost pitiless logic, with which he compels you on from one conclusion to another. So far from answering to the idea of a mystic recluse, dreaming away life in the midst of the ethereal and shadowy creations of his own fancy, we venture to affirm that never was there a man more intensely practical; never one more formed to struggle with the stern and bitter sufferings of life; never one who was more able to dispel the shadows and phantoms that deluded the world, and to gaze

upon everything in its naked reality; never a mind more clear, more deep, more sternly logical, more solemnly earnest, than was that of Fichte. His orations to the German people are amongst the finest specimens of patriotic enthusiasm, and his conduct was in accordance with the fire of his discourse: his philosophy throughout bore the stamp of a mind inured to an almost unexampled degree to abstract thinking, and his life gave a perfect mirror of that philosophy, inasmuch as the independence of his spirit was ever asserting its own native liberty, and ever breaking with unceasing effort through the shackles by which it was confined.

The fundamental error, which Fichte committed in his philosophy, was that of intrenching himself so closely within the circle of his consciousness, that it was impossible to find any scientific passage from thence into the objective world. The difference between those operations of the mind which are purely rational or purely imaginative, and those which connect us with the world without, was entirely overlooked. In opposition to this, we maintain, that consciousness, to which he appealed as the supreme judge, testifies most clearly, that while the notions involved in memory, in judgment, &c., depend simply upon the subjective power of those faculties, our *perceptions* come from a foreign source, and contain an objective element which, in each sensation, combines with our subjective self.

Fichte, indeed, acknowledges that this is the *phenomenon* presented in perception; he admits that we *seem* to be really conscious of an opposing and limiting force, or, in his own words, of a *not-self*, but he attempts to account for this by supposing, that there are certain absolute and inexplicable limits (absolute unerklärliche Schranken) in the very constitution of our own minds, and that the obstacle (Anstoss) to our free activity presented by that which we term the objective world, is self-constituted according to the laws of our intellectual nature. It is just at this critical point, the point which determines the complete subjectivity of his whole system, that Fichte has failed, and become involved in absurdity. He supposes mind to be pure spontaneous activity, and yet he assigns to it certain limits lying within its own nature; in other words, he makes it to be in the very nature of a perfectly free and spontaneous being to have some limit to its freedom—an idea which plainly implies a contradiction in terms.

This limitation or obstacle which holds so important a place in the system before us, was, in fact, never satisfactorily explained; and while it presented an insoluble point itself, it prevented the full and final solution of the great problem of ideal philosophy, *viz.*, that of identifying thought and existence. The sphere of existence, in Fichte's system, was *supposed* exactly synonymous with the sphere of thought; but the unexplained limitation

of the mind's activity implied the real existence of somewhat, altogether beyond the bounds of that consciousness; so that, after all, the conflicting claims of realism and idealism were not satisfied, thought and existence not absolutely identified in their source.

Another objection might also be raised against Fichte, *viz.*, that he never shewed on what ground we are at liberty to conclude, that although the me and the not-me mutually determine each other, and only exist as determined by each other, yet that the former is a real existence, and the latter a nonentity. If the one proves to be nothing *per se*, who shall say that the other may not prove the same; and who is to prevent the whole system before us from incurring the charge laid against it by Jacobi, of ending in absolute nihilism? Again; how is it to be accounted for, if to each individual the-me is the absolute principle of all things, that there are so many absolute principles in the world? as many, in fact, as there are men? The only explanation of this point that can be attempted is, that it is not the *individual me* that manifests itself in every man, but the *absolute* or *divine me*, of which every man is an image or reflection. If the former hypothesis be taken, then the most absurd system of nihilism, as above indicated, is the result; if the latter, then we have Spinoza's doctrine over again in another form, and this pretended structure of a critical philosophy becomes, in fact, a purely dogmatical

system, which, on Fichte's own principles, as an advocate of "Wissenschaftslehre," ought to be summarily rejected.

That Fichte felt the force of these and similar objections made against his philosophy, is evident from the fact that he relinquished his purely subjective position, and afterwards attempted an entire revision of its fundamental principles. To these later views, therefore, we must now, in conclusion, briefly refer. In the original form of his metaphysics, Fichte not only banished the idea of matter as a solid impenetrable substance, but allowed no other real existence at all beyond that of a certain activity (Thätigkeit), ever working in accordance with a given law or design. Mind was with him simply *action*, and everything else was the product of mind, brought into being by virtue of the original laws, to which it is subjected. What we see in the world of objective existence was with him simply the reflex of our own faculties; and to be a pure subjective idealist was to absorb the whole notion of existence in that of *law*, the law of our personal activity. The office of sustaining a system of philosophy on this purely subjective basis, as we have seen, proved no easy task. The enquiry was perpetually urged, What is the ground or essence of the activity, which we term mind? Whence its laws, its limitations, its characteristics? Must there not be something real at the foundation of all these subjective pheno-

mena? In truth is not something of this nature admitted by the fact of your admitting an original constitution at all, by which the laws of our consciousness are determined? Questions of this description, together with many objections of a theological kind, gradually led Fichte to seek for another absolute principle, more deep and more comprehensive than the former, upon which his philosophy might securely rest.

On reflection he saw, that to deny all *real* existence in our perceptions, does not lead, as he intended it, to a system of pure dynamical idealism, but rather, as we have shewn, to a system of nihilism. Allow that our free activity represents certain notions to itself, there must be, thought Fichte, something which is represented. Mere knowing can be nothing, unless there is something which is known; mere thinking can be nothing, unless there is something which is thought; and mere perception can be nothing, unless there is something which is perceived. To make our subjective activity in the act of knowing, perceiving, &c. *the absolute*, is to suppose that the only reality in the universe is a perceiving which perceives nothing, a thinking which thinks nothing, a knowing which knows nothing.

But, then, the question returns, How is it possible to arrive at this real essential existence which is imaged and represented in our own minds? for the moment we attempt to do so scientifically, the

old argument against representationalism returns, which again seems to shut us up within our own consciousness. Pure subjective idealism, which admits no real existence beyond our own consciousness, is beset with difficulties on the one hand; but the ordinary dualism of philosophers is exposed to equal objections on the other hand. In the former case there is no basis, on which the superstructure can rest, to keep it from sinking into the abyss of Nihilism; in the latter case we have no guarantee for the accuracy of the inward representation of the outward reality, and, consequently, no means of arriving at absolute knowledge at all. Is it not possible, then, thought Fichte, to find some *via media*, by which the difficulties of both these extremes could be avoided; by which a foundation might be added to a system of idealism otherwise baseless, and a relief found for the contradictions of dualism. The only resource left was to grant *one absolute existence*, which is the same both in the subject and the object; to assert equally the reality of the Me and the Not-me, and with it the identity of both; to find a common principle from which all subjective and all objective phenomena spring, and to recognise in this principle an absolute subject-object. This thought, the origination of which is disputed between Fichte and Schelling, was the foundation of the doctrine of identity (Identitätslehre); a doctrine which, if it did really spring from the

improved philosophy of the former, was only developed to its proper form in the writings of the latter.

Under this view of the case the starting point of Fichte's philosophy was now completely altered. Instead of regarding *self* as the absolute, by which everything else is constructed, he now admitted an essential reality as the foundation both of self and not-self, and in this way attributed a real existence, although still a spiritual one, to the objective world. The doctrine of identity thus propounded, evidently had a close affinity with the pantheism of Spinoza. The only difference of the two lay here,—that, while Spinoza fixed his eye upon the notion of *substance*, until he made it the absolute and infinite essence of which all things existing are but different modi, Fichte still retained firm as ever the notion of free and intelligent activity, and regarded infinite reason, or if we will term it so, eternal mind or the Divine idea, as the absolute, all-real, self-existent essence, which manifests itself alike in the subjective and the objective world. According to this view, whatever we experience within ourselves and whatever we see without, are both alike the manifestations of one and the same absolute mind, *i. e.* of the Deity himself; not merely creations of his power, but actual modifications of his essence. The common idea of matter Fichte never for a moment

re-admitted. He still held to his original position, that mind is the sole existence, that the whole universe is a spiritual universe, and that to speak of dead lifeless substance, lying as the substratum of what we term material properties, and of the laws of action, which we perceive around us, is going entirely beyond the region of our actual knowledge. Nay, further, he did not allow that the objective world can make any impression whatever upon the subjective self; but, as they are both forms and manifestations of the same Divine idea, he considered that we know, to a certain extent, what passes without us, from our direct consciousness or intuition of what passes within.

Although Fichte had thus gained a crude and indistinct notion of the doctrine of identity, yet he did not live to develop it in all its clearness, or to apply it to the laws and processes of nature in the world. The phenomena of the physical world, indeed, still constituted a dark and unresolved point in his philosophy; objective existence, as seen in nature, was not yet placed on the same footing with subjective existence, as exhibited in the laws of mind; the identity of the two was not completely thought out; the phenomena of our sensations not fully explained; the absolute unity of thought and existence, as attained in the infinite Being, not completely deduced. To

perfect the doctrine of identity and to apply it more especially to the world of nature, was the merit and the boast of his illustrious successor.

As this particular aspect of the German philosophy, therefore, will be more fully elucidated in the sequel of this sketch, we shall forbear to enter more particularly into the views of it which Fichte entertained, and which may be found embodied in his extraordinary treatise on the Constitution of Man (Bestimmung des Menschen), as, also, in the posthumous writings edited by his son. We only remark, that this latter form of Fichte's philosophy was in many respects superior to the former. It not only overcame many of its contradictions, but pointed more decisively to a region, in which faith, as a principle of knowledge higher than reason, could assure us of the reality of the world, of God, and of an immortality to come; in which the subjective limits of our rational nature could be surpassed, and life be rendered blessed in the confidence of our partaking the Divine nature here, and rising to the fuller participation of it hereafter. Much as the writings of this energetic thinker have more lately fallen into neglect, yet it is unquestionable, that they lie at the basis of all the modern German metaphysics; nor has philosophy since his time found an advocate so clear, so earnest, and so fervidly eloquent as it found in him.*

* Note F, *Vide* in Appendix, an account of Fichte's works.

We must now pass on to the consideration of Schelling and his philosophy, by which we shall be brought almost into the midst of the discussions in which Germany is at present involved. Frederick William Joseph Schelling was born in January, 1775, at Leonberg Würtemberg. He studied first at Tübingen, where he formed an acquaintance with Hegel, while both were yet in their early youth. After this he went to Leipsic and Jena, where he devoted himself chiefly to medicine and philosophy, in the latter of which departments he attended the lectures of Fichte. In 1798 he succeeded Fichte in the chair of philosophy at Jena, and obtained, by the efforts of his then rising genius, the greatest approbation. In 1803 he accepted the professorship of philosophy at Würzburg, and in 1807 removed to Munich, where, with some few intervals, he resided up to the year 1841. His acceptance of a professorship at Berlin, in that year, excited the greatest attention throughout the philosophical world; without satisfying the expectations, however, which were aroused, he soon relinquished his arduous post, in order that he might end his days (which God grant him) in peace.

Schelling, as we have seen, came upon the stage just at the time when Fichte had carried his subjective philosophy to its very highest pitch. The notion of self had with him absorbed every other; the individual mind was made the abso-

lute generating principle of all existence. By assigning, however, to mind certain limitations lying within its own nature, he unconsciously destroyed its absoluteness, and involved himself in inextricable contradictions. Schelling saw clearly, that the subjective tendency had been carried by him to an extreme; that it was necessary to return to the admission of some actual objective reality; and that the Absolute must be found in something beyond the limits of our own individual consciousness. Whether the first notion of the doctrine of identity (that which traces both subject and object to one common source) was given by Fichte or Schelling, we cannot determine: certain it is, that the latter was the first to see the doctrine in all its clearness, and the first who employed it as the groundwork of a complete system of philosophy.

Before we enter into an analysis of Schelling's system, we must make a few preliminary remarks upon the method he has followed in his investigations. With him the great organ of philosophy is "intellectual intuition" (intellectuelle Anschauung), by means of which faculty, he supposes, we have an immediate knowledge of *the absolute*. This intellectual intuition is a kind of higher and spiritual sense, through which we feel the presence of the infinite both within and around us; moreover it affords us a species of knowledge, which does not require the relation of subject and object, but

enables us to gaze at once by the eye of the mind upon the eternal essence itself, from which both proceed, and in which thought and existence are absolutely identical. Before the time when creation began, we may imagine that an infinite mind, an infinite essence, or an infinite thought (for here all these are one) filled the universe of space. This, then, as the self-existent ONE, must be the only absolute reality; all else can be but a developing of the one original and eternal Being; and intellectual intuition is the faculty, by which we rise to the perception of this the sole ground and realistic basis of all things.

The absolute, from the first, contains in itself, potentially, all that it afterwards becomes actually by means of its own self-development; and the great aim of true philosophy is, first, to fix our eye upon this original essence, and then to shew how everything is derived from it—that is, how from the absolute subject or *natura naturans*, is derived the absolute object or *natura naturata*. This primary essence is not, as Spinoza held, an infinite substance, having the two properties of extension and thought, but an infinite, acting, producing, self-unfolding *mind*—the living soul of the world. Unless we can disentangle ourselves from our unreflective habits of thinking, unless we can look through the veil of surrounding phenomena, unless by this spiritual vision we can realize the presence of the Infinite, the only real,

and eternal existence, we have not the capacity, said Schelling, to take the very first step into the region of speculative philosophy. If, however, we can view all things as the development of the original and absolute principle of life, reason, or Being, then it is evident, conversely, that we may trace the marks of the absolute in everything that exists, and consequently may scan them in the operations of our own minds, as one particular phase of its manifestation. Every mind is the image or reflection of the eternal mind; every individual reason the exemplar of the infinite reason; and, therefore, by gazing inwardly upon the development of our own minds, we may learn the principle or process, by which everything else is developed likewise.

Now, in viewing our own consciousness for this purpose, we find that there is combined there the knowing and the known—the subject which perceives, and the object which is perceived. But, then, what is the process by which every such perception takes place, what the law of the mind's own activity? This, observes Schelling, was shewn by Kant, when he assigned *time* and *space* as the two forms or categories of sensation. The notion of space arises from the mind's activity going forth, and expanding itself without limit, and in every direction; on the other hand, time is that which bounds and measures space,—it is the reflex or attractive force, by which our activity is restrained,

59899

and which answers, therefore, to Fichte's "unexplained limitations." The one is a positive force, the other a negative; and what we suppose to be a material existence is the result of these two forces,—the expansive giving the matter of it, the attractive the form.

Intellectual intuition sees both subject and object, knowing and known *combined* in our own consciousness; it regards them as being but the twofold law, by which the soul operates; but ordinary and unphilosophical thinking views them as entirely separate, and regards the one movement, that in which thought is predominant, as the subject, and the other movement, that in which existence is the predominant notion, as the object, thus making a generic distinction, which does not really exist, between the mind within and the world without. Both, in fact, are one and the same essence running exactly parallel to each other; so that, if we begin with the objective side, we can easily deduce from it the subjective; and if we begin with the subjective, we can as easily deduce the objective. Hence, there are two kinds of philosophy, philosophy of nature and philosophy of spirit, both having their root in the absolute, and both affording a firm point, from which we can take our departure. The office, therefore, of philosophy is, either from intelligence to construct a nature, or from nature to construct an intelligence; thus

shewing that thought and existence have their ground in the same identical essence.

To make the subsequent part of our sketch more intelligible, we must now request the reader to fix his attention *closely* upon the law, or rythm, by which the absolute, and everything else, as being a manifestation of the absolute, proceeds in its self-development. This law comprehends three movements, which Schelling terms powers, or as we will term them, for distinction's sake, *potencies*. The first is the reflective movement (Potenz der Reflexion); this answers to the negative or expansive force, and viewed philosophically is the attempt of the Infinite to embody or represent itself in the Finite. The second movement is that of subsumption (Potenz der Subsumption), which is the attempt that the absolute makes, having embodied itself in the Finite, to return to the Infinite. The third movement is simply the union or indifference point of the two former, which Schelling terms the potence of reason (Potenz der Vernunft), as being that in which the expansive and attractive, the subjective and objective movements are blended.

Having thus prepared the way, we can now give a regular and connected sketch of Schelling's "Philosophy of Identity," as it was developed in his earlier writings.

The foundation-stone upon which the whole rests is the absolute and infinite existence (Seyn), which forms of itself the whole real essence of the universe,

and to the consciousness of which we attain by means of intellectual intuition. This infinite *Being*, containing everything in itself potentially which it can afterwards become actually, strives by the law which we have above indicated after self-development. By the first movement (the potence of reflection) it embodies its own infinite attributes in the Finite. In doing this, it produces finite objects, *i. e.* Finite reflections of itself, and thus sees itself objectified in the forms and productions of the material world. This first movement then gives rise to the philosophy of nature. The second movement (potence of subsumption) is the regress of the Finite into the Infinite; it is nature, as above constituted, again making itself absolute, and re-assuming the form of the Eternal. The result of this movement is *mind*, as existing in man, which is nothing else than nature gradually raised to a state of consciousness, and attempting in that way to return to its infinite form. The combination of these two movements (Potenz der Vernunft) is the reunion of the subject and object in divine reason; it is God, not in his original or potential, but in his unfolded and realized existence, forming the whole universe of mind and Being. This is the proper view of Schelling's pantheism.

Having thus seen the absolute dividing itself into object and subject, nature and spirit, by the original laws of all being, we shall go onwards with these two branches of philosophy, and follow

Schelling step by step in the construction of his whole system.

Now, just in the same manner as we perceived three potencies in the absolute itself, so also shall we find three potencies in each of the two divisions of philosophy which have thus originated, namely, in nature and in mind. These three potencies will again form three subordinate spheres of being, each of which still continues to exhibit the same law, shewing two oppositive movements and a point of indifference in which they both unite. Schelling terms the movements which come within the philosophy of nature the *real* side of the question, those which come within the philosophy of spirit the *ideal*, both absolutely answering to each other, but the one in the lower state of unconscious existence, the other in the more highly developed state of self-consciousness. Nature and spirit are thus both the emanations of the eternal mind, but the one in a higher potence than the other. To make the matter clear to the eye, and at the same time to furnish an index to our subsequent explanation, we shall here give the outlines of the whole system in the following scheme.

The Absolute in its undeveloped essence divides itself into

OBJECT, or THE REAL SIDE,	AND	SUBJECT, OR THE IDEAL SIDE.
First Sphere, (that of Matter,) containing,		*First Sphere*, (that of Knowing,) containing,
Potence of Reflection=Expansion.		Potence of Reflection=Feeling.
Potence of Subsumption=Attraction.		Potence of Subsumption=Reflexion.
Potence of Reason=Gravity.		Potence of Reason=Freedom.
1ST. INDIFFERENCE.		1ST INDIFFERENCE.
Second Sphere, (that of Dynamics,) containing,		*Second Sphere*, (that of Action,) containing,
Potence of Reflection=Magnetism.		Potence of Reflection=Individuality.
Potence of Subsumption=Electricity.		Potence of Subsumption=State.
Potence of Reason=Galvanism.		Potence of Reason=History.
2D. INDIFFERENCE.		2D. INDIFFERENCE.
Third Sphere, (that of Organism,) also, union of other two Spheres, containing		*Third Sphere*, (that of art, as seen in the productions of genius.)
Potence of Reflection=Reproduction.		This, as the absolute indifference of all
Potence of Subsumption=Irritability.		the other Spheres, is the highest point of
Potence of Reason=Sensibility.		man's development; it has no separate
3D. INDIFFERENCE.		potencies, but leads us to the final result of the whole system,—*viz:*

The Absolute in its developed state, being the identity of Nature and Spirit of the Real and Ideal.

Now, in directing our attention first to the *real* side of the above plan, we must remember, that, according to Schelling, external nature, the movements of which are there delineated, contains the absolute essence *complete*, only viewed predominantly from an objective point of view.

First sphere.—The first sphere, that of matter mechanically considered, is the streaming forth of the infinite into the finite; it is the development of the productive *power* of nature into some actual product; the union of the infinite essence with finite form. Matter is the production of, or rather emanation from, the great eternal *mind*, it is, strictly speaking, that mind itself seen in its primary reflective movement, and making itself finite in order to become the object of its own happy contemplation. God saw all he had made—all that came forth from himself, the type of his own power and glory, and behold it was very good.

Matter, however, as being a complete exhibition of the Absolute in one particular aspect, and as forming a universe in itself, must exhibit all the three potencies above indicated. The first of these is repulsion, or the expansive power; the next is attraction, or that by which the expansive or objective tendency is limited, and referred back to the centre from which it sprung. Just as by their centrifugal force the planets individualize themselves in their own separate orbits, and by their centripetal all tend back to one centre, so matter

in general by repulsion is individualized, and by attraction tends back again to unity. The indifference of these two forces is *gravity*, that which makes matter what it is, and gives it the appearance of being the dull, lifeless, impenetrable mass which we ordinarily conceive it to be in things around us. The first generic potence, then, of nature is the union of the repulsive and attractive forces, forming the whole phenomena of the material universe, *statically* considered.

Second Sphere. This being the reflective movement of the real side, as above shewn, we now look for the second generic potence, that of subsumption, by which the material world will exhibit a regress movement back from its finite forms towards infinity. This second potence is the principle of *light.* Light is the soul, of which matter is the body; it is that by which nature gazes upon itself. Nature, accordingly, when viewed in this potence, is no longer seen as dull inert matter, but as replete with perpetual movement and activity. This dynamical sphere of nature's operations, has likewise three movements. The first is *magnetism*, in which the motive power is seen, by means of polarity, dividing itself into two opposite directions, and always acting in a right line. The second is *electricity*, which shews again the unity of the positive and negative poles of the magnet, and acts over surfaces. The third is the chemical process, or galvanism, which is the

combination of these two forces, and gives the third dimension to space.* From the two foregoing spheres—that of matter, and that of light—of statics, and dynamics, the existence of the three realms of nature is explained. Hard unyielding matter is the kingdom in which *weight*, or gravity, is predominant—that in which movement predominates is the air, and the indifference of these is water.

Third Sphere. Having thus seen nature in its first potence, as attraction and repulsion, giving rise to the phenomena of mechanical matter;—having seen it also in its second, or dynamical potence, taking the appearance of light, in the forms of magnetism, electricity, and galvanism, we now come to the third potence, that in which the two former are perfectly combined, and in which is shewn the whole working of the Absolute towards its great end, in a finite form. There is one great aim after self-development in all nature; but as in the real or objective side the Absolute is seen individualized, the aim of nature must there result in individual productions, each of which is a little world (a microcosm) in itself. This is realized in organization, or life; in which matter and light,

* For the method by which Schelling accounts for the three dimensions in space, we refer the reader to a little work containing the Elements of Schelling's Natur-Philosophie, entitled, "Schelling's alte und neue Philosophie," von J. L. Schwarz. The details are too abstruse for the present sketch.

the maternal and paternal principle, the mechanical and dynamical potencies, are perfectly combined. Every organization is the complete representation or image of the Absolute in a finite form; it is subject-object exhibited in nature; and constitutes the highest perfection of physical existence. The three movements of this sphere are, first, reproduction—the embodying of the essential life-principle into new forms; secondly, irritability—the power of independent and unimpelled movement; and thirdly, sensibility, in which the reproductive and self-moving principles are combined. Here we have followed nature in its different objective spheres, up to its highest development; sensibility forming the point in which mere organized life ends, and spiritual life begins.

In giving this rapid sketch of Schelling's philosophy of nature, we have concentrated in a few pages the matter of some two or three volumes. To shew how the different processes are deduced one from the other—how in the first sphere the principles of mechanics are developed; how in the second the phenomena of chemical agents are elucidated; how in the third the progress of organized life is traced, from the lowest kind of plant, through all the varieties of vegetable and animal existence, to the very highest organization, would take more space than can be here allotted to the subject. We have been anxious to give the principles, upon which the whole system proceeds,

as clearly as possible, and must refer the student, who would understand it more fully, to the works of Schelling himself, or to the numerous analyses which exist of his philosophy in the German language.

We have already followed nature, then, through the successive potencies, in which it appears as matter, light, life. All these unconscious productions are but unsuccessful attempts in nature to raise itself to intelligence; they are exhibitions of mind, as yet in a state of slumber; and when at length we get beyond them into a higher potence, and pass from philosophy of nature into philosophy of mind, we have to do precisely with the same essence, only in another form; and to view precisely the same processes, only raised to the loftier position of self-consciousness. Mind is the second movement of the universal law, by which the absolute unfolds itself; it is nature returning from the Finite, in which it had embodied itself, back again to the Infinite; and just as we saw, that on the real side there were three movements of objective nature, so, on the ideal side, we find answering to them three movements of subjective mind. The first sphere is that of *knowledge*, and this corresponds to matter in the objective side, inasmuch as the laws of perception and of thought exactly answer to the real productions of nature, as was already shewn to some extent by Kant, and more clearly by Fichte. The second sphere corresponding to the dynamics of nature, is that of *practice*, or mind in its *free*

activity. And, lastly, the third sphere in which knowledge and practice are combined, is that of *art*, which exactly answers to the organic power of nature. This affords us three divisions in the science of mind,—the philosophy of intelligence, philosophy of practice, and philosophy of art; the contents of which we shall now pourtray.

First Sphere. The philosophy of intelligence, being the first sphere of the subjective development of the Absolute, must bear upon it the characteristic feature of the first potence, namely, the embodying of the infinite in the finite. In other words, mind, (or the me,) in coming to the distinct knowledge of anything, must have its free activity limited, and this limitation, (or obstacle, as Fichte termed it,) which gives us the idea of an actual objective product, is the infinite activity of the subject in the process of constituting itself *finite*.

In this sphere, again, we shall have three movements as before. The first is *sensation*, in which the mind's activity gives rise to a distinct image, that is placed before it as object of its own contemplation. The second movement is *reflection*, in which the mind is no longer sunk in the contemplation of its own production objectively viewed, but becomes aware of the *process* by which the consciousness of the moment is produced. The result of this self-conscious process is called a Notion (Begriff), and the process itself is termed Judgment (Urtheil). Judgment is the

reference of a particular to a general (as we see, *e. g.* in the proposition, *horse is an animal*); and in it, therefore, the finite perception, which we attained to in sensation, is carried back again to the infinite essence (the category) to which it belongs. The union of sensation and reflection give rise to *freedom*, which is the third movement; for, by means of reflection, we become conscious that sensations, though apparently constrained, are the products of our own activity.

Second Sphere.—The idea of freedom brings us to the second sphere of the subjective side, namely, the philosophy of *practice*. Under the former sphere we have the analysis of the intellectual powers, under this the principles of action; and, as in knowledge, the *Me* was seen to be limited, throwing itself into a finite product, so now in action it essays to rise again to the Infinite; for in all moral action Deity itself, in its essential qualities, is manifested. Knowledge shews the essence of the Absolute expressed in a form; action shews the form again returning to the essence. In practical philosophy, as in all the other spheres, we still have three movements. The first is, that in which the active intelligence shews itself operating within a limited circuit, as in a single mind. This is the principle of individuality; not as though the infinite intelligence were something different from the finite, or as though there were an infinite intelligence out of

and apart from the finite, but it is merely the absolute in one of its particular moments; just as an individual thought is but a single moment of the whole mind. Each finite reason, then, is but a *thought* of the infinite and eternal reason. Under this head of individuality, Schelling explains all the phenomena connected with volition and personality, deducing the nature of the passions, impulses, and moral feelings, all of which appear before us as springs to our individual action.

The second movement in this sphere, is that in which the individualized action of the absolute seeks to generalize itself; in which man no longer acts alone as an individual, but, in combination with other men, forming *a state.* Hence arises the philosophy of jurisprudence and political economy. Now, as men, when acting individually, act under the influence of freedom, so in their political combinations they act from blind necessity. A country is urged forward in its progress towards civilization, not by any distinct volitions of its own, but by a necessary law of development. Every nation plays its part in the drama of the world, and every one performs its *proper* mission, but it marches on to its destiny, not with design, but by some unknown yet necessary cause.

This leads us, accordingly, to the third movement, in which freedom and necessity are completely blended, and that is *history.* History is

the absolute combination of the freedom of the individual with the necessary development of the race. Every act of which history is composed is a free act; and yet man, with all his freedom, cannot help contributing to the accomplishment of the destiny of the whole nation and the whole race, to which he belongs. History is thus the great mirror, from which the soul of the world is reflected; it is an ever-unfolding epic of the Divine intelligence; and in it we see how the one eternal mind, which operates in us all, reveals itself successively to view through the medium of our individual freedom.

In history Schelling lays down three great periods. The first was the period of *fate*, when everything appeared absolutely under the influence of a blind and irresistible power. This may be termed the tragic age. The second period is that in which the power of fate reveals itself as a *law of nature*, that coerces everything into a certain plan of development, which it is compelled to subserve. This period commences with the extension of the Roman empire, from which period we can trace the elements that have moulded our modern history down to the present time. The third period, will be that, in which we no longer speak of fate, nor of the laws of nature, but where we view the whole as a *Divine revelation* upon the theatre of the world. This will be the age of Providence.

Third Sphere.—Having now considered the two former potencies of the subjective development of the absolute; having seen it first in the sphere of knowledge, causing its activity to assume the appearance of an image or notion, its essence to clothe itself in a finite form; having seen it, secondly, in the sphere of practice, returning to its original mode of existence as a boundless activity or absolute law; we now come to the highest potence of mental existence, that of genius, as seen in the production of *art.* In this we find the complete concentration of all that has gone before, whether in the real or the ideal side of our philosophy.

Art, as the union of the two former spheres of the ideal philosophy, must contain in it a blending together both of knowledge and of action, of form and of essence; and this is precisely its great characteristic. Theory and practice are there completely united. Freedom and necessity, which we saw working in the other spheres separately, in this higher sphere work together; the artist is impelled by an inward inspiration to his labour. Moreover, art being the highest point of the actual development of the absolute, as it rises from the lowest forms of matter to the highest intelligence, must unite in itself both the subjective and the objective: and what, in fact, are the productions of genius but the embodying our ideal creations into actual objective forms? Again, art must shew the features both of the finite and the infinite;

and, accordingly, infinite perfection, the beau-ideal of beauty and sublimity, is shadowed forth by the artist in his own finite productions. Lastly, as nature and mind shew the two characteristics, the one of unconsciousness, the other of self-consciousness, so the inspirations of genius are partly conscious and partly spontaneous. And thus the infinite mind having passed through its various forms of objective and unconscious development, as seen in matter, light, and organization, attains to its state of self-consciousness in sensation, reflection, and freedom, and is carried by the practical movement to the highest point of self-realization, where by means of art its subjective or ideal forms become objectified. Here, then, we have the unity or indifference of the real and the ideal, and come, at length, at the end of the process, to a self-produced, or rather a self-developed, *subject-object.*

The above sketch, however brief and imperfect, may perhaps suffice to give an idea of the general character of Schelling's original philosophy. The sensation it produced was manifest throughout Germany, and many of the rising philosophers of the day entered eagerly into a system at once so comprehensive and so poetical. Many of Schelling's pupils aided him in the journal which he published as the organ of his views, and some of them exerted a reflex influence upon the master himself, leading him to recast some of his opinions and to expand

others. By the time his system as above described was completed, Schelling began to perceive that he had elaborated too much the objective points in his philosophy; and that in the intense view, which he had taken of the absolute, he diminished, nay, almost lost sight of the notion of any finite existence possessing freedom and personality. With him the absolute essence had become everything; and its development was not the free and designed operation of intelligence, but rather a blind impulse working, first unconsciously in nature, and only coming to self-consciousness in mind. On this principle, all difference between God and the universe was entirely lost; his pantheism became as complete as that of Spinoza; and as the absolute was evolved from its lowest forms to the highest, in accordance with the necessary law or rhythm of its being, the whole world, material and mental, became one enormous chain of necessity, to which no idea of free creation could by any possibility be attached.

Accordingly he now began to enter upon another course of philosophy, not intended to contradict the former, but rather to perfect it, by placing the whole question in a new light. Many different treatises were published by him one after the other, before he appeared to have written himself clear as to what his real design was; but at length he came forth with the declaration, that there are two kinds of philosophy, the *positive* and the *negative;* that

he had supplied the negative side, in his original system; and that he was now about to complete it, by supplying the positive. The difference between the two, according to Schelling, consists in this, that while the negative philosophy deduces the *idea* (Begriff) of God *as an idea*, the positive supplies his real essential existence. The positive philosophy starts from being, and comes to thought; the negative starts from thought, and seeks (though in vain) to attain to existence.

God, the object of all philosophy, stands to us in two points of view. On the one hand, there is the abstract idea of him, *i. e.* the notion of his attributes, or of *what* he is; on the other hand, there is his being or existence, embodying the truth *that* he is. The negative philosophy begins with a low and crude idea of the absolute, and evolves from it a higher; in this way it proceeds step by step through all the realms of nature and spirit, until it attains the highest *notion* which we can have of Deity; but when it has done all this, it is only the notion of God we have deduced, and not the *existence*. The positive philosophy, then, adds to this idea of God his real existence; much in the same way as in Kant's system we saw that his theoretical philosophy attained a notion of God which appeared simply as a personification of our own faculties, while his practical philosophy, on the other hand, supplied the essential reality.

The chief objects, then, of this new or positive

philosophy may be stated as follows:—1st. To raise us beyond the pantheistic view, given in the former system, and exhibit the Deity as a free personal supra-mundane Being. 2dly. To shew the necessity and the process of the creation of the world out of God. 3dly. To explain the relation of man to God, as an independent and yet dependent being. 4thly, and, lastly, To unfold the nature and possibility of moral evil. Let us view these four points in succession.

1. In order to rise above the pantheistic point of view, we must distinguish between *the Absolute*, as ground of all things, and *Godhead*, as one particular manifestation of it. The primary form of the Absolute is *will* or *self-action*. It is an absolute power of becoming in reality what it is in the germ. The second form in which it appears is that of *being; i. e.* the realization of what its will or power indicated to be possible. But as yet there is no personality, no Deity properly so called. For this we must add the further idea of freedom, which is the power that the Absolute possesses of remaining either in its first or its second potence, as above stated. *In this unity, which contains the three ideas of action, of existence, and of freedom, consists the proper idea of God.* God, before the existence of the world, is the undeveloped, impersonal, absolute essence, from which all things proceed; it is only *after* this essence is developed, and has passed successively into the three states of action, of objec-

tive existence, and of freedom, that he attains personality, and answers to the proper notion of Deity.

2. With regard to creation, we can now explain the existence of the world without identifying it with Deity, as is done in the ordinary pantheistic hypothesis. The absolute is the real ground of all things that exist, but the absolute is not yet Deity. That element in it, which passes into the creation and constitutes its essence, is not the whole essence of Deity; it is not that part of it which, peculiarly speaking, makes it divine. The material world, then, is simply one form or potence in which the absolute chooses to exist; in which it freely determines to objectify itself, and consequently is only one step towards the realization of the full conception of Deity, as a Divine Person.

3. Man is the summit of the creation—he is that part of it in which the absolute sees himself most fully pourtrayed as the perfect image or type of the infinite reason. In him, objective creation has taken the form of subjectivity; and hence he is said, in contradistinction to everything else, to have been formed *in the image of God.*

Lastly.—To solve the problem of moral evil, we must keep in mind, that man, though grounded in the absolute, still is not identified with Deity; since the divine element, namely, the unity of the three potencies of the original essence, is wanting to him. Still, man bears a perfect resemblance to God, and

therefore must be *free*, and fully capable of acting, if he choose, against his own destiny. This actually took place, inasmuch as he attempted, like God, *to create*, separating the three potencies, which were shadowed forth in him as the image of Deity, and not being able in doing so to retain their unity. Hence the will of man was removed from the centre of the divine will, attempted to act independently, and brought confusion and moral obliquity into his nature. Man would become like a God, and by attempting to do so, he lost the very image of God which he did possess.

The last attempts which Schelling has made in philosophy have been almost entirely of a theosophic, and, consequently, mystical nature. These may all be included under the title, "Philosophy of Revelation,"—in which he attempts to explain the rationale of all mythology, and to deduce scientifically the whole doctrine of the Bible concerning the fall of man, and his redemption by Christ. In this portion of his writings, the doctrine of the Trinity is explained, on the principle of the three divine potencies, which have been so often employed before: the fall of man is interpreted as being the disuniting of the human will as the type, from the divine will as the antitype; while the doctrine of redemption is viewed as the reunion of that will to God. The first Adam, the original type of humanity, separated from God, and acted during the ages of unresisted evil as the god of this world,

striving after an independent and extra-divine existence. The second Adam, on the other hand, the type of the new creation, exhibited the return of man to a perfect union with the divine nature.

On this principle is explained the whole religious history of the world; that history shewing, like everything else, three different phases. From the fall of man to the coming of Christ, the human consciousness was given up to the influence of the power of nature, being separated from God and devoted to sense. Hence the rise of Polytheism, and the existence of heathen mythology generally. Gradually the identity of these powers with God began to break in upon the mind, and gave the first notion of Monotheism, which was completed in Christ, the God-Man. Christ represented the complete reunion of man to God, the return of the finite revolted will to the infinite—a return which is shadowed forth by his perfect obedience. But man is not raised at once to perfect reunion to God; and hence the dispensation of the spirit, as that, in which the reunion is completed by the constant impulse of a divine power.

Even in the development of Christianity itself, Schelling finds the same threefold movement which runs so universally through his whole system. The first movement is seen in the Catholic Church, the religion of Peter, objective in its whole aspect; the second in Protestantism, the religion of Paul, appealing to man's subjective consciousness; the

third is the religion of John—the union of both in love. The first and second are now passing away, and the next great form of Christianity will be that, in which love will conquer all in the perfect union of the objective religion of the Catholic, with the subjective piety of the Protestant.

It is now easy to see the vast comprehensiveness of Schelling's philosophy *as a whole.* It begins by advocating a kind of divine intuition, by which we gaze upon the realistic *ground* or *basis* of all the phenomena, both of mind and matter. From this it goes on to construct, by means of an absolute and *à priori* law, the whole phenomenal universe, deriving it from the self-unfolding of the Absolute. One region of existence after another yields, as by a magic spell, to the bidding of this law, and confesses its secret unveiled. Matter, with all its dull inertia, puts on the garb of contending powers, and shews itself to be the objective reflection of the Absolute itself; those subtile agencies which we term magnetism, electricity, galvanism, light and heat, each owns itself to be but one pulsation in the self-developing process of the universal mind; and even the phenomena of organized life is still but the complete objectifying of the absolute, each animal nature being a perfected type of the eternal nature itself. From the philosophy of nature, Schelling passes in one unbroken chain of argument, without a chasm between, to the philosophy of spirit. The same great law of the absolute

solves the mysteries of sensation, of intelligence, and of human freedom; from thence it proceeds to explain the phenomena of man as an individual agent; of man in his connexion with society; and, lastly, of man as he has developed his being upon the broad page of history. Finally, it enters into the mazy regions of human genius and art, and finds in them the crown and the summit of the whole process—the highest expression of the Deity in the world.

Here it might be supposed, that the author would have found his goal, and having constructed the universe out of almost nothing, have at length enjoyed his Sabbath in peace. But, instead of this, we find that the work is only half done; he has developed the *law* of the universe, but not explained the *substance;* he has exhibited the *form*, now he must go to the matter; he has analysed the full *idea* of God, and now he must make manifest his *existence.* Upon this, with unwearied wings, he begins another flight,—pantheism is left behind, and the real Triune Jehovah is placed before us in all the plenitude of a divine personality. Next, the whole nature of the dependent creation is developed, the procedure of the material universe from the absolute expounded, and the mysteries of existence, which had been hidden before in thick darkness, made irradiant with light and intelligence. The destiny of man then comes upon the stage. To shew this, we have the origin of moral

evil discussed; and the question, so long tossed upon the billows of controversy, for ever set at rest. The door being thus open into the region of Christian theology, the philosopher boldly enters in to grapple with the great ideas which we there met with. The law, which has unveiled the mysteries of nature and the soul, we may be sure does not fail in explaining the whole rationale of Christian faith. The great doctrines of revelation—the fall of man—the theory of redemption—the effusion of the Spirit,—all are converted from objects of faith to objects of science; all flow, as by natural consequence, from the great rhythm of existence; nay, the controversies of the Church themselves are settled, and the repose of the world announced in the predominance of the doctrines of the beloved apostle over the equally partial views, both of Protestant and the Catholic. Such, and far more sweeping than we have represented it, is the philosophical system, by which the name of Schelling is destined to go down the stream of time to the latest posterity.

To give any elaborate critique upon Schelling's philosophy, we imagine is in this country quite unnecessary, inasmuch as it would be arguing about a system, which very few as yet understand, and perhaps no one believes in. We shall only offer one or two reflections upon some of the main positions which almost necessarily suggest themselves. First of all, where is our guarantee for the

validity of the intellectual-intuition principle, upon which the whole truth of the system rests, and without which, as Schelling acknowledges, no one can take one single step into his philosophy? Respecting our knowledge of the Absolute, there are in fact no less than three hypotheses in vogue. The first is, that the knowledge of it is altogether impossible, there being no higher faculty than the understanding, and that being cognisant simply of relative and finite phenomena. The next hypothesis maintains, that we have a faculty superior to the understanding, namely, the reason; by which we gain an idea of the absolute as the primary existence in which all finite things are grounded. The third hypothesis is, that of intellectual intuition, by which, as Schelling imagines, we are not only cognisant of the absolute, but have an insight also into the very laws of its development in creation.

Now Schelling fully admits that the Absolute cannot be known by our ordinary intellectual faculties; in other words, that the actual essence of things cannot be attained to simply by our *understanding*. Instead of contenting himself, however, with the faculty of *reason*, as the revealer of absolute existence, he has ventured to run into an altogether wild hypothesis, and under the fiction of intellectual intuition, has pretended to unfold, *à priori*, all the secrets of nature, as being various modi of the divine existence; in a word, to re-produce in our own consciousness Deity itself. We cannot but think

that Schelling has far too gratuitously taken for granted, both the reality of the process, which he terms intellectual intuition, and the reality of the product; especially as he professes to erect a scientific system, having self-evident axioms at its basis. If his doctrine of identity means anything, it means that thought and being are essentially one; that the process of thinking is virtually the same as the process of creating; that in constructing the universe by logical deduction, we do virtually the same thing as Deity accomplishes in developing himself into all the forms and regions of creation; that every man's reason, therefore, is really God: in fine, that Deity is the whole sum of consciousness immanent in the world. "This doctrine," says M. Willm, in his "Memoir to the French Academy," "is founded,—

"1. Upon an illusion. For it takes the process of ordinary generalisation for an absolute law of reason; and erects the principle at which generalisation stops, into the real and essential principle of things themselves.

"2. Upon a paralogism. For it confounds the order of knowledge with the order of existence.

"3. Upon an exaggeration. For it exaggerates the harmony which exists, or which we naturally affirm between our intelligence and reality, by making it an *identity*, and attributing to reason so absolute an authority, that everything must be as it thinks, from the moment that it thinks it.

"4. Upon an hypothesis. For it is a gratuitous supposition to place all truth in the reason, and thus to equal reason with God."

To be convinced that Schelling's axioms are not the soundest, we have only to look next to some of the actual conclusions of his philosophy, and consider whether they be not in the highest degree unsatisfactory. As an example of this, we imagine, that his original system of identity, which makes the whole phenomena of the universe one chain of necessary development, is entirely inconsistent with the facts of physical and moral evil; and equally so with the conscious freedom of man as a moral agent. Again; the view maintained by Schelling respecting Deity, as coming gradually to self-consciousness, and realizing himself only in man, is utterly inconsistent with the perfections of God, as displayed in the design of the universe, and felt in the holier emotions of man's religious nature. Further; the result of the system, as a theory of natural philosophy, by no means answers to the expectations it excites. One would think, that if the very laws of material existence were laid bare, there could be no further need of experimental investigations. What then is the fact?—within the bounds of experimental philosophy not an idea is introduced, which can bear any other title than that of pure hypothesis; while the *rough* path of induction must still be beaten as diligently, as though Schelling's great *à priori* discoveries had

never dawned upon the world. If we *are* to have a purely rational philosophy at all, which shall satisfy the phenomena of the universe, and explain the whole experience of the human consciousness, it must rest upon a far surer foundation than that which Schelling has laid, and answer far more perfectly to the external and internal facts, which come before our daily observation. The day, we imagine, is far distant, before we shall have to welcome the development of any great physical laws from one who entirely sets at nought the whole logic of induction.

With regard to Schelling's Theosophy, we can hardly view it as meriting the title of philosophy at all, in any true or proper sense; indeed, we believe it is very generally rejected in Germany, even by those who had been warm admirers of his original system. With these obvious objections, however, we must admit, that, as an instance of bold generalization, of fertile fancy, of reasoning, ingenuity, abounding at the same time in original views on many topics, and exhibiting a most extensive acquaintance with almost every branch of human knowledge, the philosophy of Schelling exhibits a monument of genius, which, in the same department, has been seldom equalled, and perhaps never exceeded, in the world.*

Fichte and Schelling represent the two opposite sides of the modern German idealism; the one

* Vide Note G. Appendix.

starting from the subjective principle, the other from the objective—the one regarding self as the absolute, the other, the infinite and eternal mind—the soul of the world. HEGEL, to whom we must now turn our attention, has passed beyond the region both of the one and the other, and attained to the elevation of what is usually termed *absolute idealism*. Fichte supposed that there is a real subjective existence, in whose nature resides those limitations, by which he has accounted for the phenomena of the outward world; and Schelling maintained an original, absolute, living *essence*, containing within itself the laws of its own self-development. Hegel has first resolved everything into a *process* of thought, and claimed to reach the point, at which all speculative philosophy aims—that in which thought and existence perfectly coincide.

George William Frederick Hegel was born at Stuttgard, in the year 1770. At the age of seventeen he went to the university of Tübingen, where he devoted himself to the study of theology, and, in the philosophical department, attended the same lectures with Schelling. After having taken his degree, and having occupied some years as a private tutor, he went to Jena in the year 1801, where he began his lectures as a professor, with an auditory of *four* students. The next sixteen years of his life were spent, partly as a professor, partly as rector of a gymnasium, and partly as an editor and author. At length, in the year 1818, he was

called to Berlin, where he lectured with great success till his death, which took place Nov. 14, 1831.

Hegel began his philosophical career as a firm partisan of Schelling; and when he first ventured beyond the pale of his authority, the aim was rather to give system and unity to Schelling's doctrines, than to advance any altogether new ideas. Schelling, as we have sufficiently seen, was anything but systematic in his philosophical writings; in continuing to pour forth the productions of his inventive genius, through the medium of his journals, he seemed to aim more at putting his thoughts in different points of view, than at building up the regular framework of a scientific superstructure. Hegel, with less invention, possessed greater logical acumen, and far more method than his contemporary; and to this mainly is owing the great extent to which his school has now spread itself throughout Germany.

The entrance into philosophy, according to Schelling, was by the door of intellectual intuition, a faculty by which we were supposed to gaze immediately upon the absolute, as we gaze by ordinary sensation upon the forms of the material world. Hegel considered this principle to be unphilosophical, and strove to do away with the necessity of a faculty, which might be so easily abused, and would so naturally open the door, (as was actually the case,) into the regions of mysti-

cism. With this object in view, he sought to construct a *purely logical system*, where there should be no inexplicable phenomena remaining,—where no real essence, either subjective or objective, should be admitted, that was not fully sublimated into thought, and that might not form indeed a logical part of the very process of philosophy itself.

With Schelling, there was a primary essence in the absolute, *previous* to its development, and which therefore did not originate in the developing process; in more technical language, there was an (x) which remained to the last unresolved in his philosophy. Instead of beginning with *zero*, and explaining *all* existence, he began with a realistic point—a certain absolute power or law, perceived through the medium of intellectual intuition, and made this the basis of everything else. Beyond the region of thought there lay, as he conceived, the region of real existence, containing in it the principle of its own self-unfolding. With Hegel, however, the case was different: he allowed of no original essence whatever, which was not identical with thought, and which was not completely worked up into his philosophical process. The x was with him entirely resolved; for, beginning with *nothing*, he shewed with logical precision how everything had regularly proceeded from it.

Another point of difference between these two great philosophers lies here. Schelling's *intuition*

was of such a nature, that the law of the universe, (the process of objectifying and again subjectifying,) was learned by *experience.* The rhythm of all existence was supposed by him to be cognisable at the same time by the inward experience of the subjective self, in the outward operations of nature, and likewise in the progressive course of the world's history. Hegel's philosophy, on the contrary, is pure rationalism, from the very first step to the last: it results from resigning oneself entirely to the *laws of thought*, as seen in speculative reasoning, and regards the self-development of that thought as being the true revelation of the Absolute, that is, of God. Thoughts are, with him, as much concrete realities as anything else; and logic, as being a true description of their processes, is at the same time a true description of the laws of the universe. With other philosophers, logic had been merely a formal science; but although its dignity had been much raised by Kant, as also by Fichte and Schelling, yet it was reserved for Hegel to deny altogether its formal character, to make it a *real* branch of metaphysics, and to admit it as a part of the process by which the whole universe of things is constructed. Not only (as in the philosophy of Schelling) is the method of logic regarded equally with the phenomena of nature as a manifestation of the Absolute, *but it is a part of the very process in which the absolute itself consists.* With these principles, it is easy to see how significantly the Hegelian philo-

sophy has been denominated a system of *absolute idealism.*

Philosophy begins, then, on the Hegelian principle, by our gaining a clear conception of the laws of thought; those laws by which the knowledge of *anything whatever* is arrived at. In attempting to observe these laws, we soon discover, that the process of knowing implies a threefold movement. *First* of all, our consciousness exists in a condition in which it is one with the object. Pure sensation, (as is generally admitted,) would never give us the knowledge of an external world; all that it affords us is a *bare feeling;* so that the primary step in the attainment of the knowledge of any object, must be the state, in which there is a complete blending of subject and object. *Secondly*, instead of remaining in this state of consciousness, we soon objectify it; sensation becomes perception, and we refer our feeling to some real outward existence as the cause. The faculty, by which this separation between subject and object is effected, is the understanding (Verstand), answering to judgment in the ordinary division of the scholastic logic. The *third* process is that, in which our consciousness again returns to complete union with the object, even whilst the object remains before us in all its clearness. In this last movement, we perceive the object *as a product, or state of our own minds:* while, therefore, it is, as an outward reality, destroyed, (auf gehoben,) yet as a state of our own conscious-

ness it is preserved; or, in the words of the author, the object is *sublatum*, the state is *servatum*. As the former movement was the effect of the understanding, so this is of the reason (Vernunft).

In this process, then, which we find to be uniformly followed, when we attain the knowledge of anything, we see the law, or the rhythm of all nature, and all existence. Take any object whatever and ask how it becomes to us a real existing idea or thing (for with Hegel these two are the same). Philosophers ordinarily say, that when we have a perception there is implied the mind or subject that perceives on the one side, and the object which is perceived on the other, the two communicating by some unknown process. The pure idealist, it is true, denies the reality of the object, and regards it as a production of the subject; but Schelling had exploded this notion, and introduced the doctrine of identity, according to which we must admit a real subject and a real object, but must regard them as two corresponding manifestations of the same absolute existence. Hegel, however, now goes one step further in his analysis. He says, that there is neither subject or object separately considered, but that they both owe their existence and reality to each other. The only real existence, then, is *the relation;* the whole universe is a universe of relations; subject and object which appear contradictory to each other are really one—not one in the sense of Schelling, as being opposite poles of

the same absolute existence, but one inasmuch as their relation forms the very idea, or the very thing itself.

This process, then, by which everything comes into being, is the very soul and essence of life, of nature, of the absolute; and Deity, which was in the other systems an original and self-existent reality, is now a *process* or movement ever unfolding itself, but never unfolded. God only realizes himself, in fact, in the progress of the human consciousness; and the process by which this realization is effected is absolutely synonymous with himself. In a word, the dialectic process is Hegel's method; the dialectic process is his Deity: the dialectic process is everything: all nature, all mind, all history, all religion, are but pulsations of this movement, and God himself is but the same law taken absolutely in its whole comprehension. In the threefold rhythm of all existence, as given by Hegel, there is a manifest affinity with the three potencies of Schelling; but it was Hegel alone who ventured to make a universe of pure relations, and to raise the process, the very method of his philosophy, to the dignity of being itself the *absolute idea* = God.

With these preliminary observations we must now proceed to look a little closer into the *interior* of the system. The point on which we must stand, in order to take a comprehensive view over the

whole range of Hegel's philosophy, is that of the *absolute idea*. The Absolute is with him not the infinite *substance*, as with Spinoza, nor the infinite *subject*, as with Fichte, nor the infinite *mind*, as with Schelling; it is a perpetual *process*, an eternal thinking, without beginning and without end. This process, however, rolls onward in its course by the threefold movement we have already deduced. The first step is the infinite idea in itself (Idee in sich). The second is the idea in its objective form, or in its differentiation (Idee in ihrem anders-seyn). The third is the idea in its regress. These movements, viewed in connexion with the process of thinking in which the absolute consists, and in which they are perfectly represented, give us, 1st, bare thought (Denken an sich), 2dly, thought externalizing itself = nature, and, 3dly, thought returning to itself = mind. Accordingly, philosophy has three corresponding divisions; — logic, philosophy of nature, and philosophy of mind. The first is the region of bare thinking, the second is the region of thought in its objective forms, and the third is the region of thought in its reflective movement in the soul of man. The whole object of philosophy, therefore, is to develop existence from its most empty and abstract form up through logic, nature, and mind, to its highest and richest elevation as attained in the human consciousness. In this we shall find the same process perpetually repeating

itself, and gaining something fresh at every pulsation, until it arrives at its highest perfection. We begin, then, with *Logic.*

This is the region of abstract thought, in which the absolute appears in its first and most undeveloped form. Logic, the region of *Idee an sich*, is intended to shew the subjective processes of thought; to point out the method by which, from the most empty of all our notions, we rise gradually to the most rich and full. To explain the true process of logical thinking we must observe, that all knowledge consists in a separation or distinguishing of one thing from another. In every thought there are two parts, which stand opposed; both of which are absolutely necessary to give it a clear and actual meaning. It is the same whether we view thought in the form of sensation, or of perception, or of reflection; in every instance, there must be something separated, defined, distinguished, or placed in opposition to something else. We have no notion, *e. g.*, of a finite without an infinite; no idea of cause without effect; no idea of subjective without objective. So also in nature there could be no north-pole without a south, and no idea of material substance without immaterial.

This being the case, it is not possible for any notion to exist as an *absolute unity;* it must, in every instance, consist of two sides, a positive and a negative; and, to complete it, these two sides

must be combined so as to form one perfect idea. This is called by Hegel, the doctrine of contradiction (Widerspruch), which simply means, that in every idea we form, there must be *two* things opposed and distinguished, in order to afford us a clear conception and a definite meaning. In this doctrine of contradiction, or rather we would term it, of opposition, Hegel finds the rhythm of the whole logical process, the two opposites answering to the two former movements of the dialectic process above described, and the union of these two in *one idea*, corresponding with the third or highest movement of the same.

Now if the problem were placed before us, to trace the existence of all things from their very first coming into being to the attainment of their present form, we should have (beginning with things as they now are) to follow them *backwards*, until we came to *nothing*, and there we should find the starting-point of the process of creation. In like manner, when we attempt to analyse the development of *thought* (which with Hegel is identical with existence), we must seize the very emptiest, most abstract, most meaningless notion we can find, and from that deduce all the rest in regular course by the process already laid down. This primary and most abstract of all notions is that of *being* (seyn), and forms the first division of Hegel's logic.

First Division.—Doctrine of Being.—In asking how a thing can *begin to be*, we require to see its

transition from nothing into *Being*. Without the idea of not-being, or nothing, we could never have that of being, and *vice versâ;* so that the two stand to one another as opposites, and both together combine to form a complete notion, viz., that of bare production, or the *becoming* (werden), of something out of nothing. This, then, is the first step in philosophy, the primary pulsation of the dialectic process. In it being and nothing stand as the poles; and the conjunction of them forms the notion of *existence*. In these three (sein, nichts, werden), we see the type or symbol of all thought, shewing us, that for every complete idea there must be the combination of two opposites. Neither being or not-being can exist as a reality of itself; each is but the opposite pole of the other, and it is in their indifference that the act of coming into existence first appears. Hence the meaning of the extraordinary equation that stands at the threshold of Hegel's philosophy, Sein = Nichts; and hence, the first conclusion, that the notions of being and not-being combined form that of existence. This may appear clearer to the German scholar, if we say in Hegel's language, that *Sein* and *Nichts* form *Daseyn*.

Now, the same process goes over again. Daseyn gives rise to a two-fold movement, by which a still higher point in the scale of being is attained. An existence may be viewed in relation to itself, or in relation to the things around it; it may be

existence *an sich* or existence *für andre;* in plainer terms, we may regard it as *substance* or as *quality.* Now, substance and quality are opposites to each other; we cannot conceive of a substance without qualities, nor can we conceive of qualities without a substance, in which they adhere. Both these correlates are nonentities in themselves, but united they give us the general notion of *reality.* A substance and qualities combined form a real existence (etwas), and thus complete the first category, namely, that of quality; the three steps of which are, accordingly, being, existence, and self-subsistence, or, in the original, Seyn, Daseyn, Für-sich-seyn. This category clearly shews us how the original infinite becomes finite. A real something (etwas) is distinguished from all other things, by its being limited or bounded-off: destroy these limitations, and it flows back into infinity. Thus, the notions of finite and infinite are both *per se* incomplete; the one is necessary to the other, and both arise from that movement of logical thinking, by which we rise from the bare notion of being to that of some particular existence.

The three ideas, we have just deduced, falling under the category of quality, all point to the *inner* nature of things, and not to their outward form. The next category in the doctine of bare existence (Seyn) is that of quantity. Under this are explained the notion of continued size and divisible size; of pure quantity and of a particular

quantity; these two united forming the notion of degree (Grad). Degree, then, as implying a quantity joined to a quality, gives the idea of measure (Mass), or the relation of one quantity to another, and thus completes the first divison of logic, or "*die Lehre vom Sein.*"

Second Division.—Doctrine of Essence.—In the second division of logic, Being appears in a more determined, definite, and independent form. Instead of having the characteristic of bare empty existence, it has now that of real concrete existence, and gives rise to the doctrine of essence, "die Lehre vom Wesen." This second movement of the logical process, as seen in nature, answers to the second movement in mind, where the understanding separates the object from the consciousness, and places it as a distinct reality before the mind. Here, again, we have a threefold division. Essence may appear either as the ground, or substratum of existence (as in the words, matter, spirit); or it may appear as phenomenon, *i. e.*, as expressing those qualities of objects which cannot be separated from them; and, then, by uniting the notion of substratum and attribute, we attain the conception of *a thing* in plain contradistinction from that universal essence of which it forms a part. Here, then, is resolved the great problem before which the Eleatics paused, that of reconciling the individuality of each separate thing with the unity of the absolute essence.

We have now traced the dialectic process through two of its spheres of action, and shewn how from the bare idea of being we come, at length, to that of a distinct, essential, real *thing*. When we attempt to proceed beyond this, we get into a higher region of thought, the doctrine of notions (die Lehre vom Begriff), answering to the reasoning process in formal logic, and in nature answering to all organism and life, up to the highest developments of mind itself.

Third Division.—Doctrine of Notions.—The three divisions of logic, will now stand thus, in relation to each other:—1. The doctrine of BEING, answers to the abstract conceptions of time and space, giving us only those ideas which are purely qualitative or quantitative. 2. The doctrine of ESSENCE, answers to time and space, not in the abstract but the concrete, filled up, the one with actual existence, the other with real phenomena, such as those of substance; attribute, cause, and effect, &c. Then, lastly, the doctrine of NOTION (*begriff*), refers to all those things which have peculiar characteristics of their own—real and definable objects, whether in the region of organized or inorganized existence. This last doctrine, that of notions, in the same manner as the other two, has three divisions: first, notion in its subjective point of view, giving the different movements of the mind as seen in simple apprehension, judgment, reasoning; secondly, notion in

its objective point of view, giving us the conceptions of the three realms of nature—the mechanical, the chemical, and the organized; and thirdly, we have the union of subject and object, expressed by Hegel in the word *idea*, which rises, also, through three successive steps: first, as life; then, as intelligence; and lastly, as the absolute idea—the summit of the whole process, and synonymous with Deity.

To give a clearer idea of the several divisions and subdivisions of Hegel's logic, we shall subjoin the following scheme, which the reader may now compare with the above description.

LOGIC COMPREHENDS.

I.

THE DOCTRINE OF BEING (Die Lehre vom Seyn).

A. *Quality.*

a. Being (Seyn).

b. Existence (Daseyn).

c. Independent existence (Für-sich-seyn).

B. *Quantity.*

a. Pure quantity (Reine Quantität).

b. Divisible quantity (Quantum).

c. Degree (Grad).

C. *Measure.*

(Mass.) The union of quality and quantity.

II.

THE DOCTRINE OF ESSENCE (Lehre vom Wesen).

A. *Ground of Existence.*

a. Pure notions of essence.

b. Essential existence (Existenz).

c. Thing (Ding).

B. *Phenomenon.*

a. Phenomenal world (Welt der Erscheinung).

b. Matter and form (Inhalt und Form).

c. Relation (Verhältniss).

C. *Reality. Union of Ground, and Phenomenon.*

a. Relation of substance.

b. Relation of Cause.

c. Action and reaction.

III.

DOCTRINE OF NOTION (Lehre vom Begriff).

A. *Subjective Notion.*

a. Notion as such (Begriff als solches).

b. Judgment (Urtheil).

c. Inference (Schluss).

B. *Object.*

a. Mechanical powers (Mechanismus).

b. Chemical powers (Chemismus).

c. Design (Teleologie).

C. *Idea.*

a. Life (Leben).

b. Intelligence (Erkennen).

c. Absolute idea (Absolute Idee).

In the above sketch of Hegel's Logic we have given only the chief divisions; of the ingenuity and logical acuteness, with which these divisions are deduced the one from the other, and the whole framework built up, we can give no idea whatever. To comprehend this fully, we must refer the reader to his Cyclopædia of Philosophical Sciences, published in a complete edition of his works by his most distinguished pupils (Berlin, 1840).

We must now proceed to the second division of philosophy, namely, *Philosophy of Nature.*

The transition from the logic to the philosophy of nature is by no means a clear and intelligible step in the Hegelian system. Logic is the region of bare thought; the philosophy of nature is the region of *thought externalizing itself.* Nature is still thought, but thought in its objective movement, being the exact opposite to logical thinking; while both combine in the philosophy of *mind.* In order to account for the process of thought in the universe taking that objective form, in which it appears as nature, Hegel has recourse to a somewhat far-fetched doctrine concerning the descent of the absolute idea from its original unity, as subject-object, into a state of separation; just as in pure logical thinking the understanding separates what was *one* in the original consciousness. Schelling, as we have already seen, regarded nature as a part of the process, by which the absolute realized itself: he viewed the process of development

accordingly as necessary, and regarded all existence to be the play of a supreme fate. Hegel regarded the dialectic movement, by which the absolute separates itself and externalizes itself in nature, as perfectly *free*, so that his pantheism did not profess to destroy the notion of the freedom and absolute personality of God.

Now, just as in logic, the absolute process appeared in its threefold movement, so also does it appear in the three corresponding ones in nature. Nature in its empty undetermined forms (answering to the doctrine of Being) appears in that peculiar aspect which is taken of it in the science of *mechanics*. Here there are, first, the purely mathematical ideas of matter, as existing in time, space, and motion; next, there are the mechanical properties of matter, as gravitation, &c.; and, thirdly, there are the absolute properties as viewed at large in the construction of the material universe, where the fixed stars, the binary stars, and the solar system, give us illustrations of the different kind of forces which are actually in operation.

The second division of the philosophy of nature is *physics*. Here we take into consideration, first, the general forms of matter, as earth, water, light, &c.; secondly, the phenomena of specific gravity, cohesion, elasticity, &c.; and, thirdly, the specific forms, as acids, alkalies, metals, &c.

The third division of this branch of philosophy is *organism*, in which the other two movements are

combined; the first giving to nature its matter, the second its form, the third affording that in which matter and form are united. Here, again, we have *first*, the geological world; secondly, the vegetable world; and thirdly, the animal world; the last leading us to the point where the philosophy of nature ends and that of spirit begins. To give a clearer idea of the chief steps, under which this branch is treated, we annex the accompanying scheme.

PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE COMPREHENDS.

I.

Mechanics.

a. Mathematical properties.
b. Mechanical properties.
c. Properties of absolute motion in space.

II.

Physics.

a. General forms of matter.
b. Relative forms of matter.
c. Specific forms of matter.

III.

Organism.

a. Geological structure.
b. Vegetable structure.
c. Animal structure.

Each one of these triplets forms one complete pulsation of the dialectic process, and were it not entering too far into detail, each one of the minor divisions would be seen to contain a minor movement of the same threefold process as well. We hasten on, however, to the third division of philosophy, namely, *Philosophy of Mind.*

At the point where nature leaves off, having carried on her operations to the very highest pitch of perfection in the human organization, the philosophy of mind begins; in which, as the third great division of philosophy, we have pure logical thought and nature (the subjective and the objective) fully combined. The steps of this, corresponding with those in logic and nature, are as follows.

PHILOSOPHY OF MIND.

I.

Viewed subjectively.

a. Anthropology.
b. Psychology.
c. Will.

II.

Viewed objectively.

a. Jurisprudence.
b. Morals.
c. Politics.

III.

Absolute Mind.

a. Æsthetics.

b. Religion.

c. Philosophy.

Each one of these several points contains a separate branch of mental philosophy in itself. Thus, in the subjective movement, we have, under *anthropology*, the different races of mankind discussed, varying, as they do, according to the relative development of their moral and intellectual being. It is, in fact, the doctrine of *the soul* in its original constitution. Under *psychology*, we have the nature and peculiarities of the different mental processes in feeling, perceiving, remembering, imagining, &c. all analysed and arranged; while under the title of *will*, we have the classification of our active powers, shewing how they lead to all the results of practical life.

In the objective movement we are introduced to the whole range of *moral* philosophy, or mind in its relations to those without. This is divided—first, into the rights of person and property, as in jurisprudence; secondly, into the rectitude of actions generally, viz., morals; and thirdly, into domestic and public duties, which may be termed (in the extended meaning of the word) *politics*.

Lastly, when we rise to mind in its absolute form, we no longer view it as belonging to the

individual, but to the race, and look for its development, not in the life of a single man, but in the history of the world. The primary development of the human mind, in the process of civilization, is that of *art;* for the age of poetry precedes all others, and mythology is ever the form in which truth is first embodied, recognised, and taught. To this succeeds the age of *religion*, in which God is regarded as a distinct personality, separate from the world and separate from the mind of the worshipper,—a Being to whom we owe entire allegiance and submission. Under this head Hegel discusses the various forms of religion which have appeared in the world, from the earliest ages to the present. Last of all comes the age of *philosophy*, in which religion rises to its pure reflective form, and truth comes forth from her symbols to appear in her naked reality. The conclusion, then, and at the same time the top-stone of mental science, is the *History of Philosophy*, as it has appeared in the world; in which we find thought developing itself gradually (according to the process given in the science of logic), from the period of Parmenides, who stood upon the lowest step (that of bare existence), up to the present day, in which Hegel himself has deduced the *absolute idea* in all the fulness of its truth and glory!

Before we quit this our skeleton sketch of the Hegelian philosophy, it will be desirable to give our readers some idea of its application to various

important questions of a religious nature. First, with regard to the nature and personality of God, Hegel is far from departing so widely from pantheistic opinions, as to admit a distinct personality out of and apart from all other finite personalities. With him God is not *a person*, but personality itself, *i. e.*, the universal personality, which realizes itself in every human consciousness as so many separate thoughts of one eternal mind. The idea we form of the Absolute, is to Hegel the Absolute itself, its essential existence being synonymous with our conception of it. Apart from, and out of the world, therefore, there is no God; and so also, apart from the universal consciousness of man there is no Divine consciousness or personality. God is with him the whole process of thought, combining in itself the objective movement, as seen in nature, with the subjective, as seen in logic, and fully realizing itself only in the universal spirit of humanity. With regard to other theological ideas, Hegel strove to deduce philosophically the main features of the evangelical doctrine. He explained the doctrine of the Trinity by shewing that every movement of the thinking process is, in fact, a Trinity in Unity. Pure independent thought and self-existence answers to the Father — the objectifying of this pure existence answers to the λογος προφορικος the Son, God manifested in the flesh; while the Spirit is that which proceedeth from the Father and

the Son; the complete reunion of the two in the Church.

Hegel's Christology, again, agrees in the main ideas with the evangelical doctrine, except that his attempt to deduce the whole from philosophical principles gives to it a complete air of rationalism. He views the idea of redemption as the reunion of the individualized spirit of man with the Spirit of eternal truth and love. By faith we become one with God, forming a part of himself, members of his mystical body, as symbolized in the ordinances of the Church. This view of the Christian doctrines has been more fully developed by Strauss, who has entirely denied a historical truth to the New Testament, and made the whole simply a mythological representation of great moral and spiritual ideas. On the doctrine of immortality, Hegel has said but little, and that little by no means satisfactory. However the depth and comprehensiveness of his system may charm the mind that loves to rationalize upon every religious doctrine, it can, assuredly, give but little *consolation* to the heart, that is yearning with earnest longings after holiness and immortality.

In some other points, not of a religious nature, Hegel has given us many views of great originality. His philosophy of history is epecially valuable, as containing investigations into the peculiar characteristics of the different ages of the world, that

throw great light upon the intellectual progress of civilization. Into this, however, we shall not enter; we have attempted to give a comprehensive view of his whole system, just sufficient, we trust, to guide the student in appreciating the place it occupies at the head of the idealism of the present century, and must leave him, however unsatisfied with our details, to follow them up from the original source.*

In reading the foregoing sketch, it will probably suggest itself to many of our readers—How could a system of philosophy so strange, so paradoxical, so entirely opposed to all the ordinary habits of thinking common to mankind at large, be seriously maintained by any earnest and truthful mind? A little consideration, however, may tend to shew us, that his doctrine of absolute identity is not so unnatural and extravagant as some might at first imagine. Really speaking, it all turns upon two fundamental points: first, the unity of contradictories, or opposites, as the principle of human knowledge; and secondly, the identity of being and thought.

Now, with regard to the former of these principles, there is, undoubtedly, a *germ* of truth in it, which every one must admit. What is knowledge, but the perception that two different things are fundamentally one? Take any judgment, any proposition you choose, and you find that it con-

* Note H, Appendix.

tains the assertion, that two different things form a unity or identity between them. The subject and predicate are the differences—the copula expresses their identity. In proportion as knowledge advances, the tendency to generalize becomes greater; differences become more and more merged into higher principles; until finally, as all theists admit, the universe, with its infinitely diversified phenomena, is seen to spring by some process of creative power from God, the first cause—the highest unity. Thus Hegel's doctrine of the fundamental unity of opposites, which has been so often reproached as a contradiction in terms, has its *germ* in the common sense and common belief of humanity. The other principle, the identity of being and thought, is, perhaps, somewhat more abstruse, but still, it is not so utterly baseless as some suppose. For, if all finite existence can be referred, as we have just seen, to a primitive unity; if there is an absolute ground in which all things subsist, then the phenomenal, the finite, the so-termed *material*, is but mere appearance, the real substratum is the infinite essence. But this infinite essence only exists as it is *thought*; universal Being is a purely rational conception, a necessary idea; it does not come to its full reality except in the human consciousness. Hence, the real and ideal meet in one; the very essence of the former consisting really in a process of the latter.

Admit then these two fundamental principles,

and the other parts of the Hegelian theory follow step by step. The ideal and the real being one, thought and existence being identical, the process by which thought is developed must be the process of the whole of nature; the laws of logic must be the laws of the universe; and the dialectic movement, or the method by which our notions are eliminated, is the method by which all things come into being and subsist. The rhythm of existence thus being found, all that is necessary is to apply it to the construction of a complex system of philosophy, which shall draw within its mighty grasp the totality of the phenomena of man, of nature, and of Deity.

Whilst, however, there are some considerations, which appear to justify the Hegelian hypothesis, yet there are, as it appears to us, insuperable objections under which it labours. First of all, we would ask, Whence does this process, this great rhythm of existence proceed? Hegel pretends to have solved the whole secret of being; to have no realistic starting point; to begin with zero, and deduce everything. This pretension, however, is not fulfilled. The *law* of existence is still *assumed*, still unaccounted for; so that the huge fabric of philosophy he has erected upon it, however ingenious and admirable in itself, still is equally dogmatical, in its ground principle, with the pantheism of Spinoza, or the ordinary theism of mankind. *In principle*, it is just as easy to imagine an Infinite

Being, the God of Christianity, as the source of all things, as an infinite *law*. And such a supposition, we need not say, is infinitely more in consistency with the phenomena of the human mind, and of the structure of nature around us.

Secondly, there is a confusion between the logical or formal processes of thinking, and the real process of things themselves, which can never be reconciled with human experience, and never gain the practical belief of mankind. The logical idea, commencing with nothing, simply by its own inward movement or self-unfolding, creates the universe! Of course we may, *in thought*, begin with the most abstract notion, and then go on adding attribute to attribute, till we have placed the whole concrete universe before us. But this can never be put down as identical with the process of creation itself. A logical or universal whole is, speaking realistically, a nonentity; whereas Hegel makes it the *essence* (seyn) which contains in it potentially the whole phenomena of being.

Thirdly, the system of Hegel is utterly inconsistent with the results of psychology, *i. e.*, with the most obvious facts of the human consciousness. Human freedom entirely vanishes under its shadow. The man is but the mirror of the absolute; his consciousness must ever roll onwards by the fixed law of all being; his personality is sunk in the infinite; he can never be ought but what he really is. Moral obligation must here perish, because

freedom is annihilated; and the law of progress being fixed, man becomes irresponsible; this conclusion is one against which no logical finesse can ultimately save us. Either the man (or the me) is himself absolute and infinite, or he is a finite personality, having the source of his being out of himself. To suppose the former, altogether contradicts the consciousness of self, which is that of a finite power capable of being resisted. If he is the latter, then there is that in being, which does not pass through our own individual thoughts, and beyond the logical process there is a something absolutely unknown.

Finally. In the Hegelian system, Theism, with all its mighty influence on the human mind, is compromised; for Deity is a process ever going on, but never accomplished; nay, the divine consciousness is absolutely one with the advancing consciousness of mankind. This being the case, the hope of immortality likewise perishes, for death is but the return of the individual to the infinite, and man is annihilated, though the Deity will eternally live. Religion, if not destroyed by the Hegelian philosophy, is absorbed in it, and, *as religion*, for ever disappears.

Hegel died in the full blush of his reputation, and before he had published half the views, which he had matured, beyond the walls of the lecture-room. At his death, seven of his most distinguished pupils combined, according to his own wish, to

publish his lectures, collated at once from his own manuscripts, and from the notes they had themselves taken of them as orally delivered. The names of these seven are Marheineke, Schulze, Gans, von Henning, Hotho, Michelet, and Förster. Under their superintendence, an edition of his works has now been completed, which is regarded as the last and authoritative view of his whole system. Not only, however, have Hegel's pupils done justice to the memory of their master by the publication of his works and remains, but, forming themselves into a school, they have at once defended his doctrines against the numerous attacks which they have had to sustain, and applied them vigorously to the different branches of theology, law, history, and science. Amongst these, Henning and Schulze have further elaborated his views on natural philosophy; Gans, on jurisprudence; Michelet, on morals; Weisse, Rötscher, and Hotho, on æsthetics; whilst in theology, a host of writers have sprung forth to wield the Hegelian weapons, and contend on every side for a religion of complete Rationalism.

It is in the department of theology chiefly, that the great battle of Hegelianism has been, and is still being fought. Within the last ten years, indeed, philosophy and theology in Germany seem to have become almost synonymous; the transcendent importance of the great fundamental principles of man's religious belief absorbing almost every other purely philosophical question. Inca-

pable, however, of coming to a united understanding upon these topics, the Hegelian school has separated into *three* divisions, each regarding the nature of religious truth in a different point of view. To explain the variations of these three parties, we must observe, that there are two inward sources from which religious ideas may be supposed to spring; the one is the direct intuition of our religious nature, excited either by faith or experience; the other is pure logical reasoning; and it is according to the predominance of one of these sources over the other, that Hegelianism takes its lower or its higher pantheistic signification.

The first, and least rationalistic branch of the Hegelian school is that, which is represented by Göschell, Schaller, Erdman, and Gabler. According to the view of these writers, our religious perception must be the *criterion* and *judge* of all our logical inferences. That it is possible to deduce rationally the whole sum and substance of theological truth, they freely admit, (otherwise they could not take their station among the rationalists,) but in every case, they affirm, our religious consciousness must be consulted, to confirm and approve the inferences of our reason. Hence, on the ground of this consciousness, they assert the full personality of God, and likewise defend historically the literal views given by the Scriptures of the person of Christ, as the God-man—the Mediator between the human and the divine. These opinions, there is

every reason to believe, very much accorded with those of Hegel himself, who ever professed his belief in the ordinary faith of the Lutheran Church.

The second branch of the Hegelian school, at once the most numerous and influential, is represented mainly by Rosenkranz, Marheineke, Vatke, and Michelet. By these writers, the religious perceptions and feelings are only appealed to as a *secondary* source, by which we simply *illustrate* the results of logical thinking. Accordingly, the personality of God is taken by them in a far more general and pantheistic sense, as agreeing better with the nature of that dialectic process by which all theological, as well as other ideas, are developed. The doctrine, again, respecting Christ, his union with human nature, and his redemption of the world, is taken from its plain historical meaning, and made to represent general ideas, such as the reunion of the fallen and separated will of man, with the infinite reason—the soul of the world; while the immortality of the mind is made to refer, not so much to the duration of our personality, as to the general perpetuity of *thought*, of which our minds are but individual movements.

Up to this point, then, in the Hegelian school, religious consciousness and the deductions of reason had gone hand in hand, only with a varying preponderance of importance attached, either to the one side or the other; but in the third and newest Hegelian party there is a complete breach formed

between the two, it being formally declared that we have to follow the dictates of our reason, *to whatever extent they may contradict the dictates of our religious perceptions and instincts.* The representatives of this school are Strauss, Bruno Bauer, Conradi, and Feuerbach. With them, Pantheism attains the point at which it ever tends, that, namely, in which it becomes fully synonymous with Atheism. In their system, no God is admitted to exist, out of and apart from the world; *i. e.*, in the proper sense of the term, there is no God at all. With reference, moreover, to the New Testament, it is well known that these writers have rationalized upon it to the furthest possible extent, regarding the whole of the historical portion as a *designed* mythology, in which are conveyed to us great and immortal truths.

Since Hegel's death, the conflict between the Hegelian school and their opponents, (especially with Schelling, and those who adhere to his doctrine,) has gone on with unmitigated vigour, and even rancour. Up to the present hour, work after work is teeming from the press, in which the respective claims of these two great absorbing systems are advocated; whilst on theological grounds they are both alike attacked by the more orthodox, with all the weapons of learning and eloquence.

To enter into this endless discussion would be altogether impracticable in the present sketch, and

perhaps equally uninteresting to the majority of our readers. Krug, in his history of the modern philosophy, fills three large volumes in detailing the battle of Hegelianism up to the year 1837; and were the history to be continued, it is probable that as many more volumes would be required to complete it. The general feeling amongst all, except those who are pledged almost to the very words of the master, is, that *Hegelianism proper* is on the wane. The idealistic movement found in *it* its culminating point; that point is now past, and a tendency is already manifesting itself in the general tone of philosophy to come back to a more realistic system, in which matter and form shall not be confounded, or the divine personality denied, or the foundations of man's immortality undermined.

Mournful as are the *final* results of the sweeping rationalism we have detailed, the works to which it has given rise have tended to throw light, perhaps to an unprecedented degree, upon many of the most important points connected with the philosophy of matter and of mind, of human nature, and human destiny; neither shall we have to regret the whole rationalistic movement, if the atmosphere of truth is cleared by the storm that sweeps across it—if errors are carried away in its course, and the great foundations of man's belief left standing more visible and more certain than ever.

If the reader will turn back to the commencement of this section, he will be able to refresh his memory respecting the twofold course which philosophy has taken in Germany since the time of Kant. In *his* system, as we then remarked, there is, on the one hand, an idealistic, on the other, a realistic element. There is a real existence given in sensation, but yet all we know of it is bare phenomenon. The course, in which the idealistic side of Kant's philosophy has flowed, we have now pointed out. We have seen the speculative method, as the modern idealism is sometimes termed, in its subjective movement, completely realised in Fichte: we have seen its objective movement set forth with great copiousness by Schelling: and we have seen it rising beyond both, up to its most abstract form, in Hegel. In Fichte, the Absolute is to every one his own individual self, beyond the powers and perceptions of which self, he shews, we are utterly unable to reach: in Schelling, the Absolute is the living soul of the universe, of which everything, both in the natural and mental world, is an expansion: in Hegel, the last realistic point is resolved; the Absolute becomes a process, ever unfolding and renewing itself in the world, and that, too, identical with the process of thought—with the method of philosophy. Here we have idealism reaching its culminating point, the matter of our knowledge becoming synonymous with the form; thought one with existence.

Having traced the ideal side, therefore, up to this position, and witnessed its culmination, we leave it to futurity to mark its descent, and turn now to the *realistic* philosophy, which has originated from the Kantian principles. The immediate elaborator of this element was unquestionably Jacobi, whom, on chronological grounds, we ought now to have taken under review, but that his mystical tendency removes his system onward to a future chapter. There is one name, however, which stands forth with great prominence among the philosophers of the present age, who, though an idealist, has, almost single-handed, stemmed the torrent of ultra-idealism, and acquired a reputation, second only to the heads of those great systems, which we have already considered. The name to which I refer is that of HERBART.

John Frederick Herbart was born in the year 1776, at Oldenburg. In 1805, he became professor of philosophy in the University of Göttingen; in 1808, he succeeded Kant at Königsberg; and in 1833, returned to Göttingen, in order to supply the place of Schulz, where, in the summer of 1841, he died.

Herbart's philosophy was the reaction produced by the boldly-advancing idealism of Fichte and Schelling. Their extreme principles on the ideal side threw him back upon a completely realistic hypothesis, which, for many years, he sustained single-handed, with a patience and a logical ability

that reflected the highest credit upon his talents and perseverance. In terming Herbart, however, a realist, we are not to suppose that he returned to the ordinary notion of matter, as being a hard, dull, impenetrable substance, that is perceived immediately by the aid of sensation. This position, (that of common sense,) he never admitted; on the contrary, he asserted, that we can never get beyond our own consciousness, but that all we can know immediately are the phenomena which take place there. From this principle, however, he drew a different conclusion from that of Fichte. Fichte asserted that the idea which actually passes through the mind is synonymous with its *objective meaning:* Herbart shewed that the idea (the actual inward process) is one thing, and that the reality which is implied in it is another. We have, for example, the idea of matter; and as, of course, we know nothing of it which is not contained in our idea, Fichte concluded that, to us, matter, and the idea of matter, are the same. On the other hand, Herbart shewed that the idea is simply the mental or subjective phenomenon, and that this phenomenon *implies* an objective reality, of the truth of which it is at once the voucher and the test. It is true that our ordinary perceptions involve, in many instances, the most palpable contradictions; and the consequence is, that some thinkers have lost all confidence in man's intellectual powers, while others have denied the reality of the objects themselves;

but the proper course of philosophy is manfully to solve the difficulty, instead of falling into scepticism on the one hand, or pure idealism on the other.

The basis of all philosophy, then, according to Herbart, is the whole sum of the phenomena which pass through the human mind. Instead of laying down the existence of an absolute essence, from which all things are derived, he regarded the whole mass of our ordinary convictions as containing the matter, from which alone we must take our start in erecting a system of philosophy. That we have a mass of ideas, which are naturally formed in the mind by its own constitution, and the circumstances in which it is placed, none can deny: these ideas, then, we must detain, examine, elaborate; and, if truth can be arrived at by man at all, it must be arrived at by this process. Herbart's notion, therefore, of philosophy was very simple; it was an analysis and investigation of our ideas, so as to resolve any contradictions they may seem to imply, and to educe from them all the truth which they contain. This is the office of *logic*.

The process by which the necessity of philosophy comes to be felt is the following:—When we look round us upon the world in which we live, our knowledge commences by a perception of the various objects that present themselves on every hand to our view. What we *immediately* perceive, however, is not actual essence, but phenomena; and after a short time, we discover that many of

those phenomena are unreal, that they do not pourtray to us the actual truth of things as they are, and that if we followed them implicitly we should soon be landed in the midst of error and contradiction. For example, what we are immediately conscious of in coming into contact with the external world are such appearances, as green, blue, bitter, sour, extension, resistance, &c. These phenomena, upon reflection, we discover not to be so many real independent existences, but properties inhering in certain substances, which we term things. Again, when we examine further into these *substances*, we discover that they are not real ultimate essences, but that they consist of certain elements, by the combination of which they are produced. What we term the reality, therefore, is not *the thing as a whole*, but the elements of which it is composed. Thus the further we analyze, the further does the idea of *reality* recede backwards; but still it must always be somewhere, otherwise we should be perceiving a nonentity. The last result of the analysis is the conception of an absolutely simple element, which lies as the basis of all phenomena in the material world, and which we view as the essence that assumes the different properties which come before us in sensation. Experience, then, on the one hand gives us a vast number of phenomena, which appear to be so many actually existing realities; reason, on the other hand, obliges us to reject these phenomena as realities, and assign a

simple element for the basis of them, as that which is alone *essentially* true. Here, then, arises a contradiction between reason and experience; and as we cannot fall back upon scepticism without being involved in a still greater difficulty, we look to philosophy so to elaborate and interpret our ideas, both those of experience and of reason, as to solve the contradictions, and to give us a clear insight into the truth. The philosophy which accomplishes this object is termed METAPHYSICS.

Now, in order to see what branches the science of metaphysics contains, we must consider how many fundamental ideas there are, to which our ordinary perceptions may be generalized. From the first moment we perceive objects around us, we begin to classify them, and express the classification by general terms; this process goes on until we come to the three fundamental notions of *thing*, *matter*, *mind;* the first being the notion of a unity with several properties; the second being that of an object existing in space; the third designating that, which has self-consciousness. All these three notions give rise to contradictions in the following manner.

First, if we contemplate a thing, as *e. g.* a piece of gold, we observe that it is yellow, heavy, malleable, &c. And all these properties together go to make up the *unity* which we term gold. If one of these properties were taken away, it would be gold no longer; and if they were all taken away,

nothing whatever would remain to our perception; so that here we come to the contradiction, that the unity is in fact a plurality. Secondly, if we contemplate the notion of matter, we perceive that it is that, which fills a certain space, while at the same time it consists of atoms infinitely divisible; and which, therefore, in their ultimate form can fill no space at all. Here, then, is another seeming contradiction, viz., that atoms, ultimately immaterial or having no extension, should give rise to extended and solid substance. Thirdly, if we contemplate the mind, we find that it is at the same time in continual change or perpetual movement, and yet is ever the same unalterable personality. Now these three fundamental ideas, each giving rise to a separate contradiction, point us to three branches of metaphysics. The first is *Ontology*, which in Herbart's sense means the science that treats of the nature and constitution of things in general, and more especially the explanation of the problem—"How can the one be a multiple, and the multiple a unity?" The second branch is synechology (from συν and εχω), which is the doctrine of *matter*, or the phenomena of the real as existing in time, space, and motion. The third branch is termed eidolology (from ειδωλον), which means the doctrine of ideas or images, and includes psychology, or the science of mental phenomena.

I. Of Ontology. The great problem here to be solved is, to shew how different predicates can exist

in one substance; and conversely, how one simple substance can exhibit a plurality of predicates, This problem is explained through the medium of a principle which is termed by Herbart the *method of relations.* The principle is briefly as follows:— Instead of supposing a thing to be composed of one absolutely simple essence, we must suppose it to be composed of *many*, all independent of each other; and it is the different relations in which they stand to each other, that give the appearance of many predicates existing in one subject. Just as a binary star appears one to the naked eye, but is seen to consist of two by the medium of the telescope, so an object in nature, *i. e.*, *a thing*, appears to be one, but by means of philosophy is discovered to be manifold. The separate and independent essences of which all things are composed ever remain absolutely the same, as they are entirely self-sustained; but when viewed in different lights, and from different points of view in relation to each other, thence they exhibit a multitude of different characteristics.

To shew how this principle accounts for the phenomena in question, Herbert explains very fully his doctrine of *accidental views* (Zufällige Ansichten). In mathematics, we know that one and the same line may be often viewed either as sine, or tangent, or radius of a circle, without its ceasing to be a straight line, and the same straight line. In music, again, a tone may be a fourth, fifth, or sixth, &c., according to the key in which we are playing; so

also here the same essences may remain the same, and yet *appear* different, according to the relation in which we view them. On this principle, then, Herbart seeks to explain the contradiction which lies at the basis of ontology; *i. e.*, to shew that in different lights the same object may be both a unity and a plurality at the same time.

II. Synechology. The object of this branch of metaphysics is to give an intelligible explanation of the phenomena of matter; to shew how things exist or hold together in space; and thus to solve the contradiction of infinite divisibility. To accomplish this purpose, Herbart first attacked and refuted Kant's theory of time and space, which, as we have seen, makes them simply the subjective laws or forms, under which all sensation is carried on. Instead of this, he shewed that the notions of time, space, and motion express certain *relations* in which objects stand to each other. Now the idea of extension, as applied to matter, is the direct result of the idea of space; whatever, therefore, will explain the notion of space will also explain that of extension.

Herbart's doctrine of *intelligible space*, by which he sought to elucidate these points, is in brief somewhat of the following nature:—He begins with viewing each ultimate monad as a mathematical point, thus expressing the negation of all extension with reference to them in their primary form. One mathematical point, as also one monad,

expresses simply locality, and no space whatever; if, however, we add another point to it, and then another to that, in the same direction, we get the idea of *a line*, which is the first dimension. By the addition of other points we are led in the same way to fill up the intervals by the notion of distance, and thus at length to complete the idea of space in all its three dimensions. Space, then, has nothing to do with the monads singly, and can in no sense of the word be attached to them; but no sooner do we see them *in relation* to each other than the idea of continuity, of space, of extension, arises in the mind. Precisely the same thing is true both of time and motion; so that, by this same method of relations in another view of it, the main problem of *synechology* is solved as well as that of *Ontology*.

Matter, then, according to Herbart, is in the ordinary sense immaterial, and without extension; but it obtains all the primary properties, such as extension, inertia, &c., from the *relation* which the monads hold to each other. Upon the same principle he explained the phenomena of attraction and repulsion, and, then, of organization; by which means he finds a transition from the abstract sciences of matter into the philosophy of nature, and a method of explaining the constitution of all the varied portions of the vegetable and animal world.

III. Eidolology.—In this branch of metaphysics,

the principles already deduced in the other two branches are now to be applied to elucidate the phenomena of the human mind, and to shew how those principles agree with our own inward experience. This is the part of his philosophy, which Herbart elaborated with the greatest assiduity, and in which he has most displayed, at once, the power and originality of his genius. The mind we feel to be *one;* at the same time it is conscious of an ever-changing multiplicity of states and feelings, which we must shew are perfectly consistent with its unity. Here, then, the method of relations again comes to our assistance, separating the human consciousness into its proper elements, and shewing that, what could not be predicated of the individual parts can be predicated of the whole, in their various relations to each other. The mind, as subject, is ever the same; but it sees itself, as object, existing in numerous different states—those, for example, of feeling, thinking, willing, &c., and all these different states we call at the time one *self.*

To account for these different states, Herbart goes into a singular mechanical theory of consciousness; the idea of which is, that all mental phenomena are simply different *relations* in which the mind exists to other things. When these relations are such that no particular point stands out from the rest to claim our attention, but all, as it regards our consciousness, are in a state of

equilibrium, we are in a condition of mental quiescence. When one particular point becomes prominent, then it represses the rest, just as a greater force does a smaller, and a corresponding state of consciousness is the result. When there is a struggle for some perception to become prominent over the others, the state of mind is termed *desire*. *Feeling* is the condition produced by the obtrusion of a perception between two antagonist powers. In this way Herbart explains all the facts of consciousness by a species of mechanical calculation, making them all result simply from the mental relations, in which the mind stands to the different objects that work upon it. Having thus completed the province of metaphysics, properly so termed, he calls in, at length, the aid of *faith*, in order to lay a basis for the philosophy of religion, with which his system concludes.

From this slight view of Herbart's method, it becomes at once evident, that it stands in direct opposition to the purely idealistic systems we have before considered. The reader, who has looked far into the history of philosophy, will not be at a loss to see the affinity there is between Herbart's theory of matter and that of Boscovich; while the similarity of his doctrine of monads to that of Leibnitz, compels the conclusion that many of his ideas must have been directly borrowed from that acute thinker. That Herbart has fully sustained his

ground against the energetic idealism to which he stood opposed, would be too much to grant; but, unquestionably, he brought to light much truth on the other side of the question, nor, perhaps, have his exertions been amongst the least of the means, which have succeeded in giving to the philosophy of the present age an incipient, although a very decided realistic tendency.

The names which have passed under our review, namely, those of Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, and Herbart, comprehend, with the exception of the mystical school, almost all that is really original in the German metaphysics. There are a few thinkers, however, of a recent date, who have attempted to mould the Hegelian philosophy into a more satisfactory form; and a few others, who have set up some new philosophical principles, although they are not of sufficient reputation to need any very particular mention at present. The four writers, who are termed by Michelet, in his History of German Philosophy, Pseudo-Hegelians, are Fischer, Fichte, jun., Weisse, and Branis. These authors all acknowledge the excellency of Hegel's *method*, and allow him due honour for the discovery, but they all agree with Schelling, that Hegel has only taken up the negative side of philosophy, that his system can only afford the

purely logical process of thought, and that he has not succeeded in shewing, that his categories express the real essence of existence as well as the form. In a word, they protest against the absolute idealism of the Hegelian system, and shew the path back again to a realistic or positive philosophy, from whence the *material* is to be obtained, by which the bare forms of the categories of thought may be filled with a real and essential existence. With regard to the idea of God, moreover, they attempt to step beyond the Hegelian point of view; to deduce his proper personality; and to explain the process of creation by which the world exists as a distinct entity.

With regard to those philosophers, who have put forth new ideas, we might mention Suabedissen, Hillebrand, Troxler, and Krause, as the principal; always, of course, excepting those who have taken a direction in favour of mysticism. The peculiarity of these writers is, that they have all made the attempt to combine in one the subjective and the objective branches of the modern idealism, to unite the principles of Schelling and Hegel. Suabedissen has, with peculiar care, elaborated the philosophy of religion, in which he has combated the idea, that God is the eternal process of the universe, and deduced from the bare notion of self-existence, the proper essence, spirituality, and personality of Deity. Hillebrand, also, has bent his chief attention upon

this same theological point. His great principle is, that God, or the Absolute, has revealed himself to us immediately in our own consciousness: to prove, however, that we can trust our consciousness upon these points, must be the province of philosophy; and it is in this sense only that philosophy can give any proof of the existence of a Deity. Troxler's philosophy is of the microcosmic order. To him the source, the centre, the object of all philosophy is *man*. All truth and all knowledge is simply the revelation of the original elements of our own reason, and the *reality* which is implied in them. The soul is a perfect mirror of the universe, and we have only to gaze into it with earnest attention, to discover all truth which is accessible to humanity. What we know of God, therefore, can be only that, which is originally revealed to us of him in our own minds.

Lastly, Krause terms his philosophy a system of transcendental idealism, in which, commencing with the subjective principle of observing what exists in our own consciousness, he raises himself step by step to the acknowledgment of one, eternal, self-existent being. To characterize these different shadings of the ideal philosophy of Germany more accurately would hardly consist with the brevity of our present plan, we shall, therefore, now take leave of this most remarkable page in the history of the world's philosophy, with a single observation.

The great peculiarity, which distinguishes the modern philosophy of Germany from that of every other country, is the use of the ontological instead of the psychological method. Descartes, Locke, and others, following up the Baconian principles, affirmed, that in taking a survey of the whole mass of human knowledge, we must commence with an observation of the powers and conceptions of the human mind, as the instrument by which alone everything is to be comprehended; *i. e.*, we must make an induction of the facts of the case. The German philosophers, on the contrary, despising this method, begin by laying down the most primitive and abstract *notion* we have of existence, as though it were a reality, and proceed onwards, until step by step they have constructed the whole universe. Now, those who follow the psychological method, give us for the most part a valid philosophy, but too often a shallow one. Bent upon the observance and classification of the facts of mind, they too frequently remain altogether within this circle without touching upon any of the deeper problems which ontology brings before us. On the other hand, the abettors of the ontological method, beginning to philosophize before they have investigated the instrument, by which alone they can proceed, and consequently, having no definite boundaries fixed within which human knowledge must be confined, are obliged to *assume* their first position, (such as that of intellectual intuition, or

the dialectic process,) and are thus imperceptibly led into a region of philosophy as extravagant as it is baseless. The true march of philosophy is the union of the two. Starting from the analysis of the human mind, trying, as Locke expresses it, the length of the line by which we are to sound the ocean of truth, we must go steadily on directed by the light of induction, until, at length, we find ourselves legitimately landed within the region of ontology. From thence we may start upon a new voyage of discovery, still guided by an analysis of the facts and implications of our reason, until we run out our line to the full length, and wait for the brighter apocalypse of another world.

"It is time," says M. De Rémusat, speaking of the German philosophers, "it is time that we should venture to fix our eyes upon the object which they have set before them, and to enter into the region in which they have marched; without, however, following their footsteps. We must imitate them, preserving at the same time those precious guarantees of method of erudition, of language, of experience, which are the foundation of our philosophical wisdom. Let *us* bring reasons as well as they for grasping fundamental questions, but let us feel bound either to resolve them in a contrary sense, or to conclude upon the impossibility of resolving them at all. In one word, let us reinstate that which is most difficult, but most elevated in all philosophy, namely—METAPHYSICS."

SECT. III.—*The English School of the Nineteenth Century.*

In sketching the history of idealism generally, from the revival of philosophy in modern times, I termed that of our own country *polemical idealism*, as originating rather from opposition to sensationalism than from the spontaneous tendencies of the national mind. In Germany the ideal tendency has ever seemed to spring from the very soil, and to have flourished there without any of the excitement derived from opposition; in England, on the other hand, it has lived upon warfare; and whenever the bold advances of sensationalism have ceased, it has always been inclined to cease with them. The deistical writers, who at the close of the seventeenth and beginning of the eighteenth centuries sustained their sceptical principles by expanding the germs of sensationalism, which lay hid in the philosophy of Locke, gradually died away; and with them disappeared, one after the other, the traces of our idealistic philosophy. By the close of the eighteenth century the school of English idealism may be said to have become altogether extinct, and every attempt at metaphysical speculation seemed to merge in the supreme authority of Locke, or the efforts of his successors.*

* A few idealistic works, such as Drummond's "Academical Questions," appeared about the beginning of this century, but not of sufficient weight to need any particular mention.

At the opening of the nineteenth century, therefore, we may consider that, as far as idealism is concerned, the ground was perfectly clear. Sensationalism, indeed, was again advancing with rapid strides, urged on by the impulse acquired from the brilliant literature of France, and fostered by the writings of Priestley, Belsham, and the school of which they stood at the head; but of the ideal tendency hardly the slightest appearance was left in England to remind us, that it was still the country of Cudworth, Clarke, and Berkeley. Neither, indeed, has the present century, in its progress, been very forward to supply the metaphysical deficiency which existed at its birth. That the reaction has now set in we fully believe; but it has come tardily and unwillingly, and it may yet, to all appearance, be some years before an energetic anti-sensational school shall grace the literature of our native land.

With regard to the *sources*, from which the seeds of a more rationalistic system of philosophizing have been imported, there are two which almost immediately suggest themselves to our minds, namely, Scotland and Germany. Great as is the difference between the philosophy of these two countries, yet there are, unquestionably, some important points of resemblance, which place them together as the antagonists of empiricism; and we can hardly be mistaken in saying, that all the reaction which has been experienced in

England against sensational principles has borne the complexion of one or other of these two philosophical schools. Scotland, true to its principle of "common sense," has insisted on the validity of those ideas, which appear to be the natural product of the human reason, and resisted every attempt to resolve them into sensational elements; and Germany, boldly grappling with the deepest questions of ontology, has drawn a broad distinction between the phenomenal world, as viewed by the senses, and the real world as comprehended by the intellect. In both cases there is a direct appeal made to the authority of reason, and an equal determination not to remain shut up within the boundaries of sense.

England, with the clear-headed practical wisdom for which it stands pre-eminent, has been gazing, from time to time, upon the results of both these schools, and has been considering what there is in each that is likely to prove unsound, and what that can be safely adopted. It has entered with earnestness into the philosophy of Reid, and appropriated its results without copying its too often tedious dialectical dulness; while, on the other hand, it has been lately approaching the borders of the German spiritualism, and shewing a disposition to sift the wheat out of the large mass of chaff which that voluminous school presents. From these circumstances, then, we are furnished with a principle of classification under which to describe

the manifestations of idealism, which have appeared in England during the present century. We shall divide them into two classes:—First, the English metaphysical school, which is predominantly under Scottish influence; and secondly, that which is predominantly under German influence; leaving at the same time in each some scope for the working of the peculiar characteristics of the national mind.

(*A.*) Scoto-English Metaphysicians.

That so profound a writer as Dr. Reid, followed up by the elegant and learned additions of Dugald Stewart, should raise a vigorous school of philosophy in Scotland without producing some effect upon English philosophical thinkers, could hardly have been possible. The labours of these northern metaphysicians, more especially in disabusing the world of the errors couched under the phraseology of the ideal system, became, during the earlier part of this century, more and more appreciated throughout the whole of our country, until gradually their works came to be widely regarded in the south as the best text-books of intellectual science. The tone and character of philosophical writing in England by degrees were altered; and if it did not entirely follow the Scottish models, yet, at least, it exhibited the great influence, which those models had exercised upon the ordinary habits of metaphysical thinking. It is the history and

nature of this influence, accordingly, which we now purpose to depict. To do this we shall not make out any chronological list of authors, who have manifested this leaning to the northern school; but we shall briefly present the names of the *most prominent* metaphysical writers, who have been distinguished respectively by a more near or remote degree of approximation to the Scottish system, as illustrative of the influence of that system upon the country at large.

1. And first, we notice those who have followed Scottish authority almost without deviation. Not a few of our countrymen, (who have either been educated at the Scottish universities, or have confined their philosophical reading to the volumes of Reid, Stewart, and Brown,) have so entirely imbibed the philosophical spirit of the north, as never to depart from it except here and there on some very few, and those unimportant, points. Those who have read Dr. Payne's "Elements of Mental and Moral Philosophy," will see in it an excellent example of the style of metaphysical writing we are describing. With good abilities for analysis, and a mind well versed in habits of abstract thinking, the Doctor has furnished us with an abridgment of Brown's philosophy, which, while it wants the poetry of the original, at least equals it in the clear and succinct statement of the philosophical doctrines which are advanced. In the moral department, moreover, the errors and im-

perfections of Brown are well pourtrayed, and an attempt is made, if not entirely successful, yet at least forcible and well sustained, to lay afresh the foundations of the emotional theory of morals. In this attempt he has been seconded by Spalding, in his "Philosophy of Christian Morals," another author (now unhappily no more), who, while he adopted for the most part the Scottish system of philosophizing, yet knew well how to take an original view both of its principles and its results. To dwell upon this peculiar feature of our English philosophy, however, is unnecessary, since we may regard it almost as a pure reflection of the Scottish school: let it suffice here to notice the simple fact, that such a reflection has existed in this country and has given rise to some few excellent digests both of moral and psychological science.

2. We may point out the existence of certain other metaphysical writers, who have used the productions of the Scottish school, not so much in the light of *authorities*, as of *guides* and incentives to their own independent thinking and research.

At the head of these we should place Isaac Taylor, a name now, indeed, better known in the controversies of the theological, than those of the philosophical world. The metaphysical works of this profound and voluminous author began with a small book, entitled, "Elements of Thought," which has gone through several editions, and remains, to

the present day, we believe, the only brief and elementary introduction to mental philosophy (which is worthy the name) in our own language. The works, however, upon which Mr. Taylor's philosophical reputation now mainly rests, are the four volumes, which appeared successively under the titles of the "Natural History of Enthusiasm," "Fanaticism," "Spiritual Despotism," and "The Physical Theory of another Life." In these treatises, he has opened what may be considered, in our own land, a new field of philosophical observation. Impatient of confining himself to the study of mind in its isolated state; not content, like the closer followers of the Scottish system, simply with looking within, and marking the processes of the *individual self*, he has cast his eye upon the broad surface of humanity, and attempted to gather results from the *action of mind*, as seen working on the vast theatre of the world. Mr. Taylor's genius is of the telescopic rather than the microscopic cast. In the sweep of his thought he may overlook some of the smaller points which lie in the road, but assuredly the range of his vision is far beyond men of the ordinary stamp, and his power of generalizing often of the most striking character. Every volume he has published is, in its tone and spirit, a stern rebuke to the pretensions of that shallow sensationalism, which is apt to carry away the unreflecting mind by its vaunted simplicity,

and bears an unequivocal witness to the majesty of the human reason, even in its wanderings and its follies.

With all this independence of thought, however, with his capacity of grasping great principles, and drawing inferences from the widest survey of facts, there is still, we think, impressed upon many pages, the bias derived from Scottish philosophy. With a mind so vigorously constituted, a spirit not to be daunted by difficulties, a reason that does not shrink from the most recondite and startling conclusions, when they come in its way, and a disposition to identify truth, though it lie at present in the twilight of man's vision, we see everything in this author that would almost necessitate a sympathy with the more able and profound of the continental metaphysicians, were his sympathies transferred for a time from Britain to Germany. An elaboration of the most valuable points of German metaphysics, adapted to the capacity of English minds, would, in such hands, prove of incalculable service, in satisfying the now growing demand for a sounder system of metaphysical science. For the realization of this service, however, we have no ground of expectation, as Mr. Taylor has become too much entangled in party strife to be able to devote himself to those deeper problems, from neglect of which such strife really proceeds. It is not, assuredly, one of the least complaints we have to make against the din of theological controversy,

that it should entice minds such as these from the calm pursuit of a lofty and spiritual philosophy into its vortex, and cause the more local and temporary questions of the day to absorb those intellects, which might be establishing the greater principles that lie at the foundation of human knowledge, and by the establishment of which, alone, we can hope for repose from the noise and confusion of lesser contention. As it is, however, the name of Isaac Taylor, in connexion with the philosophy of human nature, as developed in his Histories of Enthusiasm, Fanaticism, and Spiritual Despotism, in connexion with his physical theories on the spiritual state, and also in connexion with his more recent advocacy of the sanctity and inviolability of moral obligation, will ever hold a decided place in the history of English metaphysics during the nineteenth century.

3. There is yet another class of thinkers, sometimes expressing their opinions through the pages of the Magazine or Review, and, in a few instances, by original works, who, while they oppose the Scottish philosophy *as a whole*, yet avowedly borrow from it many of their views and principles. Such a writer is Mr. Smart, the author of a volume containing three separate treatises, and entitled, "Beginnings of a new School of Metaphysics." Mr. Smart is a professor of elocution of long and established reputation, and has been allured from his proper department—that of rhetoric—into the

kindred topics of logic and metaphysics. His first work upon these subjects was entitled, "Sematology; or, the Doctrine of Signs," in which he lays down the respective nature and limits of grammar, logic, and rhetoric. The view which is taken of the two latter branches gives us a very clear line of demarcation between them; logic being regarded as "The right use of words, with a view to the investigation of truth," and rhetoric as "The right use of words, with a view to inform, convince, or persuade."

According to these definitions, logic is the art of gaining knowledge through the medium of words, while rhetoric has the sole office of placing them in such positions, whether they form syllogisms or anything else, as to inform or convince others. This division has certainly the merit of some degree of originality, and the method in which the matter is argued is highly ingenious; although we cannot make up our mind as to the propriety of altering so widely the ancient landmarks between the two branches in question. As a metaphysician, Mr. Smart proposes to re-model and revive the philosophy of Locke, and combine with it the more recent results of the Scotch metaphysicians. Through the whole of his treatises, great stress is laid, as might be expected, upon *words*, as the signs and media of our thoughts. He wishes, in fact, to do away with the philosophy of mind, as such, and to reduce all science to these three

branches:—1. The study of things physical, or those which exist distinct from our thoughts; 2. The study of things metaphysical, or those which do not exist apart from our thoughts, (as a circle—man—good—the edge of the table—the power of God;) and, 3, Logic, which is to shew the method of procedure to be followed in both. Many good thoughts are scattered up and down these pages, although, as a whole, we cannot divest ourselves of the feeling, that they lead to an indefinite and unsatisfactory result. They afford us, however, at present, a very obvious example of the working of the Scottish philosophy upon the modern Lockian school of England, and the influence it has had, both in moulding its phraseology, and in reversing its sensational tendency.

4. We mention, lastly, under this head, the present Cambridge school of metaphysics, which is the *transition point* between the English philosophy that partakes of the Scottish, and that which partakes of the German character.

For above two centuries past, the University of Cambridge has given indications of a sympathy with metaphysical speculation, which, though sometimes almost disappearing, has ever and anon made its re-appearance, as circumstances have called it forth. During the seventeenth century, the Platonic divines, to whom we have before referred, excited a spirit of philosophical inquiry, which must be reckoned among the most remarkable literary mani-

festations of the age. Locke, though himself one of the ornaments of Oxford, yet, after his death, was far more zealously studied and admired at Cambridge than in his own University, and it was there first that a school of metaphysics was formed which owned him expressly as its authority and its guide. Dr. Law, one of the greatest advocates of the Lockian sensationalism, was a resident at Cambridge, and Dr. Hartley, the originator of the modern school of association, was a student at the same university.

The earlier philosophical school of Cambridge was idealistic; the latter was decidedly sensational. Perhaps the brilliant discoveries of Newton in physical science may have tended to absorb all purely metaphysical investigation, or where it did not absorb, to divert it into a more objective channel. But, notwithstanding the ardour with which physical science long has been, and still is, studied at Cambridge, we are mistaken if the dawn of a new philosophical spirit is not even now manifesting itself within the walls of that university. Many are the intimations which are given there from time to time of a sympathy with the German idealism; many the attempts to revert from the wonders of nature to the deeper wonders of the spirit of man; many the intimations that, amidst all the blessings conveyed by the extension of physical science, yet "there are fields of grander discovery; that though Nature's works be great,

we are greater than all these; that what we can least do without is not our highest need; that man cannot live by bread alone." *

The new intellectual spirit, now rising in the university of Cambridge, may be perhaps most clearly seen in the reform of its moral philosophy. Paley, who stood almost alone for a long space of years as *the moral philosopher* of Cambridge, was clearly of the empirical school, and accordingly advocated, with some peculiarities of his own, the sensational theory of ethics, that which grounds all virtue upon utility. The reaction against this school has now most decidedly set in. Very plain intimations of it appeared as far back as the year 1834, when Professor Sedgwick published his admirable Discourse on the Studies of the University, and attacked the philosophy of Locke and of Paley, both in their principles and in their effects. "The Essay on the Human Understanding," he remarks, "produced a chilling effect on the philosophical writings of the last century, and many a cold and beggarly system of psychology was sent into the world by authors of the school of Locke, pretending, at least, to start from his principles, and to build on his foundation. It is to the entire domination his Essay had once established in our university, that we may perhaps attribute all that is faulty in the moral philosophy of Paley." Again, the same author, speaking more particularly

* *Vide* Professor Lushington's Inaugural Lecture at Glasgow.

of the philosophy of Paley, sums up his many lucid remarks in the following striking and emphatic words:—"Lastly, we may, I think, assert, both on reason and experience, that wherever the utilitarian system is generally accepted, made the subject of *à priori* reasoning, and carried, through the influence of popular writings, into practical effect, it will be found to result in effects most pestilent to the honour and happiness of man."

These are by no means the only indirect evidences, which might be adduced, of a nascent idealistic school in the university of Cambridge. It seems almost certain, that the reaction against the excessive pursuit of physical science, the growing sympathy with the most lofty-minded of the German philosophical writers, the profound and at the same time elegant reflections upon spiritual truth, which for some time past has characterized many of the sons of that university, *must* give rise to a spiritual philosophy which, like that of the seventeenth century, *may* play an important part in the future literature of our country.

It is, however, in the writings of Professor Whewell that we are to look for the more marked characteristics of the modern Cambridge metaphysics. The influence of the Scottish and German philosophy are there almost equally visible, but both receive a colouring from a mind deeply imbued with physical science, and accustomed to walk amongst the highest regions of mathematical

investigation. The great work in which Dr. Whewell has embodied his metaphysical opinions is that entitled, "The Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences," the object of which is to shew the foundation principles of all scientific research. This work is divided into two parts, the former of which treats of *ideas*, and the latter of *knowledge*. In pursuing the investigation of our ideas, Whewell has closely followed some of the principal results of the Kantian philosophy. In imitation of Kant, for example, he shews, that in all our notions we have to distinguish the *matter* and the *form*, the matter coming through the senses, the form being the mould in which this matter is shaped by the mind itself. Time and space, which, with Kant, are the two categories of sensation, are viewed by him virtually in the same light, namely, as the two necessary *conceptions*, under which all our sense-perceptions appear. A sensation itself he regards as the bare impression of an external object upon the mind, the *form* under which that sensation is viewed he terms an *idea*. Those ideas which are the ground-forms of our knowledge, such as time, space, cause, are called *fundamental;* secondary ideas arising from them, such as length and breadth, number and succession, are termed *ideal conceptions*. In all this strain of thinking the philosophical student will not fail to see not merely a tendency to, but a decided appropriation of, some of the most valuable parts of the Kantian metaphysics

Whilst, however, we discern, on the one hand, the influence of Germany, there are several points, on the other, in which the results of the Scottish metaphysics are very manifest. One of the principal of these is the adoption of the muscular-tactual sense, as first explained by Brown; a theory which Dr. Whewell, in fact, not only adopts, but carries out still further, so as to account for many of the phenomena of vision, as well as those of resistance. In the general phraseology of the work, indeed, as well as in some of the theories it upholds, we plainly see that the writings of Reid, Stewart, and Brown have had, perhaps imperceptibly, no inconsiderable influence upon the mind of the author.

Without entering more minutely, however, into the peculiar features of the elaborate treatise before us, we must endeavour to shew in what manner it may be regarded as presenting a very important step in the transition, which philosophy is now undergoing, from the sensationalist to the idealistic tendency. The principal points where this transition process is exhibited in the work before us are the following.

1. In the broad distinction laid down between sensations and ideas; a distinction, in which (unlike that of Locke, Mill, and many others) the latter are shewn to have no direct dependence upon the former, but an *à priori* existence of their own.

2. In the opposition that is pointed out between necessary and contingent truth, the one being

grounded in experience, the other in the mind's own primitive constitution.

3. In the doctrine propounded concerning time and space as being the forms of all our perceptions, and existing consequently in the mind previous to our first sensations.

4. In the explanation that is offered of the notion of causation, as the fundamental idea, on which the mechanical sciences are founded, and not an effect of habit or association.

5. In the view which is taken of human knowledge generally, as resulting from the appropriate combination within the mind of facts and ideas.

Dr. Whewell's work, beside its own intrinsic excellence, has likewise the merit of being the first in our own country in which the logic of induction has been fully and fairly discussed. Since its appearance, indeed, it has met with a formidable rival in Mr. Mill's "System of Logic," but by no means yields to it, as it appears to us, either in the accuracy of views, depth of analysis, or copiousness of examples. Presumptuous as it may seem, to judge between two works of such unquestionable merit, nay, which may be both viewed as the highest efforts of the human mind upon these subjects, we cannot forbear expressing our belief, that Mr. Mill, biassed by the psychology he has inherited almost by birth, has neglected some of the most important subjective elements in the formation of our simple and original conceptions, which elements the Cam-

bridge philosopher has seized with great clearness, and illustrated with great power.

In brief, Dr. Whewell, though an ardent lover of mathematical and physical science, has never allowed the earnest pursuit of objective knowledge to obscure the necessity of investigating the subjective grounds, on which these pursuits ultimately repose. He has boldly grappled with the metaphysical conceptions, which lie at the basis of science, overturned the sensationalism which too often has attached itself to the physical inquirer, shewn with admirable clearness the dependence of all objective knowledge upon subjective ideas, and raised, we trust, an effective barrier against the recurrence of those abuses, to which the Baconian principles have so often been exposed. Respecting Dr. Whewell as a moralist we would rather observe an unassenting silence. As his work on morals does not profess to contain a full discussion of the principles of ethical philosophy, we pass it by with the hope, that when he undertakes to develop them, the subject will have assumed a more definite form, than it appears at present to have assumed in his mind. We must pass on, however, to the consideration of that more decisive influence, which the German philosophy is at present exerting on our country.

(*B.*) Germano-English Metaphysicians.

The voluminous and profound school of German

philosophy, though somewhat repulsive in its first aspect, could not in the nature of things remain shut up within the limits of the German States. Philosophical thinking, in this as in most other cases, has pursued its course irrespective of all national barriers, and has already found its way into England, France, and America. Amongst our own countrymen, Sir James Mackintosh, whilst in India, obtained some little insight into this philosophy, although he never gave the results of his investigations on it (which we imagine were not very profound) to the world. The first of our English thinkers, as far as we know, who entered with real enthusiasm into the subject, and clothed the thoughts of German philosophical writers in the English dress, was Coleridge. Much of the revival, which spiritualism has more recently experienced amongst us, is probably due to the zeal and eloquence, with which that extraordinary man advocated his doctrines of modern Platonism, doctrines to which he was manifestly led by his ardent study of German philosophy.

In France the modern German idealism has found a still more energetic and efficient champion in M. Cousin, the effects of whose writings upon philosophy generally are probably but now in their infancy. America, too, has recently been arousing herself from the dream of practical utilitarianism, and giving birth to a school of philosophy (grounded chiefly upon the writings of Cousin) which bids fair

to prove as productive, though not certainly as profound, as the European sources, from which it springs. Amongst these, George Ripley and Dr. Henry have done good service by presenting their country with many excellent translations from the French eclectic writers, which have found their way into this kingdom. H. P. Tappan of New York has re-argued the question of the freedom of the will, in opposition to the rigid conclusions of Jonathan Edwards, and given a very lucid compendium of logic on the principles of the new philosophy. The names of Emerson, Brownson, and Parker are well known through various of their productions, which have been reprinted in England, as belonging to the school of American Transcendentalism; while a monthly publication, termed "*The Dial*," the organ of this party, has, until lately, brought over to us an exhibition of the progress which idealistic principles are making upon the Western Continent. With such seeds of idealism scattered amongst us from so many different quarters, all originating primarily from the philosophy of Germany, it were unreasonable not to look for some decided effect upon our own national habits of thinking.

In adverting to the philosophy of England, which bears the German stamp upon it, almost every one will immediately recall the name of Thomas Carlyle, a name which stands first and foremost among the idealistic writers of our age. In bringing the

works of Carlyle for a moment before our attention, we shall not give any opinion respecting his *theological* sentiments, inasmuch as these lie quite beyond our beat, and have to be judged of before another tribunal, beside that of *à priori* reasoning. Neither do we wish to track his philosophical views to the German originals, from which it is unquestionable that many of them have sprung. In the case of a writer so powerful, so original, and so full of native fire and genius, it is a thankless task at best to assign a foreign paternity to the burning thoughts, that we find scattered with no sparing hand almost through every page. That Mr. Carlyle has learned much truth, and added much inspiration to the force of his genius, from the literature and philosophy of Germany, he would himself be among the first to own; but his sentiments have not been so much borrowed from these sources, as inspired from them: he has used these philosophers as his familiar companions, rather than as his masters; and instead of sitting at their feet, we should rather say "that his soul has burned within him, as he has walked with them by the way."

It is in vain that we open the volumes, which have come from the pen of this fertile writer, in order to find there a *system* of philosophy; and yet his philosophical opinions may be traced there with a clearness and a certainty which leave no room either for misunderstanding or doubt. The great and prominent feature of all his writings is a

marked contempt for the shallow objective sensationalism of the age we live in; and an earnest struggle for the re-establishment of an exalted and a spiritual philosophy. He has seen clearly and felt deeply, that the objective element in our knowledge is threatening to absorb everything else; that our literature, our science, our laws, morals, politics, and religion, are all tainted with this tendency; and he considers it to be his mission to lift up the voice like a trumpet, in order to warn the age of its folly and its danger. The idea of *self*, the mind, the real man, he considers, has degenerated almost into that of a living machine, hardly separated by a boundary line from nature in her visible organization; the idea of the eternal, the infinite, the divine, has become too often the artificial God of a sect or party; it is his aim, therefore, to hold up these two fundamental thoughts of humanity again to our view, to shew their great reality, and to infuse by this means into the philosophy and feeling of the age precisely the two elements, which it has either marred or lost. Whatever be the subject on which he writes (and he writes more or less upon nearly all), this aim is never lost sight of, nay, appears to be the great ruling thought around which the others cluster as their central point. If he comes upon morals, with what infinite scorn is it that he scouts and tramples upon "the Gospel according to Jeremy Bentham;" with what intensity does he point out as existing in God the reality

of an eternal justice, and in man the reality of an eternal obligation, that must break down every passion and every selfish interest until it be accomplished. If he enters the wide field of law and politics, you see him impatiently pushing aside all the clever arithmetic of law-makers and statesmen, and grasping at once the broad principle that man is divine, that he exists here under great spiritual laws, and that it is in vain to reckon up profit and loss, vain to number ships and soldiers, vain to balance parties and interests, while the great duties between man and man, and between man and God, are trodden as an unholy thing in the dust.

In his joyous rambles through the regions of elegant literature and poesy, there are the same tendencies apparent, the same purposes kept in view. "The pretty story-telling Walter Scott," that required no thought to read him, that spoke not to the inner soul of man, that described only the visible, and had no eye for the invisible world, finds but little favour in the stern hands of our spiritualist. The snarling, impious Byron, the poet of misanthropy, and earthly passion, is hardly pitied and heartily despised. On the contrary, Burns, Coleridge, Wordsworth, and more than all Goethe, sing music to his inmost spirit, and seem to revive the long-silent strains of Shakespeare, of Dante, and of Homer.

Much would we say of Carlyle's earnest appeals on the religion of the age, were we not afraid to

venture into so fruitful and, we might almost say, so dangerous a subject; but here, too, we find him uttering his lamentations or his anathemas against the hollow-hearted formalism of Christendom, against the *sham* worship which has taken the place of the undaunted faith and burning love of the prophets and apostles of God. Without distinction of name, of rank, or of popular favour, he tears the mask from the features of hypocrisy, and places again and again, in no very flattering contrast, the pompous, easy, formal, soulless worship that is seen in many a Christian temple, with the Hindoo, the Mohammedan, or even the untutored Indian, who sees God in everything he sees, and hears him in everything he hears. "Will you ever be calling heathenism a lie, worthy of damnation, which leads its devotee to consecrate all upon its altars, and with a wonder, which transcends all your logic, bows before some idol of nature; while those who with sleepy heads and lifeless spirits meet in a framed house, and go over a different set of forms, are the only elect of God? Clear thy mind of cant! Does not God look at the heart?" With a truly Platonic contempt for the material, and as ardent a love for the intellectual, the ideal, the Divine, our author wanders through all the regions of literature, of morals, of religion, of the habits, customs, laws, and institutions of our day, chastising all that is shallow and

insincere, and pleading for everything that is earnest and true in human life.

With such tendencies of mind, it is not difficult to see of what nature must be his philosophy. The Scottish metaphysics he *respects* as being in its day a powerful protest against sensationalism; but it is in the German idealism that he finds his true element. There he meets with men who strive to look through the world of phenomena into that of absolute reality, there, at length, he finds the world of matter assigned to its true place of inferior dignity, and the absolute, the real, the essential, the eternal raised to its lofty position in the contemplation of the intellect, and the affections of the heart.

Had Carlyle, like his German contemporaries, fashioned his philosophy into a system, and sent it into the world all bristling with repulsive words and formulas, he might have been read by a few, and lived and died to the mass unknown. Instead of this, however, he has rushed into every subject of popular interest, cast around his thoughts the drapery of bold poetic imagery, and thus succeeded in carrying his philosophy into a thousand avenues, which it had otherwise never reached. That he will make many feeble imitators is a matter of certain prediction, nay, already of actual experience; that he will prove a stumbling-block to many sceptical minds, who have an eye for his

boldness but no heart for his spiritualism, is equally certain; but, assuredly, we have no writer, who is so adapted to stem the current of empiricism, and to hurl defiance at the noisy and shallow pretensions of the materialistic or sensational systems of the age; none who holds so important a place in the transition, which is now effecting, from the degenerated philosophy of Locke, to a new and, we trust, a rational idealism. For our own part we are thankful that Carlyle has lived, thought, and written; he may scandalize the few, as every bold thinker will, but the world in the end will be the better; it will be a truer and an honester world for his life and his labours. That he should have involved himself in certain aberrations of philosophy and good sense is not to be wondered at. No man ever wrote so earnestly on one side of a question without doing so. Disgusted with formalism, he has made sincerity the *whole* test of moral greatness. He *tends* to make Paul the persecutor as elevated a hero as Paul the apostle. He *tends* to sink all consideration of the object towards which our zeal is directed in the glory of the zeal itself. Such a principle, if there be any distinction between truth and untruth in the world, we must learn to repudiate; but let us retain the deep impression of the sentiment he so earnestly labours to inculcate,—that all our outward life is destitute of moral excellence, while the soul does

not act with fervour and sincerity and godly fear within.

The influence of Carlyle's writings, and of the German philosophy generally, are already becoming apparent in several different quarters. In America they have operated powerfully, especially upon the numerous body of Unitarian Christians who exist there, turning that system of Christianity, which sprung originally from a sensational philosophy, into a far more profound and a far more spiritualized system of religious rationalism. The same effect is visible, though not to the same extent, in our own country. The influence of the German philosophy is visible among the more deep-thinking of the Unitarians; it is visible in a new and increasing party in the Established Church, that usually denominated Young England; it is visible to a certain degree, even among those reputed to be most rigidly attached to their symbols. There can be little doubt, indeed, but that theology, without, we trust, giving up any of its distinctive features, is about to be the medium for popularizing and spreading some of the main principles of an idealistic philosophy.

In the meantime there are some other minor manifestations of sympathy with the present eclectic philosophy of France, springing too, in some cases, from sources where it was least to be expected. Any

one may satisfy himself of this by directing his attention to a series of works published by that promoter of elegant typography, William Pickering, termed "Small books on great subjects." In one of these little treatises, entitled "Philosophical Theories and Philosophical Experience," there is a new psychological classification of our mental phenomena, into—I. Material and Animal Functions, those subjected to bodily change; and II. Spiritual and Unchanging Functions. In another of them, written by John Barlow, M.A., of the Royal Society, a professed physiologist, there is a deduction of man's spirituality and immortality from the power of the will: in fact, both these treatises are strongly characterized by their giving prominence to the notion and the power of *self*, and assigning it its due place in their metaphysical philosophy. We might mention also, a treatise of Isaac Preston Cory, Esq., on Metaphysical Enquiry, and another on Logic and the Laws of Thought, by Rev. Wm. Thomson, each of which gives a pleasing instance of the growing tendency, which now exists, to the cultivation of the abstract and metaphysical sciences. What the hopes of the next generation may be we do not now inquire; but we shall, perhaps, find an opportunity of throwing out a few speculations on this subject when we come to speak of the *tendencies* of the speculative philosophy of the nineteenth century.

The modern idealism of France might, perhaps, naturally be looked for under this chapter; but, as it has assumed the eclectic form, we reserve it for a separate consideration.

CHAPTER VI.

CHARACTERISTICS OF MODERN SCEPTICISM.

SECT. I.—*Modern Scepticism generally—In England.*

THE interest that attends the history of philosophy in any age, will always attach itself mainly to the two opposed schools of sensationalism and idealism. From them originate most of the deeper problems, upon which the mind of man delights to dwell, and to their efforts we naturally look, to have those problems clearly solved. It is, however, one of the most universal failings of humanity, to run into extremes in different directions. Hardly is the necessity realized of investigating closely the facts of sensation, than the philosopher, absorbed in this object, and overwhelmed, perhaps, with the variety, magnitude, and number of the phenomena presented, makes sensation the basis of every mental state, and, in the same proportion, disparages the value of all the other faculties.

But the opposite extreme is equally natural. Reason, as all admit, is the noblest part of man, for

it regulates and guides all the rest. Once, then, let the metaphysician become wrapped in the contemplation of its grandeur, and he will, in all probability, begin forthwith to detract from the value of the senses, to look with contempt upon empirical knowledge, and thus to lose sight of one, at least, of the most fertile sources of our ideas.

The abuses both of sensationalism and idealism have been, we trust, already sufficiently pourtrayed. In the former case, we have seen them leading to egotism in morals, atheism in religion, and materialism in philosophy; in the latter case, they have given rise successively to religious rationalism, to fatalism, and, ultimately, to complete pantheism. Now the logical deduction of false results in any philosophical system, always betrays a falsity in one or more of the fundamental data, from which they are evolved. The error, it is true, may be invisible; yet, if such conclusions actually clash with the indisputable facts of daily experience, we may be sure that it is lurking somewhere in the foundations. The mind, indeed, which is totally given up to system, will admit many a startling conclusion, nay, perhaps, many a contradictory one, without any difficulty. Full of confidence in the principles it has adopted, it is borne along with the stream of argument to all their results; and should insoluble difficulties arise, it leaves them, as points which transcend the powers of the human mind to unravel or to comprehend. There is a limit, how-

ever, at which the force of system stops, and beyond which it cannot impose upon human credulity; and when this limit is arrived at, not only does the mind refuse to advance any further, but, system being once found in error, a flood of suspicion pours itself even over those conclusions, which had been heretofore most firmly believed. Such is the origin of scepticism, which, in its first aspect, is really nothing more than the common sense of mankind rising in rebellion against the authority of the current philosophy of the age.

The proper office of scepticism is, to act as a check or drag upon the too rapid progress of all dogmatical systems. As such, it has been eminently beneficial in every age; nay, has formed an indispensable movement in the advancement of speculative science. It dispossesses the mind of man of its excessive love of system, pulls down its blind attachment to authority, and moves out of the path some of the greatest obstacles, which oppose the investigation of truth. Never, perhaps, was there a philosophical system more widely diffused, more deeply inwrought into the belief of mankind, and more sternly contended for, than that of Aristotle. The ideal theory of human knowledge, which originated there, was for ages looked upon as possessing authority almost amounting to axiomatic certainty; and it must have appeared little less than madness to attack a belief so universal, and established, in all appearance, for

endless perpetuity. The instrument, however, by which this was overthrown, was the scepticism of Hume. It was he who, regardless of consequences, carried the principles in question to their furthest results, shewed that they involved in them universal unbelief, and thus gave them virtually their first refutation. The scepticism of Hume, which may be called *a "reductio ad absurdum," aimed against the ideal system*, necessitated a thorough reconsideration of the very first elements of human knowledge, and was instrumental in suggesting, both to Kant and to Reid, the primary idea of a philosophy based upon sounder principles.

Had scepticism been content to keep within its proper limits, and quietly to perform the office assigned to it, it would have ever appeared in the light of a friend and benefactor; but, not content with pronouncing the actually existing systems to be in error, it often seeks to advance still further, and affirms that no possible system of philosophy can develop *any truth whatever* with absolute certainty. Here, then, having resisted and exposed the errors of others, it falls itself into the most startling errors of all, and having proffered a blessing with one hand, withdraws it with the other.

Now in taking a general view of scepticism, we must point out as clearly as possible the different aspects which it assumes, since in doing this we shall be the better able to estimate the amount of influence it is now exerting in our own country.

Scepticism, then, regarded generically, may be divided into three subordinate species, which we may term *absolute* scepticism, *authoritative* scepticism, and the scepticism of *ignorance.*

1. By absolute scepticism we mean, a disposition of mind to admit nothing as absolutely true, accompanied with a formal denial of the certainty of any branch of human knowledge. This species of scepticism, in the very nature of things, must be rare, and when it does appear, must be altogether limited to the more thinking classes of mankind. The natural and healthy state of the human mind is one of belief. We instinctively give credit to our senses, our memory, our reason, our moral sentiments; and ere distrust in any of them is experienced, a considerable process of thinking and of reasoning must have passed through the intellect. Ordinarily speaking, men have neither the leisure nor the taste to sit down and investigate the foundations of knowledge, and, consequently, they give themselves up, without any hesitation, to their natural and instinctive beliefs. It is only here and there, in men of deep reflection—men who have gone, or imagined that they have gone, to the very bottom of those foundations, that any idea is entertained of the absolute uncertainty of the whole superstructure.

The natural history of this species of scepticism may be briefly pourtrayed in the following manner. We will suppose a man, vigorous in his natural

capacities, earnest in his purposes, and eagerly devoted to the investigation of truth. Too penetrating to be imposed upon by vulgar modes of thinking—too independent to admit, without testing, the common opinions of those around him—he scatters the faith of his childhood to the winds, and seeks to re-cast, for his own satisfaction, the primary elements of his real philosophical belief. In doing so, he soon finds himself involved in questions of the most intricate nature. The more easy and superficial problems are spurned with contempt; he wants to go at once to first principles, and to convince himself that everything *there* is firm and stable. To his grief and astonishment, however, he finds that those fundamental questions, upon which everything else must rest, are among the most difficult, both of comprehension and of proof. The greatest minds of former ages, he discovers, have in this region perpetually lost their way; and he sees nought in prospect but a conflict of opinions, as endless as it must be unsatisfactory. In his perplexity, he appeals to the great dogmatical systems which have had the chief reputation in the world; he tracks the history of them from Plato down to Kant; and the probable consequence is, that the arguments of the one party completely neutralize those of the other. In this painful position, the fearful question begins to dawn upon his mind,—Is there such a thing as truth at all? Can we have a certainty upon any-

thing? Are we not the sport of an ignorance which dazzles only to delude us with the hope of absolute truth? Such a thought, once entertained, acts like a spell upon all his researches, and throws suspicion over every argument. It gains force from the very fact, that it seems so plainly to unfold the causes from which the contests and disagreements of philosophy have arisen. A disgust at all dogmatism next ensues; and at length he determines to rest in the conviction that each man must see truth for himself alone, because absolute truth lies entirely beyond the reach of the human faculties.

This disposition to universal unbelief, then, once fixed in the mind, it soon manifests itself upon almost every subject, that lies open to man's consideration. It begins of course, by attacking the ground-principles of philosophical truth,—in one breath denying the certain existence of the material world, and in another, that of the spiritual; thus leaving, ultimately, nought but a bundle of impressions and ideas. Next, it loosens the strong bands of moral obligation. Virtue to it is either a nonentity, or but another name for that which produces pleasure; and vice is a similar cypher, except it be that which produces pain; but as to the word *duty*, it has absolutely no meaning, since no *obligation* can be shewn why I should pursue happiness any more than misery. Next, the foundations of man's natural religion fall under its

stroke. Men may have (grants the sceptic) each one for himself, *the idea* of God, and this idea may prove very beneficial in directing or constraining his actions; but who is to prove that objective reality is to be attached to it? In a word, once let confidence be shaken in the veracity of our natural faculties, and there is not a buttress left to support any portion of the edifice of truth.

Now the philosophical error, which lurks in the principle of absolute scepticism, is by no means difficult to discover and expose; in fact, as a system, it carries within itself its own refutation. The sceptic distrusts the veracity of man's natural faculties; but by what means, we would ask him, has he arrived at this his startling conclusion? Of course, by the *use* of his faculties—the very faculties which he distrusts. But if our reason is ever leading us astray in other matters, and if it never suffers us to attain certainty, then why may it not have led *him* astray? and on what ground can he affirm the certainty of the conclusion to which he has arrived? The sceptic, above all men, is fond of employing the power of reasoning, in order to pull down the systems which exist around him; but if he has already undermined the veracity of reason itself, why does he believe his own arguments? Why not take for granted, that he is as far wrong in pulling down as others may have been in building up? For an absolute sceptic to argue at all is a piece of folly, only second to the folly of those

who argue with him. If there is no credence to be given to the working of our intellectual powers, the former, for consistency's sake, might spare himself the trouble of using them against the belief of his neighbours; and the latter might, with equal propriety, avoid the useless task of arguing with one, who professedly has no faith in argument. The sceptic, in fact, writes at once his own defence and his own reply: he may make out the best possible case against his opponents; but then who, of all those whom he convinces of the futility of human reason generally, will be likely to pay any respect to his own application of it? The only rational effect of scepticism, when it is carried to this length, is to throw aside all the weapons of philosophy together, and let the world quietly go on as it does, without either encouragement or restraint. In other words, the influence of it, rationally considered, is equal to *zero*.

If this be the case, then, it might be said, why is it worth while to oppose a sceptical system, which rationally has no influence whatever, for good or for evil? We answer, Because men will make an *irrational* use of it, and we wish to cut off the plea which it affords them for doing or thinking what is evil. The mere assertion of sceptical principles in the abstract, is of extremely little consequence, as they exert in this way hardly any perceptible influence upon the conduct of any one;

but, unfortunately, there is ever a sufficiency of half-ignorant minds, who, without having depth enough to see the inconclusiveness of scepticism *as a whole*, are very ready to catch at the notion of the universal uncertainty of all human knowledge, and to urge it in opposition to everything that is good or great, whether in religion, morals, or philosophy. Thus the loss of confidence in the powers of the mind soon makes itself felt, more or less, in every department of science; it represses exertion, fosters a contempt for all systematic truth, weakens the ties of moral obligation, and tends to the degeneracy, rather than to any advancement of the human race.

Absolute scepticism, as now explained, has, fortunately, at present no decided representative in this country. Its last great advocate was David Hume, who for a time gave origin and support to a class of petty unbelievers, that, without entering into the depth of his argument, much less seeing its self-refutation, learned, notwithstanding, to sneer at evidence and despise truth. This spirit was arrested, at least to some extent, by Reid, and others of like views, who combated, step by step, so earnestly for the reality of our knowledge, that a sweeping unbelief has not as yet, during the present century, made its re-appearance in this Island. Many, it is true, are the different faiths now in vogue throughout the community;

but amongst these we hardly find one, the principle of which is to have no faith at all. We go on, therefore, to describe—

2. The scepticism which bases itself upon *authority.*

It is possible to deny the capability of the human mind to gain absolute knowledge for itself, without denying the fact that such knowledge is actually in our possession. If, *e. g.*, we supposed truth to be infused into us miraculously, we might in this way avoid the sweeping conclusion, that there is no such thing as truth at all cognizable to man, whilst at the same time we might regard the self-acquisition of it as altogether impracticable. Now this exactly describes the opinions of many, who look upon the scriptures as the only source of absolute truth, and who, standing upon the platform of revelation, scout at the very notion of philosophy.

The system of opinions to which we now refer, is somewhat of the following kind. Man, whatever he might have been in his first creation, is now naturally blind and foolish; his reason is perverted; his moral nature overturned; and he is thus rendered totally unfit for the great office of acquiring knowledge, with any perfect degree of certainty. Upon this state of helpless darkness the light of revelation dawns; the shadows of ignorance gradually disperse; and a source is opened from which we may at length gain absolute truth—an acqui-

sition otherwise impossible. Let it be remembered that the question here is by no means, whether or no revelation unfolds to us truths which could not have been attained by us in any other way: this is admitted by all who hold the special inspiration of the Bible. The question is, whether *all moral truth* must be derived from thence, or whether some absolute knowledge cannot be attained by man, quite independent of supernatural assistance. Those who hold revelation to be the only source of certain knowledge to man, would, no doubt, start at being ranked under the title of sceptics, and yet, in truth, this principle contains the germ of a scepticism, under which both religion and philosophy would soon be seen to expire.

Let us weigh this question a little. The human faculties, it is urged, are perverted: there is no confidence to be placed in them: they lead us astray at every step. How then, we ask, can we be ever assured that the revelation, to which we apply for light, is a true one? The veracity of it, as far as our convictions go, *must* rest upon a process of reasoning. We must collect evidence; we must decide what is valid as evidence, and what is not; and then from this we must draw our inference respecting the truth of the revelation itself. What, then, are the instruments by which all these processes are carried on, and by which the ultimate conclusion is at length arrived at? Of course, our own reasoning faculties. But these

faculties are said to be fallacious: why, then, may they not have failed us in this particular argument? If we cannot trust to their decisions *generally*, what certainty is there in that revelation, upon the truth of which they alone can decide?

The argument becomes still stronger, when we pass from the question of revelation to that of the being of God. Without this truth already established, inspiration is a word without any meaning whatever. But how is it established, except by the inferences of our own reason? To undermine the authority of reason, therefore, is to undermine that of revelation as well; once destroy the validity of the subjective world within, and there can be no longer a certainty left in any objective reality. The scepticism, therefore, which builds itself up upon authority, is in its nature inconclusive. It holds some truths as absolutely sure; but if it could only expand its own principles to their legitimate extent, it would discover that the knowledge which it allows is no more certain than that which it rejects; nay, that the truth of the one is indissolubly connected with the truth of the other.

Whatever scepticism now exists in England is, we imagine, nearly all of this kind. The philosophic spirit is with us, for the most part, at a low ebb, whilst the religious is developing itself often with great intensity. The effect of this is to depress the value of metaphysical truth, and to hold up

that of revelation as altogether independent of it. Our ordinary religious literature abounds in crude assertions of this nature. Many of those who write for the religious public, conscious that they never thought themselves clear upon any of the first principles of truth, suppose that no one else has; conscious that their own reason is inconclusive in its researches, stamp the whole reason of mankind as equally so; assured that their own knowledge is taken entirely upon trust from tradition or the Scriptures, suppose that all men must take theirs from the same source. Men who have been brought up to a certain belief, and whose minds have never broken away from the blind but confiding faith of their infancy, have not, in many instances, the slightest idea of the amount or the kind of evidence, which would be necessary to prove the truth of Christianity to a mind without any faith at all. Their own belief is in no sense whatever the result of evidence, but simply a matter of education; and consequently it is no wonder if they commit mistakes with respect to the *real* evidence upon which such knowledge must ultimately rest. This contempt of philosophy, into which the religious world so frequently falls, we feel convinced, is extremely detrimental to the best interests of religious truth. While it may here and there deter a solitary mind from involving itself in the web of human sophistry, it is, on the contrary, infusing into many other minds strong prejudices against admitting the full

claims of revelation, and weakening the evidences of it in the minds of those who do.

It is a fact, not to be disputed, that some of the most enlightened minds of the day have nurtured a secret opposition to the doctrines of Christianity, owing to the intellectual intolerance of its abettors. And while such intolerance lasts, can it possibly be otherwise? Is not every mind *impelled* to the admission of all truth, the evidence of which it has itself thoroughly evolved? Did not the same God, which speaks in revelation, create the powers of the human spirit? and when Christianity is made to contradict and repel the natural results of our own faculties, yea, to deny the certainty of that, upon which its own evidence rests, is it to be wondered at that the prejudices of men should be aroused and their assent refused? We regard the believer, who would raise the value of religion by invalidating the due authority of human reason, as committing an error which in time must prove fatal to his own belief. To mention any particular works, in which this species of scepticism is discoverable, would be a task more invidious than useful; we merely point out the general fact, that such a method of viewing things is but too common in our own country, and shall rest content with having thus briefly but firmly recorded our protest against it.

3. There is yet a third species of scepticism claiming our attention, to which we have given the

name of the "scepticism of ignorance." This is peculiar to the less educated and more unthinking portion of mankind. Men, in general, as we have already remarked, impose a most implicit reliance upon the evidence of their senses and their faculties, which it is almost impossible for anything to shake. But there lie, beyond these, certain other great principles of belief, absolutely necessary to the repose and well being of the human mind, the confidence in which varies, even amongst the larger masses of mankind, in different ages and in different countries.

Man requires faith in moral obligation, faith in God, faith in immortality; and this faith cannot be shaken without at the same time endangering the very framework of human society. Faith in these great objects, it is true, always forms a constituent part of the *religion* of the age, so that want of belief in them might be termed *religious* scepticism, with which we have at present nothing to do; but so far as unbelief touches the great fundamental principles of *natural* religion, in so far it is strictly speaking a philosophical, as well as a religious scepticism. There have been in the history of the world eras of intense faith as well as eras of general unbelief upon these matters; and it is the latter which we now note down as being characterized by the scepticism of ignorance. Current systems of belief (as was the case at the Reformation) will sometimes, from various causes, be shaken

to their very centre, and then the community at large, sympathizing in the work of destruction, are apt to go onwards with it, until they have left no temple of faith at all, in which they may worship. The next generation, accordingly, will grow up uneducated in any belief; and, as the consequence of this, there will ensue a scepticism, not arising from any designed rejection of the spiritual faith of humanity, but from actual ignorance of what there is to believe in. Such to a great extent is the present state of France, and such a phenomenon, in some few instances, is seen in our own country, amongst those classes in which infidelity has most frequently taken up its abode. Happily, however, the diffusion of religious truth is too general in this country to admit the return (except, indeed, under most extraordinary circumstances) of another age of unbelief in the groundwork of man's natural religious sentiments. Of the three forms of scepticism we have mentioned, it is the second only from which anything is at present to be apprehended. For absolute scepticism we have too little philosophy, for the scepticism of ignorance we have too much religion; with regard, however, to the scepticism of authority, we cannot conceal our fear, that should the theological odium pursue the spirit of philosophy with the rancour, which has too often been experienced, the result must in time prove fatal to the best interests of morality and of religion itself.

Sect. II.—*Modern Scepticism in France.*

The state of France, philosophically speaking, previous to the Revolution, has been already glanced at in the chapter which traces the history of sensationalism from Bacon down to modern times. We have seen, moreover, in another chapter, the main features, which French philosophy assumed, when the storm of the revolution had passed away, and the comparative repose of the present century had commenced. The principles of Condillac, to whose writings the philosophic spirit seemed then to revert, we have noticed developing themselves successively in the physiological theories of Cabanis, in the metaphysics of Destout de Tracy, and in the ethics of Volney. The triumph of sensationalism, however, was not destined to be of long duration. Every extravagant and one-sided system contains, in fact, the seeds of its own overthrow, refuting its assumed data by means of the very consequences to which they lead. A striking example of this is seen in the materialism of France. The germ of the modern eclectic philosophy began to appear amongst the very triumphs of the materialistic school; and then commenced the struggle which has now brought about the glory of the former and the humiliation of the latter. The rise and progress of the eclectic philosophy, however, we have yet to exhibit; our present business

is to track the footsteps of those different forms of *scepticism* which have arisen out of the contest.

The sensationalism of France was eminently *irreligious*. It delighted to scoff at all veneration for the Divine, to shock man's deepest sentiments of spiritual duty, and to substitute the indefinite idea of nature for that of the living God. The opponents of sensationalism, in the mean time, taking up another hypothesis, shewed many indications of running into the opposite extreme of pantheism; the pantheistic principle being, in fact, equally fatal to the cultivation of an intelligent and efficient theism as the atheistic itself. The natural effect of these results upon many minds must be at once obvious. The efforts of man's natural reason, whether it flow in the sensational or ideal direction, was made to appear as though in plain contradiction to our indestructible religious sentiments; a distrust of the power of reason naturally followed; and confirmed scepticism, at length, made its appearance on the stage. This scepticism naturally placed itself in opposition to the irreligious tendency of the age; and as the other current philosophies seemed to undermine the authority of revelation in favour of reason, it, on the contrary, sought to substitute for reason the dictates of revelation itself. The most decisive philosophical scepticism of France, accordingly, is that which bases itself upon *authority*, and aims at restoring

the power and influence of the Church. To this school, then, we must now briefly revert.

The idea of appealing to Divine authority, and bolstering up the weakness of our natural reason by the cultivation of our faith, was widely diffused throughout France in the seventeenth century, by the writings of Huet, Bishop of Avranches. Huet may be regarded philosophically as the type and exemplar of the sceptics, to which we are now referring; and just in like manner as his views came forth from the rival schools of Gassendi and Descartes, so theirs have come from the similar contest of the materialists and eclectics of the nineteenth century.

The Count Joseph de Maistre (born 1753, died 1821) appears to have been one of the earliest of these modern theologico-philosophical writers—one, too, who, by the liveliness of his style, and the fertility of his fancy, no less than by the gloominess of his opinions, was well adapted to excite the attention, though not perhaps to gain the suffrages of his countrymen. M. de Maistre, it is true, can hardly be called in strictness a philosophical writer at all, so entirely does the religious element preponderate over the metaphysical; yet, still, the whole tone of his *thinking* was such, as to prepare the way for future speculations, and still more decided attacks upon the validity of our natural faculties. There are three principal works in which he has explained

his views upon human society and human life. The first, published in the year 1819, is "On the Authority and Office of the Pope," the object of which work is to shew, that his Holiness is a universal appeal for mankind, not only in spiritual matters, but in social and political also! The next work is "On the Gallican Church, in relation to the Sovereign Pontiff." The last of his works, published posthumously in the year 1821, is entitled "Evenings at St. Petersburg, or Conversations on the Temporal Government of Providence;" and it is here that he has, at once, given his meditations upon some of the most profound problems of human life, and proposed their solution.

The chief design of this work, as the title indicates, is to explain and to vindicate the conduct of Providence in relation to man in the present world. The lot of humanity is to suffer. From this none are exempt, although the wicked may in the long run suffer much more than the virtuous. The cause of this suffering M. de Maistre traces up very consecutively to original sin, taking the orthodox doctrine of the Church as his guide throughout the whole discussion. The means by which suffering is to be alleviated, he considers, are *prayer* and *merit*, the one securing us the constant favour of God, the other allowing the supererogatory righteousness of the saints to stand in the place of the deficient righteousness of the sinner. As theology, these sentiments, of course, must stand

or fall according to the evidence of a purely spiritual nature, which can be shewn for or against them. The deceptiveness which runs through the whole work, scientifically speaking, arises from its being tacitly taken for granted, that there can be no valid philosophy of human nature which does not build itself up upon these foundations of inspired authority.

Far would we be from detracting ought from the inestimable value of revelation, or from denying the light which it casts upon human life; but it does not follow from the truth or authority of revelation, that our reason must necessarily be weak and delusive in those subjects, which are not exclusively of a religious nature. There is assuredly enough of truth accessible to our minds in the intellectual and moral constitution of man wherewith to erect a system of pure philosophy, without the aid of revelation; nay, upon the philosophical accuracy of our knowing faculties depends the value, even, of revelation itself, which, like everything else, must be known through their medium. Whilst, therefore, we would willingly allow M. de Maistre, or any one else, the "liberty of prophesying," *i. e.*, of treating and arguing theology, as theology, upon its proper evidence, we cannot for a moment allow their right of intrenching themselves within the authority of the Church, and claiming a complete dictatorship over the philosophical or the religious belief of mankind.

Such dogmatism it is the more necessary to resist, when we consider the conclusions which are drawn from it. As mankind exists, says our author, in the present world only by suffering to atone for the sin of the fall, he ought meekly to yield to every misery, that is inflicted upon him for that purpose. Amongst other methods of exacting penance, God has appointed human power to restrain the licence of the will, and this power, consequently, best answers its purpose when most stringent and severe. The duty of mankind, then, politically, is *abject submission to authority;* and, as all authority delegated by God centres in the Pope, we must in everything yield implicit obedience to him, whatever he may inflict or command. When sentiments like these are deduced,—sentiments which turn the world into a purgatory, man into a slave, and human life into gloom, it is, assuredly, high time to hold up either to ridicule or to reprobation the intolerant dogmatism in which they are nursed and cradled. Let a religionist dogmatise upon theology, speculatively considered, as much as he will; but never let him enslave mankind under the yoke, or on the plea of his crude opinions.

The tendency shewn by M. de Maistre to substitute faith for knowledge, and authority for philosophical investigation, in matters where such a substitution is not admissible, has been still further developed in more modern times by the Abbé de

la Mennais. This remarkable writer was born in the year 1780, and must, therefore, have grown up amidst the very storms of the revolution, with which his country was agitated. Being naturally of a deeply religious tendency of mind, he could not but look with sorrow, and even with bitterness of spirit, upon the almost universal reign of unbelief; and it must have become early a ruling passion of his nature to recal his countrymen back to the exercise of a faith in God and immortality, to which they seemed to have grown insensible.

To aid him in this design, philosophy seemed entirely unavailing. As to sensationalism, it had already banished Deity from the temples erected to his honour, yea, if possible, from the temple of the universe, filled though it be with his own glory. The antagonist system of idealism, with its rationalistic spirit, likewise afforded but little that was satisfactory to an ardent mind, longing to rush with enthusiasm into the great question of human destiny, and to bring man's duty to God with intense earnestness and vivid perspicuity before its contemplation. Resigning, then, all trust in philosophy, he took his stand upon the doctrine of the Catholic Church, and proposed to find there the one principle of truth, from which all veracious human knowledge really proceeds. His work, entitled "De l'Indifference en Matière de Religion," was the first to rouse the public attention at once to himself, and to the theme of his passionate in-

terest. It is the production of a mind disgusted with the sensualism and immorality of society, tired of the petty objects which were absorbing the attention of mankind, and longing to gain peace and satisfaction in higher thoughts and nobler feelings. Such a satisfaction he finds in religion as held by the Church in all ages; and therefore, neglecting every other avenue of knowlege as vain and fruitless, he will have this to be the one great and sole channel, through which God has communicated truth to his creatures below.

In order to establish this principle, the first requisite was, if possible, to *destroy* the confidence of humanity in philosophy, of whatever kind; and thus to compel them to take refuge in the ark of faith, against the universal deluge of absolute scepticism. He had to found, consequently, a philosophical scepticism, in order to establish the full authority of his theological dogmas. The scepticism which M. de la Mennais, with this object in view, maintained, if not profound, nevertheless is such as will be always sure to find a response in many minds. His spirit of combined mysticism and misanthropy; his restless weariness at the delusive glare of human things; his contempt for the errors, the failings, the follies of mankind; his disappointment over the frailty of his own cherished hopes; all these will ever touch a chord of sympathy in many a heart which has struggled through

the same experience, and arrived, perhaps, at the same results.

"What philosophy is there," he exclaims, (we quote from one of his own critics, M. Damiron,) "whose pretensions are not all uncertain—all false? The senses deceive us, and attest nothing that can be termed clear, positive, complete. Feeling is not more sure: its object, although in appearance more evident and more simple, still, unless we are on our guard, is nothing less than a continual series of doubts and illusions. As to reason, it is to be still more suspected; for, first of all, it only operates upon the data furnished by the senses, or the feelings, (data upon which it cannot count,) and, secondly, when the data are at hand, how does it operate? and what guarantee have we of the legitimacy of its procedure? What are we to think of the contradictory conclusions which it draws from the same principle? what of the identical ones it draws from different principles? What truth has it not denied?—what error has it not established? In a word, must it not associate memory with all its operations?—and is memory a faithful ally? Reason, feeling, sense!—faculties without control!—vain means of gaining knowledge!—principles of error and incertitude! These it is, which deprive man of all hope of having either knowledge or faith from himself; there is for him no reality, either within or without; there is nothing, up to the very truth of his own exist-

ence, in which he has any right to believe, unless he has some other reason than his own private sentiment, and his own individual consciousness."

M. de la Mennais, we thus see, has himself exactly fallen into the error, against which Plato makes Socrates affectionately warn his friends, in the conversation before his death. "Is it not lamentable, O Phædo," he says, "that when there is such a thing as true and valid reasons, capable of being comprehended, any one, from meeting with other reasons, some of which appear to be true, and some not, should fail to lay the blame upon his own unskilfulness, but at last should delight to thrust the error from his own shoulders upon reasoning itself, pass the rest of his life in hatred and contempt of it, and thus be deprived of the truth and knowledge that he seeks?"

It will not be necessary here to repeat the arguments, by which this sweeping procedure of scepticism is met and refuted. We have already shewn, that all absolute unbelief in the human faculties is answered by the very principle which it attempts to establish. If our senses and feelings, our memory, our reason, all are delusive, then every system of philosophy is placed *hors de combat*, and the reasoning which has established scepticism itself, may be just as erroneous as any other. Against all wanton unbelief of this kind, the common sense of mankind protests. That we may fall into many errors and many delusions through

false reasoning, is unquestionable; but there are some points of knowledge, in which we feel that error is impossible. Here mankind have ever taken their stand; and equally vain is the attempt to shake the confidence of humanity in that which bears the marks of necessity and universality, as it is to inspire a fear lest the solid basis of the everlasting mountains should crumble beneath our feet.

M. de la Mennais, however, having begun by establishing a philosophical scepticism, does not purpose, by any means, to leave us in doubt and perplexity as to what is true, and what false; on the contrary, he goes on to propound a theory of human knowledge, by which we may arrive at certainty upon all the great questions of human interest. The theory in question is that of *authority*—a theory which we must now attempt briefly to explain.

Man having no criterion of truth within himself *as an individual*, must find one in the universal assent of the whole race. The principle, "Quod semper, quod ubique, quod ab omnibus," taken in its widest possible acceptation, gives us the sole test of what is most assuredly true. This principle being settled, the next question is, *where* and *how* such universal assent is to be found. Opinions on all ordinary subjects within the range of human contemplation, have been perpetually changing. There have been different views advocated in art,

in science, in philosophy, in almost every department of general knowledge; so that it is vain to look for common consent, and, consequently, for absolute truth, in any of these directions.

In religion, however, the case is different. Here there has been really but one system among the enlightened of mankind, from the earliest ages of the world to the present time. Revealed at three different epochs, it has not changed its essence in passing from one age into another, but only varied its form. The religion of the Patriarch, of the Jew, of the Christian, is really one and the same; and the truth which it contains has gradually been developing itself, with greater clearness, from one dispensation to another. The existence of false religion is no obstacle against this view of the case. False religion is simply a defective view of truth; while true religion, amidst all its various developments, and all its corruptions, has ever retained its fundamental unity. Here, therefore, we are to look in order to find THE TRUTH,—that, namely, which rests upon the authority of the whole world, from its creation to the present hour, and which proceeded originally from the direct intervention of God himself.

Now the depository of truth, which was formerly vested in the patriarch, and in the Jewish priest, in the present day is vested in the Catholic Church. This is the receptacle of the universal consent of mankind; this has preserved it in its purity; this

can boast the sole authority from God, both to expound it, and to enforce it upon our attention; and the man, therefore, who abandons the Church of Rome, necessarily plunges into the abyss of error, both as it regards religion and everything else beside. Such being the case, it is the duty of every state in the world, (as the guardian of the best interests of the subject,) to support, by every possible means, that one Church, and that one doctrine, which alone can give stability and peace to society; to punish any dissent from it as a crime against human happiness; and to give implicit obedience to the popedom, as the living concentration of universal consent, the sole guide and arbitrator of human reason. Such is the extraordinary system, which M. de la Mennais has propounded and supported, with a learning, power, and eloquence which raises him to the very summit of the living writers of France.

It is the learning and eloquence, however, we imagine, which abound in the work now before us, rather than the soundness of its arguments, to which it owes all its popularity and success. The principle of authority, put forward as it is in the light of a philosophical, rather than a theological dogma, and stripped of its imposing dress, will hardly bear the test of a moment's close investigation. Put in plain language, it comes just to this—listen not to yourselves but to those who are worthy of your confidence, and remember that neither you

or they are able *individually* to know for certain anything whatever, whether it rest upon reason or experience.

The Abbé, perhaps, did not perceive that in undermining the authority of the human faculties he virtually undermined every other. Admitting that there are persons who are in possession of truth, *they* must have received it from some who went before them; they again from the generation before that; and so on, till we come back to the mind which received the truth directly from God. But these first recipients must have used their own faculties; they must have recorded their own impressions, obtained either through sense, reason, or feeling; and they must have transmitted them through the medium of other minds. If these faculties, therefore, are so weak, wavering, and deceptive, as our author supposes, what guarantee have we that they have either appreciated or transmitted truth with faultless accuracy? Must not tradition be corrupted by the very channel through which it has flowed?

Or, to put the subject in another point of view, let us suppose the Abbé himself in the act of seeking for truth *previous* to the time when he had found the sole fountain, out of which, as he affirms, it can be obtained. How, we would ask, did he come to the conclusion that we must fall back upon authority? How did he prove satisfactorily to his own mind, that the source and centre of authority

is in the Catholic Church? Did he not read, and search, and argue, and meditate? has he not written whole volumes of controversy on the subject, to persuade men to adopt his opinion? But on his own principle, what is the value of all this argument? Does not *his* reason totter and err, as well as that of other people? and has he not, in fact, followed his own private and consequently fallible judgment, in choosing to yield himself to the supreme direction of his spiritual head?

In matter of fact, private judgment *must* be exercised, whether we will or not. We come into God's world without any mark upon our spirits to tell us where we are to find the truth, and it is equally a matter of private opinion, whether we determine to work out our own system of religious belief for ourselves, or whether we determine to yield to the authority of others. If reason, therefore, be invalid, this very determination, which it makes, to resign itself into the hands of authority, may be an erroneous judgment. In short, if the validity of reason be once destroyed, nothing—not even revelation (which must be received through its medium)—can save us from universal scepticism; that is, a universal "*reductio ad absurdum.*"

That our reasoning here is correct, the subsequent conduct of M. de la Mennais himself has given the best possible proof. At the breaking out of the Revolution of 1830, he began to advocate the complete independence of the clergy, and to

argue that as they were in allegiance to another and a superior power, they ought to have nothing whatever to do with the temporal government. This doctrine was opposed at the same time by the clergy and the pope. In 1834 he published a small work, entitled, "Paroles d'un Croyant," the object of which was to advocate pure democracy on the principles of the New Testament; a theory which was so unpalateable in the same quarters, that the work itself was publicly condemned.* Baffled and spurned by the supreme authority, which he had formerly represented as the very concentration of truth, he had nothing left but to declare against it, to commit the crime which he had before held up to reprobation, and to afford another proof, that those who pretend to submit most implicitly to authority are actually, in doing so, equally following their own private judgment, and quite as ready to exercise it, as all other men are, whenever the occasion may require.

There are several other works beside those of M. de la Mennais, which might be discussed in connection with the school of philosophical scepticism grounding itself on authority; of these, however, we shall hardly do more than mention the authors, since in them all the *principle*, metaphysically considered, is the same. The Vicomte de Bonald, one of those to whom we refer, is usually

* This work has been recently translated into English, by Rev. E. S. Pryce, B.A.

esteemed a clever and eloquent metaphysical writer, but withal there is an air of sophistry and insincerity, which much detracts from the value of his writings, and creates suspicion, even where perhaps there may be no cause for it. The theory which he advocates respecting the origin of human knowledge is this:—That man when created must have been furnished by God with a perfectly formed language (to prove which he enters into a great variety of arguments). That, words being the signs of ideas, there must have been communicated with the primitive language a considerable stock of notions, which form, to the present day, the nucleus of all our knowledge, and which have been transmitted by the use of language unimpaired from one generation to another. That it is vain to seek for absolute knowledge from our own consciousness, from the efforts of our reason, or from our moral nature; but that we must find it, if at all, in the relics of those primitive and divinely communicated notions, which have come down traditionally from age to age, and which are preserved, and as it were stereotyped in the various languages of mankind.

That there is somewhat of ingenuity in the theory before us, and much art in working it up to an appearance of probability, may be readily admitted; but there are two considerations especially which deprive it at once of much of its value. First, it cannot be demonstrated that there was any primitive language at all, beyond the natural pro-

pensity implanted in the human mind, to embody its thoughts in external signs. To most minds, indeed, the latter hypothesis is by far the more probable and simple. Again, if we are to study truth from the words in which it is expressed, we must remember, that those words have ideas answering to them, so that after all it is to the human reason or consciousness we must look as the source, from which every thing proceeds, and which makes words themselves the fixed representatives of thought. If it should be replied, that the first thoughts of the mind must have been divinely inspired, then the whole question is removed from the platform on which it was before argued, and merges into the higher discussion respecting the origin of our ideas. Taking up the matter in this point of view, we think that our author's eloquence would hardly serve him to make the whole theory appear in quite so plausible a light.

Another writer, similar in theory, but very different in spirit, is M. Ballanché, the author of the works entitled respectively, "Essai sur les Institutions Sociales," "La Palingénésie Sociale, &c." The principle of these works, as of those just referred to, is that man at his creation received his knowledge by direct communication from God, and that all subsequent knowledge proceeds from the primitive revelation thus afforded. Owing to sin, the brightness of this first revelation was darkened, error and vice succeeded, and we must have been

irrecoverably lost had not God provided a plan, by which man might expiate his guilt by suffering, and recover his lost position. This plan is the Gospel, which was given for all mankind, and which incorporated into all the institutions of human life will one day become the law of the world.

The main object of this author seems to be the development of the plan of Divine Providence in the advancement of humanity onwards towards perfection. It is by means of social institutions, civil and religious, that he considers this advancement is to be made, this perfection to be attained; and he looks forward to the time when the evils of society shall be all overcome, and we shall rejoice in the complete accomplishment of God's providential designs.

> Then shall the reign of truth begin on earth,
> And starting fresh as from a second birth,
> Man in the sunshine of the world's new spring,
> Shall walk transparent like some holy thing.

"M. Ballanche," remarks M. Damiron, in his critique, "is in fact of the same faith as M. de Maistre, but of altogether different feelings;—having greater tenderness for his brethren, greater sympathies, and better hopes. If he has not, indeed, the wing of the eagle, still he is without its stern look, its pitiless cry, its thunder ever ready

to strike. In a region, less high, but more serene and calm, he goes like the dove, scattering ever on his way sentiments which do not trouble, and words which console. In his eyes humanity is not destined never to be good except by fractions; to have externally its plebeians and patricians, its weak and strong, its righteous and wicked; from day to day it will extend the circle of its influence, and will evangelize the multitude, and at last will be entirely good and happy at the same time." Such, according to M. Ballanche, is the origin of truth, as far as man is concerned, such its republication, such its progress, and such its final issue.

There is yet another name belonging to this school, which we must not entirely pass over. The Baron d'Eckstein, to whom we refer, though a native of Denmark, yet, from the conclusion of the last European war, became a regular inhabitant of France, and identified himself with her in all her religious and political interests. A man of great learning as well as great readiness in embodying his opinions in writing, he undertook the editorship of a periodical entitled "Le Catholique," from the articles of which alone his philosophy is to be gathered. With a tone more mild and liberal than most of those we have already noticed, he attached himself, for the most part, to the views of that theological party, denying (and here consists his scepticism) the possibility of obtaining truth from

the testimony of our individual consciousness, or the efforts of our own individual reason, but referring us, for that purpose, to the *authority* of the whole mass of humanity.

"It is not the individual man," he affirms, "the man of this age or of this country, to which we are to look, but to the ideal man, the type and model of the whole race. But where is this to be found, except in Adam and in Christ, who both represent our nature; the one, as created good, and then fallen—the other, as regenerated and divinely restored? Christ and Adam!—here we have *man*—the true and absolute man. What, then, must we study in order to know him? We must consult tradition; we must thoroughly initiate ourselves, by history, into the real sense of primitive Christian tradition. The whole is an affair of erudition and historical criticism; the great question is, to examine and understand the different monuments which can retrace to us these two models of humanity—the one placed at the cradle of the world, the other at its re-creation. First, our view must be turned to India, and the regions which touch upon it; then, Greece and Alexandria, Rome and Judea; all these announce, prepare, determine, and accompany the coming of the God-man. And as, from Adam to Christ, and from Christ to our own time, the human type which they bear in them, has not passed from age to age, from country to country, without altering—as

it has had its variations, its accidents, its vicissitudes—we must accordingly follow them through all their movements—we must explain and systematize them; and by so doing only can we embrace the whole subject, and give to our ideas the character of catholicity."

This brief summary may give a general idea of the method by which the Baron proposes to search after truth; and on what grounds he lays so much stress upon the principle of authority.

In concluding this sketch of the French authoritative scepticism, we shall make one or two observations upon the principle of authority itself. And, first of all, we are far from denying its value, upon many important topics within the range of human knowledge. In theology, for example, when once we have got beyond the precincts of natural religion, authority is our sole guide;—inspired authority standing foremost, that of tradition acting occasionally as its interpreter. With the truth upheld by such authority, philosophy has almost nothing to do, except testing the validity of the evidence on which it rests; for beyond this it can only reserve for itself the power of pronouncing a veto upon any dogma which absolutely contradicts our faculties. The God of revelation and the creator of the human faculties are the same; and if these *seem* to contradict each other, it only proves either

* See Damiron, "Historie de Philosophie," vol. i., p. 315.

that the revelation is spurious, (we know that our faculties are not,) or that we have misinterpreted its meaning. With this exception, however, we conceive that the authority of a well-authenticated revelation must be regarded within its own proper limits, as paramount and supreme.

Authority, however, while it is most valuable within the province of theology, yet, even within the range of philosophy itself, is often of no little service. The appeal to the common consent of mankind, is one which has great weight in aiding us to determine accurately the entire phenomena of the human consciousness. Individual *observation* may prove imperfect or fallacious; but where the common consent of mankind bears testimony to the certainty and uniformity of any of our mental phenomena, we can have the less hesitation in regarding them as valid. What other than the principle of authority, as far as regards psychical observation, was that of Reid, when he appealed to the common sense of mankind? What other is the principle of all who strengthen the testimony of their own consciousness by that of their fellow-creatures? In philosophy itself, therefore, authority is not to be altogether despised; while with regard to matters of faith and mere opinion, it is the great appeal in which we must take refuge—the best guide by which we can be directed—the clearest voice that speaks to us amidst the discordant sound of private judgment.

Now the error of the school which we have just described lies here,—that instead of thankfully receiving the aid of authority in those questions on which it is entitled to speak, it has exaggerated, if not its value, still the *extent* of its application, and made it at length the sole organ or channel of all truth. The fallacy couched in this procedure becomes evident at once from the consideration, that no truth which comes to us through a secondary medium, as does that of authority, can be *absolute* and *fundamental.* However unobjectionable the medium itself may be, still the knowledge it conveys has to be received through our own faculties; and if those faculties be not of equal credibility, of course the whole result may be vitiated. To plant oneself upon authority, and then deny the validity of the human intelligence to discover, test, or appreciate truth, is like sawing off the bough of the tree upon which we are standing. As the bough, severed from the stem, must fall and hurl us with it to the earth, so authority, if severed from the whole tree of human knowledge, must sink to the ground, and carry those who trust to it to the same ruin. *God makes his first and fundamental revelation to us in the constitution of our own minds.* If the credibility of this primitive revelation be rejected, it is impossible ever to prove the reality of any other. For how can we prove it? How, except by the laws of reason and the rules of testimony? In these, accordingly, all truth, as far

as we are concerned, must be grounded; and the scepticism, which would shake their authority, though it attempt to furnish another in its place, must at length prove detrimental to the stability of the whole edifice of human knowledge.

The scepticism we have just described is without doubt that which possesses, in France, the most learned and accomplished supporters. It is by no means, however, that under which the greatest number of minds in that country are to be enrolled. In England, the popular scepticism, if there be any, is that which sacrifices philosophy on the shrine of theological faith: in France, on the contrary, it is rather of the nature we have already described, under the appellation of the scepticism of ignorance—a scepticism in which many of the most necessary beliefs of humanity have been altogether lost. The history of France, during the last two or three centuries, unfolds to us the process, by which that country has well nigh sunk its faith in God and immortality. The age of the reformation caused to resound through the French provinces, as it did through the whole of Europe, the war-cry of intelligence and liberty against spiritual despotism. Persecution and bloodshed followed, and the holiest precepts of religion were often violated by those, who stood forth as its firmest

champions. The effect of this upon the minds, that stood by to gaze upon the contest, could not be long of an equivocal nature. Their faith in the Christianity they professed was shaken at once by the arguments of the Reformer, and the practice of the Catholic, the former appealing to their intellectual, the latter to their moral nature; and they learned, unhappily, to despise the one, before their belief was replaced by the other. The results of this soon became evident in the rise of men, who, like Voltaire, sported with the most solemn truths of human belief; in the establishment of the atheistical school of the French Encyclopædists; and, what was still more decisive, in the sympathy with which their works were greeted by thousands throughout the country.

What was thus fairly commenced, the horrors of the revolution so effectually completed, that there was hardly a single region of human thought in which the tide of opposition, that raged against everything existing under the old regime, was not manifested. Monarchical institutions gave way to complete democracy; the various classes of human society were all thrown down to the broad level of citizenship; the religion of Christ, (the religion of pure spirituality,) gave way to the grossest materialism; the morality of the Gospel, which enjoins self-sacrifice, was exchanged for that selfish system which knows no good but pleasure, no evil but pain. The reaction, in a word, was intense, com-

plete, universal, and as the next generation (one which had been born and fostered in these principles) grew up, though there was still the moral nature and the religious capacity innate within them, yet, alas! there was no virtue for the one, no God for the other. The nineteenth century, accordingly, has exhibited to us the people of France, to a vast extent, *without a belief* in the great truths of God and immortality: happy will it be, if, too eager to supply this want, it does not again rush into the dim regions of religious mysticism and superstition. Perhaps we should be hardly correct in terming the scepticism of ignorance a philosophical school at all: it is rather the *negation* of a school; still it is a great fact in the present aspect of that country, and, as such, we thought it not right to pass it by without a cursory notice.

Sect. III.—*Modern Scepticism in Germany.*

The intellectual atmosphere of Germany is one by no means calculated to encourage the growth of scepticism, least of all to cherish those two species of it, which we have described as existing to a large extent in France. Whatever other characteristics the German mind may or may not possess, there are few who would deny to it a power of deep reflection upon the world within, and a quiet independence that loves to probe every

moral question to its foundations. The Germans have long proved themselves to be the thinkers and the investigators of Europe, furnishing the material out of which the more adroit and polished minds of England and France draw perpetual supplies for their higher literary productions.

If this be true, what should we say is likely to be the influence of two such mental qualities as those above mentioned, within the region of philosophy? It appears evident, we think, at first sight, that a people who reflect deeply, and who investigate patiently, are not likely to become, to any wide extent, involved in the scepticism of *ignorance*. It is those, who allow their faith to be destroyed, without having reflective habits of mind sufficiently active to supply the loss with equal rapidity, that are liable to fall into such a state of mind. The German mind, however, cannot well be without a faith. If one system of belief falls another rapidly springs up; if one dogma comes to an end, another is ready on the instant to take its place. So great is the fertility of thought and speculation in the German world of intellect, that there seem to be theories in store to supply any imaginable series of intellectual loss, that the future may present. There may be among the Germans hypotheses monstrous as well as credible, there may be systems of metaphysics and of theology extravagant as well as sober; there may be fancies for the poetical, and wanderings for the

eccentric; but there cannot well be an absolute nonentity of belief from not knowing what there is to believe.

These same mental qualities, again, stand almost as much opposed to the scepticism of authority. To search into the monuments of antiquity, is, indeed, a labour for which the German mind is admirably qualified; but when all the authority of these records is discovered, its independence prompts further questions of this nature:—What is the authority of this authority? What means had men of yore to discover truth more than I have myself? Or, if the authority be Divine; the question still comes, What is the testimony on which it rests? What the process by which it reaches my own mind? The German thinker is too subjective in his views and tendencies to be satisfied with any merely objective evidence. He wants to know what must necessarily be true to himself individually; what confidence is to be placed even in the dictates of his own reason and his own consciousness; in other words, he wants a fundamental philosophy as a substratum, before he can allow to authority the command, which it claims over the human mind.

The only scepticism, then, of which Germany is in danger, is that of the philosophical or absolute kind; for, should the reflections and the investigations of her metaphysicians in any instances so clash with one another, that no definite results

can be arrived at, such a scepticism, of course, must follow. The only instance, perhaps, in the whole philosophical history of Germany, in which a *shallow* scepticism came into vogue, is to be found during the reign of the Leibnitzian-Wolfian metaphysics. At that time the influx of French writers, on the one hand, disseminated a low worthless sensationalism; while, on the other, the pedantry and formalism of the idealistic school brought the deeper method of philosophizing into universal contempt. The result was what we just remarked; a low, shallow, and railing scepticism, un-German in its real character, but rendered sufficiently influential by circumstances to produce a baneful effect, both upon literature and morals. It was this, in fact, that roused up the mighty spirit of Kant to an intellectual effort, which swept away all the minor actors from the stage, and commenced a new scene in the wondrous drama of the world's philosophy.

Whilst Kant, however, opposed so successfully the shallow scepticism of the age in which he lived, his philosophy contained many germs of another species of scepticism far more deep and philosophical. Determined to silence for ever the quibbles and sophistries, in which so many were indulging, respecting the fundamental questions of ontology, of morals, of religion; he conceived the idea of removing them into a region alto-

gether inaccessible to the reach of ordinary logic, and there to let them repose in solemn majesty.

The general idea of the Kantian metaphysics is, we trust, sufficiently remembered by the attentive reader to render repetition needless; but still, to prevent the obscurity, which a too great brevity might cause, we shall re-enumerate one or two of the principal conclusions. Of the three great faculties of the human mind, sensation, understanding, and reason, the first alone is capable of furnishing the *material* of our knowledge, the two latter are merely *formal.* Sensation gives us the simple fact of objective existence; understanding gives form to whatever notions we may have of it. Sensation, accordingly, in making known to us the reality of an objective world does not tell us of what it consists, whether it be of a spiritual or of any other essence; it simply assures us of objective *phenomena;* and to these phenomena, accordingly, our real knowledge of the world without must be confined. Again; since the understanding gives to our notions all their peculiar forms and aspects, defining their quantity, quality, relation, and mode of existence, this part of our knowledge must be purely subjective, and its truth, consequently, depend upon the validity of our faculties. But further; not only is the understanding merely formal in its nature, but reason is so likewise. Reason strives to bring the notions

of the understanding to a systematic unity, and in doing so, it personifies its own laws, and regards them as having a real objective existence; the three personifications being the soul, the universe, and the Deity. Any logical reasoning upon these three ideas, upon their existence, or their nature, Kant shews to be entirely fallacious, giving rise in each instance to endless paralogisms. They are, in fact, *as ideas*, the spontaneous productions of our own reasons, and to argue upon them as being either realities or non-realities, is allowing the understanding to intrude upon a province (that, namely, of the supersensual or spiritual) with which it has nothing whatever to do.

In this way Kant removed the chief points around which scepticism delighted to linger entirely out of the reach of all argumentation. If any one disputed respecting the material world, his reply was, "Of what value is discussion about an existence, of which we can never know ought beyond mere phenomena?" Should any one contest or propound any theories respecting the nature of the soul, the origin of the world, or the existence of God, the same withering repulse was given, "Why reason of that which lies beyond all reasoning?" "Your notions of the soul, of the universe, of God," he would continue, "are but subjective ideas; they are personifications of your own mental processes; I can give you strong reasons of a moral nature to believe in the

soul and in God; but, as for *logic*, it is incapable of saying anything whatever, whether it be for or *against*."

But now it becomes a question to us, whether Kant, in cutting off the plea of the sceptic of his day, did not prove too much; and whether he does not give occasion to another kind of scepticism more deeply laid than that which he destroyed. Let us see the results, to which his principles gave origin. Reinhold, whom we must look upon as the immediate continuator of Kant's philosophy, was dissatisfied with the analysis which it furnished of the perceptive faculty. The truth of our sense-perceptions, he considered, was too rapidly taken for granted; and he suggested, therefore, the propriety, nay, the necessity of going one step backwards, and analyzing the *consciousness* itself, as that in which the perceptions themselves are to be found. The reality, therefore, of an objective world lying without our consciousness was put in a much less obvious light by Reinhold than by Kant. The latter took the phenomena of sense at once for granted, as much so, indeed, as did Locke himself; the former, on the contrary, affirmed, that a philosophical conviction of their reality must result from a due analysis of the consciousness, and a recognition of the objective element which it contains.

The spirit of speculation being thus once more aroused, scepticism began to make its formal ap-

pearance in the person of Gottlob Ernst Schulz, then professor of philosophy at the university of Helmstadt. In the year 1792 Schulz published an anonymous work, entitled "Œnesidemus, or a Treatise on the Principles of the fundamental Philosophy of Professor Reinhold." In this work he denies that Reinhold has succeeded in proving, that any distinction of subject and object, of matter and form, can be learned from the analysis of man's inner consciousness. There exist in the consciousness itself, without any controversy, the varied phenomena which it presents to us; but as to separating these phenomena into different elements, and shewing that the one belongs to the subjective, the other to the objective world, this he affirms to be impossible.

In urging these results, Schulz does not intend to deny the existence of an objective world, he merely intends to shew, that it is impossible for us to *prove it*. His scepticism, therefore, consists in the conviction he professed, that a fundamental philosophy, in which the phenomena of existence are explained and man's relation to the outward world deduced, cannot possibly be realized. His reasons for this are condensed by Michelet, in his History of Modern Philosophy, into the following particulars. First, in so far as speculative philosophy must be a *science* (Wissenschaft), it requires principles which are unconditionally *true*. Such principles, however, are impossible, because the

coincidence of the idea of a thing with the thing itself is never given *necessarily* and *immediately*. Secondly, whatever the speculative philosopher asserts that he knows respecting the fundamental principles of conditional existence around him, he knows only through the medium of his own ideas. The understanding, however, which is conversant simply with ideas, has no power to represent to itself any objective reality. Representations are not things themselves, and ideas can never decide upon the objectively *real*. Thirdly, the speculative philosopher rests his science of the absolute grounds of conditional existence mainly upon an inference drawn from the nature of an effect to the nature of a corresponding cause. From the nature of an effect, however, that of its cause cannot with the slightest safety be concluded: for, that is no other than concluding the conditioned from the unconditioned. By arguments of this kind, Schulz aimed at resisting the pretensions of speculative philosophy; and had he followed out his principles, would, in all probability, have furnished in its place a theory of human knowledge grounded entirely upon experience as the only real foundation.

The sceptical tendency, however, which was so plainly manifested by Schulz, was not followed up to any extent by after-writers. Jacob Sigismond Beck and Salomon Maimon, it is true, added somewhat to the sceptical arguments against

Reinhold, and for some time threatened to found another school of philosophy, in which all the conclusions of the human reason respecting the grounds of our knowledge should be contested and denied. This sceptical tendency, however, proved of short duration; and from the opening of the nineteenth century to the present hour, Germany has presented no school whatever, we might almost say no individual, who could be accused of cherishing the spirit of absolute scepticism.

The younger Fichte, in summing up the different directions in which the speculative spirit of Germany in modern times has flowed, makes the following mention of Schulz and his principles, together with their nature and their origin:—"The reflecting (or subjective) school, since its revival by Kant and Jacobi, has included within itself its whole process of development. We need only to place the individual forms of it as they stand by themselves in connexion, or to develop them logically from one another, in order to embrace the whole cycle of their possible phases. The separation of the consciousness from objective reality in our reflection, can, on the one hand, proceed to the complete negation of the possibility of deciding upon truth (scepticism of Schulz); or, on the other hand, reflection may bethink itself of the original and unalterable certainty attached to the consciousness, whether it arise from faith or in-

tuitive reason. If the certainty arise from faith, as with Jacobi, then bare reflective knowledge is regarded as empty, unnecessary, yea, superfluous in the acquisition of truth: if it arise from intuitive reason, then there is room left for a species of thinking between reflection and immediate faith. Fries, therefore, the connecting link between Kant and Jacobi, placed knowledge and faith as directly opposed to each other,—the one referring to the world of phenomena, the other to the higher world of ideas. Bonterweck, again, shewed the unsatisfactory nature of this relation, pointing out the alternative, either of giving one's self up entirely to faith, or of boldly carrying out the principles of scepticism. Eschenmayer, at length, embraced the former of these opposites, in which he realized the direct extreme of the contrary hypothesis of Schulz."

Such are the different hypotheses which, according to Fichte, may arise from the separation of subject and object in the human consciousness by means of reflection. How far the sceptical tendency might have been followed out, had nothing occurred to stop its career, it is impossible to say; but just at the juncture to which our present history refers, Fichte began to pour forth his startling idealism, and to draw away the whole philosophical world in that direction. Instead of speculating any longer upon the evidence of the objective element in our consciousness, instead of

appealing to faith, or intuitive reason, or any other principle, by which its reality might be established, Fichte boldly denied the real existence of it in philosophy altogether; accounted for the phenomena of the case upon purely subjective grounds; and thus crushed the rising efforts of scepticism under the more potent arms of idealism. From that time idealism has been the national philosophy of Germany, without allowing a rival to appear in the field.

The result of this chapter may be concentrated in one sentence. With few exceptions, the chief scepticism of England is, that of authority; the chief scepticism of France, that of ignorance; the chief scepticism of Germany, that of an absolute kind, which bases itself upon the denial of the fundamental laws of the human nature.

CHAPTER VII.

CHARACTERISTICS OF MODERN MYSTICISM.

SECT. I. — *Modern Mysticism generally;—In England.*

WE have now, at some length, traced the course, which three of the great generic systems of philosophy have taken during the present century. We have seen the efforts which sensationalism has made to analyze all the materials of human knowledge, and deduce the primary elements of which it is composed: and, even while pointing out its many errors and defects, we have acknowledged the fruitful results, which its close investigation of our sense-perceptions has ever produced. Next, we have marked the deeper channel in which idealism has flowed, and observed its tendency to become lost in a sea of interminable speculation upon subjects, which no sounding line of human construction can ever fathom. Both the systems admit, that truth *can* be discovered by man's natural faculties, only the former allows no source of ideas to be possible except the senses, while the latter

contends for another and a profounder source, which has its seat in the very depths of man's intellectual nature. Thirdly, we have noticed and weighed the efforts of scepticism to undermine the whole foundation of truth, and bring us to the comfortless conclusion that our highest knowledge is to perceive, that we know nothing. The fourth generic system yet remains—that which, refusing to admit that we can gain truth with absolute certainty either from sense or reason, points us to faith, feeling, or inspiration, as its only valid source. This we term *mysticism.*

As the two former systems are those around which metaphysical speculation and inquiry for the most part gather, scepticism and mysticism have ever played a somewhat subordinate part in the history of philosophy. Instead of being the *spontaneous* production of the human mind, they have generally arisen from the errors and extravagancies of other attempts. Scepticism may be regarded as a kind of corrective process to prevent the erection of a philosophical superstructure upon an insecure foundation. The precise office which mysticism has performed in the progress of human knowledge is that of discovering and asserting the worth of man's *emotions*, whether they be instinctive, moral, or religious; for there is great danger both in the case of the sensationalist and the idealist, lest devoted, the one to the analysis of sense, the other of reason, they should overlook those sensibilities

of our nature which often speak the language of truth as certainly, if not as clearly, as reason itself. In this case, the voice of mysticism warns them of their error; it tells them that there is a source of truth which they have both left unnoticed, and which might often avail, even when nothing else perhaps can, to direct the reason into the right path of investigation.

To elucidate the origin and nature of mysticism, we must glance for a moment at the connexion which subsists between the intellect and the emotions in the constitution of the human mind. Man may be said to have been created for two purposes, to *know* and to *do*. We can conceive of a mind utterly passionless, gazing with piercing transparency of vision upon truth; but yet unimpelled by motives to any sphere of action whatever. A being thus formed might possess the most commanding intellect, but it would never be fitted to fulfil any destiny. To rouse a mind to action there must be feelings, emotions, desires, passions: by their means alone it is that it begins to exert its influence upon things around, and stepping forth from the sphere of its silent contemplation to live for a purpose as it regards the universe at large. The intellectual and the practical side of humanity, however, are not severed entirely from each other. Our emotions spring forth, in some mysterious manner, from our *ideas* or conceptions; so that what the intellectual force pictures to the mind as *truth*, the emotive

force reduces to feeling or impulse, and by that means at length to action. These explanations are by no means novel; they are laws or principles of our nature which many have already observed, many described; in the department of ethics, especially, the dependence of our moral feelings upon the conceptions of right and wrong which precede them have been repeatedly asserted and illustrated by the advocates of the intellectual theory.

It may be found, however, upon a closer investigation, that these two departments of our mental constitution run more parallel with each other than has been generally supposed. M. Cousin, in one of his lectures on the true, the beautiful, and the good, has hinted at this parallelism, but not having carried out the idea to any great extent, he has left the subject fully open to future research, so that we need no apology for offering one or two additional thoughts upon it.

In examining, then, the phenomena of intelligence, we see a gradual progression from bare sensibility (the lowest intellectual process) to the very highest efforts of reason. We may easily observe the process in its various steps, if we imagine to ourselves an infant mind in its progressive development. That mind begins by experiencing a sensation; and this sensation brings with it the first gleam of knowledge, for it announces the existence of some phenomenon, though of course it says nothing respecting the origin or the nature of it.

Next, after sensation, comes perception. Here a primitive judgment is exercised, by which the phenomena of sensation are all referred to a cause without us, to an objective world.

Thus far, indeed, the life of man and of the brute creation run completely parallel. The infant mind, however, expands still further. Having made itself acquainted with the external world, in its various forms, it begins to compare, to generalize, to combine; it observes qualities, and abstracts them; it indicates things by signs, and forms language; in a word, it shews all the marks of *understanding*, as we see it exercised in the various engagements of our outward life. Of this faculty the brute shews but a feeble glimmering; just sufficient, however, to indicate the possession of it to a slight degree. But understanding is not all; the mind, thus far expanded, begins to look beyond the world of phenomena into that of realities; it oversteps the region of sensible into that of spiritual things; thoughts of God and of immortality occupy its deepest moments, until it rises to the loftiest attainments of human knowledge, and longs for the revelation of a brighter world. This faculty, it is almost needless to remark, is reason—the great prerogative of man alone.

Now, to each one of these different gradations of intelligence, we may see that certain gradations of sensibility precisely answer. To sensation on the intellectual side, answers *instinct* on the practical.

These two, in fact, form the lowest step of both, that in which they seem well nigh to unite; for instinct is, as it were, *an impulsive or practical sensation.* To our perceptions, again, perfectly answer the lower desires and passions; those, I mean, which are shared alike by the man and the brute. We perceive objects as they stand affected to our own interests, and our feelings are excited by them accordingly. So far man is not a moral or accountable agent; but now comes the human *intelligence* applying itself to all the framework of society, to all the relations between man and man, to all the outward aspects of human duty; and to this part of our intellectual nature we have the *moral* emotions standing in exact correlation. The actions to which we are induced by the understanding are *moral* actions; they all have an ulterior purpose in view; and it is according as this purpose is consistent or inconsistent with our nature and destiny, that they are to be regarded as *morally* right or wrong. Finally, standing in correlation with our purely rational and spiritual ideas, we have the spiritual and religious affections—affections the most potent as also the most refined of which our nature is capable. We may present these correlates to the eye in the following manner:—

MAN'S LIFE IS

I. *Intellectual*, *comprehending*,	II. *Practical*, *comprehending*,
a. Sensation, to which answer	Instincts.
b. Perception	The Passions.
c. Understanding	Morals.
d. Reason	Religious affections.

Now in every one of the above gradations the intellectual state chronologically precedes the emotional, and is that from which the other emanates. Naturalists, for example, tell us that the remarkable impulse termed instinct arises from some *sensation* which is experienced by the animal in some portion or other of the bodily frame. When our passions again are roused, there is always some object from the perception of which those passions appear to originate. In our moral nature the case is still clearer. There must be first the notion of right and wrong, then the contemplation of some action to which merit or demerit is attached, before any feeling of moral approbation or disapprobation can be excited. Lastly, our religious affections always spring from religious ideas. Just according to our conceptions of God, their great object, will be the feelings we exercise in worship towards him. *As a whole*, therefore, the intellectual man must be said to guide the practical man, the groundwork of all our emotions being found in our conceptions.

Such, however, cannot be said to be entirely and

exclusively the case; for these emotions when once excited react in their turn upon the intellect. They invest its ideas with new lustre and beauty; they add intensity to all its operations; and by their natural tendencies they often direct it in its researches after fresh truths. The result is, that in estimating the human mind as a whole, and giving their proper place to all the phenomena of its conscious existence, due stress must be laid both upon the intellectual and the emotional element; if either side be left unappreciated, error will be the sure result.

Now the sensationalist and the idealist both neglect, to a great degree, the emotional element contained in our nature. The former, more frequently than not, confounds emotion altogether with sensation, making them but different modifications of the same power; while the latter too commonly confines himself simply to the analysis of reason, neglecting the reflex influence which the emotions exert upon it. On the contrary, the mystic goes exactly into the opposite excess. To him the emotions of the human mind are regarded as supreme; so that, instead of allowing the intellectual faculty to lead the way, it is degraded to an inferior position, and made entirely subservient to the feelings. Reason is in that case no longer viewed as the great organ of truth; its decisions are enstamped as uncertain, faulty, and well nigh valueless; while the inward impulses of our sensi-

bility, developing themselves in the form of faith or of inspiration, are held up as the true and infallible source of human knowledge. The fundamental process, therefore, of all mysticism is to reverse the true order of nature, and give the precedence to the emotional instead of the intellectual element of the human mind.

This, then, being the common ground of all mysticism, we have next to seek after the various forms which it assumes, and to make out as far as possible some classification of them. Cousin, in the lectures to which we before referred, has given a twofold classification of the different mysticisms grounded upon the two fundamental ideas, or categories, which lie at the basis of all human knowledge; those, namely, of the finite and the infinite, of the relative and the absolute, of phenomena and substance. *Phenomenal* mysticism with him is that which actually transfers the phenomena of our inner self into the natural world, giving rise, first, to paganism, or the deification of nature, and then, as a natural consequence, to invocation, evocation, and theurgy. *Substantial* mysticism is that which imagines the infinite being to reveal himself immediately to the feelings of the human soul, giving rise to those extraordinary attempts (for which some have been celebrated) at sinking down, in their inward contemplation, beneath the veil of mere phenomena, and gazing face to face upon God. In this classification there is unquestionably much

truth and much ingenuity; as it is, however, too recondite and too subjective for our present purpose, we shall attempt another, which may better answer the purpose we have in view, that, namely, of describing the history of philosophy from a more objective point of view. We divide the various species of mysticism, then, into three classes. It arises—

I. When truth is supposed to be gained in pursuance of some regular law or fact of our inward sensibility: this may be variously termed philosophical faith, or intellectual intuition.

II. When truth is supposed to be gained by a fixed supernatural channel.

III. When truth is supposed to be gained by extraordinary supernatural means.

We do not assert, that any one of these suppositions is *absolutely and uniformly incorrect;* nay, we are far from denying that knowledge cannot be communicated by all three of these methods to the human mind. The mysticism which attaches itself to such views lies in the belief, that some one of these three is the great, if not the sole channel by which we have to gain infallible truth. The former, it will be seen, is *par excellence* a philosophical mysticism, the two latter partake more largely of the religious element.

I. We begin, then, with the first of these three modes of mysticism, that which supposes truth to be gained in pursuance of some regular law or fact of our inward sensibility. Here, of course, as in

all philosophical systems, there is to be noted a progressive advancement from the milder to the more intense form, in which it makes its appearance to the world. The first step in the development of a new metaphysical school is often so insignificant, that we can scarcely perceive in what it really differs from those already in existence; just as the first deviation of two lines which form an extremely acute angle can hardly be observed, while in their progress they soon become widely separated. Such is precisely the case with respect to the point, in which idealism and mysticism first commence to diverge from each other. The former accepts reason as the organ of truth, the latter faith; but reason and faith, however they may stand apart as distinct phenomena in their ordinary acceptation, yet in their higher acceptation blend together like the colours of the spectrum, without our being able to say where the one ceases and the other begins.

Now the writer, whose works fill exactly this angle of our philosophical literature, is Coleridge. Our literary periodicals and reviews have teemed, for the last twenty years, with articles or observations upon the genius, the style, and the opinions of this our great poet-philosopher. To record anything here respecting his life and character would be to repeat what almost every one already knows. His dreamy youth, his opening manhood, his collegiate life in Cambridge and in Germany, his wild purposes only created to fade away, his lecturings,

his writings, his marvellous conversations, all have formed the topics of many a page and many a reminiscence. Waving, therefore, all further allusion to these subjects, we shall now merely attempt rightly to estimate and determine the place, which Coleridge holds on the philosophical stage of our country.

The philosophy which Coleridge was first *taught* must have been the sensationalism of Locke, as adapted to the wants and contingencies of modern times. The moral philosophy he heard at Cambridge, if indeed he ever attended it, was that of Paley; and strange must it have seemed to his profound and earnest spirit, then beginning to dive into the deeper world of speculation, to hear an unpoetical utilitarianism delivered from the post of instruction in that venerable university. No wonder that he craved after the more congenial minds of Germany; of Germany with its mystery, with its poetry of life, with its spiritual philosophy: and no wonder that the literature of that country, when he once knew it, exerted a mighty influence upon him through the rest of his life—an influence which shews with what eagerness he gazed upon the new world of thought and of feeling, which was there opened to his wonder and delight.

Having mastered the principles of Kant, and looked into those of Fichte, Coleridge returned home with his predispositions to the higher metaphysics at once fixed and directed. Had he been

brought up amongst the metaphysicians of Germany he would undoubtedly have been a German idealist of the true stamp; as it was, however, the commingling of his early education with the idealism of Kant and Fichte gave to his mind a tinge of mysticism, which was only heightened by his passionate love of poetry and œsthetics. To comprehend, then, the exact nature of this mysticism, (which is the precise object we have now in view,) we must first attempt to grasp some of the grand metaphysical principles, which our author laboured to establish.

Man is viewed by Coleridge as possessing (besides some minor ones) four great and fundamental faculties:—sensation, understanding, reason, and will. With regard to sensation, we find nothing in his writings that can be considered of any importance. The reality of our sense-perceptions was antecedently admitted by him, just as they were by Locke, Kant, and most others; in no case, that I am aware of, did he venture upon any transcendental theory to account for these phenomena, or dive so far into the spirit of idealism, as to deny their objective validity. In proceeding, however, from sensation, to understanding and reason, we soon get at one of the main points of Coleridge's metaphysical opinions. The distinction drawn between the *Verstand* and the *Vernunft*, in the philosophy of Kant, has been already explained at some length. Coleridge seized this distinction

with great clearness, and, having done so, preached, defended, and illustrated it, with all the ardour of his profound and philosophic mind. The one he terms reasoning *by sense*, the other, reasoning *beyond sense*. The one is confined to the objects and relations of the outward world, the other, to those of the spiritual world; the one relates to the forms, under which we view the finite and contingent—the other relates to the forms, under which we image to ourselves the infinite, the absolute, the eternal. This distinction, to which we have already so often referred, unquestionably underlies a very large proportion of Coleridge's philosophical theories.

Our author, however, has not only imitated Kant in reference to the general distinction between understanding and reason, but has also accepted his twofold division of reason itself into the *theoretical* and the *practical*. The one is reason, as applied to the comprehension of truth—the other is reason, as applied to the regulation of actions. Pure reason tells us what is necessary and real in existence—practical reason tells us what is incumbent upon us as moral agents. The one has to do simply with the intellectual man—the other has to do with the *will*. All the moral philosophy, we believe, which the writings of Coleridge contain, ultimately rests upon the validity and the authority of the practical reason, as a categoric imperative,

an indisputable law, formed to regulate and control human life.

The part of our constitution, however, which Coleridge dwells upon with the greatest delight is *the will.* It had been the effort of sensationalism to identify volition with pathological and sensational phenomena; that is, to sink the personality of the human will in feelings arising from our nervous sensibility. Coleridge had drunk deep enough into the subjective spirit of Kant's philosophy, to see the complete futility of all such attempts: he learned there to look with an almost piercing intensity of vision into the native constitution of the mind, the original power of the *Me;* and applying this keen perception to the practical side of our humanity, he recognised in every man A WILL, a spiritual force (entirely distinct from his animal nature) given to him by God, to regulate his higher life. This will, accordingly, he regarded as the source of moral obligation, the germ of our religious being, the link by which our earthly nature is united to those higher natures, which evince a pure spontaneity for eternal holiness and love. These elements, therefore—the understanding, the reason, and the will—form the basis of Coleridge's metaphysical speculations. The view which he takes of them, though strongly marked, yet is by no means original; the counterpart of all his notions on these subjects is to be found somewhere

or other among the German idealistic writers—the greater part of them in the philosophy of *Kant.*

So far, then, Coleridge is to be reckoned properly as idealistic in his tendency; and, had he stopped here, must have been classed as one of that school. Having carried on his investigations, however, up to this point, he proceeds to construct, out of the elements above mentioned, a new organ of truth, termed *faith*, by means of which a fresh light, unattainable by reason alone, is shed over the whole mind. Reason, according to Coleridge, blends with the will: in other words, the faculty, by which we gaze upon absolute truth, unites with that, by which we are conscious of our own personality; and from hence originates a new insight into the secrets of man's destiny both in time and eternity. "Faith," to use his own words, "consists in the synthesis of the reason and the individual will. By virtue of the latter, therefore, it must be an energy; and, inasmuch as it relates to the whole man, it must be exerted in each and all of his constituents, or incidents, faculties, and tendencies: it must be a total, not a partial—a continuous, not a desultory or occasional energy. And by virtue of the former (that is, reason), faith must be a light—a form of knowing—a beholding of truth. In the incomparable words of the Evangelist, therefore, faith must be a light, originating in the Logos, or the substantial reason, which is

coeternal and one with the holy will, and which light is at the same time the life of men."

From this passage it is evident, that the faith-element enters decidedly into the higher branches of Coleridge's metaphysical system; that truths are supposed to be conveyed to us by its means, which could not come solely through the understanding or the reason, and that there is a mixture of mysticism, therefore, with his idealistic principles, shewing itself particularly in the application of his philosophy to religion. At the same time, faith, as viewed by Coleridge, is not a distinct and independent faculty, but the blending of the higher faculties in *one;* so that his mysticism is of a kind, which stands on the very verge of idealism, not daring to venture without the sight of the reason, nor choosing to trust itself to the uncontrolled suggestions of faith or of feeling.

The extraordinary value of Coleridge's writings, we think, must be fully admitted by every impartial mind. They form the first successful attempt of modern times, in our own country, to ground any of the great doctrines of Christianity upon a philosophical basis, without at the same time detracting aught from their peculiarly evangelical character. Added to this, they open a sphere of metaphysical thinking well adapted to counteract the objective tendency of our national philosophy, and direct the mind to those lofty views respecting human nature and human destiny, which, in the turmoil of our

practical life, and in the want of a more spiritual system, we are so inclined to forget.

To estimate the mind of Coleridge *philosophically*, we should say, that most of his opinions and tendencies arise from the predominance which the ideas of *self* and of *God* ever held in his intellectual being. The former idea led him to the deep investigation of the intellectual faculties, and the will; the latter led him to apply his metaphysical principles to the truths of religion. When, therefore, he found that the objects of religious contemplation transcended the powers of his rational nature to comprehend, immediately he sought to bring in the aid of his moral nature, and to construct out of the reason and will combined, another faculty, which should be adapted to the perception of these sublime truths. In so far as he has attributed to this new power of faith a super-rational capacity, must Coleridge be termed a mystic; but his mysticism simply consists in attempting to explain by these means the scriptural doctrines which most men receive, simply upon the authority of inspiration. The influence of Coleridge upon the age has been, and still is, more extensive than many imagine. His works form just the turning point in the philosophical history of our country, in which the advancement of sensationalism came to a stand, and the tide of spiritualism began to return. That tide has since continued to deepen and increase, and we anticipate

ere long the time, when England shall again boast a philosophy which is worthy the name, and take its stand with France and Germany, as partner in the further development of abstract truth.

Another somewhat remarkable development of philosophical mysticism appears in the works of Thomas Taylor, the learned translator of Plato. This, we should say, is chiefly remarkable as being a complete revival of the ancient Platonism—a fresh establishment of it amidst the varied systems of modern times. The power of gazing upon the pure forms of all existence—of seeing the archetypes of all creation, reposing in the mind of Deity, we must regard as being a kind of intellectual intuition, sufficiently distinct from reason to warrant the appellation of mysticism rather than idealism, as distinctive of the system. The Platonic point of view we regard, indeed, as one step in advance of Coleridge: it not only advocates that kind of immediate intuition of truth—that gazing upon pure ideas, which Coleridge admitted; but it denies the possibility of rising to this lofty contemplation, while the mind is debased by the perpetual contact of material things. Listen to Mr. Taylor's reflections upon this point—"The conceptions of the experimental philosopher, who expects to find truth in the labyrinths of matter, are not much more elevated than those of the vulgar; for he is ignorant that truth is the most splendid of all things; that she is the constant companion of the

divinity, and proceeds together with him through the universe; that the shining traces of her feet are conspicuous only in form; and that in the dark windings of matter she left nothing but a most obscure and fleeting resemblance of herself. This delusive phantom, however, the man of modern science ardently explores, unconscious that he is running in profound darkness and infinite perplexity, and that he is hastening after an object, which eludes all detection and mocks all pursuit."

Coleridge would scarcely have proceeded to this extent. He would have asserted the combination of our best faculties into one supreme faith-principle, by which truth could be immediately conveyed to the mind; but he would not have insisted upon the renunciation of physical investigation, and the absorption of the mind in Deity, as the only method of rising to the heights of true science. It is through advancing such opinions, that the name of Plato, even to the present day, stands on the threshold of almost every system of mystical philosophy.

The most remarkable phase, however, of this school of mysticism has been realized in the notions of JAMES PIERREPONT GREAVES, the friend, and, for some time, the coadjutor, of Pestalozzi. Mr. Greaves was born near London, in 1777, and educated to mercantile life. On meeting with some reverses in business, he went to the Continent, and spent some time at Heidelberg, where he gathered

many of the rising literati around him, and first began to open his new and strange opinions. From thence he went to Switzerland, and lived ten years with Pestalozzi, engaging ardently with him in the work of infant tuition, and maturing still further his spirit-philosophy. On his return to England, he devoted himself to the improvement of popular education, and to spreading the views he had formed among his fellow-men. He died in the year 1844, beloved by many, and admired by a few.

To gain a clear conception of Mr. Greaves' philosophy, is a matter of no ordinary difficulty; and still more difficult is it to explain it. The idea which lay at the basis of all his thoughts, seems to be the superiority of *being* to all knowing and doing. He considered that the great evil in life was *selfishness, i. e.*, the regard to *individual* instead of general being; that before any improvement could be made, the inner man must be appealed to, and united with the love-spirit—the eternal and divine nature. His philosophy was, in fact, a species of spiritual socialism, in which all human natures were to be united and harmonized by the perfect submission of every soul to the law of love, and the passive yielding itself to the impulse of the spirit.

Nothing would be easier than to go on multiplying explanations of his philosophy in similar terms; but we fear that the reader, like ourselves,

would fail to grasp the essence of it after all. As, however, Mr. Greaves has some followers and admirers, of whom we may name Mr. H. N. Wright in England, and Mr. Alcott in America, who has already written many valuable thoughts on education, we must look forward to see whether there is really a germ of living thought lying under the uncouth phraseology with which we are scandalized; and whether it can ever unfold itself to a system of philosophic truth. Meantime, we must request the reader, whose curiosity would prompt him to look into this form of modern mysticism, to consult "The Contrasting Magazine," published in 1827, a small volume, entitled, "Physical and Metaphysical Hints for Everybody," "Thoughts on Spiritual Culture," and a pamphlet, entitled, "The sentiments of R. Owen and J. P. Greaves contrasted." To attempt fully to explain the system which these works unfold, would be attempting to explain that of which we have never succeeded in gaining a clear conception;—we merely point out the above works as containing one of the most mystical of all the mysticisms of the present age.

II. The second mode of mysticism is that which supposes truth to be gained by a fixed supernatural channel. And, first, we must shew the distinction between the mysticism we have now to consider, and the scepticism, based on authority, to which we made reference in the former chapter. In that case, it will be remembered,

there was a formal denial of the validity of the human faculties; truth attainable by no other means, was supposed to flow by various channels from a primitive revelation of God to man; and the mind, well-nigh powerless in itself, was regarded as the bare receptacle of ideas coming to it from an outward source. In the mysticism now before us, there is, indeed, the same denial of validity to the intellectual faculties in their original state; but by supernatural interposition, regularly and systematically supplied, they are imagined to be so enlightened and stimulated, as to apprehend truth—even such as lies beyond the reach of the natural man. We term the former scepticism; because, on the hypothesis there made, the mind of man never becomes *per se* cognisant of absolute truth, but simply receives it through a given medium from an objective source. We term the latter, on the other hand, mysticism; because the mind is made actually capable subjectively, of *acquiring* truth, but is conditioned for this process by supernatural agency.

This form of mystical philosophy has been maintained in our own country, chiefly by teachers of religion, some of whom have put forth sentiments on the subject sufficiently remarkable to demand our attention. Their speculations, as might be expected, refer rather to moral than to metaphysical truth, their object being to shew, that a valid moral philosophy is impossible when the

assistance of revealed religion is not embraced in the creation of it. We shall attempt, therefore, to give a brief analysis of the system, as it appears in the writings of one or two of its abettors.

And, first, we shall refer to a somewhat small volume, entitled "Christian Morals," by the Rev. W. Sewell, M.A., formerly Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Oxford, — a volume pretty extensively known, as containing the ethical system adopted by the Tractarian Theologians. In this work there is, undoubtedly, much to admire, but much also, as we think, to repudiate; much good reasoning, but still more unwarrantable assumption; many glimpses of truth, but still too many admissions of error. With the anti-sensationalism of the author we fully coincide, and have rejoiced in the stern rebukes with which he has met its shallow pretensions; but, with the exception of what bears upon this point, we can find very little, that assumes a truly scientific character in the whole volume.

The object of the work, it should be understood, is to sketch out a complete system of ethics; to account for the existence of moral truth in the world; to explain the nature and growth of the moral emotions in the human mind. The author, almost at the outset, abjures all the attempts which a rationalistic or ideal philosophy is able to make, in order to do this; with equal decision he denies

the claims both of eclecticism and syncretism; and, having thus cleared the way, introduces, at length, his own theory on the subject. The essence of this theory may be stated in few words.

Man, by the very constitution of his mind, is adapted to perceive certain relations, as existing between persons, just in the same manner, as by a primitive judgment we perceive relations between things.

The feelings, which arise within us, on the perception of them are instinctive, and, consequently, both universal and eternal.

In this perception, then, and in these feelings, lies the primitive germ of our moral being.

Man, however, at his birth is under the influence of a corrupt nature; the evil spirit has dominion over him; so that, instead of perceiving these moral relations aright, he views them distortedly, and acts, as the consequence, incongruously.

All moral education consists in impressing upon minds the right knowledge of these relations; because from right knowledge of them, right actions will infallibly flow.

This education begins in the act of Christian baptism; by which we are placed in an entirely new position with respect to moral evil, the heart being in that act regenerated and the powers of evil exorcised.

The moral faculties being thus set right, they must be further enlightened, strengthened, and

perfected by the instruction of the Catholic Church; by perfect submission to all its requisitions; and by the mystery of the holy communion, in which we become partakers of a Divine nature—the old man being crucified and dead.

In this manner the moral emotions become healthy and active; the dim undefined light of nature is no longer our guide; but we follow the road pointed out to us by the authorized teachers of Catholic Christianity, our faculties having been prepared beforehand rightly to receive and clearly to comprehend all their instructions.

These ideas, then, we select out of the mass of theories and opinions which come before us in the work under consideration, as containing the essence of its moral system. The whole, in fact, may be compressed in these few words. Man is born with a moral capacity, but in a confused and perverted state; the grace conveyed in baptism sets him morally right; and the living teaching of the Church has to perfect what is thus commenced.

Now, in the whole development of this system, however ingenious it may be, it cannot be concealed that the writer is aiming at a particular purpose, rather than investigating impartially scientific truth. The whole plan of it is so heterogeneous, that it could hardly have been formed in any mind without the influence of certain outward motives to mould the opinions advanced into their fantastic shapes. It is with

the greatest difficulty, indeed, that we can arrange the system, scientifically speaking, under any particular school. The first step in man's moral development, as our author views it, is pure idealism, — it affirms innate moral powers and instincts. The next step is scepticism; for it affirms the fundamental disorder of these powers, and the consequent impossibility of gaining moral truth by them alone. The third step is mysticism; for by a supernatural agency, the nature of which is not very explicitly stated, the moral perceptions are all rectified in a moment, the spirit that haunted them exorcised. Lastly, with all the author's horror for eclecticism and syncretism, yet we find him culling from Plato, from Aristotle, from the Christian fathers, as well as all the different philosophical schools of modern times, to which we have just alluded. Let any one compare the ethical philosophy of Jouffroy (the great eclectic moralist of France) with the work now before us, and say in which lies the greatest unity, both of design and of execution. We doubt not, but that any impartial and scientific judge would give the palm in this respect to the former.

With the idealism and, to a certain extent, with the eclecticism of Mr. Sewell (for eclectic he assuredly is) we can fully sympathize; they harmonize perfectly with the principles we have maintained throughout this whole work: with his scepticism and his mysticism, however, we entirely

disagree. Let us turn our attention for a moment to his scepticism. The principle upon which this proceeds is shewn, first of all, in the contest that he undertakes against rationalism. The author here attempts to repel and to pour abundant ridicule upon the attempt, which some philosophers have made, to form for themselves a system of ethics simply by the exercise of their own reason. Moral truth, derived in this way, he considers as synonymous with *the fancies of individual men*, and strives to prove that, whatever may be viewed upon this ground as right one day, may be proved wrong the next.

To bear out his assertions on this point, he takes some two or three *parallel (!)* illustrations from the experimental sciences—as geology, chemistry, &c.; as though it followed, that, because men cannot form right conclusions on these matters without the aid of the observation and testimony of others, therefore they cannot do so in the case of abstract and necessary truth. Why, the argument of the idealist provides against this very objection. He contends that there are certain principles of eternal and immutable truth in the world; that, while empirical facts must be gained by observation, by diligent colligation, and by the testimony of others on the same points, there are certain foundation-truths, which rest upon the necessary constitution of our own minds, and for the pledge of whose validity we need no second

opinion. Might not the "*dear little original independent thinker*," whom the author chuckles over, perchance discover, that the angles at the base of an isosceles are equal? Might he not haply rear up a whole edifice of mathematical truth without the least fear, that what he discovers to-day may prove wrong to-morrow? Now idealism contends that there are axioms of metaphysical, of moral, aye, and of theological truth, too, which are quite as certain as those we have just mentioned. The only proof of the validity of mathematical axioms and deductions, is, that they express necessary relations, which our reason, constituted as we have it, can never reject; and precisely the same proof is at hand to verify the fundamental laws, both of moral and of metaphysical philosophy. Let men beware how they tamper with these primary laws of human belief; let them beware how they allow scepticism to plant its first step within the region of our rational convictions: once undermine the power and validity of our faculties in their application to the grounds, either of metaphysics, morals, or religion, and the catholic testimony of the whole Church and the whole world combined will not save the most precious truth we possess from refutation and ruin.

Again, the author's scepticism shews itself in the effects which he regards as flowing from the corruption of human nature. His theory is, that this corruption prevents us from viewing moral rela-

tions aright; and that the evil cannot be rectified without the rite of baptism and the aid of the Church. What is here involved, we would ask, but a perpetual paralogism? The *duty* of belief, the *duty* of submission, the *duty* of entire trust to authority, is reiterated and asserted to satiety; but whence, it is demanded, does the *obligation* of exercising such belief and such submission flow? My friend over the way, perchance, was never canonically baptized; he has never had the mysterious influence supposed exerted upon him; he has never sat at the feet of a Catholic, or Anglo-Catholic priest; his moral nature, therefore, is unsound; he cannot possibly view the relations of duty aright. On what ground, then, do you urge upon him the *duty of belief?* He has not, on the hypothesis before us, the capacity to feel it to be a duty. Words to him are nothing; for there is no correct moral sensibility to work upon. Talk not of his sin, his pride, his resistance of law, his rejection of God's authorized teachers; if his fundamental notions of moral obligation are perverted, duty is to him, in comparison with a baptized person, a nonentity. In brief, if those without the Catholic Church are left so perverted, that their moral nature does not act aright within them, then all argument to bring them to the pale, all attempts to prove them wrong, must be unavailing: the only course must be to cajole them to the font, and having rege-

nerated them, then, at length, to appeal to their renewed hearts. Whilst, however, the moral faculties are all twisted, in the name of consistency do not blame them with a want of belief, the obligation of which they are morally incapable of perceiving. Again we say, to deny the validity of a man's moral faculties, and then to affirm him wrong in not performing the moral act of belief, implies a paralogism in reason, and an absurdity in practice.

Into the author's *mysticism* we should be tempted to enter far more largely, were we writing on theological principles rather than those of speculative philosophy. As, however, we certainly regard it entirely out of place, in a work pretending to scientific rigour, to advance so loosely and affirm with so little proof the reality of sacramental efficacy, so we should be stepping out of our own track in marshalling any arguments, derived from Scripture or experience, which may lie against it. But extraordinary it certainly appears to us, that any one should accuse man's instinctive moral convictions of *indefiniteness*, and then appeal to an abstraction, called the Catholic Church, to obtain a scientific system of ethical truth in which this indistinctness should be rectified. Let any one consider the mass of conflicting opinions, both on religion and ethics, which has been held by the visible Church in different ages; let any one consider the difficulty of deciding which out of this

whole mass must be Catholic truth and which the incrustation of error; let any one look round him now, and see how many authorized teachers of the Church itself are giving completely contradictory views on the same points, and those of fundamental importance; let any one, in fine, estimate the difficulty and uncertainty of historical inquiry reaching back into remote ages, the chief monuments of which have perished in the wreck of time, and then say, whether he is willing to rest the fundamental principles of moral obligation upon this basis.

Leaving, therefore, the Anglo-Catholic system of ethics, we go on to notice another form in which this same species of mysticism is sometimes advanced, and that is, when the authority of the Bible is substituted for that of the Church. I might mention Dr. Wardlaw's "Christian Ethics" as an instance of that, to which I am now alluding; in which it is maintained that human nature is too perverted morally ever to arrive at pure ethical truth without the influence, which the revealed word exerts upon the mind. Here, as in the other case, there is a principle involved, which, if consistently maintained, would strike at the root of all moral obligation. For, not only must our personal responsibility on this hypothesis be diminished, but even religion itself must lose its foundation and its force, when once the sanctity of conscience, as an inward law, is disowned. All

religion rests upon the existence of a God, infinitely just, and holy, as well as powerful and great; but of what use were it that the moral perfections of Deity should be displayed in the world around us or in the written word, if we had no correct moral sensibility, to which these manifestations might appeal? Unless there were a standard of right within us, we could never *conceive* of holiness or moral perfection as the attributes of the Supreme Being; and, wanting this conception, religion would be a non-entity.

The influence of depravity falls primarily upon our *dispositions*. Indisposition towards what is holy may divert our thoughts from moral truth, and weaken our conceptions of it; then, the conceptions being weakened, the moral emotions will be less intense. But never can sin invert or disturb the great principles of man's moral nature. Conscience may be *seared*, but never *deranged;* it may cease to speak, but it will never turn upside down the great relations of good and evil. Moral *approbation* will ever follow the perception of what is esteemed right; moral *disapprobation* the perception of what is esteemed wrong. Were we to suppose it to be otherwise, man would not only be placed beyond the region of responsibility; but there would be a moral impossibility that he could ever be taught the sacredness of virtue, or the turpitude of vice. Just as no teaching could convey the notion of salt or bitter if sensation

were deranged, so, also, no course of moral instruction, not even a revelation itself, could ever give us the perception of good and evil, if our moral sensibilities were thrown into confusion.

III. We come now to consider the third mode of mysticism, to which we have alluded; that, namely, which supposes all truth to be gained by extraordinary supernatural means. This, of course, must be regarded simply as a species of religious mysticism, held for the most part by those who make but little pretension to philosophical investigation. It results frequently, for example, from an exaggerated view of the Scriptural doctrine of Divine influence. Not a few earnest believers in Christianity, with a mistaken desire of enhancing the value of revelation, would have us to suppose, that all absolute truth must be communicated by the special operation of the Spirit upon the mind. Man, it is argued, is blinded by sin, his reason is beclouded, he cannot understand revealed truth though it blaze forth in the clearest light from the sacred page; but a special enlightenment comes over him, and then truth becomes plain and obvious.

In this system we see simply the exaggeration of a great theological doctrine. That the eternal and infinite Spirit should communicate with those finite spirits, which are emanations from its own essence, is philosophically probable, and theologically certain; but far is this from justifying the sweeping

conclusion that *all* absolute truth must depend upon such especial communings of God with man. To the *spiritual* nature of man, indeed, they may be all in all; but God has not left him so irresponsible as it would be implied that he really is, were he entirely dependent *intellectually* upon the extraordinary communications of spiritual influence, in order to view truth aright. This idea, in fact, if developed to its full extent, lands us exactly upon the doctrine of Swedenbourg, who imagined that he had received certain special revelations from God, by which not only spiritual truths, but also a complete system of philosophical science was unfolded to his mind. That direct intercourse with God is permitted, and that it answers a purpose infinitely important in human destiny, we fully believe; but assuredly it was never intended to supply the place, or to contravene the duty, of our own intellectual effort. As these phenomena, however, come more under the idea of religious than philosophical mysticism, we shall now, having indicated their existence, forbear to pursue them any farther.

To sum up, then, our remarks upon the modern mysticism of England, in few words, we would remind our readers that the errors which it contains are all errors either of *defect* or of *exaggeration;* and that every form of it really contains some germ of truth at the basis, to which it owes its existence. Look at the first form. That truth may stream in

rays of beauty upon the mind through the medium of our inward sensibility (since all our affections have their appropriate object) we can hardly entertain a doubt; but when sensibility is substituted for reason, and raised to a position superior to it in the development of our knowledge, then there is an error admitted, which only needs a little unfolding to produce the wildest fancies of the philosophical mystic. Again, to adduce the second form—we should be far from denying that there is such a thing as a fixed supernatural channel, by which God reveals his will to mankind; for the Bible, as we regard it, is such a channel, and so also is the Church. But when the Bible on the one hand, or the Church on the other, is raised up as an authority upon the *ruins* of human reason, we cannot but think that a suicidal act is virtually committed, inasmuch as if the validity of reason is undermined, the possibility of proving the authenticity of revelation itself is for ever destroyed. Lastly, to adduce the third form of mysticism, we do not reject the illumination of the soul of man by especial outpourings of Divine influence; but we contend that such influences relate to man's religious progress in his probationary state, and are not to be regarded as the channels for conveying to any mind either physical or metaphysical truth. Mysticism, in fact, within its due limits, expresses what is true and sacred; beyond those limits it becomes a vain and a pernicious assumption.

Sect. II.—*Modern Mysticism in France.*

France is a country by no means favourable to the rise or the growth of mysticism. In no other nation of Europe is the *understanding* so perfectly developed as there. In none is the higher reason, generally speaking, developed so *imperfectly*. As a consequence of this, sensationalism has long been and still is the philosophical system of the mass; and although a strong reaction has set in, it has not yet worked long or powerfully enough to raise the minds of many into that lofty region of thought, which is chiefly accustomed to be swept by the clouds and vapours of mysticism. France is the country of clear transparent mathematical thinking. Its language is of all others definite; its idioms of all others most logically correct, and least poetical. In vain do we search in France for the poesy of England or the deep mystic and reflective spirit of Germany. Extravagant romance may be sufficiently at home there, both in literature and in life; but the spiritual nature, the spring of what is greatest in humanity, is for the most part untouched.

The stirring scenes of the Revolution, and the expectations which it raised throughout the world of the coming regeneration of human society, directed the thinking minds of France more particularly to the philosophy of social life; and it is

in this department that speculations nearest bordering upon mysticism have made their appearance in that country.

The name of St. Simon is well known as heading a band of political regenerators. The system, however, which he originated embraces not only the details of a new social constitution, but some other doctrines, which demand a little consideration under the present section. The mystical element, we should premise, does not attach itself to St. Simonism in its principles, so much as in its details and its spirit. However rational the grounds of any system may appear, yet when its advocates separate themselves from the rest of the world, as some superior race; when they adopt a peculiar garb, and dress; when they announce a great crisis in the world's history, and promise a complete regeneration of human society of which they are themselves the precursors; it is hardly possible to withhold from such visionary enthusiasts the charge of mysticism. St. Simon not only attempted to introduce new social principles, but a new Christianity. Moses, it was said, had promised to men a universal fraternity. Jesus Christ had prepared it: St. Simon has realized it. In him the universal Church at length appears, in which the whole man, socially as well as individually, is embraced.

Claude Henri Count de St. Simon was born at Paris, A.D. 1760, of a noble family. At an early age he went to America, and served in the repub-

lican army. There his first ideas of a new state of society were formed; and when he returned to France, instead of taking any part in the Revolution, he gave himself up entirely to the realization of his cherished plans of social reform. In 1814 he published a tract on the "Reorganization of European Society." Other works on the same topics followed in quick succession: at length, poor in resources, and neglected by his countrymen, yet to the very last urging his few followers to go on in the path he had opened for them, he expired A.D. 1825.

After the death of the apostle, strange to say, the doctrines he had lived for became suddenly popular. Many of the first men joined the ranks of his disciples; and his principles were powerfully advocated in the "Producteur," and in the "Globe." St. Simonism, as taught by these organs, begins by setting down all attempts, which have hitherto been made to form a valid philosophy, as vain and abortive. Sensationalism and idealism have alike been unproductive; and all moral systems proved sterile and useless. The true philosophy of man must be sought for *historically*, by deducing the law of human development: in this way we shall interpret the past, comprehend the present, and predict the future. Whatever elements, moral, intellectual, or religious, we find operating upon human nature in the progress of its development, these are the real elements with which philosophy

has to do. St. Simon's doctrine, therefore, gives a philosophy of *minds*, rather than of *mind;* it presents a science of humanity as a whole, rather than of human nature in its isolation. This *principle* is one to which no real objection that we are aware can be made; nay, we regard it as a most important branch of philosophy, to trace the mental progress of mankind in the world. All the mysticism attaching to it in the present instance arises from the enthusiasm with which the law of development was proclaimed, as a divine discovery of the new prophet, and as a substitute for all philosophy, all politics, and all religion for the future.

And what, then, is the law of development, by which humanity marches onward to perfection? Society, according to St. Simon, has shewn two great phases or epochs, which, in long cycles, have alternated with each other. The one is the organic epoch, the other the critical. Under the former, society is always bound together by some general law—all its facts are regulated by some great theory. Under the latter, all law and theory is broken up; unity of action ceases; and individual interests go on clashing with each other. This alternation has already taken place *twice* in the history of humanity. The ancient pagan period was an organic state; the breaking up of paganism the critical. This led to the second organic period, by the consolidation of human opinion under the power of the Catholic Church; while the second

critical epoch, commencing with the reformation, found its climax in the French revolution. St. Simon considered himself raised up to announce the advent of a *third* organic period, now just at hand, in which war, confusion, discord, shall all cease, and man be united by the triple bond of a moral, intellectual, and industrial perfection.

In this state of society, there will be due provision for education, legislation, and religious worship. Every man must be a producer, and every class of producers must have its own proper sphere of action. Priests of religion—men of science, and industrial classes; these will form the whole mass of society. The most eminent of the three divisions will form the aristocracy; the whole together will form at once the Church and the State; and the great principle of action will be—*Each man according to his capacity, and each capacity according to its works.* Such is the general idea of St. Simonism, as given by the disciples of it, in a work entitled, "Doctrine de St. Simon," and published at Paris (second edition) A. D. 1829.

The sentiments of St. Simon, though hardly admissible in their original form, yet have been very suggestive to some other minds. M. Guizot has evidently borrowed somewhat from them in his account of the progress of civilization; and M. Comte, a pupil with more science and less piety than his master, has made the law of human

development the basis of his great work on positive philosophy.

The St. Simonian system has found a more recent, more complete, but somewhat more mystical development, in the hands of CHARLES FOURIER (born 1772, died 1837). Fourier bases the whole of his social theory upon certain psychological principles; the chief idea which lies at the foundation of the whole being this—That our natural impulses, or, as he terms them, *attractions*, are all implanted by God, and all point to our happiness as their final cause. In the present state of society, however, mankind cannot follow their attractions; to do so, would throw confusion into our whole social life. The great problem, therefore, is to frame a state of society, in which every man may follow his own attractions, and make them at the same time subservient to the general well-being. This end Fourier supposes that he has accomplished by his social system; a system which he has shewn to spring from psychological principles, and which he has carried out to its remotest details. To enter into the particulars of his social "Phalange," would have no philosophical interest attaching to it. The curious reader may find every information in "Chambers' Edinburgh Journal," 1839; and also in the Appendix to the work on "Social Science," by Charles Bray.

Fourier's system, it appears, like that of St. Simon, has gained more credit since his death than

it did during his life. It has engaged the powerful pens of M. Victor Considerant, and M. Abel Transon, in its favour, and has been advocated in a periodical of some talent, termed the "Phalange." The same system, moreover, has been supported in this country, in a periodical termed "The London Phalanx," edited by Mr. Doherty.

Amongst the many mystical ideas, to be met with in the writings of this school, there is much benevolence and philanthropy. In this species, indeed, of historical mysticism generally, there is a germ of truth—that of the intellectual development of humanity—which gives it all its force. Impossible as we conceive it is to ground a whole philosophy upon such a basis, yet it seems not improbable, that, to the method of St. Simon and Fourier, perfected, as it has more recently been, by M. Comte, social science is likely to owe its chief advancement in futurity. Such, then, in brief, is the modern social mysticism of France. Whatever other elements of mysticism that country may contain, are not of a character, as far as we are aware, to claim a place amongst the philosophical systems of the nineteenth century.

Sect. III.—*Modern Mysticism in Germany.*

Germany is a country, in which mysticism has ever found a somewhat congenial resting-place. Religious mysticism, for example, has often exhi-

bited there some of its most remarkable phases. Even Luther himself, the great religious hero of the country, may be said to have shewn a decided tendency to it in several features of his character; and modern times have not wanted instances still more marked and decisive. It is not our intention, however, to dwell, even for a moment upon the *purely religious* mysticism of Germany, as this would carry us too far from the proposed object of the present history; our purpose will be simply to delineate, as clearly as possible, the *philosophical* mysticism, which that country has originated during the present century. This course is rendered the more satisfactory, because philosophy and theology, in Germany, more than in any other part of the world, delight to go hand in hand; so that mysticism in religion, as it exists there, is for the most part but the application of philosophical mysticism to theological questions.

In describing any particular department of the modern philosophy of Germany, we must always revert to the Kantian period, as that from which it has taken either its origin, or its chief tendencies. In order to carry our readers back, then, for a moment, to that period, we would remind them, that Kantism contained in it a two-fold element. On the one hand, Kant admitted the objective validity of our sense-perceptions; and herein consisted his realism: on the other hand, he made all the peculiar features of these perceptions dependent

upon the subjective laws of our own understanding; and herein consisted his idealism. The expansion of the idealistic element we have followed through the writings of Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, and the respective schools to which they gave rise; the realistic element, on the contrary, was that upon which Jacobi linked his speculations, and from which he originated his profound system of philosophical mysticism. It is from this system that all the German mysticism of the nineteenth century, which is worthy of notice, has regularly flowed.

Frederick Henry Jacobi was born at Düsseldorf, on the 25th of January, 1743. In the eighteenth year of his age, he went to Geneva, and studied under some of the most celebrated professors in the different departments of mathematics, medicine, and philosophy. Being of a family that was possessed of some rank and consequence in the world, he devoted himself chiefly, on his return to Düsseldorf, to public affairs, residing at his country seat at Pempelfort, and occupying his leisure hours in philosophical researches. The extensive correspondence, which he carried on with many of the first scholars and writers of the age, during this period, may, in some measure, account for the wide and rapid influence of his own productions. In 1807, he was made President of the Academy of Sciences at Munich, and there, on the 10th of March, 1819, he died.

Jacobi came just at the period when some

attempt at founding a mystical philosophy was naturally to be expected. The energetic idealism of Kant had swept away, after a manful struggle, the pretensions of empiricism, throughout the whole country; and, not content with that, had given a manifest opening to the revival of a profound scepticism, such as we have already noticed in Schulz. Sensationalism, idealism, and scepticism, therefore, had all three been engaged in the struggle to which the giant of Königsberg gave occasion; and now mysticism stepped in to assert its claims also to the reverence and the confidence of mankind. Haumann had, some time before, attempted to found a system of faith-philosophy, and Herder, to graft his results upon the metaphysics of Locke; but it was Jacobi who first brought the faith-philosophy into repute, and, by his profound genius as well as elegant taste, raised it to a position, in which it was enabled to contest the supremacy with the other philosophies of the age and country.

One of the first things we observe in the writings of Jacobi, is his deep-rooted aversion to those rationalistic systems of metaphysics, for which Germany especially had been famous. He assailed the Wolfian school, the pantheism of Spinoza, and all other dogmatical systems of a similar kind, with a force and perseverance, amounting almost to rancour. To comprehend the method of this opposition is by no means a difficult matter. All

knowledge, he affirmed, communicated to us through the medium of the understanding, (or the logical faculty,) must be of a contingent character, and can never attain the marks of the universal, the infinite, the purely philosophical. To *demonstrate* any truth, we must infer it from another, that lies beyond it; this, again, from another still more general; and so on, to an infinite series. The human *understanding*, therefore, can never get beyond a series of conditions; it can never rise to first principles; never reach that point where truth is known and gazed upon by a direct intuition of the soul. Hence, he shews, that the philosophy which is grounded simply on the understanding, and which attempts to define and demonstrate all things, necessarily leads to fatalism. The philosophy of Spinoza, he regards as the complete type of these demonstration-seeking systems—systems which can never really transcend the finite and the conditioned—never attain to the absolute and real; and, consequently, never consistently admit a Deity, except in that pantheistic sense, which regards God as the totality of finite and conditioned existence.

"It has been," he remarks, "since the time of Aristotle, the increasing striving of all philosophical schools, to make immediate knowledge secondary to mediate; to make the original perceptive capacity, which grasps all things immediately, secondary to the reflective capacity, which is conditioned by abstraction; to make the prototype secondary to

the type—the essence to the definition—and intuition to understanding; yea, to make the former altogether vanish in the latter. Nothing is allowed to hold good by these philosophers, except what admits of being proved, yea, twice proved, by turns, in the intuition, and in the conception—in the thing itself, and in its image or its name; so that in this last alone the thing itself is supposed to lie, and to be really seen."

To these kind of remarks, the dry and formal definitions of the Leibnitzian-Wolfian philosophy had certainly given abundant occasion. It seemed to be imagined by the adherents of that school, that no sooner could any thing be defined by the rules of logic, than its whole nature was determined. Jacobi, impressed by the folly of this procedure, opened a campaign against all dogmatical systems whatever, and, with great ingenuity, drew the conclusion, that a purely demonstrative philosophy, as it has no first principles to rest on, must lead to scepticism and absurdity.

The philosophy of Kant he excepted from these sweeping objections; although he did not consider even this to be by any means fundamentally sound. He admitted, that that great thinker had effectually opposed the dogmatical systems of the day; that he had shewn their futility, in his theoretical philosophy; and pointed out the road to truth, in his practical: but still he objected to him, that, having once admitted the validity of demonstra-

tion, and, by its means, having undermined the arguments, on which our belief in God and immortality rests, he could not consistently restore by his practical movement what he had destroyed by his theoretical. It was evident to him, that some more fundamental principle was wanting; something to furnish a basis for Kant's demonstrations, and to give validity to his practical conclusions. This principle, then, he asserted to be *faith*—the direct inward revelation of truth to the human mind.

The true idea, then, of Jacobi's philosophy lies here:—that all human knowledge, of whatever description, must rest, ultimately, upon faith or *intuition*. As it regards sensible things, the understanding finds the impressions, from which all our knowledge of the external world flows, ready formed. The process of sensation itself is a mystery; we know nothing of it, till itself is past, and the feeling it produces is present. Our knowledge of matter, therefore, must rest entirely upon our faith in these intuitions. There is, however, another and a higher species of faith than this. Just as sensation gives us an immediate knowledge of the world, so there is an inward sense—a rational intuition—a spiritual faculty—by which we have a direct and immediate revelation of supersensual things. God, providence, freedom, immortality, moral distinctions, &c.—these are things which come not to us by demonstration.

We gaze upon them by the inward eye; and have just as firm conviction of their reality, as we have of those material objects, upon which we look with the bodily eye. It is by this twofold faith or revelation, that man has access to the whole material of truth—material which his understanding afterwards moulds into various shapes, and employs, on the one hand, for the purposes of this life, and, on the other, for preparation for the life to come. Leave out, however, this direct inlet to our knowledge, and all demonstration, all definition—in short, all philosophy is but a sport with words,—a superstructure, sometimes complete enough in itself, but baseless as the most airy visions of the imagination.

It may now be easily seen, how Jacobi linked his views of philosophy upon the realistic principle of Kant. Kant admitted, without proof, the reality of our perceptions: here, then, was the faith-principle already in operation, and only needed some additional fencing against the encroachment of the ideal element, to give it its due weight and importance. While Kant, therefore, supposed the sense-perception to be a subjectively formed image, in which, not indeed the thing itself, is represented, but simply the existence of an objective phenomenon declared, Jacobi affirmed the real object of our perceptions to be a true and perfect representation of the outward reality; so that he completely fortified this part of our mental constitution against

the sweeping results of the rising idealism. He shewed, in brief, that in every sensation there is something *actual* present, (Princip der Thatsächlichkeit,) which can never be explained away into the operation of our own subjective laws and faculties.

From this principle of actuality in sensation, Jacobi proceeded to establish the same with reference to the higher conceptions of the reason. Here, too, he had the example and authority of Kant for his method of procedure. Kant, it is true, in his critique of pure reason, had viewed both the understanding and the reason as simply formal or logical faculties, from which no actual material of knowledge could possibly come; and, on this ground, had removed the notions of God, of the soul, of substance, &c., as objective realities, beyond the bounds of philosophical truth. But he allowed the validity of those great moral conception of Deity, of immortality, and of rectitude, which come to us through the medium of the practical reason. To the latter principle, accordingly, Jacobi appealed. He contended, that the conclusions of the practical reason were as valid, philosophically, as those of the pure reason; and that the one was as much the organ of scientific truth as the other. Following out this mode of argument, he was led to view reason itself (Vernunft) as an inward sense—a direct revelation of spiritual things, upon the actuality of whose intuitions there

is as much dependance to be placed, as upon those of the senses.

In brief, Jacobi, at a time when idealism seemed preparing to sweep away all the great and recognized boundaries of human knowledge, stood forth as the apostle of realism—a realism which rested upon faith in our direct intuition of truth, whether human or divine. "He shewed," says Chalybäus, "that there is something more in our soul, than a dead and empty mechanism of logical thinking and shadowy representations; he reassured us of a deeper, and, as yet, an inviolable treasure in the human spirit; and, although this boon be hidden in the seven-fold veil of Isis, yet has he powerfully excited us to the investigation of it, by pointing to the reality of so precious a germ. He himself, indeed, thought, (and herein lies his mysticism,) that, if we would not sport it away, we must preserve this germ, without exercising a sinful curiosity; that it happens to every one, who ventures to enter this sanctuary with the torch of demonstrative knowledge, as it did to the youth before the veiled image of Sais; for that every complete and scientific demonstration could only lead to Spinosism."

Without entering more particularly into the details of Jacobi's philosophy, we shall conclude our remarks upon it by the following beautiful and significant passage from the pen of Hegel:—

"Jacobi," he says, "is like a solitary thinker,

who, in the morning of his day, found some ancient riddle, hewn upon an eternal rock. He believes in this riddle, but he strives in vain to guess it. He carries it about with him the whole day, allures weighty sentiments from it, spreads it out into doctrines and images, which delight the hearer, and inspire him with noble wishes and hopes; but the interpretation fails; and in the evening he lays him down, with the hope that some divine dream, or the next waking, will pronounce to him '*the word*,' for which he longs, and on which he has so firmly believed."

Jacobi's style of writing is so chastely poetical, and yet so philosophically accurate, that it has often been compared to that of Plato, and is regarded by many as a model for imitation. As a thinker, too, Jacobi is despised by none. Even the Hegelians themselves, so severely logical in their theory, and so supercilious towards those who disagree with it, have repeatedly acknowledged his services to the cause of philosophy. From Jacobi we must begin to date the introduction of a new element into the German metaphysics, that of *feeling;* an element which, if it had not been before altogether disowned, still had never been looked upon as an organ of truth.

The path, however, being once pointed out, a number of philosophical thinkers, and some of no ordinary character, began to discuss more fully the respective claims of feeling and intelligence as

sources of human knowledge. The relative position assigned to each was very different in the different systems which were now propounded. Some placed faith or feeling in the foreground, as Jacobi most decidedly had done; others made it only secondary. Some, again, tried to shew how the two elements co-operated equally in the creation of our ideas; others to prove that they both flowed from the same fundamental principle. Of these, very few, of course, could be strictly termed followers of Jacobi; and even those few kept by no means close to their master; the majority had belonged already to some other school, and being struck with the importance of many of Jacobi's ideas were anxious to combine them with the principles they had before imbibed. Frederick Köppen and Jacob Salat are the only two we can at present recall, who may be properly termed the successors of Jacobi in the advocacy of his faith-philosophy; the others must be regarded as seeking to unite this philosophy with that of Kant, of Fichte, or of Schelling; oftentimes adding original suggestions of their own. In following, then, the fortunes of this new element of *feeling* (whose introduction upon the stage we have just shewn), we shall notice three classes of advocates, whom we may characterise as grafting the faith-philosophy of Jacobi respectively upon the idealism of Kant, of Fichte, and of Schelling.

1. The writers, to whom we ventured to give

the appellation of Jacobian-Kantists, are Bouterwek, Krug, Fries, and Calker.

Bouterwek (born 1766, made professor at Göttingen 1791, died there 1828) began his philosophical career just at the time when the writings both of Kant and Jacobi were in the flush of their fame. From the former he learned that there is a realistic ground which lies at the basis of all phenomena, and without which all thinking is simply a logical play upon empty terms and notions: from the latter he learned that, in addition to the external senses, there is an inward sense (whether it be termed faith or feeling) by which all real objective existence, of a spiritual or rational nature, is communicated to us. Hence he concluded that, whether we direct our attention to thought or to feeling, there must be a real basis, a "seyn," from which they equally spring. This basis, he argued, can neither be found by thinking or by feeling, as these are both subjective phenomena; but there must be an absolute knowing-faculty (Erkenntniss-vermögen) by which it is immediately revealed to us, and out of which, as the ultimate ground, both thought and feeling spring forth. The science of this primitive faculty, and the knowledge which arises from it, Bouterwek terms *Apodiktik* (from *αποδεικνυμι*); and from this source it is, we believe, that the somewhat pedantic use of the word apodictical has been occasionally introduced into our language, to designate all truth, which is primitive and axiomatical

in its nature. In the original form, in which this system was propounded, there is a manifest approach to the intellectual-intuition principle of Schelling; in subsequent publications, however, the author tended more and more to the faith-philosophy of Jacobi.

Bouterwek had placed thought and feeling very nearly upon an equality, leaning sometimes more to the one side and sometimes to the other. In the writings of Krug (born 1770, since 1808 Professor at Leipzic, died 1842), to whom we next advert, we have another variation of this kind of mixed metaphysical system. Krug began by attempting to furnish a new critical philosophy, in which the true method of metaphysical investigation should be better shewn, and the full extent of the human faculties sounded. This was accomplished in a work, entitled "Sketch of a New Organum for Philosophy," published at Meissen, in 1801, in which he shews that true philosophy arises from turning our contemplation inwards, and searching into the facts of our own consciousness. In the consciousness, he affirms, subject and object, knowing and known, thought and existence, are *absolutely united*. Beyond this synthesis, as a fact of our own observation, we are unable to reach; for *there* is the ultimate bound of all metaphysical research (transcendentaler Synthetismus). In his next work, entitled "Fundamental Philosophy," he develops more at large the nature of human

knowledge, and lays greater stress upon the principle of faith as a source of our mental conceptions. Lastly, to probe this faith-principle to its foundation, he furnishes a new theory of the Feelings, (published 1823,) in which he attempts to shew that feeling is the dim and undefined ground, from which thought springs forth, and that it is by means of thought or reflection that the knowledge which feeling conveys is rendered clear and valid. The motto which he prefixes to this work well-nigh explains its whole theory.

Fühlen willst du ? Wohlan ! Es regt sich innerst im Herzen
Jedes schöne Gefühl, stammend von oben herab,
Doch vergiss nicht, dass auch von dorther stammt der Gedanke,
Funke der Gottheit, Gefühl ! Funke der Gottheit, Vernunft ! *

* The following graphic sketch of Krug's philosophical life, in a religious point of view, is given by M. Amand Saintes, in his " Histoire Critique du Rationalisme," p. 207.

" Fertile and earnest as a writer, Krug made use of all possible methods to extend the empire of Kant's philosophical ideas at the expence of the ancient faith. Speeches, articles, programmes, dissertations, dictionaries, manuals, all forms, and one might say all fashions, were employed to arrive at his purpose ; for he did not even disdain satire when he judged it necessary to shut the mouth of his adversaries. He appeared, after a long life spent in struggles, to have earned some enjoyment of the fruit of his labours ; but we are assured that his wounded self-love contemplates with bitter feeling a generation which no longer applauds with the same warmth his philosophical dissertations, * * * and that he has not been insensible to the withering of his laurels."

This last attempt of Krug opens to us the way for the philosophy of Fries (born 1773, since 1805 professor of philosophy at Heidelberg and Jena), in which the element of feeling again attains a predominance, more nearly equal to what it held in the writings of Jacobi. The chief work of this author, is entitled "A new Critique of pure Reason," (published 1807,) the object of which was, to place the categories of Kant upon a fresh basis, and to shew how they all spring forth from inward sense, or feeling. The position, accordingly, which Fries holds in the history of philosophical doctrines, is between Kant and Jacobi, with a predominant leaning to the latter. He admits, with Kant, that all our notions and conceptions, all that we properly term knowledge (Wissen) arises from our inward faculties, and, consequently, is purely subjective: on the other hand, he maintains, with Jacobi, that there is an inward faith-principle, to which all our thoughts and notions are secondary. The one he regards as fallible, and, consequently, unworthy our implicit confidence; the other he holds up as that sure and infallible organ of absolute truth, by which the real nature of things is made known to us.

The chief feature in his system (which he terms philosophical anthropology) is the attempt to draw thought and feeling into closer connexion; to shew that, instead of being entirely different phe-

nomena, the one naturally arises from the other; that they both conspire to aid us in reading our own inward nature aright; and through that, of understanding the nature of the world without. The opinions of Fries have, perhaps, gained the greatest fame through their application to theology; as we forbear, however, as much as possible to venture upon this ground, we pass on to the last of the names we have placed together under this sub-division, that, namely, of Calker.

Frederick von Calker (formerly private teacher at Berlin, since 1818 professor at Bonn) brought the two elements of thought and feeling into complete union, so that the whole difference between them in his system altogether disappears, and the faith-philosophy becomes entirely sunk in the ordinary procedure of metaphysics. Like those, whom we have before noticed, he appeals to consciousness, as being to us the foundation of all truth. In the consciousness we find three features of spiritual existence, namely, knowledge, action, and love; and, by the play of these three laws of our being, we are placed in close fellowship with the very nature and essence of things themselves, which fall under the three corresponding ideas of the true, the good, and the beautiful. The object of Calker is to exhibit the original laws (Urgesetze) by which these three ideas develop themselves, in all their fruitful results, to the human mind;

in doing which, faith is not viewed either as the beginning or ending of philosophy, but is made absolutely identical with scientific knowledge.

In summing up, then, this movement of the philosophical mysticism of Germany, we must consider, that it all results from the varied application of the two facts of logical thinking and inward faith, as they were furnished, the one by Kant, the other by Jacobi. In Krug, thought or reflection is the more prominent of the two, and plays the greater part in the creation of man's knowledge; in Bouterwek, the two elements as nearly as possible balance each other: in Fries, the faith-principle becomes predominant; whilst, lastly, in Calker, the distinction vanishes, and both facts are blended in one. Such are the attempts which have been made to complete the Kantian philosophy, by the introduction of mysticism; and, if the results have not been entirely successful, yet they have called forth much truth, and may be looked upon as making one appreciable step in the march of philosophy.

2. The writers who have grafted the faith-principle upon the philosophy of Fichte, are Schlegel, Schleiermacher, and Novalis. Charles William Frederick Schlegel was born at Hanover in 1772. In 1796 he commenced private lecturing at Dresden. After a time he went to Berlin, and lectured there with great approbation and success. From thence he removed to Paris, where he

studied chiefly the oriental languages. On his return to Germany, he joined the Romish Church, and settled at Vienna as court secretary. After experiencing some other changes, external and mental, he died on a temporary visit to Dresden, Jan. 11, 1829.

The earliest work in which Schlegel developed at large his philosophical ideas, was a romance, entitled "Lucinde,"* where he found an opportunity of explaining the abstruse metaphysics of Fichte in a popular and poetical form. Fichte, as we have seen, had worked out the most finished system of subjective idealism which the world had ever beheld. The Me, with him, became absolute, and absorbed in itself both nature and God. Schlegel, however, starting from the practical side of Fichte's philosophy, attempted now to drive the subjective principle, if possible, to a still further extreme. In language of the most glowing imagery he represents the spirit of man, though conscious of its own infinite activity, and fully aware of its endless productive power, yet becoming dissatisfied and disgusted with its own operations. Act as we may, yet nothing great is the result: the moral order of the universe was established beforehand; instead of *creating* the true, the beautiful, the good by our own power, we only act according as this

* He had already, in conjunction with his brother Augustus William, published some philosophical miscellanies, termed "Characteristiken und Kritiken."

moral order impels us; the limits it marks out can never be overstepped. The spirit, then, finding that its longings cannot be realized in action, becomes still and passive: it refuses all exertion, and gives itself up to Divine idleness,—in this it would now find the aim and purport of its own existence. Here it longs after eternal sunshine, and youth; but, instead of seeking some object far distant, and never attainable, it finds in this very longing the goal and the prize of its own exertion. *Only in the seeking itself does the spirit discover the mystery after which it seeks.* Here, then, we see the subjective principle absolutely completed. The Me, at length, becomes the cause, impulse, law, boundary, and goal of its own action. These paradoxes, according to Schlegel, all come under the notion of irony; and hence the first form of his philosophy is that, which represents the human mind under the ironical point of view.

These thoughts, of course, were presented in a metaphorical and unscientific form. In the year 1804, however, Schlegel began to publish a course of lectures, in which his views were to be systematically and philosophically developed. The first volume contains propædeutic and logic. The idea of philosophy is there explained, not as being one branch of science, but as that which gives life and soul to all the sciences; as that universal science, which embraces, and affords a basis to all the rest. Logic is defined as the science of the rules of

thinking; it is that which points out the method of all philosophical research. The ordinary logic, which has to do simply with the understanding, is barely formal; but there is a higher and rational logic, which has to do with the real objects of philosophy, which points out to us at once their inner essence, and their progressive development. This he illustrates by deducing the idea of God, as the Absolute, through all the various categories of thought, to its most perfect form.

As another preparation for his metaphysical system, Schlegel next gives a sketch of the history of philosophy, following the great schools of idealism, empiricism, scepticism, and mysticism through their various changes, and estimating their various merits. The result is, that each of these systems is seen to contain some element of truth; but that, after all has been done, the only source from which a clear and steady light can be thrown on our researches, the only spirit which can unite all the results of our science into a harmonious whole, the only guide which can lead us through the labyrinth of human opinions into the broad daylight of truth is that *faith*, which dimly seen in the platonic, has been fully developed in the Christian philosophy. Here, then, we see the mysticism of Schlegel breaking through the clouds of his original subjective idealism. In fact, he carried his subjective principle to such a pitch, that, at length, he took refuge in an objec-

tive and historical revelation against the bottomless abyss of his own scientific conclusions.

This leads us to Schlegel's peculiar philosophical system. Hitherto he had been only preparing the way; now, however, having reached the religious point of view—the only one, as he thinks, from which truth can be seen with distinct and steady eye,—he begins to build up his edifice. Seen from the religious point of view, the real object of philosophy is to restore to mankind that Divine image which it has lost. Men, for the most part, are buried in objective pursuits, and gratifications of sense; they do not see the purport of their existence; they do not comprehend the true end of human life; they do not gaze stedfastly at their high destiny. To bring these things home to our inner consciousness; to restore truth to the mind, and inspire it to labour for high purposes—this is the noble aim of all true philosophy. Schlegel, then, divides his system into three parts:—1. Philosophy of Life; 2. Philosophy of History; 3. Philosophy of Thought, both subjectively and objectively considered.

1. The philosophy of life comprehends psychology and theology. In his psychology, Schlegel regards our whole compound humanity as consisting of the mind, the soul, and the body. The mind possesses the two faculties of will and understanding; the soul possesses reason and imagination. Imagination invents; reason regulates; understanding

perceives; and will impels to moral action. The fall of man has produced confusion between these faculties, so that, instead of acting harmoniously, they clash with each other; and the great object of a true philosophy is to restore the harmony which has been broken.

With regard to theology, Schlegel rests the knowledge of God as the Supreme Being upon a fourfold revelation, which is made to us in the conscience, in nature, in Scripture, and in history. In this point he comes near to the faith-philosophy of Jacobi, inasmuch as he contends, that all our perception of spiritual realities must come by an inward revelation, which is communicated by different channels to the mind. Our knowledge of God is, in fact, a *feeling*, springing from some divine manifestation; and of such importance is this knowledge, that it is only by knowing God aright that we can rise to the true conception of everything else, as existing in God. From this springs the true philosophy of government. God is the ruler of mankind, the sole origin of all power; and the three relationships in which the power of God is represented on earth, are those of the father, the priest, and the sovereign: the authority which each of these possesses, according to Schlegel, is Divine. In brief, the author here discusses every philosophical question from a religious point of view. Man, nature, history, human life, every

thing is viewed in its relation with God; and from divine revelation alone are we to find the key to their interpretation.

2. If the object of philosophy, as a whole, is to restore the divine image to man, the philosophy of *History* shews the process, by which this great end has hitherto been unfolding itself in the world. The loss of the divine image consisted in the separation of the elements of the human consciousness; its restoration will consist in the complete reunion of them. In the first period of the world, the Chinese represented the pure reason; the Indians, the imagination; the Egyptians, the understanding; and the Jews, the will—each in its false and fatal isolation. The second period of the world's history began with the Persians, and included the Greek and Roman world. In this age, we see the uniting process in its commencement—we see humanity stepping forth into a more commanding position, and becoming more blended in political relations, and in mental communion, through the world. The third age is the Christian. Here we find the true uniting principle, which, though striven against by self-love, by natural vanity, and by the false spirit of independence, shall at length unite all mankind into one vast brotherhood; shall bring back all the scattered elements of man's consciousness into one focus; and make humanity itself divine. In all this, Schlegel's catholicism burns forth most conspicuously. To him everything that

favours *freedom*, political or mental, is antichrist; and peace is to be found only in submission to authority, both in church and state.

3. Having taken an historical review of man's spiritual life, up to the present day, Schlegel proceeds to describe the final completion and reunion of man's consciousness in the world, which he explains at length in the philosophies of *language*, of *religion*, and of *nature*. In all these, the mystical element is most prominently shewn forth. *Language* is the outward transcript of those eternal ideas and feelings, which have flowed from the mind of God into that of man. *Religion* expresses the innermost point of the human consciousness—that in which reflection and feeling unite, and in which God is realized as the very corner-stone of our inward life. *Nature* is to be viewed by the philosopher as the perpetual manifestation of the divine love in a material form. The whole result, then, of Schlegel's philosophy is this,—That true knowledge consists, not in viewing things as they externally appear, but as they are essentially in themselves; and that the only way by which we can attain to such a perception of them is, by seeing how they have all flowed forth from God, and how they eternally subsist in him. The method by which this result is prosecuted, is a mixture of religious faith, historical research, and speculative reasoning; a method which seems to combine the reflection of Fichte and the faith-

philosophy of Jacobi, with the submissive religious belief of the catholic.

Pass we now from Schlegel to his friend Frederick Daniel Ernest Schleiermacher. This extraordinary thinker and writer was born at Breslau, A. D. 1768, of parents, who belonged to the society of Moravian Brethren. His earliest years were spent in the midst of the religious life, for which that brotherhood was remarkable; and never did he lose the impressions, which were made upon him at that period. He studied theology at the University of Halle; and, in 1794, was ordained to a pastorate, first in Landsberg, and then at Berlin. In the year 1802, he became professor of theology and university preacher at Halle; and in 1806, removed again to Berlin, where he resided, sustaining the various offices of preacher, professor, and royal minister of instruction, until his death, which took place on the 12th of Feb., 1834.

Schleiermacher was, *par excellence*, a theologian. Religion had been the friend and companion of his childhood; and he never deserted his first love. The instruction of religion formed the great purpose of his life; the reformation and spread of religion was the object of his most earnest endeavours; and his last words, after receiving the holy communion, were, "In *this* faith I die." Had we to pourtray the influence which Schleiermacher exerted upon the theology of his age, we should fill many pages, ere we could do justice to

his long and laborious life. We should have, for example, to describe the startling effect of his discourses on religion, ("Reden über die Religion,") where he attacked infidelity in its last resource, namely, that of indifference; to recall the solemn accents with which his "monologues" fell upon the ear of his countrymen; to picture the mighty power of his eloquence, as felt by those who listened to his sabbath-day labours, or perused them after they were immortalized by his pen: most of all, should we have to trace the entrance of his great production on the "Doctrine of Faith" (Glanbenslehre) into the abodes of the learned, and the halls of theology and science, to see it wrestling there with the cold-hearted rationalism of the age, or recalling the common soul of humanity back to its better nature, and its final rest. These things, however, we must waive, and only take a brief view of Schleiermacher, as a *speculative philosopher.*

One of his earliest efforts in philosophy was his undertaking, in conjunction with Schlegel, to execute a complete translation of Plato. The influence that flowed from his love for that sublime thinker, was visible, more or less, through his whole life; so that, while the right understanding of Platonism owes much to his efforts in its elucidation, he undoubtedly owed much that was lofty and spiritual in his metaphysical views to *it.* To deduce a complete and connected system of philosophy from the

miscellaneous writings of Schleiermacher would be impossible; in fact, it was a part of his very doctrine, that no philosophical system should be propounded for universal reception, and that no school should be formed. Whilst, therefore, he lectured much upon philosophy, and took many original views upon most questions, which it brings before us, he has left no followers behind him, to associate his name with any peculiar class of metaphysical opinions.

The position which Schleiermacher seems most nearly to occupy in the history of philosophy, is somewhere between Fichte and Jacobi; with a strong preponderance, however, towards the latter. His relation to Fichte is seen in the decided subjectivity of his early views. To him, every mind was a separate, an independent, and, in some respects, a peculiar reflection of the whole universe. The human consciousness was a microcosm; each one a distinct microcosm. Every man, according to our author, must necessarily have his own views of truth, his own set of emotions, and his own religion. The *individual* consciousness, then, is to every one the supreme revealer and test of truth; in a word, the Deity unfolds and manifests himself in and through the individualities of the different minds which he has created.

So far the influence of Fichte's subjective idealism is very apparent, but now we shall see the light reflected from Jacobi blending with it and casting

a different shade over the whole system. Allow that our own personality is the absolute principle of truth, in what does this personality consist? Not in thinking. Thought proceeds by definite logical rules. The path which I take in any dialectical process must be taken by every one else; the laws of Aristotle are not Aristotle's, but the outward expression of the laws of reasoning, as they exist alike in all minds. Our personality, with all its peculiarities and revelations, consists in *feeling;* it is this fundamental faculty, therefore, which reveals to us the material and substratum of all truth, placing it before us in a thousand different aspects. The importance which our author thus attaches to feeling, and the large share which faith holds in his philosophical opinions, clearly attach him to the school of Jacobi, and bring his philosophy under the head of mysticism, although mysticism perhaps in its least objectionable form.

It is, of course, to the department of religious truth that Schleiermacher has more especially applied his metaphysical principles. The following extract from Michelet's criticism of him may, perhaps, give our readers some idea of the nature of the mysticism, which he introduced into his theology. "As Schleiermacher could not but perceive that the peculiar (das Eigenthümliche) as such must be a very inadequate expression of the universal, while still the peculiar was the very principle of his philosophy, he holds up a privileged personality, that of

Christ, as the highest expression of the Absolute. This is the only unity, in which the many can know themselves as one. Accordingly he lays down, in the life of the individual, two sources of joy which should be celebrated. Our birthday is the type of a definite and limited feeling. The Christmas festival is the universal feeling, in which we celebrate human nature, as it is seen flowing from the Divine principle. The earth-spirit, namely, humanity itself, is perfect and without growth, but the individual man is subjected both to imperfection and to progress, until he becomes one with humanity at large. Only when the individual regards humanity as a living assembly of individuals, only when he bears in himself its spirit and its consciousness, when he loses himself in its separate existence, and anon finds himself again,—only then has he in himself the higher life, and the peace of God. This communion, the self-consciousness of mankind in the individual, is the Church. We seek a point, then, from which such communion has sprung, and because in Christ this self-consciousness of the earth-spirit first awoke, therefore he is the Word of God become flesh. In the God-man, therefore, all are one, for every one must manifest this identity. In the birth of Christ every one sees his own higher birth, and therefore universal joy is the character of the Christmas festival. Every mother must celebrate in her child the birth of the Divine Child. Redemption, how-

ever, has to do rather with an absolute decree than with empirical facts. Although the outward testimony concerning Christ should be never so contradictory, and his whole historical existence be involved in doubt, yet *the idea* remains ever necessary, and is the true foundation of the Christian religion: yet still the external appears something more than the bare mythical. Here Schleiermacher's faith-philosophy goes close in the footsteps of Jacobi, who, in like manner, made inward revelation a principle of knowledge. Schleiermacher's Christianity is not the religion of the historical Christ, but that of the eternal incarnation of the divine."

This extract may be sufficient to shew in what manner Schleiermacher, in his early life, applied at once the subjective idealism of Fichte and the faith-philosophy of Jacobi to the elucidation of religious truth. We would recommend the reader who wishes to understand somewhat of the best, the most spiritual, the most religious of the German rationalism, to peruse carefully the theological writings of Schleiermacher, where amidst much which he may repudiate, he will assuredly find much to instruct, to delight, and, we hope, to improve him.

There is yet another name, which we must not altogether omit, that, namely, of Novalis. Frederick Baron von Hardenberg (such was his proper appellation) was born, like Schleiermacher, of Moravian parents, in the Duchy of Mansfield,

A.D. 1772. In 1790 he entered the university of Jena, and completed his studies in Leipsig and Wittenberg. In 1795 he settled at Weissenfels in Thuringia, where, about the same year, he married. Death, however, soon removed his bride from his then happy home, whom, after lingering three melancholy years, he followed into that eternity, with thoughts of which his writings were so deeply imbued. Novalis completes the cycle of mysticism, which we have seen springing from the mixed influence of Fichte and Jacobi. Schlegel, in whom it commenced, took refuge, as we saw, from the abyss of scepticism, to which his extreme subjective principles led, by introducing a supernatural faith as the revealer of eternal verities otherwise unknown. Schleiermacher, while making each human consciousness the supreme arbiter and test of truth, yet would assimilate them all to the perfect mind of Christ, the Divine Man, the type of infinite purity and love. Novalis, proceeding one step further, regards it as the true purport of philosophy to destroy the individual, the finite, the imperfect, the subjective self; and to enable us to become one with the infinite and all-perfect mind. To him the foundation of all philosophy is faith, that is, an inward light, which reveals to us the infinite and the real: a direct perception of the divinity; an irresistible conviction of the presence of the great spirit of the universe in all we see, hear, and feel

around us. Thinking is to him but the reflection or *the dream* of faith, one which pictures to us truth only in dim, unreal, and fantastic forms. It is only when we cause our own individuality to sink and die within us, when the peculiar thoughts and feelings of the finite self are crushed under the power of the higher feelings, and we become absorbed in the divine, that we rise to the full light of truth, and gaze upon things as they are. In Novalis, accordingly, we no longer see the idealist starting forth from the principles of subjective philosophy; but we see him, having left the road, and introduced the additional element of a higher faith, completely overcoming the subjective point of view, sinking the individual self in the great spirit of the universe, and evincing a sublime mysticism, that strives to unite man with God.

Novalis only published during his lifetime a few poetical rhapsodies (Hymns on the Night), and other light productions; the chief of his philosophical notions are derived from his posthumous fragments, in which he touches upon many points in morals, physics, and philosophy; and develops somewhat at large the ideas to which we have just adverted. The merits of Novalis, as an æsthetic writer, have been discussed in several of our English reviews. The reader can judge of his general style of composition by a reference to these articles; our object has been simply to shew his

proper position in the development of the subjective mysticism of Germany, as it arose during the earlier years of the present century.

Let us sum up our remarks in a few words. The tendency of Kant flowed decidedly towards the point of view we have indicated by the term subjective idealism; that, namely, which makes all human knowledge spring from and concentrate in self. This philosophy was completed in Fichte. In Schlegel we see the subjective philosophy just about to open into the region of scepticism, we might even say of nihilism, and the fatal consequences only retrieved by the interposition of faith. This, accordingly, is to be viewed as the critical turning-point between the subjective and objective tendency in the German philosophy. In Schleiermacher we see the subjective principle assuming still more of the objective character, inasmuch as the human individuality, according to him, is to be moulded into the likeness of Christ, until all men, in their religious consciousness, reflect his Divine image. In Novalis, at length, the subjective self is to be crushed and destroyed, and we are to become one with God, the soul of the world.

Here subjective mysticism terminates, and we find a transition from the predominant influence of Fichte to that of Schelling. Schelling saw the abyss of nihilism, in which subjective idealism, when consecutively developed, must end; and began by asserting the claims of some objective

reality, upon our firm belief. We have already shewn in what manner he developed his whole system of objective idealism, and how nearly he had come in his later views upon the verge of philosophical mysticism. The majority of his followers, indeed, have become decided mystics; and we must now, accordingly, advert to the views which the conjunction of the opinions of Schelling with those of Jacobi has produced. This leads us to consider—

3. Those writers who have combined objective idealism with the philosophy of feeling. One of the most celebrated, and, at the same time, most valuable of these authors, is Gotthilf Henry Schubert, now professor at Munich. Incited by his objective tendency, and by his evident admiration of Schelling, Schubert directed his attention, for the most part, to the philosophy of nature, and proposed mystical interpretations of many natural phenomena. In fact, his system, as a whole, starts from nature, and proceeds upwards to spirit; and, accordingly, most of his first writings refer entirely to the world of outward phenomena. The following titles of some of these works will give an idea of the primary branches of Schubert's philosophy:—"Views from the Night Region of Natural Science" (1808), "The Original World and the Fixed Stars" (1822), "Universal History of Nature" (1826, last and complete edition, 1837), &c.

To recount the theories which are here proposed,

in their bare principles, would be by no means interesting; and as we have somewhat fully explained the Natur-philosophie of Schelling in a former chapter, our readers can gain from thence an idea of the method, in which the same subjects are treated by the author now before us. Suffice it to remark, that, beginning with the fixed stars, and the *bare framework* of nature, he attempts to write her complete history through the regions of inorganized masses, plants, and animals, up to the point, where the philosophy of nature hands us over to the philosophy of mind. Re-commencing his labours, he then sets out upon another journey, and proposes to write the "History of the Soul;" and here it is, that we have peculiarly to look for his metaphysical opinions. In accomplishing this history, he shews, first, how the soul is, as it were, reflected in and by the body; how it gives form and perfection to our material organization. Next entering upon the analysis of mind, he brings forward a somewhat remarkable doctrine, setting forth the distinction between the soul (Seele) and the spirit (Geist).* The soul is the inferior part of our intellectual nature—that which shews itself most distinctly in the phenomena of our dreams—the power of which also is situated in the material constitution of the brain. The spirit, on the contrary, is that part of our nature which tends to the purely rational, the lofty, the divine. The doctrine of the natural and the spiritual man, which we

find in the writings of St. Paul, may perhaps have formed the basis upon which Schubert founded this system of mental dualism. Whatever may have been its origin, however, it forms a very prominent feature in his metaphysical analysis, and affords an explanation of many facts, which is by no means unreasonable or worthless.

The feelings, as might be anticipated, play a very considerable part in Schubert's psychology. Feeling, in reference to the soul, is the great impulse of all our outward actions, more especially when, by a ray from heaven, it acquires a moral character, and impels us to what is good and virtuous. Feeling, however, with reference to the spirit, is of a far higher character, and appears to us in the form of faith—faith, which conquers sense, and sight, and the power of death—faith, which enables us to realize the divine, and which gives us at once the longing after, and the full conviction of an immortal life beyond the tomb. Thus, starting from nature in its most original forms, our author pursues his investigations through the whole region of inanimate and animated existence, passes from the world of matter to that of mind, and follows the course of our faculties and feelings, in their gradual rise from the inferior to the superior, until he at length attempts to solve the mysteries of our spiritual being, by the development of that higher faith, which binds us by close affinities to the immortal and the divine. In brief,

Schubert may be regarded as one of the best, the most moral, and perhaps we may say, the most religious writers, who have sought to combine the objective philosophy of Schelling, with the mystical tendencies of the school of Jacobi.

The next writer of the same school, that we have to mention, is Franz Xaver Baader. Unlike Schubert, he begins with the subjective point of view, and from the central region of the soul itself, attempts to spread a new light over the whole realm of being at large. His writings consist, for the most part, of lectures, short treatises, and articles furnished for the philosophical periodicals of the day, in which we find *glimpses* into the different regions of metaphysical truth, rather than a complete and connected system. Of all the philosophers who have taken from Schelling the idea of a dynamical theory of nature, Baader is decidedly the most mystical. There is, indeed, comparatively little in his works to remind one of Jacobi, but a strong affinity for the mystics of earlier times,—Jacob Boehme, Tauler, and others of a similar kind.

To pursue the windings of these mysticisms, which the inordinate speculations of modern times have thrown up to light, would be anything but easy, and anything but instructive; and we should be tempted at once to close our list of authors, chosen from an extraordinary number of names, all candidates for the honour of a philosophical

reputation, were not the name of Henry Steffens too prominent, as a mystic natural philosopher, to be passed over in silence. Steffens was born in Sweden, in 1773, but, since the commencement of the present century, has belonged almost entirely to Germany. The fact which places this voluminous author somewhat prominently forward in the philosophical world is this—that while some of the followers of Schelling have verged more to the subjective, and others to the objective side of his system, Steffens has seized upon the middle point, and laboured with much ability to shew the absolute unity of nature and spirit. "The totality of the school of Schelling," remarks Michelet, "is most manifestly set forth in the writings of Steffens. 1. In his 'Principles of Natural Science philosophically considered' (1806), he comes near to Oken, and to the formalism of the philosophy of nature. 2. The spiritual side of our knowledge is shewn forth in his 'Caricaturen der Heiligsten' (1821). 3. In the third series of his writings, the *unity* of nature and spirit is developed, from various points of view. *First*, eternal nature is considered historically, as representing itself in time, and, consequently, as a spiritual thing—an idea which Herder had already pointed out, and which Steffens regards as the great theme of his life, the highest aim of all his investigations. To this belongs his 'Contributions to an inward Natural History of the Earth,' and his 'Polemical Treatise towards the

Furtherance of Speculative Physics.' In the first part of the latter work, he shews, how the original union of spirit with nature had been an ancient opinion—that, *e. g.*, of Roger Bacon, how the mechanical view of physics had become entirely predominant in the seventeenth century; and how, in the eighteenth century, men began to rise from the bare material relations to the dynamical opposition of magnetism, of electricity, and of chemistry, *i. e.*, to a dynamical system of physics; until, in our own century, the remarkable union of all the main phenomena of nature, under the idea of one spirit, has introduced the dawn of natural science, *properly so called*. *Secondly*, in his Anthropology, Steffens has exhibited mind or spirit as something reposing upon nature, and remaining in close unity with it, much in the sense of Schubert. *Thirdly*, he proceeds at length to the mystical-religious point of view, after the example of Baader, and reproaches himself with the boldness of his earlier knowledge. To this period belong his writings on 'False Theology and True Faith,' 'A Voice out of the Churches,' and his treatise, entitled, 'How I again became a Lutheran, and what to me Lutheranism is.'"

The three authors above mentioned form but a very small portion of those whom the captivating philosophy of Schelling incited to similar investigations. Of these, the majority became mystics, and even Schelling himself cannot be freed from

the charge of decided mysticism, in most of his later productions. The course of the German mysticism, therefore, as a whole, now lies before us. Retracing our steps to Jacobi, we see him introducing into the speculative spirit of the age, the element of faith, as a thing absolutely necessary to the perfection of our knowledge, and the due explanation of the phenomena of the human mind. This faith-element was combined, first, with the current Kantism of the age, and gave rise to the somewhat sober and modified mysticism of Krug, Fries, and Calker; next, finding its way into the subjective idealism of Fichte, it produced the paradoxical mysticism of Schlegel, and the Christian platonism of Schleiermacher; and, lastly, obtaining a lodgment in the objective philosophy of Schelling, it brought to light those multifarious mystical interpretations of natural phenomena, to a few only of which we have now reverted.

The writers I last mentioned, as advocates of modern mysticism in Germany, are the living representatives of the present age, and in them, therefore, we recognise the exact point to which the mystical tendency has just reached, and with which, accordingly, the present historical inquiry into the German mysticism must terminate. We only add one remark in conclusion. The whole of the intellectual phenomena we have just been reviewing originated from a new philosophical element, which Jacobi added to the pure logical

rationalism of Kant. What is this element? In science it is called *genius*, in poetry, *inspiration*, in philosophy, *feeling*, in religion, *faith*, in life, *enthusiasm*. Be it what it may by name, there is assuredly a spontaneous movement of the soul, an intuitive apprehension of moral and spiritual truth, developing itself sometimes in meditation, sometimes in action, which gives rise to some of the most striking phenomena of human life. This movement is the basis of mysticism. Mysticism, then, when confined within its proper limits, like all the other philosophical systems, is truth; it is only when this spontaneous element in the soul is elevated over the calm reflection of the understanding and the reason, that it is likely to lead into extravagance and folly.

CHAPTER VIII.

ON THE ECLECTIC SCHOOL OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY.

SECT. I.—*Rise and Progress of Modern Eclecticism in France.*

THE school of philosophy, which forms the subject of the present section, might have been treated of as one branch of modern idealism, and would not have found an inappropriate place at the end of our fifth chapter. As, however, eclecticism is not *necessarily* idealistic in its tendency, we have thought it, upon the whole, more convenient to devote a separate portion of our work to the development of its rise and progress, more especially in France.

The current philosophy in France, at the commencement of the nineteenth century, was that which we have already pourtrayed under the title of *ideology*. So firmly fixed, indeed, was this system in the schools of instruction, and in the very habits of the thinking part of the population, that it seems necessary in the outset to offer some conjectures on the probable causes of its rapid

decline. These causes we shall be able to trace by observing the various movements, by which the reaction against sensationalism was gradually developed.

The first indications of discontent towards the reigning system made their appearance amongst some of the more spiritual of the theological writers of the age. Ideology was without a religion, — without ought of the spiritual and mysterious,—without any means of satisfying the irrepressible cravings of the human mind after God and immortality. Even Bonaparte himself is known to have commented with severity upon its utter incapability of shewing any thing great in human destiny.

Considering then, the force of man's spiritual nature, there is no wonder that there were many prepared, on theological grounds, to combat a philosophy that could lead to so dreary a view of human destiny.

Again, ideology, by reducing all the finer sentiments of the mind to mere nervous susceptibility, stripped them of that poetic colouring, which the doctrines of spiritualism so well knew how to throw around them. The poet, the critic, the man of taste, possess by nature a kind of spiritual philosophy, which, if not embodied in any distinct doctrines, yet shews itself with equal certainty in the excursions of their fancy, and the refinement of their feelings. Those writers of the age, who,

like St. Pièrre, Chateaubriand, and Madame de Stael, embodied in their thoughts a tone, either of religious sentimentalism or of poetical fervour, must have contrasted very strikingly with the philosophers, who sought to reduce even the most ethereal of our feeling to the bare pulsation of the nervous system. Thus, if there were none ready to contest the dogmas of sensationalism upon scientific grounds, there were many who tacitly refuted them by the philosophy of their feelings and the spiritualism of their sentiments.

Another discouragement was thrown in the path of ideology, by the rapidity with which the power of Bonaparte during the first decade of the present century reached its climax. In addition to the ardour for military glory, by which he dazzled the universal mind of his country, and which was anything but favourable to such philosophical pursuits, it is well known that he had a personal antipathy to the so termed ideologues, which he took little care to conceal. Accordingly, in all the schemes for education which issued from his Government, the study of this philosophy was thrown altogether in the back-ground, and its cultivation attended rather with the chance of penalty than the expectation of reward.

These several circumstances all tended to foster the doubts, which some even of the ideologists themselves began to evince respecting the soundness of their principles. The rage for materialism

had, in fact, gone by; the arguments by which it could be upheld, were exhausted; the whole extent of its possible influence (an influence not much to be vaunted) was now made visible; the charm of its novelty was fled. Those who were the professed metaphysicians of the age began to feel that, if any further progress was to be made in their department, it must be by a change of system, rather than a closer investigation of their old one; and that, if the mysteries of the spirit of man were ever to be sounded, other lines must be used than those furnished by sensation alone. Our present object, therefore, will be to trace these indications of reaction from their first commencement, and shew in what manner they have gradually led to the present system of French eclecticism.

In doing this, our first attention must be directed to M. Laromiguière, who was originally reckoned amongst the abettors of ideology, and formed one of the celebrated society who assembled in the retreat of Auteuil. This elegant and philosophical writer was born in the year 1756, and having taught metaphysics for some time at Toulouse, removed to Paris towards the commencement of the present century, where he soon became a professor in the normal school. With the exception of a few miscellaneous pieces, his chief reputation as a philosopher rests upon the lectures which he delivered, *ex cathedrâ*, during the years

1811, 1812, 1813, and which were published in two volumes, with the unassuming title of "Leçons de Philosophie."

M. Laromiguière had been educated a zealous pupil of Condillac; and, although he was led by his own acute spirit of mental analysis to depart widely from the opinions of his master, yet he ever seemed to do so with reluctance, and everywhere attempted to make his own opinions coincide as much as possible with the views advanced in the "Traité des Sensations." There were, as Cousin expresses it, in M. Laromiguière two men, the ancient and the modern; the disciple and the adversary of Condillac; and it is the struggle between these opposed spirits, which forms the great leading peculiarity in all his writings. If, then, our author did not make that progress towards a more reflective philosophy, which was soon afterwards made by those who followed in his footsteps, yet at any rate to him must be awarded the honour of the first great struggle to throw off the chains of the reigning authority.

The philosophy of M. Laromiguière is by no means difficult to expound; his clear, consecutive, and precise habit, both of thinking and writing, affording ample means of doing so with ease and distinctness. In the volumes to which we have just alluded, there are two great subjects which are brought under discussion; the first is, the analysis and classification of the human faculties;

the other is, the nature and origin of our ideas: and from each of these portions we can derive a tolerably accurate insight into the spirit of his philosophy. Let us first advert to his classification of the *faculties*. Here, instead of beginning, as Condillac does, with the great fundamental faculty of *sensation*, he substitutes in its place that of *attention;* from which, as the basis, he derives in regular succession, all the other powers and capacities of the human mind. These powers and capacities he separates into two great classes—those of the *understanding* and those of the *will;* not regarding, indeed, either the understanding or the will, as designating separate and individual faculties, but using them simply as general terms by which to denote two distinct *assemblages* of mental phenomena. The faculties of the understanding he reduces to these three:—1. Attention; 2. Comparison; 3. Reasoning. Of these three, attention is the fundamental principle from which the other two proceed; and of these two, again, the phenomena usually denoted by the words memory, judgment, imagination, &c., are simply modifications. Thus there are, according to M. Laromiguière, three generic powers of the understanding from which all the specific or subordinate phenomena proceed. Since, however, these three generic powers in their last analysis are all seen to be included in the first, the whole of the phenomena of the understanding may be said

to spring from the one great fundamental faculty of *attention.*

If we now turn to the will, we find, according to M. Laromiguière, a complete parallel existing between its phenomena and those we have just been considering. The foundation of all voluntary action in man is *desire;* and in the same manner, as we have already seen the two latter faculties of the understanding spring from the first; so now we see springing from desire as the basis, the two corresponding phenomena of *preference* and *liberty.* These three powers, then, being established, all the subordinate powers of the will are without difficulty reducible to them, so that, at length, we have the complete man viewed in two different aspects: in the one, as an intellectual; in the other as a voluntary being; the chief facts of his intellectual exactly corresponding to those of his voluntary existence. Lastly, to bring the whole system to a state of complete unity, our author shews that desire itself is, strictly speaking, a peculiar form of attention, that the fundamental principle, therefore, of our intellectual and voluntary life is the same; that the power of attention, broadly viewed, (being, in fact, but another expression for the natural activity of the human mind,) is the point from which the whole proceeds.

Now, the contrast between this psychology and that of Condillac is sufficiently striking; the one being indeed, in a measure, directly opposed to

the other. The latter system assumes sensation, not only as its point of departure, but as the formative principle of every other faculty; the former builds up the whole upon *attention*. The one lays at the foundation of our whole intellectual and active life a faculty purely *passive* in its nature, and regards all phenomena as simply transformations of it; the other assumes a primitive power, the very essence of which is *activity*, and makes all our other powers more or less share in this essence. The one deduces all the facts of consciousness from the impulse of the world without upon the mind within,—the other derives them from the reaction of the mind within upon the world without. So widely had the pupil, perhaps almost unconsciously to himself, departed from the philosophy of his master.

The second part of M. Laromiguière's lectures refers to the origin of our ideas. Here, in order to swerve as little as possible in appearance from the philosophy of Condillac, he makes the whole *material* of our knowledge come from our *sensibility*. Condillac had derived all our ideas from sensation in its ordinary and contracted sense; Locke had derived them from sensation and reflection; taking in the active as well as the passive element to account for the phenomena of the case; M. Laromiguière, however, explains his meaning of the word sensibility in such a manner, as to make the foundation still broader than that of

Locke himself. Sensibility, he shews, is of four kinds:—1. That produced by the action of external things upon the mind—this is sensation in the ordinary sense of the word; 2. That produced by the action of our faculties upon each other—this is equivalent to Locke's reflection; 3. That which is produced by the recurrence and comparison of several ideas together, giving us the perception of *relations;* and 4. That which is produced by the contemplation of human actions, as right or wrong; which is the moral faculty.

In this theory it appears, at once, evident, that there is a secret revolt from the doctrines of sensationalism. Our author, in explaining his notion of the sensibility of the human mind, goes back step by step, until he has virtually undone all that had been attempted in the analysis of our simpler notions from Locke down to his own times. From sensation, as the most obvious form of our sensibility, he goes back to reflection; from reflection he goes back to the power of perceiving relations, *i. e.*, to judgment in its primitive form; from judgment he comes at last to the moral faculty, viewing it, also, as an original and irreducible fact in our constitution. The very manner, indeed, in which these four classes of phenomena are presented, namely, as different branches of our sensitive life, shews the struggle which was going on in the mind of the author, between the system he had left and the broader and deeper views

which were opening before him. This struggle, however, was the harbinger of better days. The activity of the human mind was again vindicated; the majesty of reason restored; and, what was still more important, the moral faculty was again raised from its ruins to sway its sceptre over human actions and purposes. M. Laromiguière, the ideologist, will always be viewed as the day-star of French eclecticism.*

Hitherto there was no *open* revolt manifested against the authority of Condillac in the public expositions of philosophy. France was, as yet, entirely pledged to sensationalism; and although deeper thoughts were stirring in the minds of those who, like M. Laromiguière, were dissatisfied with the reigning system, yet no direct hostility was shown to the system itself. To show this was reserved for M. Royer-Collard, whom we now accordingly introduce to the notice of our readers. Peter Paul Royer-Collard was born in the year 1763, and began his career as an advocate in the French Parliament. During the Revolution, he was one of those who, while advocating the principles of popular liberty, yet endeavoured to restrain the outbreaks of licentiousness with which that age was unhappily characterized. In the year

* Those who wish to see a masterly estimate of M. Laromiguière's philosophical character, should read the funeral oration delivered by M. Cousin, and inserted in his "Fragments Philosophiques."

1810 he was made Dean of the Faculty of Letters, in the Normal School, at Paris; and it was in the lectures which he delivered there, from the year 1811 to 1814, that he laid the foundation for his reputation in philosophy. It is to be lamented, however, that so small a portion of these lectures have been given to the public through the medium of the press. An introductory discourse forms the whole of what was published under his own eye; and although his papers have been admirably arranged and edited by M. Jouffroy, as an adjunct to his translation of Dr. Reid's philosophy, yet the real mind and spirit of an author must necessarily suffer much when they are only known through the medium of posthumous fragments. We shall attempt, however, as far as our means will admit, to give the main features of our author's metaphysical system.

M. Royer-Collard, on assuming the chair of metaphysics at Paris, boldly commenced by setting at defiance the whole authority of Condillac, and the Ideologists; and though he stood alone without any kindred mind to aid and sympathize with him in his undertaking, yet he firmly persisted in declaring himself the advocate of a new philosophy. The student who has thoroughly mastered the controversy of Reid against the scepticism of his day, will have no difficulty in understanding the position which was held by M. Royer-Collard, as the professed opponent of sensationalism. Well in-

structed in the philosophy of Scotland, and deeply imbued with its spirit, he saw that he had to direct the same arguments against Condillac, as Reid had directed against Hume. He clearly comprehended that the ideal system, which upheld the scepticism of the one, equally upheld the sensationalism of the other, and that by shaking this foundation he should destroy every edifice which could be erected upon it.

To make this the more evident, we must remind the reader, that Hume's argument proceeded somewhat in the following manner. First, let it be conceded that all our knowledge of external things is communicated through the medium of *ideas*, and that its veracity depends *solely* upon the inward ideal representation being correct. This point being established, it follows, that we can never attain to any certainty with regard to the existence of the external world; it being perfectly impossible to verify the accuracy of the image by a comparison of it with the original. Once grant, then, that *all* our knowledge consists in *ideas*, and we can never get beyond them; the passage from the ideal to the real can never be discovered; and even if it could be discovered, still the *real* itself must remain to us perfectly unknown. M. Royer-Collard perceived that if we admit this hypothesis at the commencement to be correct, the whole train of reasoning based upon it was irrefragable:

he still further perceived, that the doctrine of Condillac virtually included in it all these consequences. If, as that philosopher maintained, all our knowledge is derived from our sensations, if our whole consciousness, in fact, consists of nothing else, then why should we attribute an objective reality to one sensation more than another, — why should we suppose, for example, that the sensation of magnitude and extension has a real and material object answering to it, while that of a sound or an odour has none?

Following up the reasoning of Dr. Reid, our author showed with great force and perspicuity, that in connexion with certain sensations, we are led by the very constitution of our minds to supply the further idea of an external object, from which those particular sensations proceed. Reid termed these primitive judgments principles of common sense; Stewart called them primary laws of reason; M. Royer-Collard considered it to be a kind of *intellectual instinct*, by which we pass from the inward sensation to the outward reality. The working of this instinct he explains under the idea of a natural process of induction, which leads us infallibly to conclude from the unceasing variety of sensations which crowd in upon us, not only the real existence of external objects, but also much concerning their nature and properties. So far, then, our author trod in the footsteps of his

Scottish instructors, and wielded with admirable success the weapons of which they had first proved the utility.

Next to this controversy, M. Royer-Collard proceeded to the analysis of our fundamental *ideas.* The notions we possess of substance, of cause, of time, of space, of eternity, of infinity, &c., were all brought under review; and, by a most careful investigation, it was shown that they do not bear the character of abstractions, or generalizations, made from experience, but that they are primitive *à priori* notions, with which the mind is furnished as starting points for all its knowledge. After this, he proceeded to explain the notions of right and wrong, of duty and obligation, of all, in a word, which peculiarly distinguishes our moral nature; and tearing to shreds the flimsy reasoning of Helvetius and Volney, he drew forth from the depths of the human consciousness the indestructible element of eternal and immutable morality, which they had alike rejected in theory, and too much despised in practice. "We recall," says one of his biographers, "the effect which his whole address upon this subject, so grave, so powerful, so full of emotion, produced upon the minds of the hearers. He arrested the understandings which he did not gain, or which did not fully comprehend him; he captivated the rest; he elevated, fortified, and filled them with wisdom and with reason; he played the same

part as did Socrates with the youth, who listened to his instructions."

From this brief sketch of M. Royer-Collard's labours in the department of philosophy, it is sufficiently evident, that he had reconsidered and recasted the whole method of philosophical research in his own country. No longer content with the attempts which the ideological school had been making to explain the facts of our moral and intellectual nature, by an appeal to external influences, he felt and acknowledged the existence of a world within, the facts of which have to be observed, classified, and reasoned upon just in the same manner as the facts of the world without. He entered the hidden chamber of the human mind, with the lamp of induction in his hand; and if his life was neither long enough, nor calm enough, to inspect the whole region, which he had opened to view, yet having pointed out the way he did not want those, among his admiring pupils, who were ready to enter into his labours, and carry them forwards towards their completion. Before we proceed, however, to exhibit the effects of his instructions upon the progress of mental science, we must pause to notice a contemporary author, whose extraordinary philosophical genius has left many traces behind it, not only in France, but in various parts of Europe beside.

The author to which we now allude is M. Maine de Biran, who was born in 1766, and died, too soon

for the interests of philosophy, in 1824. Maine de Biran was one of the celebrated society of Auteuil, to which we have before alluded, and from which all the modern philosophy of France has virtually proceeded. In the year 1800 the National Institute offered a prize for the best essay "On the Influence of Habit upon the Faculty of Thinking," which was awarded to M. Maine de Biran, as the successful competitor. In this essay he shewed his entire predilection for the principles of ideology, accounting for all the phenomena of the human consciousness by the action and reaction of the nervous system. Soon after this (in 1803) he bore off another prize for an essay "On the Decomposition of the Faculty of Thinking," in which essay he shewed the first signs of defection from the philosophy of Condillac, and the first germs of those peculiar sentiments, for which he afterwards became celebrated. In 1807 he bore off fresh honours from the Academy of Sciences of Berlin, for a memoir on the question "Whether there is in man an immediate internal intuition, and in what it differs from the perception of the senses." Other honours he gained shortly after from Copenhagen, for an exposition of "The mutual relation of man's moral and physical constitution." In both these last essays he departed still further than ever from his original views, and gradually brought his new philosophy to maturity. Anxious to impart his doctrines to France, he embodied them in a short

work, which he entitled "An Examination of the Lectures of M. Laromiguière;" and finally crowned his philosophical labours by his magnificent article on Leibnitz in the "Universal Biography."

The great fact of consciousness which M. Maine de Biran developed with so much perseverance was that of the *activity* of the human mind—the power of the *will*. This fact had been entirely neglected by the sensational school, which, only intent upon the influence of the outward and material, had altogether banished one at least of our three fundamental notions. It was M. Biran's peculiar merit to recall this notion from oblivion, and to re-establish it with due honour as a great and leading idea in our intellectual existence. Already, in his essay on the decomposition of thought, he began to depart from his former physiological tendencies, and to assert the distinct reaction of some active, immaterial principle upon the intimations of sense. In the memoirs of Berlin and Copenhagen we take for granted that he must have placed the activity of the human mind in a still clearer light; certain it is, that in his next published work—that on M. Laromiguière—he fully establishes the doctrine, that the soul is a *cause*, a force, an active principle; and that the phenomena of consciousness can never be explained until we clearly apprehend the *voluntary* nature of its thoughts and impulses.

Not content, however, with this, he began next to ask whether there was anything whatever within

the bounds of existence, which might not equally be reduced to the notion of a *power* or force; whether the idea of substance itself is to us anything more than that of a *cause;* whether, in a word, the dynamical theory of the universe was not the one grounded upon the most solid and philosophical basis. To this notion he at length yielded his full assent, and in his article on Leibnitz avowed himself a believer in the spiritual monadology advocated by that great founder of the German idealism. In the whole of the process by which our author had gradually progressed from the ideology of Cabanis to the absolute dynamical spiritualism of Leibnitz, he had relied simply upon his own power of reflection. Disciple of none, he had philosophized simply within the region of his own consciousness; so that whatever merit some may deny him, there are none assuredly who can reject his claim to that of complete originality. "Of all the masters of France," remarks M. Cousin, "Maine de Biran, if not the greatest, is unquestionably the most original. M. Laromiguière only continued the philosophy of Condillac, modifying it in a few important points. M. Royer-Collard came from the Scottish philosophy, which, with the rigour and natural power of his reason, he would have infallibly surpassed, had he completely followed out the labours which form only the least solid part of his glory. As for *myself*, I come at the same time from the Scottish and German school. M. Maine de Biran alone

comes only from himself, and from his own meditations."

After this general notice, we must attempt to afford our readers a glance into some of the peculiar tenets of the philosophy now under consideration. In order to unfold the fact and expound the nature of man's natural activity (the hinge upon which the entire system turns), M. Maine de Biran analyses the whole of what is contained or implied in a given action; for example, a movement of the arm. When I move my arm there are three things to be observed:—1. The consciousness of a voluntary effort; 2. The consciousness of a movement produced; and 3. A fixed relation between the effort on the one hand and the movement on the other. Now the source or cause of the whole movement is the *will;* and this term *will* we now use as virtually synonymous with self. Whether we say I moved my arm, or my will moved it, the sentiment is exactly identical. Hence the notions of *cause*, of *will*, of *self*, we find to be fundamentally the same; and several truths are by this means brought to light of great importance in metaphysical science.

First, it becomes evident that we possess a natural activity, the seat of which is in the will; so that whether we regard man as a thinking or an acting being, yet it is the will which alike presides over and regulates the flow of our thoughts, or the course of our actions. Secondly, we infer that the

will is the foundation of personality; that my will is virtually myself. And, thirdly, we infer that to will is to *cause*, and that from the inward consciousness of volition, viewed in connexion with the effect produced, we gain our first notion of causality. These three points, as Cousin has shown us, embrace, in a small compass, the whole philosophy of M. Maine de Biran. He first seizes, with admirable sagacity, the principle of all human activity, as resident in the power of the will, exemplifying it even in the case of those muscular movements which may appear to the unreflecting to be simply the result of nervous excitement. Having established the principle of activity, as residing in the will, he proceeds to identify the will with our very personality itself, showing, that the soul is in its nature a force, the very essence of which is not to be acted upon, but to act. Finally, he proves that we gain our first notion of causality from the consciousness of our own personal effort; and that, having once observed the conjunction of power exerted, and effect produced, in this particular case, we transfer the notion of cause thus originated into the objective world, and conclude by analogy the necessity of a sufficient power existing for every given effect.

M. Maine de Biran having thus drawn forth, from the depths of his own consciousness, these undoubted facts of our voluntary existence—facts which the sensational school had neglected or

denied—proceeded to show how these facts avail to explain the nature of the human faculties, and the origin of our fundamental ideas. Here, however, he began to carry his principles to an extreme, which led him from his original attachment to sensationalism, at length, into the opposite extreme of pure idealism. First of all, in the ardour with which he applied the powers of the will to the elucidation of the facts of our consciousness, he was induced to neglect those other phenomena, which spring forth, not from our voluntary, but from our rational nature. Hence, as we before shewed, he threw a doubt over the notion of *substance*, as being a purely *rational* idea, and proposed to account for it under the notion of *cause* or *force*. This principle expanded, naturally led to a dynamical theory of physics, and was the ground on which our author gave in his adherence to the monadology of Leibnitz, as being the best explanation of the material universe upon the dynamical hypothesis.

Had he rested here, however, it might have been difficult to show that he had carried his notion of causality too far, the dynamical system of the universe being much more easy to deride than to disprove; but in his limitation of the principle of causality to the idea of our own *personal* effort, he shewed the evident germ of pure subjective idealism. That we derive our first notion of cause from the consciousness of our own

voluntary power of action, there can be little doubt; but M. Maine de Biran proceeds to show that our *whole notion* of causality is but the transference of this consciousness to the objective world. In doing this, he strips the category of causality of its necessary and universal character, and admits a principle, the result of which was perhaps unseen by himself, but which we have fully carried out in the idealism of Fichte. The universe, affirms M. de Biran, consists of certain *powers* or causes which are in operation; and these powers or causes are only known as objective realizations of our own inward personal effort. In other words, everything is a power, and all power is conceived of only as *my own* power. This principle duly expanded makes *self* the absolute ground of everything, and must ultimately bring the subjective form of ideal philosophy to its well known climax.

It is true, M. Maine de Biran did not live to evolve these results; but, once shut up within his own subjectivity, there can be little doubt but that, if he had developed his whole system with the same logical rigour with which he sketched it out, we must have had a second edition of Fichte's philosophy indigenous to France. It was his intense absorption in the contemplation of the power of the will—in the fundamental notion of *self*—that led to the neglect of the other two elements; giving us another proof that the closest analysis, whilst evolving truth, ever errs, from its

very concentration upon the question which it illustrates, and showing the importance of an enlightened eclecticism, in aiding the true advancement of philosophy. We must now come, therefore, to consider the metaphysical labour and services of him, whom we may term the founder of modern eclecticism in France,—I mean Victor Cousin.

M. Cousin was born in the year 1792, and entered, whilst quite young, upon a course of instruction in the normal school, which was to fit him to be himself an instructor of the youth of his country. In 1811, he had the good fortune to attend the captivating lectures of M. Laromiguière, and, following them up soon after by the still more deep and earnest philosophy of M. Royer Collard, he determined to devote his whole life to the investigation of moral and metaphysical truth. So extraordinary was the aptitude which he manifested in this department, that, on the retirement of M. Royer Collard, in the year 1815, he was at once appointed to the vacant chair of philosophy in the normal school. For five years, he carried on his labours there with the utmost assiduity. Ardent, and even passionate, in his love for metaphysical speculation, he worked onwards with untiring energy towards the reformation of the French philosophy; and endowed by nature with an eloquence extremely rare in minds devoted to the most abstruse subjects, he fired the youth who attended his lectures with an enthusiasm kindred

to his own. In the year 1820, however, his progress was arrested. Looked upon with suspicion by the contemptible government which had been reinstated at Paris, by the wealth and the blood of all Europe, he took refuge in Germany, where, for eight years, he buried himself in the depths of the German philosophy, and thus prepared to complete the system, from the more public development of which he had been untimely driven. In 1828, being recalled from his banishment, he delivered lectures on the history of modern philosophy, before a brilliant auditory, in Paris, and raised his reputation, both for eloquence and philosophy, to the highest pitch. In 1832, according to that noble policy, which reckons learning and wisdom the best title to aristocracy, he was made a peer of France, and, in 1840, was created minister of public instruction. His published works on philosophy consist—1, of a succession of brief articles, called "Philosophical Fragments," in the two admirable prefaces to which, we have at once the most lucid and succinct portraiture of his views and doctrines. 2. Two courses of Lectures on the History of Philosophy, delivered at Paris, as above stated. 3. A course of Philosophy, in thirty-eight Lectures, founded on the fundamental notions of the true, the beautiful, and the good. 4. Translations or Elucidations of Plato, Aristotle, Proclus, and other ancient and modern philosophers; and,

lastly, a course of admirable Lectures on the Philosophy of Kant.

This brief sketch of the life of M. Cousin is sufficient at once to point out the schools, in which he has studied, and the influences under which he has lived, thought, and written. He came upon the stage exactly at the moment when the sensational school was retiring from its prominent position in the public regard. M. Laromiguière, though himself, by profession, an idealist, yet was virtually undermining the doctrine he professed; and M. Royer Collard, having made an open revolt, cherished and matured in the mind of his pupil (so soon to be his successor) the desire of carrying on the reformation thus auspiciously commenced. His retirement to Germany, though compelled by a false act or arbitrary power, yet was fortunate, in giving him leisure and opportunity to sink down into the quiet depths of spiritualism, by which the German philosophy is characterized; and, finally, the public approbation with which he was greeted on his return, all impelled him forward in a career, in which he seemed destined to obtain the highest distinction.

His own account of his philosophical experience is precisely in accordance with what we have just stated. "M. Laromiguière," he remarks, "initiated me into the art of decomposing thought, he exercised me to descend from the most abstract and

general ideas which we now possess, to the most common sensations, as their primary origin; and to give an account of the play of the faculties, whether elementary or complex, which intervene between the two. M. Royer Collard taught me, that if these faculties have any need of being solicited by sensation, in order to produce even the least idea, yet they are subjected in their action to certain interior conditions; to certain laws; to certain principles, which sensation does not explain, which resist all analysis, and which are the natural patrimony of the human mind. With M. de Biran I studied especially the phenomena of the will. This admirable observer taught me to disentangle, in all our notions, and even in the most simple facts of consciousness, the part of our voluntary activity—that activity in which our personality reveals itself.

"It was under this triple discipline that I was formed; and it was thus prepared that I entered, in 1815, upon the public instruction of philosophy in the normal school, and the Faculty of Letters.

"Before long, I had exhausted, or thought that I had exhausted, the teaching of my first masters: after France and Scotland, my eyes naturally turned to Germany. I then learned German, and set myself to decypher, with infinite pains, the principle movements of the philosophy of Kant, without any other aid than the barbarous latin translation of Born. I thus lived two entire years, as though

buried in the depths of the Kantian psychology, and simply occupied with the passage from psychology to ontology. I have already said how psychology itself instructed me, and how I traversed the philosophy of Kant. That of Fichte could not detain me long; and at the end of the year 1817, I had left the first German school behind me." After stating his acquaintance with Schelling and Hegel, M. Cousin thus refers to their relative merits, and his own obligations to them: — "The admirers of Hegel consider him as the Aristotle of another Plato; the exclusive partizans of Schelling only see in him the Wolfe of another Leibnitz. However it may be with these rather lofty comparisons, no one can deny that to the master has been given a powerful invention, and to the pupil a profound reflection. Hegel has borrowed much from Schelling; and as for myself, much more feeble than either, I have borrowed from both. It were folly to reproach me with this, and it is certainly no great humility in myself to acknowledge it."

After these few preliminary remarks, we must now proceed to give our readers as clear an insight into the doctrines and spirit of this philosophy, as our limited space may admit. In order to do this, we cannot follow a better guide in the arrangement of the materials, than that which the two prefaces above alluded to afford us. According to these, every important question in philosophy may be

regarded as belonging either—1, To the *method* of investigation; or, 2, to psychology; or, 3, to ontology. These three heads, together with some peculiar views on the history of philosophy, entirely exhaust the topics which are treated of in the metaphysical system we are now considering.

I. We direct our attention to the doctrine of *method*, as set forth in the philosophy of Cousin. There are, in all, two grand methods which it is possible to follow in conducting metaphysical investigations; and these are the rationalistic and the psychological. The rationalistic method strives to sink down at once into the very depths of existence; to grasp the absolute or fundamental principle, from which everything proceeds; and then to explain all phenomena by the operation of this law. In this way, Spinoza deduced everything from the idea of *substance;* regarding this as the sole and universal existence; and making all nature but different modes of its one immutable essence. Fichte found *his* absolute existence in the idea of *self*, and from the law of our personal activity, sought to explain all the objective phenomena around us. In like manner, the reader may see, by referring to our sketch of the German idealism, how Schelling and Hegel, each assuming an absolute existence, and a fundamental law, deduced from thence the whole multiplicity of things, human and divine. This process of logically deducing all phenomena from some fundamental principle, is

called by the German writers *a construction*—by ourselves it would be termed simply an *hypothesis*. Whatever plan, therefore, may be proposed for *construing* the universe, that is, for deducing the existence of all things from certain fundamental laws, this plan answers to our idea of the rationalistic method of philosophy.

The psychological method is, in many respects, directly the reverse of this. Instead of beginning with the fundamental law of our being, it first of all cautiously looks out upon the facts of human nature, which present themselves. These facts it attempts to observe and to classify; and thus gradually to discover the principle upon which they proceed. The one method is deductive, the other inductive; the one is synthetical, the other analytical; the one starts from the general, and descends to the particular; the other begins with particular facts, and ascends to the general; the one is the ancient method of philosophy applied to metaphysical truth; the other is the modern Baconian organum carried into the region of mental science. Now, of these two methods, Cousin advocates, with all earnestness and decision, *the latter*. He considers mental science to be a science of facts, as well as all other; he applies the aid of observation and experiment *here*, as well as everywhere else; in a word, he views it as one legitimate branch of inductive philosophy.

Whilst, however, he decides for the psycholo-

gical method, he is careful to free it from those defects under which it has ever laboured in the hands of sensationalism. The method may prove deficient from two causes; either from not starting with a sufficient induction of facts as the data, or from not reasoning upon them with patience and accuracy. Locke, for example, although admirably adapted to reason upon the facts presented, did not begin with a sufficiently patient induction, and thus vitiated many of his results. The followers of Locke betrayed a still greater deficiency; for not only did they exclude many undeniable facts of our rational and moral nature from their system, but they reasoned upon what facts they did admit in so perverted a strain, as often to change their very character, confounding all the phenomena of memory, of judgment, of the emotions, &c., with those of simple sensation. The psychological method, therefore, in the hands of Cousin demands that we enter into the innermost chambers of the soul; that we investigate every fact of the consciousness, which presents itself there, with the utmost accuracy; and lastly, that, having obtained these data, we reason upon them with precision, and deduce everything which seems to be warranted by the rules of sound logic. Such is the method by which Cousin proposes to prosecute the study of intellectual science.

II. We come to psychology itself, *i. e.*, the application of the method just described to the eluci-

dation of the ideas and faculties of the human mind. Admonished on the one hand by the over-simplification of the ideological school; and on the other, by the very imperfect classification advanced by the Scottish system in the hands of Reid and Stewart, Cousin has taken the middle course between the two. Without entering at length into the grounds on which he has reasoned the subject out in his own mind, we state at once, that he enumerates amongst the facts of our consciousness three generic classes:—1. Those of the Will; 2. Those of the Reason; 3. Those of Sensation. 1. With regard to our natural activity, M. Cousin has adopted almost entirely the theory of M. Maine de Biran. The principal points in this theory are these two,—that the whole groundwork of our activity is in the will; and that it is the will which peculiarly constitutes our distinct personality. The peculiarity of those things which possess no personality is, that they are entirely under external influence. For this reason nature is impersonal. It has no source of power in itself; it is absolutely at the command and in the hands of some extrinsic agency. Just such, also, would man be without the will. Sensations are produced by direct impulse from the external world,—ideas of pure reason arise spontaneously from the very constitution of our faculties; both the one and the other influence us as certainly and as necessarily as outward force influences the material objects

around us. It is the will alone, therefore, which makes us free agents.

Previously to the development of the will, man is but a part and parcel of the natural universe; he is a unit which is at the absolute disposal of the forces, physical or spiritual, in the midst of which he is situated. The moment, however, we are conscious of an inward power, which we variously term activity, liberty, will, that moment we assume a new character in the world. Far from being now passively given up to the agency of other causes, we become in our turn a cause which reacts upon them, and which does its part, whether it be greater or less, in directing the future course of our life. This *will*, therefore, is in a peculiar sense *the man himself*. While his sensations and his ideas are *fatal*, originating from without (the one teaching him contingent, the other necessary, truth), the determinations of the will originate from within, and going forth from our own activity, enstamp everything to which they apply with the impress of *personality*.

To this fact of liberty, moreover, there not only attaches itself the notion of personality, but, also, that of moral obligation. Sent forth, as we are, not subject to an unconditional necessity, but intrusted with the power of the will, we are under the moral *obligation* of exerting ourselves for the accomplishment of our proper destiny in the world. Wherever man goes he carries with him his *power;* and, consequently, has both his duties and his

rights. Thus, in a word, the whole aspect of our moral, social, and political life, with all their spheres of activity, spring from the fundamental fact, that, endowed with liberty, we are the master of our own actions, which actions have, at once, to be restrained from injuring the inviolable rights of others, and to be so directed, as to fulfil the requirements of our own personal obligations. Without dwelling, however, upon this branch of psychology, we pass on to that which M. Cousin has elaborated with the greatest care and ability, I mean

2. The phenomena of our rational or intellectual life. The first thing to be accomplished, in analyzing this part of our nature, is to reduce the multiplicity of facts, which at once present themselves to their primary elements. Almost all philosophers have recognised the importance of such a reduction, but very few have attempted to perform it. Of these few, Aristotle classified our notions from the objective point of view; and in his table of categories, gave us a complete list of those "*summa genera*," to one of which every individual object that we have any knowledge of belongs. Kant, after the revolution of many centuries, produced another table of categories, made from the *subjective* point of view, in which table he has given us a deduction of all those laws or forms of the understanding by which the material of our knowledge is shaped into distinct ideas. Cousin, again, takes up the same great problem, applies to it a

closer method of analysis learned from the schools of modern idealism, and comes to the conclusion, that the whole phenomena of our reason may be reduced to *three* integrant and inseparable elements, which at once constitute its true nature, and govern all its manifestations.

The first of these elements is that which is variously expressed under the terms unity, identity, the absolute, the infinite. This we term the category of *substance*, as being the one immutable essence of the Eleatics and of Spinoza. The second of these elements is that which, in direct opposition to the former, we term plurality-difference, the conditioned, the finite, the phenomenal. This we name the category of causality, as being the principle of all change, of all the passing phenomena of the universe. Now, these two categories are not to be viewed as separated from each other—they are, in fact, indissolubly united. The absolute can only manifest itself in the phenomenal—the phenomenal only subsists in the absolute; which facts, accordingly, give rise to a third element or category, namely, that of the mutual relation which these two primary notions bear to one another. According to Cousin, these three elements manifest themselves wherever the human reason is seen in operation. They form the type, as it were, under which every subject is viewed, and absolutely govern the whole development of an intellectual nature. To give an idea of the extensive application which is made of this

doctrine of categories, we subjoin the following list, which shews them as reproduced in the various spheres of human thought or activity:—

First Category.	*Second Category.*	*Third Category.*
Unity	Multiplicity	Relation between them.
Absolute Space	Bounded Space	Relation between them.
Absolute Existence	Dependent Existence	Relation between them.
Eternity	Time	Relation between them.
Infinite	Finite	Relation between them.
Primary Cause	Secondary Cause	Relation between them.
Substance	Phenomena	Relation between them.
Mind	Thoughts	Relation between them.
Beau Ideal	Beau Real	Relation between them.
The Perfect	The Imperfect	Relation between them.
Contraction	Expansion	Relation between them.
Subject	Object	Subject-Object.

Thus we see thought, morals, science, the fine arts, nature, in a word, every subject of human contemplation appearing under the type of this trinity, that emanates from the fundamental laws of our nature.

But now comes a most important inquiry, namely, how far these dictates of our reason possess *authority; i.e.*, how far we can depend upon them as unfolding truth, not merely as it appears to us, but as it really exists in its own intrinsic nature. It is in the discussion of this question that we come to some of those peculiar doctrines which belong alone to Cousin and his school of philosophy. Instead of admitting that

our knowledge is *relative*, that we see truth only as it stands in connexion with ourselves, that we have no other pledge of its objective accuracy than the perfection of the instrument by which we attain it, he contends that the truths with which reason is conversant are *absolute*, and that they both are, and ever must be, precisely as we see them, altogether independent of ourselves, and of the medium through which they are known. So far, indeed, he is only treading in the footsteps of his German instructors; but with respect to the grounds on which the point is argued, he stands quite by himself. There are two chief arguments which Cousin uses to prove the absoluteness of our knowledge.

The first is derived from the impersonality of reason. In this point he shows the philosophy of Kant to be altogether erroneous. That philosopher made all our necessary ideas and *à priori* conceptions to be simply the results of the subjective laws of our own minds. All abstract truth was to him but the personification, or the reflection, of our own intellectual constitution. The two forms of our sensational life—time and space; the twelve categories of the understanding; the three regulative principles of the pure reason giving origin to our notions of the soul, the universe, and God, all had, in the Kantian system, no objective validity whatever. The germ of

Fichte's subjective idealism, in fact, was already latent in the philosophy of Königsberg.

Now to contravene these false and sceptical results, Cousin labours to prove, that the dictates of pure reason are not merely personal, that they do not simply express what *seems to be real*, according to the constitution of our own faculties, but that they are the direct reflection of absolute and eternal things. *The will*, we are conscious, is, in all its various efforts, enstamped with the impress of our personality; our volitions are our own, our desires are our own, our emotions are our own; that which we experience of all such phenomena is not experienced in the same manner by any one else. But not so in the case of our intellectual judgments. Necessary truth does not belong to one human being more than another, it has no element of human personality about it,—it is the common patrimony of every rational nature,—a direct emanation from God. Such being the case, the decision of reason, within its own peculiar province, possesses an authority almost Divine; and if we are led astray by it, we must be led astray by a light from heaven.

But the question now arises, How can we strip any fact of our own consciousness of its personality? Our rational judgments and *à priori* conceptions, it might be argued, are as much phenomena of our own individual minds, as are

our volitions, desires, or emotions. Admit that a truth *appears* to be absolute and necessary, yet it only appears so by virtue of the constitution of our own intellects. How, then, can we establish the objective validity of anything, when it is certain that everything must be seen only through the medium of our own subjective consciousness?

This leads us to the second ground on which Cousin argues the authority of reason; one which is derived from the distinction between its *spontaneous* and its *reflective* movements. When we take up a subject designedly, when we search into its evidences, when we put in array the arguments for and against, and at length draw our conclusion, we term this step a *reflective* process. The subject has, by this process, to be analyzed, or *separated* into its component elements; and then the truth of the whole to be deduced from the validity of the parts. Now here, there are abundant opportunities for errors to creep in. The analysis may be incomplete,—some of the parts, for example, may be omitted, others may occupy a too prominent, or too subordinate place; in a hundred different ways the conclusion, as a whole, may be vitiated. Reason, therefore, when it operates *reflectively*, can have no *absolute* authority,—it is involved in all the imperfections of our own personality. There is, however, another process by which we arrive at knowledge, or truth, and that a

purely spontaneous one. There are moments of thought in which the mind mingles up no element whatever of its own personality. It does not analyze, it does not search, it does not voluntarily attend, it does not even reflect; but yet there is a distinct apperception of certain truths which it simply receives. Almost every one must be conscious, that his best thoughts come upon him like flashes of inspiration; and that when he has most lulled to rest the workings of his own *personal* effort, then most he seems to stand in the unobstructed light of eternal things. If, therefore, there be a direct and immediate apperception of absolute truth—if there be moments in which the mind receives the pure light of heaven without any intermixture of its own personality, then reason, viewed as a spontaneous principle, must possess an authority which cannot be gainsayed or resisted.

That such an internal apperception *really* exists, Cousin considers to be an unquestionable fact which may be verified by observation. We subjoin his own words. "It is by *observation*," he remarks, "that within the penetralia of the consciousness, and at a depth to which Kant never descended, under the apparent relativeness and subjectivity of necessary principles, I have succeeded in seizing and analyzing the instantaneous, but veritable fact of the spontaneous apperception of truth,—an apperception which, not immediately

reflecting itself, passes unperceived in the depths of the consciousness; yet is the real basis of that, which later under a logical form, and in the hands of reflection, becomes a necessary conception. All subjectivity and reflexivity expires in the spontaneity of apperception. But the primitive light is so pure, that it is unperceived; it is the reflected light which strikes us, but often in doing so, sullies with its faithless lustre the purity of the former. Reason becomes subjective by its connexion with the free and voluntary *Me*, which is the type of all subjectivity; but in itself it is impersonal, it does not appertain any more to one than to another, it does not even appertain to humanity as a whole, its laws emanate only from itself." Such is the chief ground on which Cousin repels the latent scepticism of a too subjective philosophy, and such the method by which he proposes to place the lofty authority of reason, as an evidence for objective reality, upon an immoveable foundation.

3. We pass on now to the third division of psychology; that, namely, which takes cognisance of the phenomena of *sensation*. Sensation with Cousin, as with most other philosophers, is the faculty which acquaints us with the various facts and changes of the outward world. In saying this, however, we do not pronounce anything upon the nature of objective existence around us; we do not decide, for example, whether it be material in the ordinary sense of the term, or whether it be

not. That there are real phenomena, independent of ourselves—that there is a *Not-me* limiting and opposing the *Me*, our consciousness in every sensation attests; but it has yet to be shown what may be the nature, and what the constitution, of this outward existence. The common sense of mankind regards it as consisting of hard, impenetrable, and passive material; in short, of *atoms*, characterized by nothing except their *vis inertiæ*. But is this dictate of common sense to be accepted as philosophically correct? or does metaphysical analysis place the question in any other and clearer light? Let us view the evidence of the case.

The moment we begin to reflect, we are conscious of certain states of mind produced within us from some source out of ourselves. But, by a law of our reason, whenever we experience change, either within or around us, we necessarily attribute that change to some *cause*. Hence, the primary notion we must have of the external world is that of an assemblage of causes, which are able to produce given effects. These causes, of course, we refer to some real existence, which is the principle, or substratum, on which they depend; that is, we view them under the notion of certain finite, but independent forces, which bound, resist, or modify the exertions of our own volition. Let us put the question in another light. All our knowledge of external nature arises from internal impressions

made by it, through the medium of sensation, upon the mind. But what is it that can create impressions? Manifestly *powers*, *forces*, *causes*, something that is *active* and productive of impulse: nothing that is barely passive, as matter is generally accustomed to be viewed, can possibly do so. Science, in fact, has at length come to view all material existence in this light. The principles of mechanics are entirely comprised in the doctrines of statical and dynamical *forces*, that is to say, all material phenomena are viewed as the productions of certain *powers*, acting with different intensities, and in different directions. "What natural philosopher," says our author, "since Euler seeks after anything beyond forces and laws? Who speaks now of atoms? And even with respect to molecules, the newer form in which atoms have been viewed, who regards them otherwise than as an hypothesis? If this fact is incontestable, if modern science occupies itself only with forces and laws, I conclude rigorously from hence, that natural philosophy, whatever it may know, or not know, is by no means *materialistic*, that it became *spiritualistic* the very day it rejected all other methods, except observation and induction, which can lead us to nothing but forces and laws."

From these and similar remarks, it is abundantly evident that Cousin is to be regarded as an idealist, although certainly of a very moderate kind, when

compared with the German school in which he was instructed. He does not lose sight of the fundamental idea of nature: far from it; he makes it play a very important part in his system; but he entirely denies its passive, inert, atomic character; he views it all under the type of *power* or cause; in short, he makes it homogeneous with mind, only mind in its lower and as yet unconscious development. Perhaps we should not be wrong in placing him by the side of M. de Biran and Leibnitz, as the advocate of a dynamical system of monadology; indeed, with reference to the latter, he says, "The more I advance, and the more I believe in philosophy, the more clearly I seem to see into the mind of that great man; and all my progress consists in understanding him better."

Here we must close our sketch of Cousin's psychology; brief as our explanations have necessarily been, we trust that the careful reader may gain from them a correct idea of its general nature; and if not, he has only to betake himself to the two prefaces prefixed to the "Philosophical Fragments," in order to gain the most definite views on this part of his philosophy.

III. We must now go on to the third point which was to claim our attention, and that is, Cousin's *Ontology*. There are three different lights in which the subject of ontology has been viewed by modern philosophers. First, by the German idealistic writers it has been regarded as the start-

ing point of all intellectual science. Commencing with the notion of *being*, in its most general and abstract character, they proceed to add to it one attribute after the other, until they have philosophically constructed the entire universe. The whole problem of the German metaphysics is, in fact, to determine what is the prime absolute essence from which all things proceed, and then to expand the *law* by which bare existence rises, through all the multiplicity of its changes and gradations, to its most pregnant and most fully developed character. These systems, therefore, are exclusively *ontological.*

Secondly, the English and Scottish writers generally interdict the ontological branch of philosophy, as lying beyond the reach of our faculties. Intellectual science with them is confined, for the most part, to psychology, that is, to the analysis and classification of our mental phenomena. Whatever the universal testimony of the human faculties attests, that they accept as being true "quoad nos," and on this principle they refute the pretensions of scepticism; but they do not admit the possibility of attaining to the mysteries of absolute existence, or of expounding what, independently of our own perceptions, is the essential constitution of anything whatever. Now Cousin regards these two opinions as extremes, both of which it is necessary to avoid. In place of commencing, as the Germans do, with ontology, he affirms that the psychological

method is the only true one; that we can only properly begin by an analysis of the *facts* of our conscious existence; but, instead of bounding himself by the limits of psychology, he affirms the possibility of finding a solid passage from the subjective world to the objective—from phenomena to real existence. Since reason is not *personal* in its nature, but receives truth spontaneously, by direct and immediate apperception, he considers that we may, by the medium of this faculty, attain at once to the knowledge of essential and absolute existence.

Existence appears to us under three different forms. First of all, we are conscious of our own personal and voluntary energy; this we are led by reason to attribute to an essential and ever abiding existence, which we term self, or *the-me*. Again, reason in like manner instructs us, whenever we are conscious of some outward influence exerted upon us through the medium of sensation, to attribute this influence to real and essential causes, the aggregate of which, we term *nature*. But both self and nature are finite; they cannot, therefore, be self-existent or absolute, and must consequently have proceeded from another source, which bears the attributes of self-existence, infinity, eternity. Here, then, reason leads us to the absolute essence from which all things proceed, by which all things are sustained, in which all things subsist; and that essence is God.

According to this view, it is evident that God

comprehends the universe in himself, and that all finite existence is but the emanation from his infinite existence. Still Cousin does not view Deity by any means in the pantheistic light, which was advocated by Spinoza and the Eleatics. "The God of consciousness (we quote his own words) is not an abstract God, a solitary sovereign, banished beyond creation upon the throne of a silent eternity and an absolute existence, which resembles existence in no respect whatever; he is a God at once true and real, at once substance and cause, always substance and always cause; being substance only inasmuch as he is cause, and being cause only inasmuch as he is substance; that is to say, being *absolute* cause, one and many, eternity and time, essence and life, end and middle, at the summit of existence and at its base, infinite and finite together; in a word, a Trinity, being at the same time God, Nature, and Humanity."

Cousin's view of the Divine nature is confessedly somewhat recondite and indistinct. While on the one hand he altogether repudiates the charge of pantheism, yet on the other hand it is difficult to say how his opinions, as above described, can be altogether vindicated from it. Time, perhaps, will show how far he has grasped, or how far misconceived, the whole subject. There is one point, however, upon which Cousin has expressed himself with great clearness and precision, and that is the essential comprehensibility of the Absolute and

Infinite Being by the human mind. This is, in fact, a principal feature in his philosophy. He considers that the establishment of the Absolute as a fundamental notion, and a constitutive principle of the human intelligence, is his chief merit as a philosopher, and upon this he grounds the peculiar claims of his modern system of eclecticism.

Now, of all questions which philosophy proposes for our investigation, there is probably not one so difficult to sound to its depths, not one on which the greatest thinkers have so much differed as upon this. Sir Wm. Hamilton has reduced the philosophical hypotheses, which have obtained respecting our knowledge of the absolute or unconditioned, to four distinct heads:—1. The Absolute is altogether inconceivable, every notion we have of it being simply a *negation* of that, which characterises finite and conditioned existence. This opinion he holds himself in common with the English and Scottish school of modern times. 2. The Absolute, though not an object of real knowledge, yet exists subjectively within our consciousness as a regulative principle. Kant held this opinion: he believed that pure reason necessarily gives rise to the *notion* of the infinite and unconditioned, which notion we view under the threefold type of the soul, the universe, and the Deity; but he did not admit the objective reality of these conceptions. He regarded them merely as personifications of our own subjective laws or processes. 3. The Absolute cannot be

comprehended in consciousness and reflection; but it can be gazed upon by a higher faculty, that of intellectual intuition. This is the well known doctrine, upon which Schelling has erected his system of philosophy. 4. The Absolute can be grasped by reason, and brought within the compass of our real consciousness. Such is the theory of Cousin himself.

Now, here we have three minds standing severally at the head of the respective philosophies of Britain, France, and Germany, assuming each a different hypothesis on this subject; while Kant, the Aristotle of the modern world, assumes a fourth. Under such circumstances he must be a bold thinker, who ventures to pronounce confidently upon the truth or error of any one of these opinions. Few, perhaps, in our own country would be inclined to side either with Kant or Schelling; the great point of dispute is most likely to be between Sir W. Hamilton and M. Cousin, that is to say, whether the infinite, the absolute, the unconditioned, be really cognisable by the human reason, or whether it be not; whether our notion of it be positive, or whether it be only negative. And here we freely confess, that we are not yet prepared to combat, step by step, the weighty arguments by which the Scottish metaphysician seeks to establish the negative character of this great fundamental conception; neither, on the other hand, are we prepared to admit his inference. We cannot divest our minds

of the belief, that there is something *positive* in the glance which the human soul casts upon the world of eternity and infinity. Whether we rise to the contemplation of the Absolute through the medium of the true, the beautiful, or the good, we cannot imagine that our highest conceptions of these terminate in darkess; in a total negation of all knowledge. So far from this, there seem to be flashes of light, ineffable it may be, but still real, which envelope the soul in a lustre all divine, when it catches glimpses of *infinite* truth, *infinite* beauty, and *infinite* excellence. The mind, instead of plunging into a total eclipse of all intellection, when it rises to this elevation, seems rather to be dazzled by a too great effulgence; yet still the light is real light, although, to any but the strongest vision, the effect may be to *blind* rather than to illumine. It is not by negations that men are governed; but it is before the idea of eternity and infinity that our fiercest humanity is softened and subdued. Until we are driven from this position by an irresistible evidence, we must still regard the notion of the infinite, the absolute, the eternal, as forming one of our fundamental notions; and one which opens to us the highest field, both for our present meditation and our future prospects.

Before we conclude this sketch of Cousin's philosophy, we must advert to his merits as a historian. In doing this, we pass over the labours he has undertaken, as a translator and an editor, although,

perhaps, he will not owe the least portion of his fame, *eventually*, to the admirable manner in which he has introduced the modern thinker into the profundities of Plato, and many other regions of philosophy, hitherto but imperfectly explored. A better foundation for modern eclecticism could not be laid, than that which such an exposition of the thoughts of great minds affords. In addition to this, however, the most attractive, perhaps, of our author's own writings, are his Lectures on the History of Philosophy. Many of the sentiments, it is true, are drawn from German sources; but still, they are so thoroughly individualized, and pourtrayed with so much force and perspicuity, that we hardly know which most to admire, the profound thinking by which they were first conceived, or the clearness and beauty by which they are here embellished. To comprehend the history of philosophy aright, Cousin affirms that we must have a distinct knowledge of the constituent elements of the human reason. Now, observation shews us, that these elements are three: the infinite, the finite, and the relation subsisting between them. These three notions, accordingly, must have been the foundations of philosophy in every age; and in whatever manner they naturally develop themselves in the mind of humanity, such must have been the course of philosophy, historically speaking, from the earliest period.

In the individual reason, the first idea that occu-

pies the mind, is that of the *infinite*; gradually this is lost sight of, to make way for the knowledge of finite objects; and lastly, the two are united, and viewed in their mutual dependency upon each other. Just such has been the development of reason, in the whole course of humanity. The early oriental philosophy was grounded upon the idea of the infinite and absolute substance; the Greek philosophy, culminating in Aristotle, was the philosophy of the finite; and, lastly, the modern philosophy has developed the relation of the finite to the infinite, and is thus destined to complete the whole cycle of human thought. These three eras, in fact, have been severally characterized by the existence of certain grand ideas, which, though seen in their pure and abstract form in philosophy, yet have virtually pervaded the whole religious and political existence of mankind. Thus, in religion, the first era gave rise to Pantheism, the second, to Polytheism, the third, to Theism; whilst, in politics, the first was the age of monarchy, the second, of democracy, the last, of mixed government.

It is not to be imagined, however, that these three eras of the world were each *exclusively* occupied with the fundamental conception in its various developments, upon which its grand peculiarities were founded. All the elements of reason must have really existed in every period; and although each have had their time of predominant influence,

yet every age of mankind has exhibited, in a subordinate degree, different systems of philosophy; according as different minds have been led, more or less, to the contemplation of God, of nature, or of humanity. Hence, we find, as we gaze down the stream of history, the constant reproduction of the four philosophical tendencies, which we have indicated by the terms sensationalism, idealism, scepticism, and mysticism; and upon these four points, accordingly, the whole history of philosophy must turn. Each of the four systems is based upon a true idea, and has its own peculiar mission to perform in the development of human reason; but each is involved in error, arising from its partial and exclusive view of the elements of which that reason consists. Their error, therefore, is the error of deficiency; they are each true in what they teach, and each false in what they reject. In order to obtain the whole truth, they must be all united; the doctrines which are mutually contradictory will then be exploded, and those, which are able to stand side by side, will be retained.

This, then, is precisely the aim of modern eclecticism; it is the summing up of the positive and negative results of all other systems, and the complete separation of that which is valid truth, in them all, from that admixture of error, in which it was before involved. Such is the purpose (one truly worthy of a great mind) with which Cousin has devoted himself to the study of history; and

although we might be more gratified had he written systematic works upon philosophy, yet there can be little doubt, but that in following his present course, he is laying a far more solid foundation for the future stability and glory of the school which he has founded. In fine, as a popular expositor of philosophy, we doubt whether Cousin has anything approaching a rival in the present age. There may be, in Germany, more profound thinking, and more power in the purely abstract faculties, but we know of no philosopher of modern times, who unites to great originality of thought, so extraordinary a power of conveying his ideas in the most clear and eloquent language. The German thinkers, from their want of perspicuity, write almost exclusively for Germans; and, even of them, only for a small portion; but the philosophy of Cousin, although comprehending some of the most recondite points of the German metaphysics, yet, has already found its way throughout Europe and America.

That this should be the case, we cannot but sincerely rejoice. Although it is true, we could not subscribe to the system as a whole, yet we know of none which, diving deep into the interior of the human consciousness, comes forth at length with so little admixture of mere hypothesis, and so large a development of truth. Much as some might be startled at the idealism manifested in his analysis of *sensation*, we doubt whether any other

ontological theory of the natural world has been propounded, so little involved in contradiction, and so thoroughly capable of explaining all the facts of the case. Metaphysics and natural philosophy, it appears to us, are both tending to a dynamical system of the universe, similar to that, of which the mighty mind of Leibnitz caught the distant glimpse.

In the analysis of *reason*, again, we can almost entirely coincide. The development of its constituent elements—the exposition of its spontaneous and reflective movements—the vindication of its authority—all present to us philosophical doctrines of the greatest value; all resting, moreover, upon the foundation of psychological *facts*, as evidence of their truth. We do not deny that these doctrines may not yet require to be modified and perfected; but still, there are pregnant germs of truth in them, as they now stand upon the pages before us. To the analysis of the *will*, there may be some objection, owing to its complete isolation from the reason; but even here, too, there are the elements of much truth, which only need a little more development, to place the philosophy of our voluntary activity upon a firm and intelligible basis.

There is one part, however, of the system now before us, which we must distinctly except from the eulogy we have pronounced upon the rest, and that is the part, in which our author carries the

results of his philosophy into the region of theological truth. There are two points in particular, which touch very closely upon the ordinary sentiments of the Christian world, and which open the door for an almost boundless advocacy of religious scepticism. These are, first, the notion he has given of Deity itself; and, secondly, that which he has given of inspiration.

With regard to his notion of Deity, we have already shewn how closely this verges upon the principle of Pantheism. Even if we admit, that it is *not* a doctrine like that of Spinoza, which identifies God with the abstract idea of substance; or even like that of Hegel, which regards Deity as synonymous with the absolute law and process of the universe; if we admit, in fact, that the Deity of Cousin possesses a conscious personality, yet still it is one which contains in itself the finite personality and consciousness of every subordinate mind. God is the ocean—we are but the waves; the ocean may be one individuality, and each wave another; but still they are *essentially* one and the same. We see not how Cousin's Theism can possibly be consistent with any idea of moral evil; neither do we see how, starting from such a dogma, he can ever vindicate and uphold his own theory of human liberty. On such Theistic principles, all sin must be simply *defect*, and all defect must be absolutely fatuitous.

But the most dangerous door into religious scep-

ticism, is the use which Cousin makes of the spontaneity of the human reason, in order to explain the phenomena of inspiration. Reflection alone is considered to be the source of error; while that pure apperception, that instinctive development of thought, which results from spontaneity, is absolutely infallible. Now this spontaneity, it is said, is the foundation of religion. Those who were termed seers, prophets, inspired teachers, of ancient times, were simply men who resigned themselves largely to their intellectual instincts, and thus gazed upon truth in its pure and perfect form. They did not reason, they did not search, they did not reflect deeply and patiently, they made no pretension to philosophy; but they received truth spontaneously, as it flowed in upon them from heaven. Now, in one sense, all this may be true; but, according to Cousin, this immediate reception of divine light was nothing more than the *natural* play of the spontaneous reason; nothing more than what has existed, to a greater or less degree, in every man of great genius; nothing more than what may now exist in any mind which resigns itself to its own unreflective apperceptions. This being the case, revelation, in the ordinary sense, loses all its peculiar value; every man may be a prophet; every mind has within it the same authority to decide upon truth, as those minds had, who dictated the bible; we have only to sit and listen to the still small voice within, to enjoy a

daily revelation, which bears upon it all the marks of absolute infallibility.

This doctrine, of course, may seem very plausible and very flattering; nay, it may arraign some evidence, and boast the explanation of many facts; but, assuredly, it can only be erected and established upon the ruins of all the fundamental evidences of Christianity. When the advocates of this natural spontaneous inspiration will come forth from their recesses of thought, and deliver prophecies as clear as those of the Hebrew seer—when they shall mould the elements of nature to their will—when they shall speak with the sublime authority of Jesus of Nazareth, and with the same infinite ease rising beyond all the influence of time, place, and circumstances, explain the past, and unfold the future—when they die for the truth they utter, and rise again, as witnesses to its divinity—then we may begin to place them on the elevation which they so thoughtlessly claim; but, until they either prove these *facts* to be delusions, or give their parallel in themselves, the world may well laugh at their ambition, and trample their spurious inspiration beneath its feet.

Much as we admire Cousin, while he keeps within his proper limits, and much as we are disposed to maintain the truth of his philosophy, in most of its principal features, we cannot but repudiate, with all our energy, his attempt to intrude upon the sacred province of the Christian

revelation. If he will stand up as a theologian, and fight the battle upon its proper grounds, let him do so, and there are plenty to take up the gauntlet which he throws down; but it is not the part, which his own philosophy would dictate, to raise a new theory of revelation to supersede all the rest, without considering the facts and the evidences which the Christian revelation can display.

In the foregoing pages, we have seen the process by which the principles of the ideological school have been gradually overthrown, and those of eclecticism established. M. Laromiguière began by secretly undermining the bulwarks of sensationalism; M. Royer Collard made the first open breach in the wall; and M. Cousin has spent his life in rearing the edifice of a new philosophy. Our next duty is, to exhibit the effects which this philosophy has produced in France, and to describe the *school*, to which it has given rise. To do this, will be a work of but little difficulty. The school itself is so recent, that, as yet, it has had no time to assume many variations; and, although it numbers several thinkers of great independence among its advocates, yet their opinions do not depart so widely from those of the founder, as to require any lengthened explanation.

By far the most celebrated of Cousin's pupils and supporters is M. Theodore Jouffroy. This popular and eloquent writer was born in the year 1796, and having studied philosophy in the faculty of literature, under the direction of Cousin, was appointed soon after Professor of Moral Philosophy in the same institution,—a post which he retains, we believe, to the present day. M. Jouffroy first became known to the public through the medium of a translation of Dugald Stewart's "Moral Philosophy." To this translation he prefixed an essay or preface, in which he vindicates the study of intellectual science against the attacks of those, who would banish all except natural philosophy out of the domain of human investigation. The preface, as a whole, shews that the author has deeply imbibed the principles and the spirit of the Scottish metaphysicians, whilst, at the same time, he rises to those more expansive views of philosophical truth, which were inculcated in the lectures of his illustrious predecessor.

Nothing can exceed the clearness, and even the beauty, with which he establishes in this little production the fundamental principles of intellectual philosophy. As all science must be built upon *facts*, he first enquires, whether there be not an order of facts peculiar to themselves, and valid in their nature, upon which mental philosophy, as a branch of inductive science, can be erected? This leads to a very lucid exhibition of the contrast

which exists between the external facts of sensible observation, and the internal facts of consciousness; in which he shews, that no fact cognizable by the senses could possibly be arrived at by direct consciousness, and that no fact of consciousness could ever be known through the senses. He concludes, therefore, that two orders of facts exist, perfectly unique in their character and perfectly distinct from each other. This point once established, he proceeds to prove, that the facts of consciousness can be accurately observed, and that their laws can be determined with the same precision as the laws of the material world. Next, with regard to the *communication* of the facts of consciousness to others, he proceeds to shew, that although sensible evidence cannot be given, as is the case in natural philosophy, yet, that the same end is attained by appealing to what passes within the consciousness of our fellow-creatures, who, in all important points, are able to verify the truth of our descriptions by their own personal experience. That nothing may be wanting to establish his point, he goes on to prove, that physiologists themselves, even while they deny a separate order of spiritual facts, virtually proceed upon them in all their own investigations; —natural science being as much grounded upon abstract and *philosophical* principles, as any other. In this manner he successfully deduces the conclusions, that there *are* valid facts on which to build a science of psychology; that these facts can

be accurately determined;—that they can be communicated by one mind to another; and, that every branch of human research virtually admits them.

The great requirement for the advancement of psychological science is, that theories should be renounced, that hasty inductions should be given up, and that we should apply ourselves to the collegation of all the facts of consciousness, and to their proper classification, with the same diligence that has been expended upon natural philosophy. Many problems, respecting the nature of the human mind, are, at present, confessedly enveloped in darkness and obscurity. "Whence, then," says our author, "is the light to come? Where are we to seek for it? In a more profound observation," he replies, "of the *phenomena of human nature*, and especially in the study, which has been greatly neglected and which is yet in the back ground, of the facts of consciousness." Such, in brief, is the clear and common-sense view which our author has taken of the proper method of philosophical research.

The next source to which we must go, in order to estimate the philosophical character of M. Jouffroy, is a collection of articles upon a variety of topics, entitled "Mélanges Philosophiques." These were originally contributions to a philosophical journal, termed "The Globe," but have since been published by the author in a distinct form. In these articles, we see the zealous pupil and successor of Cousin, the genuine mo-

dern eclectic touching, more or less, upon all points within the range of intellectual philosophy, and pouring light derived from all directions upon them. We feel ourselves in company with a master mind, one who does not servilely follow in the track pointed out by others, but, yet, who knows how to appreciate the labours of all true-hearted thinkers, and to make their results tell upon the elucidation of his own system.

According to this system, man is to be regarded and studied in a twofold point of view; inasmuch, as he comprehends in himself two separate elements — *the thing* on the one hand, *the person* on the other. The former is human nature, as subjected to its necessary laws and impulses; the other is human nature as the possessor of that extraordinary *personal* power, by which our natural capacities are directed, and our whole existence moulded to the intelligent accomplishment of its destiny. These two elements constitute in us two distinct modes of life,—the impersonal life, and the personal; and it forms one of the chief features in the system before us, that every faculty, we possess, is regarded as being developed, either on the one hand, according to the necessary laws of human nature; or, on the other hand, under the superintendence and direction of our personal power. With regard to the faculties themselves, Jouffroy has reduced them to the following heads:—First, *the personal faculty*, or the supreme power of

taking possession of ourselves and of our capacities, and of controlling them; this faculty is known by the name of liberty or will, which, however, designates it but imperfectly. Secondly, *the primitive inclinations* of our nature, or that aggregate of instincts or tendencies which impel us towards certain ends and in certain directions prior to all experience, and which at once suggest to reason the destiny of our being, and animate our activity to pursue it. Thirdly, *the locomotive faculty*, or that energy by which we move the locomotive nerves, and produce all the voluntary bodily movements. Fourthly, *the expressive faculty*, or the power of representing, by external signs, that which takes place within us, and of thus holding communication with our fellow-men. Fifthly, *sensibility*, or the capacity of being agreeably or disagreeably affected by all external or internal causes, and of re-acting in relation to them by movements of love or hatred, of desire or aversion, which are the principle of passion. Sixthly, *the intellectual faculties.* This term comprises many distinct powers, which can be enumerated and described only in a treatise on intelligence. This may suffice to give what is peculiar to Jouffroy's system, in most other respects he has followed in the footsteps of his master.

M. Jouffroy, however, is by profession a *moralist*, and, consequently, his chief duty is to explain and illustrate this part of our constitution. With many of the lectures delivered by him, in this capacity,

he has favoured us; and we have learned to appreciate and admire the profound, yet eloquent criticism with which he has analyzed all the principal moral systems of our own and of other countries. Without dwelling, however, upon his character as a *critic*, we must glance for a moment at the peculiarities which exist in his own views of ethical philosophy.

According to Jouffroy, the primary question in ethics is, "Whether there be such a thing as good, and such a thing as evil?" The whole life of mankind, he contends, furnishes one long and continued affirmative to this question, in as much, as men are continually engaged in deliberating, choosing, and deciding between them. Allowing then, that good and evil exist, the next point is, to determine *on what ground* one thing is to be considered preferable to another. Here our author goes into a long and elaborate discussion, to shew that we must regard everything as good on the one hand, or evil on the other, *in proportion as it serves to aid or to prevent the fulfilment of our destiny.* The great problem of human destiny, then, lies at the foundation of all morality; and it is according to the bearing which every action has upon this, that we must determine its ethical quality. To pronounce *à priori* concerning actions, whether they are good or bad, is impossible. This entirely depends, first, upon the Being to which they apply; and next, upon the influence they may

have on the destiny for which that being was created. Good, in the case of any particular being, is simply the fulfilment of *its own specific destiny;* and good *in itself* is the accomplishment of the destiny of all beings; *i. e.*, the existence of perfect order and harmony in the universe, where everything proceeds uninterruptedly to its end. In this world we find that there are perpetual interruptions in the fulfilment of our destiny. This constitutes *moral evil;* and it is only when these obstacles shall be all removed, when all intelligent beings gaze upon the great end of their creation, and proceed without lingering to the realization of it, that evil will be subdued, and the reign of moral perfection commence. For this realization, however, we must look beyond the present to a future, and that, a sinless world.

For the further development, however, of these views, we must refer the reader to Jouffroy's lectures, or for a briefer sketch of them, to an article on "Good and Evil," which will be found among his "Mélanges Philosophiques." As a *metaphysician*, Jouffroy will, probably, ever rank considerably below Cousin, both in depth and originality; but as a moralist, he leads the way in the eclectic school, without any appearance of a rival. We believe, that there is no writer of the present day who has grappled with the great problems of moral science, so manfully and successfully,—and who has succeeded in throwing so

much fresh light upon a subject which has commanded the energies of the greatest minds.

In Cousin and Jouffroy we have at once the two first, and the two greatest advocates of modern eclecticism in France. The doctrines, however, which these have been inculcating in the Normal School, at Paris, during the last twenty years and more, have been warmly received by many others; and, not a few have gone forth from their instructions to disseminate the same principles throughout the country. M. Philip Damiron may be regarded as the third in order of time and eminence, to whom eclecticism owes its present position among the philosophies of Europe. Brought up under the tuition of Cousin, he soon proved himself a worthy pupil of such a master, and has been since rewarded with the Professorship of Philosophy, at the Normal School of Paris, and the College of Louis the Great. M. Damiron has published a course both of mental and moral philosophy, which holds a somewhat distinguished place among the metaphysical productions of the day. The work, however, by which he is best known, and to which I beg now to acknowledge my own obligations, is entitled, "Essai sur l'Histoire de la Philosophie en France au Dix-neuvième Siècle." This work, which has gone through many editions, and found its way into many countries, is almost indispensable to the study of the history of modern philosophy, as it gives perhaps the only complete

account of the progress of metaphysics in France, from the period of the Revolution down to the present day.

The views of M. Damiron are formed closely after the model of the school from which he came; and in him, accordingly, electicism has found a warm, and, we may add, an able advocate. To detail his philosophical opinions would only be to tread over again the same ground which we have already traversed; and, we shall content ourselves, therefore, with giving to our readers the spirited remarks upon *eclecticism*, with which he closes the volume above mentioned, and which we regard as being, upon the whole, a fair estimate of the real worth and excellence of the system. "It would not be impossible," remarks our author, "in strictness, to make a whole philosophy without the aid of eclecticism. But such a philosophy would be a monstrosity; and for the work, there would be requisite a genius which, alone and by itself, without aid or co-operation, could equal in the best accomplishments the combined genius of the greatest philosophers; those who, in fact, were great only through their preceptors, and through history. The human mind, however, cannot count upon such a singular phenomenon; and eclecticism is much rather its proper production, because, after all it is, in one view of the case, only the natural procedure of humanity, namely, labour by concert and association. Eclecticism, in fact, is philosophy

by association; the philosophy which, by means of criticism and history, enriches itself with all the legitimate acquisitions, that belong to the past. And this philosophy is of so much the greater worth, because it is more in communion with anterior philosophies, because it participates in a greater number of doctrines, and because it has more out of which to choose, and knows better how to exercise its choice. * * * * I called eclecticism philosophy by association: cannot I call it also philosophy without exclusion,—a sort of philanthropy applied to the true ideas of all times and all countries. The larger it is in its admissions, so long as it be discreet, and the more it embraces, so long as it does so wisely, so much the more legitimate and pure it is,—so much the more accomplished.

"It would be difficult to affirm, that eclecticism will never change, whether it be in relation to its criterion (which is less probable) or to its erudition, which latter will almost infallibly happen; for already, since it has been in the world, it has undergone many modifications, both in the *rule* and in the *manner* of its choice. At present it is *spiritual;* spiritual from proceeding upon the data of psychology. This tendency I believe to be good, and consequently to be durable; but, nevertheless, I believe, it may take some day another. In the same manner, it now moves in a sphere of erudition without doubt very extensive; but how can we say

that it will not proceed, and extend itself beyond it, since it has yet altogether a new world, that of the East, hitherto little known, to pervade and to master. There is, then, a chance that in process of time it may become varied and modified.

"But what will be the consequence? Clearly, that it will be amended, fortified, perfected; not that it will come to an end. It will not come to an end, at least, until it is fully completed; and then it will be able to be said, that the humanity of the present has all the knowledge of the past; that it has what is better and more true, the sum of all science, and that nothing therein is deficient. Until then, eclecticism, whether we know it or not, will be, and will continue to be, the necessary procedure of every spirit in progress.

"As we see, and as I have said, eclecticism is not for philosophy a definitive state; it is not an end, it is a means; but this means is yet for a long futurity, and in our days, more than ever, of indispensable application. Humanity did not commence and will not finish with eclecticism; but it has lived, and will live and develop itself by eclecticism, which is to the world of ideas that which association is to the world of persons; or which is (to speak more accurately) but one form of association itself. More than ever do I find this conviction strengthened, the more I penetrate, though with many difficulties, yet with much happiness, onwards into the history of philosophy." Such is M. Dami-

ron's estimate of the philosophical school, to which he feels it his honour and happiness to belong. We have been the more anxious to present our readers with this extract, because it gives so decided an answer to the frequent cry which has been raised against the eclectic system, as though it undertook to develop a whole body of philosophical truth, from the mere juxtaposition of all the conflicting opinions of the present or of former days. Eclecticism, in Cousin's sense, is not a mere syncretism; it contains a definite philosophical method, and would develop truth even were there no other systems to compare with it. But convinced that all earnest thinkers have had some true ideas to work upon, it sets itself manfully to determine what they are; and strives to add the testimony of humanity at large to its own investigations. Admitting, then, that the eclectic starts with a clear philosophical method, we know not how it is possible more firmly to strengthen its positions than to concentrate upon them the universal truth, that flows through all the philosophies which history or the present age present.

Cousin, Jouffroy, and Damiron, all now living in Paris, and all in the vigour of life, form the foremost rank among the abettors of eclecticism; but several names might yet be mentioned in the list of metaphysical writers, which shew that there is a "corps de reserve," to carry on the work whenever they may be removed from the scene of action.

Amongst these we might mention M. Mazure, professor of philosophy at Poictiers, who, in addition to some valuable elucidations of Cartesianism, has also published a "Course of Philosophy," in two volumes, based mainly upon the instructions of Cousin. M. Hippeau also has compiled a very excellent manual of the "History of Philosophy," viewing the subject from the point of view peculiar to the eclectic system. Several other names might be mentioned, but as our object is to give a view of predominant systems of philosophy rather than to enumerate all the writers who have contributed to them, we do not think it necessary to make any distinct reference to them at present. Our readers, we trust, may obtain, from what has been already advanced, a clear view of *Eclecticism proper*, as it now exists. The next duty we have will be to point out those philosophical writers of the nineteenth century, who, without belonging strictly to the school of Cousin, yet have collaterally aided in promoting the advancement of modern eclecticism in France.

SECT. II.—*Collateral Branches of the Eclectic Philosophy.*

In the former section we have attempted to trace the process by which the materialism, that overran France at the commencement of the present century, was gradually undermined and supplanted by a

more earnest and spiritual philosophy. Were we, however, here to close our sketch of the French eclecticism, although we may have tracked its actual progress up to the present time, yet we should be far from doing justice to many profound thinkers and excellent writers, who have aided in combating the doctrines of materialism, and clearing the way for these new and nobler principles. There are some authors in all countries who, without addressing themselves *immediately* to the solution of metaphysical or ethical problems, yet by the whole cast and spirit of their writing exert a great influence upon the philosophy of their age. There are others, moreover, metaphysicians by profession, whose erratic genius defies all classification, and disowns the limits of all schools, but who nevertheless obtain their share of influence in the world of thought. To pass these by, in giving a faithful history of philosophy, would be an inexcusable omission; and we shall attempt, therefore, to compress into a small compass a succinct account of the *collateral streams*, which have aided in swelling the now deepening channel of the spiritual eclecticism of France.

I. And first, let us notice one or two writers who, in the earlier portion of the century, lent their aid to the first attacks, which were made upon the reigning ideology. Foremost amongst these we should reckon Benjamin Constant, a mind imbued with many of the best qualities, both of

the French and the German character, and free from most of the vices peculiar to each. The influence he possessed before, and during his banishment by Napoleon, was rather of a personal character than exerted through the press; but on his return he became widely celebrated for his political writings, and finally for his remarkable théologico-philosophical work, entitled, "De la Religion considerée dans sa Source ses Formes et ses Developpements." In this, his last legacy to the world, he gave the most decisive proofs of his anti-sensational tendency; and, with a brilliancy of wit and eloquence for which he was almost unrivalled, defended his more spiritual views against the attacks of materialism.

His great principle is, that the religious feeling in man is purely *instinctive*, that it arises neither from sensation, nor from a sense of fear, nor from physical organization; but from the mysterious and Divine constitution of the human soul. As Constant has written so little of a purely metaphysical nature, we cannot assign him a very prominent place in the history of speculative philosophy; by his whole style of thinking, however, by his religious views, by his earnest feelings, as well as by his direct arguments, he contributed his share in dethroning materialism from its long-continued sway, and in abetting the first efforts of the eclectic school. In connexion with Benjamin Constant we must also mention *Madame de Staël.*

It was in company with Constant, together with Villers, the translator of Kant, and Schlegel the elder, that that extraordinary woman learned to appreciate the profound and spiritual philosophy of Germany. A more admirable medium could hardly be imagined for adapting the lofty thoughts of Germany to the French mind, than was afforded by her warm and enthusiastic style. Had the intense researches of Fichte or Schelling been sent forth, just in the form in which they flowed from the pens of the authors, to the French public in its own tongue, they would, in all probability, have been thrown aside in disgust, and left hardly an impression behind them. No sooner, however, were these thoughts divested of all technicality, stripped of their abstract form, and held up to view by the light of an ardent enthusiasm, than they penetrated into every mind, and, with the admiration which they excited, left behind a longing for better things. France learned first, from the pages of this its fair preceptress, that the philosophy of Germany was not a tissue of unintelligible mysticism; it learned, that behind a forbidding exterior, there were deep and burning thoughts, which only needed a fitting channel, to shed their influence upon every branch of human knowledge. Although no *system* of philosophy was inculcated by her—none even explained, with any approach to logical accuracy,—yet it was impossible not to feel, in the perusal of her

writings, that there existed a philosophy, far nobler than the dreams of materialism; that there were sentiments and impulses in the human soul, which could never be brought down to the vibrations of a nerve, or the commotions of the brain. Mad. de Staël, though not herself a philosopher, did, perhaps, more for philosophy in France, than any writer of the same age. She seized upon the few prominent ideas which she had learned to love and to cherish, in her literary retreat at Coppet, and sent them forth, clothed with all the brightness of her own enthusiastic spirit, to awake a response in the depths of every earnest and thoughtful mind. In doing this, she well performed her mission, and exerted an influence, to which the country, from which she lived an exile, owes a lasting debt of gratitude.

Another writer, of a class entirely different from those we have just mentioned, but who has also had an indirect influence upon the renovation of the French philosophy, is M. de Gerando. This somewhat celebrated author first appeared before the public in the year 1800, by the publication of a work, proposing to exemplify the relation between the signs of our thoughts and the art of thinking. At that time, M. de Gerando, in common with all the other philosophers of the country, was a disciple of Condillac; but, although professedly belonging to the Ideologists, he was far from adopting the extreme opinions, for which many of

them became remarkable—manifesting, even at that time, a great repugnance towards the materialistic tendency of the age. In 1803, he published his great work, entitled, "Histoire compareè des Systèmes de Philosophie." This work, although estimating all systems of philosophy from the ideological point of view, yet seemed to spread abroad a more popular knowledge, than had hitherto existed, of the world's great thinkers, and of the views and opinions which they had entertained. The author showed himself clearly to possess a liberal and enlightened mind—to be a sincere seeker after truth, and not to be fettered closely by the trammels of any system. Accordingly, as the spirit of the age began to change—as the reaction against the sensationalism of the Encyclopædic period began to shew itself, M. de Gerando was one of the first to move forward in the stream, and to welcome every fresh sign of real improvement. In 1822, he commenced a second edition of his History of Philosophy, revised, enlarged, and remodelled, to the altered character of the age. Here we find an increased attention given to all those systems, which partake of an idealistic character, and a general tone of thinking, far more profound and *spiritual* than that, which was observable in the former edition.

In this later form, the "Histoire Compareè" has proved a valuable auxiliary to eclecticism. In presenting a faithful picture of the principal

schools of philosophy, which have severally played their part in the world, it has broken down a blind attachment to any one peculiar system, and shewn that truth lies, more or less, amongst them all. In a word, M. de Gerando, by introducing his readers so fully into the interior of the great philosophies of ancient and more modern times, has induced many a one to become an eclectic, even in spite of himself; so that we must regard his elaborate volumes as no inconsiderable link in the chain of causes, by which the present elevation of the eclectic philosophy has been effected.

II. We must notice the contributions which have been brought, by physiological researches, to the progress of eclecticism in France. Physiology, during the earlier years of this century, was considered to be all on the side of materialism. The views of Cabanis (which we have explained in a former chapter) reigned, for a time, almost supreme among metaphysicians, on the one hand, and the members of the medical faculty, on the other. In proportion, however, as the spirit of philosophy gradually altered, and the reaction began to manifest itself against sensationalism, in the same proportion, we find a corresponding influence exerted upon the speculations of the physiologist, forcing upon his attention facts, which, hitherto, had been either misexplained, or altogether explained away.

In the year 1823, M. Bérard published his "Doctrine des Rapports du Physique et du Moral," in which he repelled the materialism of those, who had preceded him in this investigation, and shewed, upon purely scientific principles, that we *must* admit something beyond the brain and the nerves, to account for the simplest facts of human nature. The position in which he intrenches himself is this: that matter, being dead, motionless, inert, could never give rise to any changes whatever, were there not something beside matter to produce them. We may say, popularly, that certain particles of matter, when brought into contact, give rise to *motion;* but, evidently, it is not the *mere proximity* of them, which could produce such an effect. Proximity is, in fact, only the condition, upon which a certain *force* is put into action; and this force is the real *cause* of the whole phenomenon. Wherever there is change or motion, therefore, we must necessarily admit the existence of *power*, and power cannot possibly be conceived of under the idea of atoms, molecules, or of any material type or emblem.

With regard to the real nature of power,—this, of course, must vary with the effects produced. When food is assimilated in the human stomach, here we have in operation a digestive power, of a chemical nature: when life is produced and maintained, we see the exertion of a certain vital power: so, also, when we observe

intelligence manifesting itself, we conclude the existence of an intellectual power or principle, which we term mind. In short, all *causes*, according to M. Bérard, are immaterial, or spiritual; and *mind* is the name we give to that peculiar power or cause, by which intelligence and emotion are called forth. To sum up his doctrine in his own words—"The mind is *one*—indivisible, immaterial, though united to the body; it cannot lend itself to this union, except *as mind*, and not according to the law which unites body to body. It cannot be placed by the side, or in the midst of the organs; but it is present in them—it perceives in them—it gives activity to them, and receives it from them. It is bound, in its exercise, by certain physiological and vital conditions, without which it would not be able to display its faculties; but it does not owe these faculties to them; it is a force, in harmony and co-operation with other forces, which all have, in organization, their functions and their attributes."

Another author, who has conducted the physiological argument against materialism with great ability, is M. Virey, whose volume on the "Vital Power" appeared in the year 1823. According to the theory there maintained, there is a life-power sent forth from God, the great first cause, which is the basis of all the changes that take place in the material universe, and all the phenomena of animated existence. This power we see

first giving its crystalline form to the mineral; then entering into all the varied genera and species of the vegetable world; and lastly, achieving its greatest wonders in animal life, and in man as its highest form. This vital power it is, which, pervading the whole of nature, binds all existence together in the most perfect harmony. Nothing stands isolated and alone; and even man himself, though raised above the rest of creation around, yet is a link in the chain of universal being, having relation both to the life below and the life beyond him. Far as we should be from giving in our entire adherence to a system of nature founded upon the principle just stated, yet we must regard the work of M. Virey as having been in its time highly valuable. The arguments, the assumptions, and the miserable shifts of materialism were there shewn forth in the most plain and palpable manner; the ingenious devices by which Cabanis attempted to overcome the difficulties of his adopted theory, were displayed and refuted; and the necessity was strongly demonstrated of admitting some power or other beyond the mere concurrence of atoms, in order to explain the facts both of life and of intelligence. In a word, M. Virey had succeeded in strongly impressing upon his own mind the notion of *power* as the basis of all spiritualism; and he felt (as every mind must feel in which this notion has been fully developed) that it is far less possible

to banish the existence of some all-pervading and ever energetic power from the universe, than it is to banish the notion of matter itself. Putting the three possible hypotheses of the universe side by side—that which regards it as entirely composed of material atoms; that which regards it as consisting altogether of forces; and that which regards it as a combination of the two, we have no hesitation in saying, that the first is that which we can give up with the least violation of all the fundamental principles of human knowledge.

In a country like France, where materialism had intrenched itself within the conclusions of physiology, it was assuredly no small aid to the progress of eclecticism to find writers like those above mentioned (and other names, perhaps, equally eminent might be added) who were ready to meet the materialist on his own ground, and to dislodge him from his strongest positions.

III. While France, at the beginning of the century, was devoted to the sensational hypothesis, the neighbouring soil of Germany was cherishing a most profound idealism. We may next mention, therefore, one or two French authors, who from residence in Germany imbibed the foreign philosophy, and who sought to extend the knowledge of it to their own country. The name of Villers is well known in this country as the French translator of Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason." Passing by those, however, who have merely

distinguished themselves by translation, we may mention one or two writers who have followed a more independent course in advocating their philosophical opinions.

First, we shall refer to the Baron Massias, sometime Consul-General at Hamburg, and afterwards Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin. In this author we recognise a mind which, during a long course of years, has devoted itself with persevering and untiring energy to the study of philosophy. As a writer he may not appear so attractive as many others, his style aiming rather at expressing his own thoughts, and embodying his own individuality, than adapting itself to the public mind; but it is impossible not to remark in it a great integrity of purpose, and an unbiassed love of truth. His chief work is an elaborate production of five volumes, entitled "Rapports de l'Homme à la Nature et de la Nature à l'Homme," in which he discusses a vast number of questions touching upon almost all branches of philosophy.

The Baron explains the whole phenomena of humanity under the three facts of instinct, intelligence, and life. Instinct is the foundation of our very existence,—that which guides and preserves our life in all its primitive and most essential functions. Intelligence is that which peculiarly distinguishes man as a moral agent; and lastly, life, as developed in humanity, is that which results from the harmonious combination, both of instinct

and of intelligence. Without instinct, man would not live at all; without intelligence, he would not live morally; under the influence of both together, he lives for the accomplishment of the great end of his being. In a similar strain our author discourses on the world, and on God its first cause. "He regards the whole creation," says M. Damiron, "as a great drama. The mysterious and divine poet which has conceived it, and put it into play, shews himself to no one; he is not here rather than there; he was not yesterday more than to-day; but everywhere and always he makes himself felt. He does not unveil, and yet he proves himself; and, without developing himself intimately, he makes himself known by signs and reveals himself in symbols. This, he considers, if not enough for our curiosity, ought to be enough for our reason."

In 1830, M. Massias published another work, entitled, "Traité de Philosophie Psycho-Physiologique," in which he has developed the same views as those which are scattered throughout his larger work, with a more particular reference to the physiology of the mind. In addition to this he has emitted two controversial pamphlets in opposition to M. Broussais, in which he defends his opinions with much warmth and vigour against the materialism maintained by that author. In fine, though we cannot term M. Massias a professed adherent of eclecticism, yet in many points he coincides fully

with their opinions, and has ever been a zealous co-operator with them in subverting the principles of the sensational school.

Another French author who comes still nearer to the spirit of eclecticism is M. Ancillon, formerly French Protestant preacher at Berlin, and afterwards professor of philosophy at the Military Academy there. M. Ancillon commenced his authorship, in the department of literature and philosophy, so far back as the year 1801; and appeared before the public from time to time almost to the period of his death, which took place in 1837. His three principal publications consist of essays and miscellanies, comprising many subjects connected with metaphysics, politics, and general literature. The last work he wrote was an essay upon "Science and Philosophical Faith," in which he takes a review of the conflicting opinions of Germany, and points out in what respect the principal philosophers of that country have erred, from taking an imperfect view of the fundamental principles of human knowledge. His own opinions approach most nearly to those of the school of Jacobi, owing to the great stress he lays upon intuitive knowledge, or, as he terms it, *philosophical faith*. He regards science, indeed, as nothing more than *faith* developed by reflection, and includes within the circle of this instinctive belief many truths of a purely spiritual nature. Though not an eclectic in the sense in which that term is

applied to the modern spiritualists of France, yet M. Ancillon has displayed the spirit of eclecticism even more fully perhaps, than some of its professed advocates. Throughout the whole of his career he has been a mediator between extremes, whether in literature, politics, or philosophy; and one of his works, indeed (written in the German language), was published with this precise object in view. We should hardly suppose, that there can be any other author (M. Cousin excepted) to which the French public owe so many valuable thoughts from the German literature and philosophy, any other who has had so direct an influence in rendering the principles of a calm and spiritual philosophy familiar to their minds as M. Ancillon.

IV. In rendering an account of the various influences that have borne upon the modern philosophy of France, we must not overlook those, which have emanated from Switzerland. From its geographical situation, and, as it regards most of its inhabitants, from a community of language, Switzerland has necessarily stood in close relationship with Germany. On the other hand, that portion of the country, which uses the French language, and of which we may regard Geneva as virtually the centre, has been almost as closely united to Scotland, both by religious sympathies and historical recollections. As a proof of this, be it remembered that the philosophy of Reid and Stewart found there its first asylum on the Continent of

Europe. Amidst all the predominant French influence, therefore, which Switzerland experienced at the time of the Revolution, there was ever mingled an under current of opposing thoughts and feelings, arising from the Scottish philosophy on the one hand, and the German idealism on the other. Notwithstanding the strong sensational tendency manifested by Bonnet (one of the first metaphysicians of Switzerland during the last century), we find in such writers as M. Prévost, and even in those who were pupils of Bonnet himself, an extreme readiness to throw off the fetters of the sensational system in which they were educated, and to adopt the more profound and spiritual conclusions of the Scottish writers. The only author to which we shall now make any distinct reference is M. Bonstetten, in whose works the critical reader will not fail to trace the combined influence of Condillac, of Kant, and of Reid. His works consist of two volumes, entitled, "Récherches sur l'Imagination," published in 1807; and two others, entitled, "Études de l'Homme," published in the year 1821; in both of which there is manifested the same earnest philosophical spirit, which is so well calculated at once to please and instruct the reader. The chief aim of his writings is to analyze the intellectual and active powers, to shew the proper sphere in which each of them operate, and the ideas to which they give rise. He most nearly resembles a pupil of the school of Reid and Stewart,

exhibiting much of the same shrewd psychological observation, the same moderation in his aims and purposes, and the same good sense generally, which have ever characterized the Scottish metaphysicians.

The influence of his works upon France must have been decidedly in favour of eclecticism. Firmly attached to spiritualism on the one hand, and ever ready to borrow light from whatever source on the other, he clearly sympathized in the main principles, for which the eclectic philosophers of that country have struggled; and to him accordingly they have appealed, as affording an unbiassed testimony in favour of their own opinions. M. Bonstetten died in the year 1831, having completed eighty-six years, during the greater part of which he had lived faithful in his devotion to the cause of philosophical truth.

V. After having noticed the above extraneous sources, from which the eclectic philosophy has received aid and encouragement, we must now conclude by pointing out one or two philosophical writers, purely and exclusively French, who, without strictly adhering to eclecticism, have showed their sympathy with the anti-sensational movement of the present day. Among these we should place M. Thurot, who was carried off in the prime of life by the fearful epidemic, with which the French capital was so severely visited, in the year 1832. This learned and elegant author had published, shortly before his death, a work, in two volumes,

entitled, " De l'Entendement et de la Raison." By the understanding he means the intellectual faculty generally; by the reason he signifies merely the proper use and employment of our faculties. The general character of the work is almost entirely psychological. It treats, first, of knowledge as derived from perception; then, of knowledge in relation to language; thirdly, of the powers of the will; and, lastly; of the moral faculty. The author does not enter, to any extent, into the deeper questions of ontology, nor does he discuss at any length the spirituality of the mind. It is evident, however, that his own views are decidedly opposed to materialism; and were we called upon to class him under any school, we should say, as we did of M. Bonstetten, that in his habits of psychological observation, and the general tone of his philosophical writing, he might best pass as a follower of the Scottish school of intellectual philosophy. M. Thurot was a friend and disciple of M. Laromiguière, and we may reckon him, therefore, as belonging to the eclectic school in that particular stage of its progress.

Another philosophical writer of the same class is M. Cardaillac, author of a work, entitled, " Études Elementaires de Philosophie." In this work we see simply a somewhat further development of the philosophy of M. Laromiguière, in which the principal defects of that author are supplied, and some of his cruder views matured. Like M. Thurot, he

is clearly opposed to sensationalism, and may be regarded as no mean coadjutor, though not a decided adherent of modern eclecticism.

To those above mentioned we may add the names of several authors of a still more recent date, who have given to the public valuable works on the history of philosophy. Of these, M. Rémusat, in addition to some lectures on philosophy generally, has recently published an interesting Report on the present state of intellectual science in Germany. M. Barchou de Penhoen and Dr. Ott have both contributed to the elucidation of the same subject. And, finally, M. Ch. Rénouvier, in his "Manuel de Philosophie Moderne," has not only attempted to throw light upon the German systems, but evinces himself a decided leaning to the Hegelian method.

We have thus briefly passed under review a number of metaphysical writers, (to which several more might have been added,) who, though not professing eclecticism, yet have taken their part in the reformation of the French philosophy. Our chief object in doing so has been, not so much to make our readers acquainted with their particular views, (which could not be satisfactorily done in a mere manual,) as to shew that the reaction in France against the materialistic school of the last century, has been more general and more decided than is frequently imagined. All this multiplicity of antagonism, which the bold assumption of the

sensational writers called forth, has, in fact, only tended to encourage and develop the spirit of eclecticism, in its more recent and energetic form.

We venture to predict, that there is no school of philosophy, that has arisen since the revival of literature in Europe, which is likely to leave broader traces behind it, and play a more important part in the development of the human mind, than is that, to which this chapter has been devoted. In point of originality, it must doubtless yield the palm to the idealism of Germany; but as in other branches of learning, so also in philosophy, Germany seems destined to afford the *material*, which the more skilful and adroit minds of England and France are to employ for the enlightenment and advancement of the great mass of humanity. Modern eclecticism, though but of a few years' growth, has already begun to put forth its vigour in many parts of the world. In addition to its having succeeded in arousing France from the torpor of its extreme materialism—in addition to its having re-infused into that great people a fresh taste for spiritual, and even religious ideas—it has crossed the Atlantic, and founded, in America, a colony, which bids fair to embrace and direct all the metaphysical tendencies of the new world. England, moreover, is now beginning to appreciate the labours of modern eclecticism; and if we are destined, ere long, to awake from the slumber, with which, as far as philosophy is concerned, we have now, for

many years past, been oppressed, we must look to the spiritual movement of France, as the chief source, from which our new life is to be derived. Already can we trace its influence upon some of the most popular and most metaphysical of our writers; and we trust that, ere long, we may see the elements of a new school of philosophy on this side the channel, which may emulate France, in those points, which are most worthy our imitation.

In estimating the merits of the eclectic school, care should be taken not to confound it with that paltry attempt at philosophizing, which, for want of any decided views whatever, puts together a misshapen and incoherent mass of other men's opinions. Eclecticism, as now advocated and understood, takes in a range of investigation, wide as philosophy itself. Philosophy has a history in the world, as well as humanity itself; and the true eclectic simply aims at studying it in its historical development. He regards the human reason as a germ, which has been ever unfolding, and is destined yet to unfold, so long as the purposes of providence respecting mankind go on to accomplish themselves upon the stage of human life. It is true, that we find the same great questions produced and reproduced, the same systems sinking and rising again, the same problems ever solving, and yet to be solved. Still, with all this, there has been a gradual progress in the development of abstract truth in the world; so that, instead of

rejecting all the labours of those great minds, who have preceded us in the domains of philosophy, and beginning to build a new edifice for each succeeding generation, it does appear to us both right and necessary to stand upon the elevation already attained, and to strive to add our portion, small as it may be, to the erection of the edifice of philosophical truth. This is the spirit of eclecticism—a philosophy which, under the influence of meagre erudition, may, it is true, easily dwindle down to absolute insignificance; but which, under the guidance of sound learning and intellectual power, promises the richest harvest to the patient and vigorous labourer.*

* Vid. Appendix, Note I.

PART III.

CHAPTER IX.

ON THE TENDENCIES OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY.

We have now completed the primary object we had in view; namely, to pourtray the broader *characteristics*, which the speculative philosophy of the nineteenth century has already assumed. Before we close the subject, however, and bring our labour to its termination, we have thought it might add somewhat to the completeness of the sketch, were we to occupy a few pages in elucidating the *tendencies* of the different systems which have been discussed.

By the tendencies of a metaphysical system, we mean the whole mass of ultimate consequences, which can be fairly and logically drawn from its acknowledged principles. These consequences, it must be remembered, are not always seen in the simple doctrines it maintains, or in the objects, which it professes to aim at; very frequently, we find it giving rise to sentiments, which were supposed altogether foreign from its original principles,

and accomplishing ends, at first by no means contemplated. Philosophical ideas are mighty and pregnant germs, which may expand almost to infinity; and often, it is no more possible to say at once, what lies potentially in a given principle, than it would be to predict, from the appearance of some strange root or seed, of what kind is the plant, which it will eventually produce.

In order, then, to understand what the tendencies of any system of philosophy really are, there are two methods which may be employed for the purpose; the one is the method of deduction, the other, of observation—the former being an *à priori*, the latter an *à posteriori* process. In employing the *deductive* method, our aim is to unfold the consequences, which lie hidden in any given principles, by *logical reasoning*. This is, in fact, what almost all speculative philosophy aims at. The germs of all abstract truth exist, virtually, in every rational mind, only in a crude and undeveloped state; and it is for philosophy to make us reflectively conscious of what these germs really contain. The whole history of philosophy, indeed, is but the history of the successive attempts, which have been made, to decypher the characters, engraven by Deity upon the tablet of the human soul. To comprehend, therefore, the tendencies of any principles, *à priori*, we must reason or philosophize upon them, until the thought they contain is expanded and realized. In employing, on the

other hand, the *à posteriori* method, all we have to do, is to note down the effects, which history or personal observation shew to have actually arisen from the principles in question. This experimental process is often necessary, to confirm or verify the conclusions of our *à priori* reasoning; and it is when both methods are employed in conjunction, that the clearest and fullest results are obtained.

But there is another thought, on which we must lay some stress, in connexion with the tendencies of philosophy; namely, that to estimate the effects of abstract principles aright, we must not confine our view simply to the *metaphysical* theories they involve. Metaphysical ideas exert a vast influence out of the region of philosophy itself; and it is in these, their indirect and collateral bearings, that their true tendencies are most readily observed. The precise object, then, which we have before us in the present chapter, is to look at the four generic systems, whose characteristics we have already pourtrayed, in connexion with some of those other spheres of human thought and activity, upon which their influence is most observable. This, it will be seen, has an important bearing upon the future. If, by logical reasoning, aided by past experience, we are able to unfold the natural effects of these different schools of philosophy, upon questions of great practical moment, in society at large, we have, in fact, the key, by which to interpret their present tendencies, and

their future influence upon the coming history of mankind.

The next point to be considered is,—What spheres of human thought and activity might be best adduced, as exemplifying the tendencies of philosophical systems? Here, of course, a wide field of observation opens itself before us. Literature, art, government, history,—almost every branch of human research, might be regarded, one after the other, as modelled upon the type of certain fundamental conceptions, and varying, just in proportion as those conceptions vary. In order, however, to bring our remarks within a closer compass, we shall select for illustration *three* of the provinces of man's mental activity, in which the working of philosophical ideas is more direct and apparent; and these are the respective provinces of Science, Legislation, and Religion.

First, then, we say, that the tendency of abstract philosophy may be seen, by its effect upon the progress of *scientific investigation.* Nothing can be more erroneous than the supposition, that the pursuit of physical science lies entirely without the range of abstract thinking, or that it consists wholly in the collection and classification of facts. Facts *alone* can never create science. They may furnish, it is true, the data on which it rests; but science, properly so called, only results, when these facts are consciously grounded in some conception, and tend to educe some general principle. The

facts of mathematical science, for example, rest ultimately upon the pure conceptions, either of number or space; those of natural philosophy, upon the idea of causality; those of physiology, upon the notion of life; and so, in every instance, there is some *thought*, from which each particular branch of investigation springs, as well as some general law or principle, at which it aims. For science, then, to advance, it is just as necessary that these abstract conceptions should be made clear and distinct, as that facts should be collected; and while the latter process requires the constant aid of observation and experiment, the former can only be finally accomplished by a well cultivated and philosophical habit of *thinking*. Science is as much indebted to those, who have expounded its nature, its conceptions, and its method, as to those who have collected its actual data. It was Bacon's metaphysical genius, for example, which turned the stream of physical investigation into the right channel; which laid open the true method, by which it should be conducted; and which enabled mankind to recover, in three centuries, the loss of labour they had sustained during two thousand years previous. Generally, then, we may say, that in proportion as philosophy has succeeded in clearing our conceptions, the facts of observation become so much the more available for the construction of science.

Again,—the tendency of philosophical systems

is seen in their influence upon the principles of *legislation.* Society is humanity in its natural combination; and according to our estimate of what the fundamental laws, wants, and characteristics generally of human nature are, will be the principles of government, which are seen to be adapted to it. The statesman, who legislates for man as nothing more than a superior animal, will follow a very different course in the application of his authority, from one who feels, that our humanity is divine, and can only thrive under the shadow of eternal justice, rectitude, and truth. The sensational moralist, as a legislator, will seek to satisfy our corporal desires and appetites at whatever cost; the spiritual moralist, as a legislator, will seek first to respect and to nurture the freedom, the justice, the moral dignity, from which all true national greatness must spring.

Thirdly,—it is hardly necessary to make any preliminary remarks upon the manner in which philosophical ideas influence our *theological creed* and our *religious practice.* If it be true that the foundation of theology is found in the laws of our reason, and the witness they bear to the being of a God; if it be true, that the germ of the religious *life* is cradled in the affections of our nature; if it be true, that the human intellect must decide upon the authenticity of a divine revelation, and interpret the documents by which it is conveyed to us;—then it becomes evident, that the conclu-

sions of philosophy upon the validity of reason and the nature of the affections, must intimately affect the whole region of theology itself. With these few preliminary observations, then, we shall proceed at once to the particular object of the present chapter, namely, to point out, as far as we may be able, the respective tendencies of the different systems of philosophy, which prevail in this our nineteenth century.

SECT. I.—*On the Tendencies of Modern Sensationalism.*

THE first or lowest step of sensationalism is that which teaches us to attach an undue importance to the intimations of the senses: the extreme development of it is, to symbolize everything with the material; to make the soul synonymous with the brain; and God but the abstraction of nature. Between these two points there is an infinite number of positions, which can be held by minds of a sensational tendency; and an infinite number of applications of the views thus maintained.

A. According, then, to our proposed plan, we shall first notice the tendency of sensationalism within the domain of physical science. Now, physical science, being an expansion of the fundamental idea of *nature*, is one of the most necessary products of a sensational age. Physics, however, are not always regarded in one, and the same

point of view, either in respect to their nature or their objects: they have always had their deeper and more recondite, as well as their more superficial movement. While, on the one hand, they may include the most common-place observation of facts, yet they may reach, on the other hand, the highest degree of abstraction. Starting with a simple classification of palpable phenomena, they may acquire progressively more and more generality; until, from being a science of simple observation, they become at length, to a great extent, one of purely rational deduction. The known laws of the heavenly bodies were first included in the scanty observations of the Chaldæan shepherd; now they are reduced to the abstract doctrine of forces, this doctrine itself, too, reposing upon the still more abstract and recondite conceptions of *power* and *motion*.

Hence, we may observe the difference that will manifest itself between the science of an objective and that of a subjective age. The former will strive to create an empirical picture of the universe; it will add fact to fact, and phenomenon to phenomenon, until the whole machinery of nature, which is open to the outward observer, shall have been described. The latter, on the contrary, will be ever searching into the *laws* or *forces*, by which the world is governed; endeavouring to generalize them to their highest degree; and seeking to reduce them to their most

abstract form. The one will investigate chiefly the matter of our knowledge, the other will investigate the form; the one will collect the facts, the other will explain the conceptions in which those facts are grounded; the one will enquire little after the First Cause, as lying beyond the reach of sensible observation; the other will attempt to conceive how all creation has flowed forth from the prime creating mind, as lying within the sphere of rational deduction.

Now, although the rash spirit of the French Encyclopædists has happily disappeared, yet various indications still exist, in different parts of Europe, of such a sensational tendency in the investigations of physical science. Some of these indications are observable in the department of general physics, others more especially in that of physiology. To distinguish these tendencies of modern sensationalism from each other, we may call the former its *cosmological*, the latter its *physiological* tendencies.

First, then, sensationalism in its cosmological tendencies always evinces a disposition more or less decisive to erect the idea of nature over that of God; that is, to merge the notion of a final cause in the totality of secondary causes around us. So it is in the present day. France, England, Germany, all three rivals to each other in the discoveries of science, have each given recent manifestations of the continued influence of em-

piricism within the domain of natural philosophy. France, as might have been supposed, has led the way. Not many years have elapsed since M. Comte poured forth his startling doctrines upon the world, and attempted to persuade mankind that this glorious universe, which we inhabit, has come into being by the spontaneous working of some abstract law.

In our own country, and far more recently, the scientific world has been thrown into commotion by the anonymous appearance of the "Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation." In this work we have a very plausible, though a very imperfectly sustained effort of cosmological sensationalism to explain the process of creation. God is here placed at some immeasurable distance from the universe, while *it* is left to proceed onwards in its process of self-development, and to bring all its multifarious phenomena into being, by virtue of certain laws originally impressed upon it. The theory stripped of all its adornments is this. That it is possible, one vast universe of nebula being granted, to trace in what manner it has assumed its present form with all its endless diversities, *by virtue of the physical laws now seen to be in operation.* It is true, that the *à posteriori* argument for the being of God is not materially affected by this system, supposing it to be true, because *law* must have a creator and a designer as well as the most fully developed

existences: but the effect intended, undoubtedly, is to exclude Deity from any *immediate* connexion with or interest in the universe he has made. Such an effect, however, we are far from thinking rationally deduced, even on the supposition that the physical and processes laws, which the author attempts to make out, were fairly established. *Laws*, after all, are merely abstractions; the *power* itself which works in them is still divine; so that, should the process, by which everything comes into being, be at length deduced, the proper influence, so far from excluding Deity, would be only to make us more than ever cognizant of the workings of the divine hand around us. The whole theory has emanated, as it appears to us, from a mind in which the idea of nature has obtained the great predominance over our other fundamental conceptions, in which the *power of intelligent mind* is sunk in the vague notion of law; and in which, as a natural consequence, Providence (that is, the presence of the mind of God in the world) is reduced almost, if not altogether, to a nonentity. Those who would further investigate the conclusions of this remarkable work, conclusions so plausibly supported and so eloquently drawn, should not forbear to read the article in the "Edinburgh Review," in which the scientific accuracy of the unknown author is probed with the hand of a master, and his theory estimated with great acuteness.

Since the publication, we may remark, of several works of a somewhat similar tendency (of which "Combe's Constitution of Man" may be taken as a fair specimen), it has become by no means uncommon, amongst many beside the author of the "Vestiges," to push aside the doctrine of Providence as a thing altogether exploded. Now we are quite ready to admit, that the common idea of Providence has had many absurdities clinging around it, and that such works as the above have brought many truths respecting the influence of the natural laws to light, which had been too much overlooked. But here, unfortunately, we find, as in most other instances, that a principle, when once applied with success, is generalized altogether beyond its legitimate extent; and that a true idea, once too eagerly grasped, is worked threadbare before it is fairly dismissed. The fact that God operates by the medium of natural laws does not, in the least, *exclude* the idea of providential interposition or superintendence. What are the natural laws after all? They are not real existences. They merely express *modes of the divine operation*, which we are able to trace in the world around us. That God operates in these modes, does not imply that he operates in no other; nor does the fact, that an event takes place by some secondary agency, exclude it from a specific participation in the divine plan *as a whole*.

Let us assume a case for example. Suppose a man by some act of imprudence to contract a disease, and hasten on his death. One says, in contemplating the scene, it is a dispensation of Providence. Not at all, says another, it is the natural effect of the laws which he foolishly violated. We rejoin, however, *that it is both.* The man broke the law, and paid the penalty; but every thought, every purpose, every action, every circumstance, in a word, which influenced that man's life, and led him, at length, into the fatal resolution under which he fell, have depended upon a succession of agencies reaching back even to his infancy; and these agencies, be it remembered, are all divinely superintended. We do not say that they are fixed by a stern necessity, since that would destroy the notion of human liberty, but they are all under the *moral control* of Deity from first to last. Human things may *appear* to the unthinking to be absolutely controlled by the fixed laws of our being; but if we look beneath the surface, we see the hand of God moving all the springs, and making every event, even those arising from our free agency itself, contribute to the development of his purposes.

How marvellous an exemplification does history give us of the manner in which human agency is blended with divine Providence! The sum and substance of the world's history is but the aggregate of the voluntary actions of mankind upon the

stage of human life. Whilst, however, this is the case, yet God himself has composed the drama; it is he that framed the law of human progress; he that brings about its accomplishment by actions, which to us, indeed, are voluntary, but which, notwithstanding, form a part of his own great plan from all eternity. To the man who looks unbelievingly upon divine Providence, the world's history is a problem that can never be solved.

It is not only in France and England, however, that we find the influence of sensationalism within the department of natural philosophy. Germany, too, which has recently been making great progress in physical research, has just given rise to a work of extraordinary popularity, which stands forth in bold contrast to the rationalistic systems, for which that country has been famed; I mean the "Cosmos" of the Baron von Humboldt. Little more, perhaps, could be observed with justice respecting the sensational tendency of this work, than the total rejection which the author indicates of all attempts to form an *d priori* explanation of the laws of the universe, and the purely objective course which he follows in all his own researches. We see throughout the whole the traces of a mind in which the observing powers are wonderfully active, while the eye, by which we were designed to gaze upon the supersensual and spiritual world, has comparatively speaking grown dim. The value of the facts which are brought forward by the Baron is, of course, not

at all affected by this objective manner of viewing them; the only thing to be wished were that the learned author had given some idea of tracing them to their divine and spiritual source. On this point, however, his language is anything but satisfactory. "In submitting," he remarks, "physical phenomena and historical events to the exercise of the reflective faculty, and in ascending by reasoning to their causes, we become more and more penetrated by that ancient belief, that the forces inherent in matter and those regulating the moral world exert their action under the presence of a *primordial necessity*, and according to movements periodically renewed at longer or shorter intervals." And again, he says, "True to the character of my earlier writings, and to the nature of my occupations, I confine myself strictly to empirical considerations. This is the only ground upon which I feel myself competent to move without sense of insecurity." And so this is the end of a long life's search into the wonders and glories of nature—either to hover in doubt and insecurity around the idea of a primordial necessity, or to entertain that of a godless universe. Thus it is, while the spiritual eye and the higher reason can see God all around, the sensational theorist, for ever immersed in the "dark windings of the material and the earthy," loses all perception of the infinite and the divine. Here, as everywhere, the error of sensationalism in the department of natural philosophy is one of

defect; the observer is impelled onwards to an unlimited extent in the collection of data, but he stops short in his investigation ere he has attempted to trace them to their first cause, or to realize the manner, in which the material is all cradled and embosomed in the spiritual.

So far, then, we notice the present aspect of sensationalism in its cosmological tendency; we now add a few words respecting its physiological tendency. Here, as in the last case, the gross materialism of the French sensational school is at present comparatively seldom met with. Few will at present attempt to argue, like Cabanis, that all intelligence consists in sensation, and that all sensation resides in the nerves; the bolder assumptions of this system consequently have been fairly controverted and overthrown. Whilst, however, the system as a whole has been refuted, yet the same doctrine under another form virtually lives on, in that peculiar school of cerebral physiology, which has adopted exteme phrenological principles. In this view of the case, materialism has far greater plausibility. The theory of Cabanis was not built upon any true idea. It was an enormous error to assert, that all intelligence is but a form of sensation; and not less so, to suppose that sensation resides in the nerves; but the materialism of the ultra-phrenologists is grounded upon a true idea, namely, that cerebral development is inseparably connected (as we are now constituted) with mental

manifestation. Let the notion of efficient causes be rejected; let simple antecedence and consequence be regarded as the whole process of causation; and from the phrenological hypothesis materialism necessarily results. The argument lies in a small compass. Here is the antecedent on the one hand, namely, cerebral excitement; here is the consequent on the other, mental manifestation. What need have we of any link between them, termed mind or spirit? The whole process is complete without it. The reply to this is a simple one, namely, that all causation implies power or force; that power, wherever exerted or through whatever medium, is an immaterial thing; much more so, that wondrous power of which we are hourly conscious, and which we term mind. The due analysis of the idea we have under the one term *power* cuts at the root of all materialism, of whatever nature or complexion it may be. We lay the more stress upon making this analysis aright, and firmly grasping the idea resulting from it, because the present tendency of sensationalism, in the hands of the phrenologist, is fast bearing us back to the materialism we had disowned, and can only be stayed by upholding the infinite distinction between the organ or law of any operation on the one hand, and the *power* which produces it on the other.

Before we conclude these remarks upon the influence of sensationalism within the department of physics, we must add a word or two respecting

its influence upon the *method of scientific investigation.* It is here that the assistance of philosophy is more immediately felt, and more imperatively demanded. Vigorous efforts have been put forth from time to time in our own day to reduce the laws of induction to a system of definite rules, and base them upon philosophical principles; and these efforts in every case have been modified by the metaphysical views which the author of them has adopted. The two great writers on the logic of induction, which our age can boast as peculiarly its own, are Professor Whewell and Mr. Mill, whose works, when put side by side with each other, present a very instructive instance of the manner, in which these fundamental principles of philosophy can bear upon the method of scientific research. The former, as we have already seen, is decidedly of an anti-sensational tendency; and the effect of this is seen in the whole theory he has propounded respecting the construction of science.* The latter must be reckoned as belonging to the sensationalist school. Yet so different is his sensationalism from what we have seen in the French materialists, that we may almost regard him as a proof of the reaction, which has set in against their extreme empirical principles. The stress which is laid upon the deductive method, the close and admirable analysis which are given of many of our

* See our remarks upon Whewell, in the Section upon Modern English Idealism.

fundamental conceptions, and the whole tone of philosophical thinking by which his "Logic" is characterized, manifest a very different spirit from that of the shallow empiricism of the preceding age. We believe that the *method* of science in the hands of such analysts is not destined to continue slavishly conformed to the Baconian model, but that it will become more and more deductive, in proportion as the data are enlarged upon which legitimate deduction can proceed.

B. We advance now to notice the tendencies of sensationalism, as seen in the department of legislation. Many of the philosophers, both of ancient and modern times, who have taken any comprehensive views of mental science, have applied their system to the investigation of the fundamental principles of jurisprudence. Several of our English philosophical writers, for example, from Hobbes downwards, have applied their principles to the elucidation of this subject; and still more, perhaps, of the French moralists, induced, probably, by the political aspect of their country, have attempted to philosophize upon grounds of law, government, and social life. Germany, too, though so much more fixed in its political relations, and so much more given to transcendental researches, yet has not been behind hand in deducing theories of legislation from the different metaphysical systems it has originated. Thus it is evident, that the various philosophical ideas, which have been in

vogue, have had great influence upon the political principles of every age.

Now, if all human knowledge be reducible to the three fundamental ideas of self, nature, and God, it follows, that every theory of law and government must find its primary conception in one of these notions. On passing the different theories of government before our view, we find, accordingly, that they admit of a very easy classification, on this principle. Some Jurists, for example, regard all law, as proceeding from God; his is the right supreme, and he has delegated a divine right to whomsoever he will, to exercise power and authority in the world. Those, therefore, to whom this right is granted, are the only proper dispensers of law to man—every human enactment being founded on the divine will, expressed through them, as its appointed organ. Another theory, or, we may say, class of theories, is built upon the indestructible facts and phenomena of the human mind. Man has the notion of *justice;* he sees in every fellow-man the possessor of certain inalienable rights; and upon these firm moral convictions of the human mind, the social fabric is to be erected. Again, a third hypothesis bases all human legislation upon mere expediency or utility; moral principle, as a separate ground of legal enactment, being discarded, and the outward happiness of the community being the sole guide, by which the legislator is to be directed in his course.

Of these three hypotheses, the last is evidently that, which would result from a sensational philosophy; the two former would as naturally flow from an idealistic or a mystical system. Sensational ethics affirm, that a thing is right because it is expedient—the ethics of idealism maintain, that it is expedient because it is right. In this, we have presented to us the great question, which stands at the threshold of all morals and all legislation; and it is according as the one or other hypothesis is accepted, that the whole complexion of the succeeding system will be determined. Let us see how these conclusions are illustrated by the history of the present century.

No author, in modern times, has advocated the sensational theory of morals with so great warmth and vigour as Jeremy Bentham; it is in the political school of Bentham, therefore, that we are to look for the due influence of sensationalism, as applied to the department of legislation; and what is the doctrine which that school has maintained? It has maintained, that the sole basis of right is expediency; that the sole incentive to human action is self-interest; and that all law and all government must proceed upon the supposition, that men will be influenced exclusively by motives of personal advancement. This doctrine, indeed, we must admit, holds a somewhat strong position, from the fact of its embodying so large an amount of truth, to counterbalance its great deficiency in

principle. No one can deny, that self-interest is a very fruitful motive to human action, and that the legislator must keep this in view, in all the details of his legislative arrangements. It was just to this point, therefore, that Bentham directed his chief attention; and few there are who would be unwilling to accord him his meed of praise for the many abuses he exposed, and the many sound truths he inculcated. But, with all this, we are far from thinking that Bentham rose to the full height of his argument, or rested his primary principles upon a right foundation. Legislation, when adapted simply to the outward circumstances of the community, and springing from the morals of self-interest, may, at first sight, appear very popular in its results; but, with all this, it is forgotten, that men are by far most powerfully moved by educational, moral, and spiritual motives, and that, while immediate abuses can be kept off by an external policy, yet the true greatness, happiness, and stability of a country can only be secured by inculcating, by all possible methods, in all institutions, and upon all minds, *eternal justice and truth*. The principle of expediency, we allow, must not be, by any means, neglected, in legislating for the physical interests of the people; but expediency becomes a danger and a curse, the moment it fails to take its stand upon the laws of our moral nature, upon the principles of eternal rectitude, between man and man.

By far the most talented advocate of Bentham's school of legislation in this country, was Mr. James Mill; and as this acute writer has given us both an "Analysis of the Human Mind," and an "Essay on Government," we can, in his case, trace the influence of a sensational philosophy upon the theory of legislation, with much greater ease and distinctness. The whole theory is here seen to flow from the fundamental principle, that all our mental phenomena arise from sensation, as their primary source. If this principle be true, then sensation is generically the same as desire; desire, moreover, is identical with the will. Consequently, all the phenomena of our moral being are but different cases, in which we seek the fulfilment of our desires; that is, in other words, the gratification of our sensitivity. With such a psychology, morals become necessarily of the selfish character; all motives to action must centre in our personal happiness; and legislation, consequently, must regard man as impelled by no other impulses or principles, in the whole course of his practical life.

The axiom, that men follow their interest, whenever they know it, cannot, we contend, be sustained, with any approach to plausibility. For what does interest mean? If it mean the general well-being, the greatest happiness to the greatest number, then we know that many will sacrifice this to their own private ends; or, if it mean the prominent desire

which exists, at any given time, in the mind, then we know that many desire and feel that they desire what is not to their interest at all. In the whole of this theory of expediency, whether applied to ethics or legislation, there is an omission of the element of the *will*, the human personality, with all the moral principles originally impressed upon it. Once regard men as possessors of a moral nature, as impelled or restrained by the voice of conscience, as having the broad distinctions of right and wrong marked out in plain characters upon their very being, and inheriting a freedom of action, by which they can follow voluntarily the one course or the other; once regard them, in a word, as having a tribunal of justice within, and convinced of an eternal justice hereafter, and you see before you springs of action more potent than all self-interest, and elements of social life, which must lie at the basis of all true legislation. Sensationalism, wanting in these fundamental ideas and principles, has thrown out upon the public, from time to time, theories of government, as crude in their plan, as utopian in their execution. Social systems, in England, industrial theories on the Continent, and models of republics in both, have been held up for the admiration of the world; but all, as far as they regard man merely in his external relations, and consider him as the creature of outward circumstances, evince a radical deficiency, which nothing but sounder views of

human nature can supply. If the actions of mankind are to be regulated, so as to conduce to the ultimate welfare of the community, then the foundation of all such regulations is to be found, not in a calculation of consequences, which, to our short-sightedness, must be infinitely imperfect, but in a clear comprehension of those moral laws, which God himself has formed, as the directories of human action, and the sources of the gradual perfection of human society.

C. It yet remains to notice the tendency of sensationalism, as exhibited in its bearing upon *theology*. As all human knowledge rests upon the three notions of nature, mind, and God, it follows, that an intelligence, in which these notions each occupy their due place, and keep up the exact balance which was intended to exist in our mental constitution, must be in the most natural and perfect state of development. Experience shews us, that if one of these notions become too prominent, the other two must proportionally sink into the shade, until, perchance, their fading hues entirely vanish away.

Now, theology, in its broadest acceptation, is based upon two of these fundamental notions—those, namely, of *mind* and of *God*. Accordingly, if the idea of the material, or the visible, become all-predominant in the mind, just in the same proportion, (and that by a fixed law of our nature,) must the thoughts, on which theology is built,

become dim, and the theology itself be shallow and incomplete. Hence it is, that the mind, whose attention is mainly directed to external things, experiences a want of intensity in all its religious conceptions, and, though speculatively convinced of their truth, yet can never realize them with clearness and with power. On these principles, we can easily estimate the effect of a sensational philosophy upon man's perception of religious truth; for, just in proportion as the sensational element becomes more predominant, shall we find elevated and spiritual views, both of God and of man, dying away, until they become at length altogether unappreciated.

First, let us illustrate the truth of these conclusions, with respect to our *theistic* conceptions. The unbeclouded reason, in the present state of man's mental development, conceives of God, as an *infinite personality;* to it, the immensity of the Deity does not detract aught from his individuality, as the presiding *mind*, that directs the universe by unerring wisdom and benevolence. Nay, further; philosophy has not repudiated the existence of those diversities in the divine unity, the reflection of which there is in man himself. The spiritual vision, even of some heathen minds, did not fail to see, in the infinite being, that blending of unity and plurality, which is the type of all perfection; and to the Christian idealist, the mystery of a Trinity has rarely proved a stone of stumbling,

or a rock of offence. But no sooner does reason become "immersed in matter," than these conceptions of Deity grow strange and incredible—his personality, *as a mind*, becomes gradually sunk in the general notion of a great first cause, and his *specific* moral attributes, in the physical idea of his immensity and infinity.

Were we called upon to explain the progressive influence of sensationalism upon man's theistic conceptions, we should do so somewhat in the following manner. The first effect is to weaken our perception of the divine personality; this, in the second place, makes itself apparent by overturning the doctrine of a particular providence; next, in order to remove the divine working further away from the world, secondary causes are adduced to explain, not only all the phenomena of nature, but also the direction of human life; and then, lastly, the process advancing one step further, it begins to be an object of speculation and of doubt whether there be a distinct personality in the Deity or not; until, at length, the conception of God is entirely blended with that of the order and unity of nature.

Again, equally decisive is the effect of sensationalism upon the views we have been taught to entertain of man as a creature of God. To the eye of sense a state of moral perfection is something altogether transcendental—the dream of some glowing imagination. To it the present life appears

void of any moral perturbation; man needs no redemption from it; he requires no divine impulse beyond what exists originally in his own faculties; and as for immortality, it is a boon which he may long to realize, but the reality of which is by no means clear and certain. In a word, man is to the sensationalist *wholly material;* his pleasure on earth is but the result of nervous affections; and it is hard to give any reason why the capacity of thought itself should not pass away for ever when the bodily structure is dissolved by death.

Such, we might predict, would naturally be the dictates of a sensational philosophy; such, experience tells us, that they actually are. The first real philosopher of more recent times, who advocated the doctrines of materialism with zeal and ability, was Dr. Priestley; and the influence of these doctrines upon his theological views was plain and undeniable. We see in him a living representative of the sensational theologian, in the first stage of his progress towards the system we have just described. That this is the tendency of Priestley's philosophy, as it regards theological opinion, has been granted by many of his own professed followers, both in England and America. Not a few have felt and lamented the want of depth and intensity in spiritual ideas, which the inculcation of that philosophy gradually superinduced, and, as the best evidence of this conviction, have renounced sensationalism, in order to find in a more spiritual

philosophy an antagonist tendency, and a more steady ground of belief in the soul, in immortality, and in God. Wherever sensationalism, however, has gone on, uncontrolled either by a belief in revelation on the one hand, or the antagonism of idealistic doctrines on the other, (a state of things which we see exemplified in France at the commencement of the present century,) little additional impulse has there been required to draw the deluded minds of its votaries into such an abyss of scepticism as we have already described.

To go very particularly into this branch of the subject, however, might, we fear, seem to savour of religious partisanship rather than philosophical impartiality. To prevent this, we shall avoid entering into details, and confine ourselves to the assertion of this one fact, that where the study of nature, in its various phenomena, occupies the mind's chief attention; where there is the perpetual attempt to account for everything by some secondary, and that, perchance, a material cause; where the notion of matter absorbs that of force, and the trains of thought flow habitually towards the visible rather than the invisible, there has ever been a weakening of our ideas of God, of Providence, of inspiration, of moral perfection, and of immortality hereafter. By the mere force of a mental habit, all our religious conceptions may be diluted without one of them being formally renounced; until, at length, the impression of

them fades away, and they all sink together into oblivion.

These assertions, we fear, are exemplified to a very wide extent in the theological life of the present day. England is, at this moment, almost entirely destitute of a spiritual philosophy; for the few attempts which have been recently put forth to create one, have not as yet made any extensive progress, even amongst the more thoughtful of the people. Devoid, therefore, of this influence, and absorbed so largely in the practical, the minds, even of the educated classes, have everything to attract them to external interests, and almost nothing to lead them into the regions of deep spiritual reflection. It is useless to urge, in reply to this, that the people have pure religious principles inculcated upon them as a guide to the higher life; for, however pure may be the system of religion that is presented, yet, if reflective habits are not formed and nurtured, religion itself will quickly assume the colouring of the medium through which it is viewed, and ritualism boldly station itself instead of penitence at the confessional and instead of prayer at the altar; yea, and will even mount the sacred desk in the place of holy intelligence, to defend a *system*, instead of contending earnestly for *truth*.

Ritualism, more or less, prevails in the present age amongst all communities, a necessary result, indeed, of the absence of a spiritual philosophy.

Even if there be in many cases sincerity enough, yet there is for the most part too little of the reflective, too much impatience at thinking beyond the leading-strings of custom or of sense, too weak a capacity of realizing the spiritual, except in name, to resist its chilling encroachments. The tendency of the religious life amongst us is almost always towards outward combination. That is to say, men rely upon *each other* in the battle of good against evil, instead of relying upon the might of truth to conquer the world. Christianity is thought to flourish in proportion as we can form societies, raise wealth to maintain them, and call together large masses of minds at once to express their joy, and feed their excitement. Little is it considered that *one mind*, going forth into the world, with an intense realization of the spiritual, armed with the deepest subjective convictions of truth, and cherishing a calm, but piercing faith, instead of a vague educational belief, will do more for the Church and for the world, than a thousand minds valiant only for a system.

To these convictions many are unquestionably becoming alive. There is, we believe, a perception nascent throughout Europe, that Christianity is as yet too much on the surface, and too little absorbed by the intellectual nature of man; that it has been too much an affair of education and profession, and too little *a great necessity* for satisfying the reason As Catholicism was based upon the infallibility of

the Church, so Protestantism has been based upon the infallibility of the Creed. Perhaps the next step in the historical development of Christianity may be that, in which both shall rally round the infallibility of absolute and eternal truth as developed in the Christian system, and leave all contention for the temporary and the relative to die away. To such a consummation the rise of a spiritual philosophy alone can lead the way.

Looking around, then, upon the philosophical horizon as a whole, we can hardly fail to see that, in spite of all the objective character of the present age, the star of sensationalism is on the wane. Never had it appeared with such brightness as it did at the close of the last century, and the beginning of the present. In every country, however, the reaction has taken place. Germany is still idealistic; France has abjured its materialism; England is becoming divided between the philosophy of Scotland and Germany; and even in America, Locke has become well nigh obsolete. The effects of this reaction are now to be looked for in all the different spheres of mental activity; and oh, may these pulsations of the great spirit of humanity lead us ever nearer to happiness and to truth!

SECT. II.—*On the Tendencies of Modern Idealism.*

Few unprejudiced minds would now deny that

idealism (we use the word in its broadest signification) occupies at present a proud position before the face of Europe. In one form or another it is enthroned in almost all the schools of learning where philosophy is studied. Glasgow and Edinburgh have both come back, with little exception, to the philosophy of Reid; and seem to be recanting the sensational heresy they began to imbibe under the impressive genius of Brown and Mylne. Cambridge no longer bows to the authority of Locke or Hartley; but, amidst all its devotedness to physical science, is evincing a manifest sympathy with intellectual philosophy, and clearly indicating that the tendency of many minds is verging towards the spiritual and the ideal. In the schools of France the power and energy of eclecticism, as developed in recent times, has turned the ideological system well nigh into a matter of past history; whilst Germany, from Koenigsberg to Basle, is still advocating the most profound systems of idealism. To the attentive observer it is most evident, that there has been infused into European society a stronger faith in the spiritual than existed at the commencement of the present century. The reign of sense has begun to give way to that of reflection; and it is now at least possible to bring out our thoughts respecting divine and supersensual things, even in a philosophical form, without being met with a smile either of pity or contempt. Literature has caught the radiance of these loftier con-

ceptions, and poetry has found in them a field of delight, hitherto almost untried. Minds which could only relish the stimulating sensualism of Byron begin to feel that there is something which strikes a deeper note to the inmost soul in the poetic philosophy of Wordsworth. The influence of the flesh (to use a scriptural phrase), with its passions and instincts, is yielding to the might of the spirit. We shall proceed, therefore, to make a few observations in order to exhibit the present tendencies of idealism, as evinced in science, legislation, and religion.

1. And, first, with regard to science. Here the effect of metaphysical investigations is, perhaps, less readily observed than in many other departments of human knowledge. Science depends so much upon empirical observation and experiment, that our attention is almost certain to be directed to *them* as the chief agents in its progress. It should not be forgotten, however, that the method of scientific research is owing very little to outward observation, but almost entirely to philosophical thinking; and that upon the employment of the right method mainly depends all real success. In addition to this, it should also be kept in mind that the *fundamental questions* in physics always partake of an abstract or speculative character, which can be elucidated by no empirical process whatever. The influence of idealism, therefore, within the department of science will be seen chiefly in the

improved methods of investigation, and in the more accurate study and fuller elucidation of the primary ideas on which science itself is founded. To verify this experimentally, we must see if it be borne out by the facts, which the recent history of science has presented.

For this purpose let any one compare the writings of our living philosophers with those of the brilliant age of the French Encyclopædia, and say whether the contrast in this respect is not at once most obvious. Let him take down a volume of D'Alembert, and after that, one on a similar subject by Whewell, and then observe how much more fully and satisfactorily the latter of the two has probed the primary conceptions of science, and how much more readily he draws inferences of pure reason from outward and visible things. The one generalizes the objects of nature in their external relations, the other traces the phenomena around us to the primary conception, subjectively considered, from which they spring. To the former nature is exactly what it appears to the eye—a stupendous machinery ever proceeding onwards by regular and unerring laws; to the latter it is a glorious mystery necessarily prompting us to the conception of spiritual agencies, which agencies are in fact only the "Indications of the Creator," the varied forms in which a divine and spiritual power is diffusing itself through its own immense creation.

The importance of duly explaining the concep-

tions of science, and of drawing from the phenomena of the natural world inferences respecting the spiritual, is twofold. First, it is of no little value to the right interpretation of the facts which are adduced, that these conceptions should be clearly apprehended. This view of the case has been proved and illustrated by Dr. Whewell, accompanied with a most copious selection of examples drawn from almost all the branches of natural philosophy. On this point, therefore, we shall not enter more fully at present; but refer the reader to explanations he will find in the "Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences." But, secondly, apart from all this, the influence of nature upon the human mind, *morally considered*, is inconceivably altered when we view everything around us as replete with life, and that life divine. To our moral instincts, what avails a huge piece of unconscious mechanism, however perfect and harmonious? The idea of an eternal and irresistible necessity, however it may inspire us with awe, does not strike a single chord of our better feelings. But when this mechanism is recognised as the direct product of a mind or a personality like our own, when it is regarded as answering some great and beneficent end, as moving ever onwards to some vast destiny; then, indeed, nature appears no longer dead; she becomes replete with moral significancy; she appeals to our deepest sympathies and feelings; she is the very link that connects us with Deity itself.

From these observations we form the general conclusion, that the tendency which idealism exhibits in connexion with physical science is to raise the idea of nature above that of mechanism, and to impart to it a life and a soul. Sensationalism views all the phenomena of the universe merely as a dull succession of changes. Idealism views them as the productions of a living agency. By the former the conception of power as effecting change around us is depressed or disowned, by the latter it is raised to the prominence which it rightly demands.

Accordingly, if power be something real (though supersensual) we are almost necessarily led, by an ideal philosophy, to inquire into its origin and nature. The *powers* inherent in unorganized masses—the *powers* of vegetable and animal life—the *powers* of passion and instinct—the *powers* of human intelligence—all become subjects, not of transcendental speculation, but of philosophical interest. We find, in them, so many secondary causes, more or less closely related to the one great first cause, from whom all existence is an emanation. And such deductions, it must be observed, fall strictly within the compass of science; they are rational inferences, drawn quite in accordance with the constitution of our own minds, and equally valid, in their origin, with the very axioms, upon which induction itself is founded. Thus, by the application of idealism to the elucidation of science, we are introduced into a new

sphere of discovery, at once of intense interest, and incalculable value.

In confirmation of these views, we appeal to the words of Sir J. Herschell at the last meeting of the British Association. "The fact is every year becoming more broadly manifest, by the successive application of scientific principles to subjects that had been hitherto empirically treated, that the great work of Bacon was not the completion, but, as he foresaw and foretold, only the commencement of his own philosophy; that we are yet only at the threshold of the palace of truth, which succeeding generations will range over as their own; a world of scientific inquiry, in which, *not matter only, and its properties*, but the far more rich and complex relations of life and thought, of passion and motive, of interest and action, will come to be regarded as its legitimate objects."

It is needless to say, that, upon sensational principles, such an extension of the objects of scientific research could never be realized; on idealistic principles, however, it becomes, at length, inevitable. Although science, therefore, may be cradled in visible and empirical facts, yet, by the aid of reason, it infers the existence of other facts and other agents which lie beyond sense; and, not content with this, it proceeds onward in its search, until all the secondary agencies are seen to converge in one centre, where is their common source, and that centre is God. Such, then, is the tendency

which idealism exhibits, in connexion with physical research—a tendency, which is indispensable to the full development of scientific truth, and still more so to its due influence upon the mind of man.

Great as may be the service of idealism, however, in the department of natural philosophy, yet it may easily overstep the mark, and transform a science of rigid induction into one of mere hypothesis. Its abuse, in this respect, has been quite as frequently experienced in the world, as its proper use; and we should be far from faithful representers of its full tendencies, were we to pass by these errors unnoticed. The empirical extreme, we have seen, on the one hand, denies that the process of scientific investigation has anything to do, beyond the observation and classification of facts,—the idealistic extreme, on the other, contends that facts may be altogether dispensed with, and that a whole system of natural philosophy may be erected upon purely *à priori*, or rationalistic principles.

Schelling's "Natur Philosophie," and Hegel's development of the "Dialectic Process," are the most perfect instances we have of this extreme. In both cases, there is a bold attempt made to grasp the fundamental law of *being*, in its most general form; and then, by logical inference, to construct the universe. The law being either assumed or discovered, or known by intellectual intuition, in the outset, the attempt is made to evolve from it

the whole process and the whole product of creation itself. Now we would not deny, indeed, but that reason, when stimulated and directed by facts, may sometimes *anticipate* the results of induction, and rise, almost by a leap, at some law of nature. It was thus that Goethe, by *à priori* thinking, enunciated the doctrine of the metamorphosis of plants, and thus, also, that Oken, stumbling on a skull amongst the Hartz mountains, exclaimed, as though by a sudden flash of thought, that it was vertebrated; but, certain it is, that purely rational systems of physics have failed to give any solid advancement to science, and that they could not even have been constructed, without the knowledge derived from those, who have been willing to tread the slow but certain road of observation and experiment. The healthy tendency of idealism is, to give life to nature, by shewing God in the midst of his works; the extreme of this tendency is Pantheism—nature absorbed in Deity. Of these two different tendencies, the former is now manifesting itself, both in England and some other countries, gradually widening the bounds of science, and leading to its more recondite researches; the latter is that which has excited so much attention in Germany, but which now appears to have passed its climax, and commenced its decline.

2. But we must now leave the walks of science, in order to seek the tendency of idealism, in the

more practical department of legislation. We have already adverted to the three possible theories of government, based respectively upon the three fundamental conceptions of the human mind. Of these three theories, all the systems of mere expediency, however skilfully they may be adapted and expressed, are at once rejected, by an idealistic philosophy, as hollow and unsound. Idealism says, Man is not a mere animal, seeking the satisfaction of his instincts; he does not regard corporal pleasure as the sole aim of his existence; he does not look upon self-interest as the only rule of his conduct, nor upon physical force as the only motive to which we may appeal in matter of government. On the contrary, it protests, that man has a moral nature, cognizant of an eternal justice, whose laws are inviolable; it asserts, that there is a supreme ruler of the world, the principles of whose government are sacred, and against which it is vain for man to vent his nostrums of fancied utility. In a word, it asserts that institutions are not to be adjudged right, because they may appear expedient, but that, relying upon the unerring sense of justice, which God has implanted in our minds, they are to be adjudged as most assuredly expedient, because they are right.*

* It it needless, perhaps, to explain, that we refer here only to the *moral grounds* of legislation; the peculiar adaptation of these grounds must, after all, be determined according to the circumstances of the case.

That the idealistic principles of legislation are gaining ground in the present day, we entertain but little doubt. Coleridge (in the "Friend") was one of the first of the modern idealistic writers, who shewed the application of a reflective philosophy to the subject of government; and nowhere, perhaps, do we find the medium between expediency, on the one hand, and the vicious employment of reason, as the source of political institutions, on the other, more clearly pointed out, than in the first four chapters of his section on the principles of political knowledge. Albeit he gave, perhaps, too wide a scope to the doctrine of expediency in his politics, yet his entire rejection of it in the deeper principles of morals, (which are at the basis of all politics,) and the power, with which he contended for moral truth, in its application to the exigencies of society, and the wants of human life—all this rendered him a worthy pioneer in the pathway of political reformation.

In speaking, however, of the politics of idealism, who does not at once turn to the erratic and versatile genius of Carlyle? Let none suppose, that, because the works he has successively presented to the public contain no systematic statement of political principles, therefore there are no specific principles to be gained from them. So far from this, the philosophy of legislation blazes forth from almost every page. Nowhere, perhaps, are the profoundest wants of humanity, in its social state,

probed with a firmer, yet tenderer hand—nowhere, the true remedies for social evil more clearly pointed out. In saying this, we do not render our unqualified assent to all the sentiments he has brought forward on this topic; for who could ever do so without almost clothing himself in the author's own individuality; but we mean to say, that he has dived down to those deep, and too often hidden sources, at the very heart of human nature, from which all sound principles of legislation must flow, and grasped the true theory of human society. If it be asked, in what respect, and by what means he has done this; I answer, by looking upon life in the light of an idealistic philosophy, and thus realizing the fact, that men are held together, not by motives of self-interest, but by the spiritual laws of their common nature.

The two great ideas, of *Mind*, and of *God*,—mind, in its intellectual developments and moral principles, and God, in his relation to the world—lie at the foundation of all his political theories. God is regarded as the source of all order—man, as the exemplar of God himself. What God has constituted must be right and expedient; and to know what God wills, with reference to human society, we have to study his law, in the moral nature impressed upon his image below. Strip society of all its embellishments—tear away all its artificial trappings—let the conventional and the unreal depart, and what then is left? The answer is,

Man, as man—man, with his original constitution—with his soul and his body, as God made them—with his divinity alone around him. Sensationalism would have us neglect this original constitution, and follow mere expediency as our guide. Idealism shews us, that it is vain to make artificial laws to rule mankind, while the very laws of our moral nature are violated, and set at nought. We look upon the political views of Carlyle as intensely significant of the tendency of the present age. Individual though they be, in their form, yet they are echoing the thoughts of a thousand minds, and the feelings of a thousand hearts. It is clear, that the reaction now experienced against sensational principles, is preparing multitudes to enter into spiritual views of human society, and, though such views may sound strange and mysterious at present, yet they will assuredly become, ere long, the practical truths, by which man's whole political life must be regulated.

Should any one doubt the truth of this anticipation, then let him look around upon all the chief political theories of the present age. Widely different as these may be, in many other respects, yet they well nigh all agree in rejecting the sensational principle, and appealing to the deeper elements of our nature. Take as example, the theory of Dr. Arnold, (a man who was as little infected with the prejudices, and who as fully sympathized with the spirit of the age, as any

great thinker of his time,) and however utopian some may pronounce it to be, yet who can deny, that he has taken many deep and truthful views of social life, such as would do honour to any country, and to any period. Take as another example, that of the modern Oxford politicians. What does Mr. Sewell contend for, with his church-supported state? What, but a legislation, that shall apprehend man as a rational, a moral, and a religious being, that shall govern him through the medium of his faith in God, as well as through the outward penalties of human law? No matter whether his theory of a Catholic Church be right or wrong; dismiss, if you should think proper, his dogma of the succession, as being the mere war-cry of a party; still there is the idea—there the assertion, that nations cannot be governed by utilitarianism; that all law flows originally from God, and his moral creation in the soul of man.

Look, again, at the principles asserted by the politicians of the so-called "Young England" school. Listen, for example, to Mr. Gladstone, in his eloquent strictures on the state-conscience and the state-personality, and see how firmly he asserts it to be the highest duty of Government to evolve the social life of man by moral and religious motives. "There is, indeed, a doctrine," he remarks, "that political society exists only for material, outward, and mere earthly objects: that it is a contrivance prompted by necessity for the defence of

life and property, through the establishment of peace and order; that it is a formula for producing a maximum of individual freedom, by an apparent sacrifice, a small payment beforehand of the same commodity from each member of the community to the State. Here is the fulfilment of the declaration of Burke, that the age of economists, sophists, and calculators has arrived. Here is the twin-sister of that degraded system of ethics, or individual morality; the injurious legacy of Locke, which received its full popular development from Paley, and was reduced to forms of greater accuracy by Bentham: which, in logical self-consistency, sought to extirpate the very notion of duty from the human heart, and even to erase its name from language; and which made pleasure and pain the moral poles of the universe."

All these phenomena, and many others now manifesting themselves in the political literature of our country, as we regard them, are but the expansions of the idealistic spirit of the age. True, they may gather church-principles, and other principles around them; but they are none the less the offspring of the deep conviction now settling in all thinking minds, that neither man nor society "can live by bread alone." To what point these different phenomena may tend, it is not easy to foresee. We may securely hope, however, that the more reflection, the more humanity, the more real knowledge of the human mind, in its secret

spring, is thrown into the political principles of our legislators, the less there will be of mere party-seeking and party-subserviency; and the more will the solemn office of the nation's rulers become too fearful a responsibility, to allow fixed principles to be shaken by individual interests.

There is only one extreme against which idealism has to beware, and that is, the state of things in which would-be philosophers, assuming that they have probed the human mind to its centre, take it upon them to enunciate fixed political axioms as the offspring of their social science,—begin to exclaim that the age of reason is now to return, and, on the ground of their own philosophic infallibility, seek to overturn all the ancient landmarks of society. Such theories were rife throughout Europe during the stirring age of the French revolution, and led many to views of political society as shallow as they were utopian. This extreme, however, being avoided, we can augur nothing but good from the application of a rational philosophy to the exigencies of social life.

3. It now only remains for us, in this section, to observe the influence of idealism upon the religion of the age. It has been already shewn upon *à priori* grounds, that under the reign of sensationalism the religious life must become cold and feeble; and we have pointed out some actual facts which seem to bear out the conclusion. The natural inference is, that some element of idealism

is necessary to the proper expansion of theological ideas in the human mind. In strict accordance with this inference, we find, that, in a sensational age, the grounds, even of natural religion, are secretly undermined, as was eminently the case during the influence of the French materialism. On the other hand, it is by those chiefly whose philosophy partakes more of the rational or ideal, that these grounds have been fenced and defended.

Writers, for example, like M'Culloch and Whewell, who have applied the highest scientific knowledge to maintain the validity of our natural religious conceptions, are, philosophically-speaking, most evidently idealistic in their tendency; and we can hardly resist the inference, that it was by the same habit of mind, which led them to rise above the sensationalism so common to physical inquirers, that they were brought to gaze with such intensity upon the conceptions, which form the basis of man's natural religion. The one set of thoughts is, indeed, very closely connected with the other. Science, when transcending the bounds of sense, must soon soar upwards to God; and the right being once admitted to adduce unseen agencies from the visible phenomena around us, there will soon follow, from the infinite design displayed in the universe, the deep conviction of an infinite designer.

The present influence of idealism, however, on this department of theology, not only tends to

place the ordinary *à posteriori* argument in a clear and commanding light, but it had added to this the force of considerations, which are derived from the constitution and from the instinctive conceptions of the human mind. Lord Brougham, in his "Preliminary Discourse," has dwelt excellently upon this part of the argument, in so far as the constitution of the mind is concerned; drawing from it proofs of design equally strong with any which could be selected from the external world. But, in addition even to this, there are some few writers, chiefly those imbued with German philosophy, who have begun to make powerful use of the argument derived from our *fundamental conceptions.* This method of proof certainly appears, to those unaccustomed to abstract thinking, somewhat obscure and inconclusive; but it has the merit of becoming more forcible the more it is inwardly realized; and we much doubt whether the tone of metaphysical thinking in our own country will not, ere long, render an appeal to these conceptions the most powerful, as also the most popular proof of the foundation-principles of natural theology. Such it has long become among the German divines; such, we believe, it will become everywhere else, when minds are no longer so sensualized, that its cogency is obscured and its moral strength invalidated. As we can imagine an angel in heaven to believe in God from its own deep intuition of his existence, so will men attain a similar intuitive

persuasion in proportion as they raise themselves above the material to the spiritual and the divine.

But it is not merely upon the grounds of natural religion that idealism exerts its influence; we may trace its tendencies with equal clearness in the effects, which it produces upon the varied phases of the religious life actually existing among different sections of the Christian Church. It is a fact universally allowed, that there has been a great increase of spiritual vigour infused during the last ten years into the English Church. The cold, dry, lifeless formality, so common twenty or thirty years ago, has been broken in upon by some living operating religious ideas. Whether those ideas are right or wrong, in a theological point of view, is another question,—still, there they are, touching the deeper springs of human nature, and rousing hundreds at the present moment to thought and emotion. Whence, then, have these movements originated? Not from the people—not from direct Christian effort—nothing of the kind: they have originated in a few minds, deeply imbued with an ancient, and, it may be, a mystical philosophy. These minds have revolted from a round of cold and stiff morality; they have abjured sensationalism in metaphysics and in ethics; they have scattered their idealism, clothed in different garbs, on every side; and, as a consequence of this, they have roused the minds of thousands to a new religious life. True, it may be a religious life that

combines much mysticism in its forms and its sentiments; but it is no less the offspring of idealism, in its reaction against a mechanical age.

Look again to that community, which, as the professed nursling of Priestley and Belsham, was formerly the true representative of a sensational theology. However unwilling some may be to admit the fact, yet it cannot be concealed, that an idealistic philosophy, the natural antagonist of the Hartleian and all similar principles, has invaded their theological system, and is rapidly working a marked change in their whole religious life. Whether this change will lead to a fresh expansion of the elements of Christian faith, whether to pantheistic mysticism, or whether to religious rationalism properly so called, it yet remains to be seen; certain it is, that the sensational point of view must give way to *something more spiritual*, of whatever hue its spiritualism may be.

If we pass over from England to France, there we have a most instructive example of the working of speculative philosophy upon the religious life of a people. The close of the Revolution found France almost without a religion at all. Direct efforts to awaken religious faith seemed altogether unavailing. The Catholic and Protestant Churches were alike powerless to arouse the mass of the people from their lethargy and unbelief. Just at this point the eclectic philosophy came to their aid, and under its influence, the belief in God and im-

mortality is again spreading among the people. We do not say that the religion of the eclectic philosophers is by any means a perfect one, or that it contains in it anything approaching to the whole of the elements of Christianity; but still it holds up a God to be worshipped, an immortality to be secured, a soul to be inspired; and where these thoughts are impressed, there cannot be an entire indifference to religious truth and religious duty. Admit even that there are doctrines maintained by the eclectics which would disarm inspiration of its glory, that would destroy everything peculiar to the Christian scheme, that would place Christianity itself down under the same category with the religions of mere human invention; still this does not prevent the great ideas, which they embody, from exerting an influence upon the mind, and preparing it for better things. It may, perhaps, sound harsh in some ears, but we firmly believe, that the spiritual philosophy of France has done more to bring back the people of that country to a sense of religious obligation, than all the direct efforts of Christian zeal combined. Such efforts are, for the most part useless, where the conscience has become seared; where the belief in God has died out; where the hope of immortality has sunk into oblivion. Restore these thoughts to the people, and Christian effort will soon tell upon them with redoubled force.

Of all countries in the world, however, Germany

is that in which the *extreme* influence of idealism upon religion has been most completely developed. In our Section on the German Idealism, we have already shewn the daring and vicious excess to which the rationalistic speculations of the present age have been carried. Neglecting that vast and important element of our knowledge, which is derived from empirical observation, the philosophers of that school have endeavoured to lay down their *à priori* axioms, and then to draw after them in one immense chain of logical sequence the whole mass of human learning, whether of a moral or a demonstrative character. They have not been willing to tolerate anything whatever that is merely experimental, or even that includes an inductive process. Whether it be politics, art, natural science, or even history itself, all must be deduced from rational principles, and built up by deductive reasoning; so that we are even told what the past state of the world must have been, and what logically it must hereafter be.

This, then, being the spirit of their philosophy, it is not to be wondered at, that religion should be drawn into the same stream of logical inference, and pared down into perfect consistency with it; nor should it be an object of surprise that they have approached Christianity itself in the same spirit with which they have approached everything else. Intolerant of moral evidence, of experience, of testimony, they have swept away indiscriminately,

in one torrent of logical argumentation, the historical, the inspired, the miraculous; that is, the whole objective element of Christianity; and have left nothing behind to supply their place, except the *à priori* religious conceptions of the human mind.

To see the folly of this procedure, as applied to religion, we only have to observe it in the case of other branches of human knowledge. Imagine all the labours of the historian discarded, and history itself only studied from the page of some speculative theorist; imagine the experience of the statesman set at nought, and a nation of living men, with all their clashing interests, governed by some logical hypothesis; imagine the experiments of the natural philosopher all neglected, and the phenomena of the universe deduced from rationalistic grounds alone; and we need hardly say that these glorious spheres of mental investigation would at once sink down into deserved contempt, And why would this be? Not assuredly because there are no *à priori* principles involved in these sciences, not because there is no room for deductive reasoning in them, not because they are exclusively experimental; no, but because there is an element of *fact* in them all, which must be observed and employed, before a firm platform is gained on which logical reasoning can rest.

So it is also in Christianity. While bare natural religion is a question of reason, Christianity is a

question of facts. Leave out those facts, rest the whole system upon rational axioms or deductive processes, and Christianity, too, like the other branches we have mentioned, will sink down to a mere visionary and hypothetical system, proving at the very best but an excrescence and a useless appendage to natural theology.

And then, at length, what will natural theology itself become under the guidance of the same philosophy? Ask the extreme idealists of the present day, and they will tell you that God is one with the universe itself. The glorious conception of the great Jehovah, which we derive from the display of his wisdom, power, and love, in the creation without, the constitution of our minds within, and the intuition of our rational and moral nature, soon sinks down into a vague personification of the human consciousness. The final result of such a theology is, that the divine is dragged down to a level with the human, instead of the human being raised up (as it is by Christianity) to the divine. Thus, then, the extremes of sensationalism and idealism at length meet. The one says that God is the universe, the other that the universe is God. Diderot and Strauss can here shake hands, and alike rejoice in the impious purpose of sinking the personality of the Deity into an abstraction, which the holy cannot love, and which the wicked need not fear. Such is the extreme of idealism in its influence upon Christian theology, an extreme

which contravenes and destroys all the good which at first it promised to effect. The German religious rationalism, however, it is pretty evident, has already past its climax; the battle has begun to grow faint, and the first symptoms of decline have appeared. When *they* have begun to find repose, it is not altogether improbable that *we* may be in the heat of contest. That England, as well as Germany, must pass through the ordeal of religious rationalism, we regard as a matter of more than probability. But, confident in the ultimate victory of truth, we shall rejoice in the conflict if it break away the shackles which still rob the conscience of its full and righteous freedom, and leave us a religion of manly vigour, that requires no arm to support it but that of its own undying energy.

SECT. III.—*On the Tendencies of Modern Scepticism.*

We have pointed out, in a former chapter, three subordinate species of scepticism, namely, the scepticism of authority, the scepticism of ignorance, and absolute scepticism. The first of these, moreover, we have shewn to prevail chiefly in England; the first and second in France; the third (though to a small extent) in Germany. In looking upon the features of the present age as a whole, we should by no means come to the conclusion that it is marked by any peculiar tendencies to scepticism of either of these descriptions. So far from that, we

think that the sceptical spirit which developed itself so largely during the last century has during the present become visibly feebler; so that the feeling of the age, instead of tending to unbelief, is rather seeking after a faith of a more fixed and comprehensive kind.

In place of its being considered the mark of a manly and penetrating mind to doubt what the rest of mankind receives as truth, it is now attributed more accurately to ignorance, or to pedantry. The common sense of the world has pronounced scepticism to be a reproach. Our readers will, of course, bear in mind that we are not now referring particularly to religious scepticism, but to the spirit of unbelief, or the habit of resisting evidence in whatsoever department it may be. A certain degree of incredulity, indeed, is manifestly advantageous to the interests of truth, inasmuch as it ever operates as a check upon false theories; but to carry it out in cases where evidence is clear, or to require demonstration when a cumulative proof only can be attained, is now pretty generally felt to be a perversion of our natural faculties, and a manifestation of folly altogether beneath the dignity of a wise man. We must attempt, however, to gather up the phenomena which scepticism is now displaying in connexion with the departments of science, legislation, and religion. In this way we shall be able better to see its present tendencies. And, first, within the precincts of *science*, the influence of

scepticism can now rarely enter. Time, indeed, was when the philosopher not only had to encounter unbelief but persecution as well. The day, however, has now gone by when mankind could persuade themselves that the sun moved round the earth, because some mitred head pronounced it to be so. Rome no longer sways the opinions of the learned, even within its own communion; the Vatican pretends not to supreme authority in philosophy; nor does the college of Cardinals assume the functions of a scientific institution. All scepticism of this palpable character has been swept away by the advancing lustre of demonstrative truth; and science now marches forward comparatively free from such obstructions.

The only instance in which scientific truth now meets with opposition is, when it runs contrary to some religious theory, and enlists that strongest of passions, I mean, theological animosity, against it. Geology has had to contend with a scepticism of this nature, by which many of its leading facts, and those too resting upon an evidence as palpable as the human reason could well require, have been rejected on the ground of their contradiction to some previous hypothesis. The motives which have given birth to such an exhibition of authoritative scepticism we do not venture to impugn. They may have been very pure and very reverential; but quite assured are we that they have been very unwise. It never seems to be imagined by those

who reject evidence of a convincing nature, on the ground of some prejudication of the matter in hand, that their own fondest and most sacred beliefs rest upon evidence of the very same kind.

I will suppose, for example, that a man rejects the antiquity of the crust of the earth, on the plea (though a false one) that it contradicts the Mosaic cosmogeny. On what ground, we would ask, does he accept and hold so firmly the truth of the Pentateuch? His faith in it must rest primarily upon testimony borne to certain facts, and then be confirmed by conclusions, drawn by processes of reasoning, from the facts presented. But this is precisely the evidence which the geologist brings to establish the principles he asserts. He presents, first of all, *facts* of which he himself and others have been eye-witnesses; from these facts he draws, *with great caution*, certain conclusions; and then, on the ground of the truth of the testimony, and the validity of the reasoning which builds itself upon it, he summons the belief of mankind. On what plea, then, does any man admit the evidence in the one case and reject it in the other; or if he repudiates the conclusion of the geologist, how can he complain if another repudiates that of the theologian? We see not that there is any superior clearness and certainty either with regard to the facts themselves or the reasoning based upon them, in the first case than there is in the second. To deny evidence blindly is always a dangerous thing to venture

upon; for the right of denial admitted in one case may soon be applied to another; and the mistaken zeal of saving a theological truth at the expense of a philosophical one may end in involving both in a common doubt or destruction. Where unquestionable evidence asserts two facts apparently contradictory, we must await a fresh apocalypse, natural or divine, to point out their reconciliation. Opposition to scientific conclusions, however, on religious grounds is fast wearing away; men are beginning to see that the same evidence cannot be regarded as a shadow in one instance, and a substance in the other.

Secondly, in the department of *legislation*, the scepticism of authority has also exercised some influence during the present century, tending in every instance to the maintenance of the principles of absolutism. It can hardly be wondered at, that after all the utopian theories of government, which France witnessed as the offspring of the Revolution, a reaction should take place, and all faith in human legislation be shaken. This reaction has led some in recent times to deny that the capacity of realizing any sound principles of legislation exists in human nature, and has brought them to rest the whole fabric of political power upon the authority of God, as expressed through his Church. If we would see, therefore, the natural tendency of scepticism as it regards the theory of legislation, we shall find it most clearly exhibited in the

present absolutists of France, of whom we have already furnished some account in a previous chapter.

The reason why scepticism should result in such a system it is not difficult to account for. To live without government at all, every man would admit and feel to be an incalculable evil; when, therefore, scepticism undermines the whole superstructure of political science, the only resource left is to take refuge in some divine command, and so to amplify the power of the keys as to embrace within it the whole authority both of Church and State.

The very same tendency, which we have seen developing itself in the principles of absolutism in France, has begun to prevail, to a certain extent, in England. Many hints have been thrown out, respecting the uncertainty of all political principles not based upon the authority of revelation. These hints, coupled with a lofty assumption of ecclesiastical power, have betrayed a secret desire in the minds of some to reinstate a spiritual despotism throughout the country. That this may never take place is devoutly to be hoped for. Experience sufficiently attests that national greatness and national prosperity can only result from carrying out those great principles of government, by which the interests of the whole people are properly balanced, regulated, and watched over. When power and property come irresponsibly into the hands of a class, to the degradation of the rest of

the community, the violated moral laws will soon revenge their own unjust infringement.

With a spiritual despotism this is pre-eminently the case. However plausible it may seem in theory, to refer human power to the power of God as its source; however excellent to put the government of the country into the hands of the professed guardians of religious truth, and intrust the chief authority to those who have to deal with the most potent influences of the human soul; yet the history of the past sufficiently proves, that of all despotisms, a spiritual despotism is the worst; that of all the tyranny under which the world has groaned, none is so fearful as that, which, not content with holding the body in subjection, binds the very soul in the adamantine chains of superstitious fear. The sceptic in legislation, however, may become a democrat as well as an absolutist; he may break down all the established principles of government and head a lawless mob; or he may set up an irresponsible power, in the form of a spiritual tyranny. But in the one case, as in the other, the distrust of rational political power leads to the most bitter consequences of anarchy and confusion.

To conclude this section, we must notice, thirdly, the tendencies of scepticism in connexion with *religion*. By scepticism generally, we mean the habit of distrusting evidence; this is the universal basis, from which all the various forms of

it arise. Distrust of evidence originates in various ways; most frequently, perhaps, in the following:—The confiding, unwavering, all-embracing faith of childhood is found, as life advances, to be partly deceptive: many instances occur in which its confidence is misplaced; and then the spirit of doubt begins to operate upon the mind and to darken the bright atmosphere in which it first lived. Hence our faith in evidence declines, more especially in that kind of evidence, which has been found to lead the mind astray.

Now, all evidence is generically of two kinds—it is either subjective or objective; it either comes from the soul within or from the world without; in other words, it is either the evidence of our own faculties, or that of testimony.* If, on the one side, our own faculties have led us astray by wrong conclusions, we are apt to have our faith shaken in their validity; or if, on the other hand, men have proved false or mistaken to us in their testimony, then we are apt to distrust testimony at large. This aptitude, whether it refer to the evidence of our faculties, or to that of our fellow-men, when strengthened and developed in the mind, leads to what we term *scepticism.*

Our present inquiry, then, is simply this, "What will be the natural effect of distrusting evidence upon man's religious life?" The effect, it is mani-

* Under the evidence of our faculties is included that of the senses and personal experience.

fest at first sight, will be very different according to *what kind* of evidence is received, or what rejected. If both kinds are rejected, then the scepticism is universal, involving all human knowledge in one common destruction; if the evidence of our reasoning faculties is rejected, then revealed theology may still flourish, but with the distrust of all philosophical truth; or, lastly, if the evidence of testimony generally is doubted, then natural theology may live, but Christianity, historically viewed, will die. According to this deduction, therefore, the tendencies of scepticism, as it regards Christianity, are threefold. Either first, it may attack and stifle all religious belief; or, secondly, it may admit the historical element (as a revelation resting upon testimony), while it denies the validity of the human faculties; or, thirdly, it may allow a natural religion, grounded on rationalistic principles, but reject the testimony which supports the truth of a revelation.

Of these tendencies, the two last are abundantly exhibited in the present day. In England, a distrust and contempt for reason prevails amongst religious circles to a wide extent: many Christians think it almost a matter of duty to decry the human faculties as poor, mean, and almost worthless; and thus seek to exalt piety at the expense of intelligence. Delusive hope! Is not Christianity itself a matter of intelligence? Must not its claims to authority be weighed by the human reason? Must

not intelligence develop the germ of truth given us in the word, to a beautiful and comprehensive system to be realized in the world? The ultimate effect of this species of scepticism can be nothing else than to strip religion of its energy, to turn the power of intelligent faith into a blind attachment to a creed; and amidst all its zeal for revealed truth, to undermine secretly the very pedestal, on which in peaceful security it reposes. The very same sceptical tendency is, at this moment, displaying similar features in France. What else is the storm, which is now raging against the philosophical instruction afforded at the universities of that country? And what could shew more plainly than this, that the scepticism of authority, if allowed to have its full sway, would not hesitate to hurl to the ground everything that could possibly interfere with the blind credulity, which in matters of testimony it seeks to inculcate? How long this contempt for reason may continue it is difficult to say; in our own country we believe it to be on the decrease, and from its final disappearance we look, not for any danger to Christianity, but for a fresh vigour to infuse itself into the popular religion of the age.

The third tendency of scepticism, that which assumes the form of a distrust for testimony, is far more widely extended in Germany than it is in our own country. The validity of reason is there seldom denied,—in many instances, indeed, its

province is made far too extensive, so that the historical element of Christianity is entirely absorbed in the rational. Such is the real nature of Strauss's hypothesis, of which we hear so much in the present day. The testimony upon which the historical authenticity of the Gospels rest is there, by a combination of ingenious artifices, weakened and depreciated, the most competent witnesses are passed over as not strictly trustworthy, the outward fact is made more and more symbolical of moral sentiment, until, at length, the history is all transformed into mythology, and the moral element left, as the sole content of the written word.

Of the two phases of scepticism we have just described, we believe the one to be in the end equally injurious with the other. Distrust in one kind of testimony may very easily produce distrust in another kind; so that either phase may prove one stepping-stone to that universal unbelief, which involves all human knowledge in doubt and confusion. The only method by which religion can attain its full bloom in any mind, is by an intelligent confidence, both in the validity of our faculties and the testimony of the past. The one must lay the foundation — the other must erect the superstructure of the religious life.

SECT. IV.—*On the Tendencies of Modern Mysticism.*

Mysticism, viewed simply in its principle, is built upon a true idea, namely, that there is in human nature a primitive faith which precedes and transcends reason. This faith, it is true, has been termed by Cousin, *the spontaneous effort of reason*, and is thus identified with the other operations of our rational nature; but still the fact remains, that there is a truth-organ within the human soul, which leads us to certain beliefs, long before they can be verified by any logical or philosophical deduction.

Such an intuitive or spontaneous perception of truth frequently accompanies the exercise of the feelings and affections of our nature. The moral and social feelings, for example, necessarily involve some conceptions respecting human duty and human destiny, in which we may place confidence quite irrespective of the deductions of reason. In like manner, the œsthetic and religious emotions lead us to the contemplation of an infinite beauty, perfection, wisdom, and goodness, long ere reason has begun to construct her argument for the being of a God. To a certain extent, then, we may put faith in the feelings, we may regard them as primitive witnesses for truth, in which we can repose confidence as long as their voice comes to

us with clear and distinct articulation. On this ground it is, then, that mysticism professes to build; and it is the element of truth which it thus embodies, that has given it all its strength.

But whilst this is the case there is great danger lest the authority of our feelings should be made too extensive, so that we should be led to mistake mere evanescent impressions for sober truths, and elevate the inspiration of the emotions altogether above the conclusions of reason. In fact, the sphere of knowledge in which we can trust these spontaneous impulses is very confined; over the greater part of the domains of truth, the perceptive and the reasoning faculties must necessarily be predominant. Most of the branches of human science have to be pursued simply with a steady and logical precision; so that in their case the influence of feeling can do little else than produce error and confusion, in other words, can lead only to a false and bewildering mysticism.

To verify the truth of these remarks, we have only to follow the same course which we have pursued with reference to the other three systems; that is, to observe the influence of mysticism upon some of the principal departments of human investigation. First, with regard to SCIENCE, it might seem at first difficult to see where there could be any room for mysticism to operate in the case of investigations, which are so precise and definite in their character. It must not be overlooked, how-

ever, that science has its higher as well as its lower movement. The lower physics, those which refer simply to the classification of obvious phenomena, can hardly be subjected to any mystifying process; but the higher physics, those which tread upon the verge of ontology, and theorize upon the more recondite causes operating in nature, afford abundant material for the development of some of the most remarkable phenomena of mysticism.

Schelling, for example, although he began as an idealist, yet has introduced into his later productions a large element of mysticism; attempting, as he does, to give a theosophic view of nature in all her varied phenomena. He proposes to shew that nature is homogeneous with mind; that it is, strictly speaking, the self-development of Deity; that, in other words, it is the infinite objectifying itself in the finite. On this principle he enters into various explications of attraction, gravitation, light, heat, magnetism, electricity, &c., carrying on his theories into the different regions of creation, so as at length to afford a connected deduction of all the phenomena of organic and inorganic existence.

These theosophic views have been further developed by the pupils and followers of Schelling. Schubert has written the "History of Nature," beginning from the objective point of view, and tracing it up to God, the soul of the world: Baader has begun from the *subjective* side; and,

from the phenomena of mind, has inferred the order of the universe: while Steffens has united both sides in himself, and shewn the absolute unity of nature and the soul. In all these writers, there is one prominent purpose exhibited—that of destroying the bare mechanical views of nature, which men have usually entertained, and shewing it to be a living manifestation of mind; yea, to be nothing else than the infinite mind itself, in its various potencies and reflections. These philosophers, accordingly, imagine, that the study of nature is only just dawning, that the time is coming, when, from our direct intuition of the soul of the world, in its original essence, the whole theory and phenomena of creation shall be fully explained; that all observation and experiment may be then dispensed with, and natural philosophy find its completion in the deductions of our pure reason.

The tendency of such a system can, of course, be no other than to discourage experimental philosophy, and to reduce physical science to a string of deductions, resting upon certain original principles, claimed to be intuitive. To the due employment of our higher reason, in the department of physics, we can conceive of no valid objection. Where conclusions can be drawn, in consistence with the laws of our rational nature, let us boldly draw them, though they should lead us into the depths of ontological speculation; but the admission of mysticism into these regions, is

something quite of a different nature. Reason, properly speaking, only erects its deductions upon observed and tangible facts, (such as that of the divine existence, from the marks of design displayed in the universe,) but the mysticism we have described *assumes* its foundation-principles, and erects its superstructure upon them in such a manner, that the facts are made entirely subservient to the theory, instead of the theory emanating from the facts.

Mysticism, again, has made some few, and rather abortive efforts, to mould into a new form the principle and the details of legislation. Mr. Greaves, to whom we have before referred, has attempted to found a system of spiritual socialism, by discovering the inward subjective bond, by which men are united in society, and seeking to strengthen this bond by moral or educational means and appliances. "The religious, moral, political, and commercial social arrangements," he observes, "have been based, from the commencement of society, upon the *model* natures, instead of the *universal* natures." He proposes, accordingly, to look beneath the surface of humanity, down to the universal essence, of which it consists, to draw forth into intense operation the love-spirit (as he denominates it), and, by these means, to lead men to dwell everywhere without the wants or wishes of wealth, without desire of individual accumulation, or any inequality of condition. Such were a few of the

benevolent dreams of this philanthropic enthusiast. Happy, indeed, would it be, if the love of self were to perish, and the world were to become united in the strongest ties of universal charity.

This consummation, however, we fear, is not to be attained by the mysticism we are now considering. We trust, indeed, that it may be attained at last; but this will only be, when the visions of prophecy are fulfilled, and the spirit of true Christianity animates every soul under heaven. We need not particularly refer to the analogous doctrines of St. Simon and Fourier in France, who have entertained similar visions of social perfection in the coming state of society. Far would we be from discouraging, even were we able to do so, any efforts of this nature, to call forth the hidden sympathies of mankind towards each other; but we see not why spiritual ideas, which are quite familiar to the mind of every right-thinking Christian man, should be dressed up in a strange and eccentric garb, and then propounded as some new system which is to regenerate society. We fully believe, that everything good, belonging to these doctrines, may be found in the social spirit of Christianity; and that all which they contain beyond this, is the ebullition of an ardent but false enthusiasm, yearning after better things than society can now present.

It is in religion, however, that the tendencies of modern mysticism are chiefly visible. In this

department there is, as we imagine, a true and a false mysticism,—a true one, inasmuch as the direct communion of the soul of man with the infinite gives rise to many phenomena, which it were vain altogether to omit—and a false one, inasmuch as there is a universal proneness in mankind to run into extremes upon all those subjects, which excite their deepest feelings. To test the question, whether there be such a thing as a true mysticism in religion, we have simply to ask, whether our whole knowledge on this subject comes from reason and revelation combined, or whether there is not another element of truth, flowing from our spiritual feelings or our religious consciousness. The primary truths of natural theology may, of course, be viewed as deductions of reason; other religious ideas, again, come from an immediate revelation; but are we to say, that this exhausts our sources of religious knowledge? Is there not a direct communication of the human mind with the divine? and does not this communion give us a deeper insight into the divine nature, than reason or revelation, or both of them combined, could ever afford? It is generally admitted, that the highest conception of Deity which our reason can form, is a very cold and abstract one—one which can hardly reach beyond the notion of a first cause, and with difficulty attain to that of an infinite personality; and even if we come to the page of revelation itself, yet all the descriptions which it

gives us of the attributes of God, form but a very indistinct image upon a mind, that simply puts these notions together by a logical process, and has no community of feeling with Deity itself. If it be the case, therefore, that, for gaining a deep insight into the perfections of God, we must rise to a communion of the heart and sympathy of feeling with him, then there is in religion a true and valid mysticism, which has to be cherished in every mind, that thirsts after God. Mysticism of this nature forms, in fact, a regular portion of the common belief of all Christian countries. The theological doctrine of divine influence is but the dogmatical mode of expressing a fact, which is almost equally evident on the principles of natural religion; namely, that ere we can enter fully into the conception of God, both in his own nature, and in his relation to the world, the spirit of man must be brought into mysterious communion and sympathy with the Spirit of God.

But there is also a false mysticism, as well as a true, to which we must for a moment advert. This is of two kinds. First, when communion with the divine mind is supposed to be gained by some artificial agency; or secondly, when it is supposed to be of such a nature, as to realize the full idea of inspiration. If a man assert, that, by the performance of certain outward acts, the human spirit can be united in sympathy with that of God, he advocates an incredible mysticism, inasmuch as

he attributes spiritual functions to bare material causes. Or, again, if a man asserts that, by any means whatever, whether physical or mental, he has such an intuition of spiritual truth, that it completely transcends, and renders useless, the agency of his natural faculties, he is likewise a mystic; for he is laying claim to a species of inspiration, which is altogether foreign to our present experience in the world. We do not say, that he is laying claim to anything in itself impossible; but we mean that inspiration, in this sense, is a phenomenon so extraordinary, that it must prove itself valid, by the most clear and unquestionable evidences; in default of which, it can be considered nought but a deception.

Of these two species of false mysticism, there are many exhibitions in the present day. We doubt whether the whole doctrine of sacramental efficacy, as held by many sincere minds, is not accurately designated as a mysticism of the former kind; inasmuch as it is all based upon the notion of a spiritual effect being communicated by a material instrumentality to the mind. So entirely foreign is this from the ordinary modes of the divine operation, in the worlds both of matter and of mind, that we need a proof sufficient to attest a miracle itself, to render the doctrine at all credible. With regard to the other species of false mysticism, namely, the pretension to, or belief in, a supernatural inspiration now enjoyed, we suppose

it still lingers amongst the ignorant or the enthusiastic, and will only gradually expire, as the province of faith and of feeling in religion becomes gradually more accurately defined. Faith in the supernatural, we may safely say, can never die out of humanity, but will ever remain a standing proof of our connexion with a spiritual world. While this, however, is the case, we may well anticipate, that the progress of science, the further investigation of the laws of the human feelings, and the fuller conception of what is included in religious faith, will, ere long, bring the tendency to mysticism into its proper bounds, and curb the extravagance of superstition, without crushing our faith in what is spiritual and divine.

The result of all our inquiries into the philosophical history of the present age, is this—that there are certain speculative tendencies, which are natural to mankind at large, and which every age more or less will reproduce; that these tendencies are wisely arranged to stimulate human research; that each one, viewed alone, leads infallibly to truth and error combined; but that, viewed in connexion with each other, they are the great pulsations, by which the human mind advances onward to the completion of its own knowledge, and, may we not hope, to the fuller perfection of society at large.*

* Vid. Note I., Appendix.

APPENDIX.

SINCE the greater part of the foregoing sheets have been in the press, our attention has been directed to Mr. G. N. Lewes's "Biographical History of Philosophy;" on which, as being the last philosophical manifestation of our country, we are desirous of making one or two observations. We are happy to bear our testimony to the patience and the success, with which the author has investigated the most prominent systems of philosophy, which appear on the page of history. In spite of a levity of style, hardly consistent with the grave discussion of philosophical questions, he has thrown his elucidations and criticisms before us, with great clearness, and sometimes with considerable power of argumentation. At the same time we altogether differ from the view he has taken of the nature of metaphysical researches, and much fear that, were it carried out to its ultimate consequences, it would peril some of the most precious germs of human knowledge.

Mr. Lewes, it should be understood, is a disciple of Comte, an advocate of positive science. In philosophy (by which he understands whatever relates to the origin of things or *causes*, and whatever relates to the existence of things *per se*, or their *essences*) he has no belief. He admits, indeed, that it has answered a good end, inasmuch as it has led mankind to the real method of investigating truth; but the whole attempt at solving *metaphysical* problems he sets down as utterly vain and hopeless. The history of philosophy, as he writes it, is intended to shew that all metaphysical investigations have gone round and round in one perpetual circle, that they have ever thrown the same great questions up to view, and that we are now as far from solving them as when the struggle first began.

The true object, then, of human investigation he affirms to be, positive science, "*the aim of which is to trace the coexistences and successions of phenomena*, i. e., *to trace the relation of cause and effect throughout the universe submitted to our inspection.*" In other words, what we have to do is to observe *facts*, and discover their *laws*, to which empirical process the whole sum of our knowledge is for ever confined.

Against this summary species of sensationalism the whole of our previous reflections, we trust, have furnished many arguments; but we shall make now a few additional observations, more especially applicable to the work before us.

1. We cannot regard Mr. Lewes's own account of the true office of philosophy as consistent with its alleged futility. He admits that it has been the great impulse to human research, the parent of positive science, nourishing, sustaining, directing the human faculties in their infancy, and leading them to all that is great and noble. Can it, then, be rational to affirm that philosophy, having been the mainspring of all human improvement, yet now, exactly in this very age, having given birth to an Auguste Comte, is from henceforth to be thrown aside as utterly worthless, and chased out of all our seats of learning? The thought at once suggests itself, *Has* its end been fully answered? Can we call it the highest stretch of philosophy to produce a system of science which formally denies the existence of a God? May not some more struggles be yet necessary, to bring the human mind to the appreciation of the true method of all mental investigation? Having achieved the true method of *physical* research, may it not yet be a higher triumph of philosophy to achieve that of metaphysical and spiritual research also? For the honour, the glory, the happiness of humanity, we hope that it may be so. At any rate, considering the natural tendency of the human mind to make bold attempts at metaphysical speculation, though they should end in nothing, we imagine that, *even on our author's own principle*, philosophy, instead of being thrown aside, must be necessary in every age, to convince it, by a process of painful experience, of the utter futility which attaches itself to all metaphysical investigation. We must have better proof than M. Comte has yet given us,

that philosophy has grown useless, before we lay it aside as having fixed for ever the bounds of the known and unknown.

2. But we are not yet prepared to grant that the peculiar problems of philosophy are so utterly hopeless, as our author makes them out. We do not regard his "irreversible canon" (that whatever relates to causes and essences is entirely beyond our reach) as by any means so certain as he declares it. What is the universe around us? Is it merely a succession of phenomena? Does it either satisfy our reason or express our *whole* knowledge of the world to say, that all we can do is to observe and classify *appearances?* Unless we choose to plunge into the absolute idealism of Hegel, and only admit a universe of relations, we *must* suppose a real, substantial objective world; and to know that it *exists* supposes a faculty which, to some extent or other, is cognizant of essences. So it is also with regard to *causes.* No empirical observations can give us the perception of *power;* but unless this is cognized as a reality by our reason, the unity of the world to us is gone; we can say nothing of a spiritual cause, we can never reach the valid conception of a God. Nay, if all ontology is denied, then our very personality can never be conceived of; man cannot call himself an essence, he is but a succession of phenomena. We insist, therefore, upon a knowledge of the existence both of essences and causes, and in the knowledge of their existence there is a germ of thought, which may be expanded into a valid metaphysic, or if the term be preferred, a valid ontology.

3. Our author will now probably come with the inquiry, "Have you then any ideas independent of experience; for on this the pretensions of metaphysics must be staked?" I answer, What is experience? What are its elements? Unless we have some ideas independent of experience, how is experience possible? Experience implies two elements—a *self* on the one side, an objective reality on the other. There must be an intuition of my own existence, there must be a subject to which the multiplicity of my ideas are referred as a primitive unity, else our consciousness would have no thread of connexion running through it. Moreover, there must be certain forms by which the objective stimuli that act upon us are shaped into

notions or ideas. Imagine the influences of the external world acting upon a perfectly formed human body, but tenanted by a mind without understanding or reason. These influences, it is admitted, would never convey knowledge to such a mind, because there would exist no faculties adapted to grasp them. But what does the existence of such faculties imply? Evidently the power of attaching certain forms, shapes, or conceptions to external phenomena—the power of reducing them to notions, and of giving them a character by which they take their place as real elements of human knowledge existing in the understanding. In this sense, we assuredly *do* possess something independent of experience; we possess, namely, those categories or forms of thought which give rise immediately to the primitive conceptions, under which all external things are viewed. Without this *à priori* element, experience itself would be impossible.

4. We come to another point which appears to us to stand in a very unsatisfactory light in the work before us, and that is the ground-principle of religion. The author, on this subject, comes forth with one of his sweeping "fallaciæ plurium interrogationum," in the following words: "Upon what does religion base itself? Upon reason or revelation? What do the Fathers teach? What do all the highest theological authorities teach? The question is pertinent, important. Do they teach that human reason is competent to solve the problems of religion? Do they teach that to reason man must look for certitude and conviction? No, they one and all energetically declare, as they are forced to declare, that reason is essentially a finite, limited, erring faculty, wholly incompetent to produce certitude and conviction." To this he adds in a note: "It would be idle to cite authorities for this fundamental and universally acknowledged position. We should be ashamed of alluding to it, did not the present discussion force us." Now we imagine it would be more *difficult* to cite high authorities for this position than *idle*, if we understand it aright. What does it imply? It cannot mean simply that reason is incompetent to deduce *all* which faith reveals; for this view of the case would make nothing for the purpose which the author has before him, that of shewing the *entire* separation of religion and philosophy. If it means,

then, to assert that *all* religion bases itself upon revelation, or that the Fathers taught any such doctrine as this, we altogether deny it. Many of the Fathers built their theological notions, even too much, upon philosophical dogmas; and the *great mass* of theological authority, both in ancient and modern times, teaches us to base revealed religion upon the broader principles of natural religion. All the great systems of theology that the Church has produced, all at least which have any pretensions to merit, proceed distinctly upon this principle. And correctly so. How the existence of a God could possibly be revealed to us by inspiration or authority is a problem which has never yet been solved. All revelation proceeds upon the *fact* of his existence, and we know not where it could ever find a valid basis, were it disowned as a primary conclusion of our reason and conscience. This brings us, then, to the very point in question. Can positive science, in the sense here employed, ever bring us to the conviction of the Being of a God? M. Comte says authoritatively *it cannot*, and we believe him to be right. Far are we from attributing this sentiment to those who advocate the positive principle, since there is nothing more unjust than to draw our own conclusions, and then force them upon other people; but we cannot see how the atheistic conclusion, into which the master openly sinks, can ultimately be avoided by the pupils. If all we can do is to observe phenomena and deduce their laws, if all inquiry both into causes and essences are entirely beyond our reach, we are quite at a loss to see how the belief in a God can be any other than what Comte represents it, namely, a delusion incident to the more infantile state of humanity. We contend, then, for a philosophy of religion. We affirm that the grounds of our religious belief, and the facts of our spiritual nature, can be subjected to philosophical investigation, as well as any other part of our mental phenomena. We believe that the history of every mind, if it be closely examined, and the history of humanity in the mass, all tends to prove some connexion with a spiritual world, without which *man* were a problem utterly inexplicable; and we look with jealous eye upon any system which tends to absorb the notions of the human spirit or the Infinite Spirit in that of nature, to

cut us off from that which gives us all our dignity, and lends to human action all its grandeur and elevation.

5. We only add a single idea respecting the distinction, which is drawn in the work before us, between philosophy and positive science, on the ground of the one being progressive, the other not. The author ought to have admitted that philosophy is progressive on his own principles; for by his own shewing it has gradually evolved the true principles of human knowledge. The fact which is so much dwelt upon, that the same questions come over and over again and are ever unsolved, is nothing to the purpose. In all sciences, even those of a purely positive character, the great ultimate points aimed at are stated in the outset; but the circumstance of their not being solved is no argument to prove that progress is not made in them. Physiology aims at the discovery of the principle of life; chemistry of the ultimate elements of nature; politics at the best possible form of government. These problems recur ever and anon; they are ever solving and never solved; but truth comes out in the very process. So it is in philosophy. The great ultimate problems have been stated, and re-stated, and never solved; but let the progress of human intelligence, the marking out of the boundaries of human knowledge, the whole intellectual phenomena of man's history say, whether there has not been a steady advancement towards the elucidation of the great questions of man's nature and destiny. For our own part, we believe fully and heartily in philosophy; we regard it as the truest expression of the thoughts of every age; as one of the greatest aids to human progress; and, when of a true, elevated, and spiritual kind, as one of the most efficient means by which man is ever recalled from his absorption in the material to the contemplation of truth, of immortality, and of God.

NOTE A., VOL. I., p. 223.

As Kantism belongs to the history of the last century, we have necessarily been very succinct in the judgment we have passed upon it. The importance of it, however, as a system, leads us to offer a few other illustrations in addition. The

great question between the school of Descartes and Locke was this—Does all our knowledge come from experience, or is some stamped with an absolute and *à priori* character? Hume has assumed the Lockian or empirical hypothesis, and educed from it a system of universal scepticism. On the other hand, Wolf, taught by Leibnitz, has assumed the Cartesian hypothesis in a modified form; and by the incessant use of mere logical definitions, as though they could stand in the place of things themselves, had given rise to a system of empty formalism. Kant originally belonged to the Wolfian school; but he so far sympathized with Hume as to feel the absolute necessity of admitting the claims of experience, the very element which the Wolfian school had disregarded.

The question, then, with Kant was this—Cannot the claims of these two schools be compromised? Admitting the necessity of experience, of what does experience consist? what are the elements of it? does it not itself contain some *à priori* principle? To answer this was the aim of his "Critique," and the answer it returned was decisive. Knowledge, it declared, cannot consist simply in the intimations of sense, for they alone would be *formless;* neither can it consist simply in *à priori* conceptions, for they would be *matterless;* but it consists in a synthesis of both, the one giving the form, the other the matter. What conclusions then flow from this view of the case? Manifestly these—that valid objective knowledge must be confined to the limits of experience; that beyond these limits there may be formal ideas, but no *matter*, no reality; that the universal conceptions which arise from the synthesis of matter and form are absolutely true *to us;* but that we cannot pronounce anything to be absolutely true beyond the limits of our own subjective method of viewing it. Kantism, therefore, instead of denying the whole certainty of human knowledge, as Hume did, merely limits it: "If we would go beyond our nature," he says, "we must be content to rush into darkness; but within that nature, consciousness is sure and certain."

But a grave question now arises. If we cannot have objective certainty beyond the limits of sense, what becomes of our ideas of substance, of the soul, of God—ideas which all admit

to be noumenal or supersensual? "Reason," says Kant, "can never assure us of their existence; attempt to deduce them, and you fall into endless paralogisms; as ideas they exist, but only as ideas, for the senses cannot clothe them with outward reality. Are we then to sit down in the dreary belief that there is no moral law, no spiritual nature, no immortality, no God? Far from it. Reason, it is true, can never vouch for their certainty; but still it has been shewn that our consciousness is veracious; that what is indestructibly impressed upon it must be true; and although we cannot *demonstrate* the fundamental ideas of ethics and religion, yet, that as they are a part of our moral consciousness, they must be accepted as morally certain. They rest, indeed, upon the same ground as does our belief in the categories of our own intelligence, namely, upon the ground of consciousness itself. Although, therefore, we are obliged to say that *scientifically* Kant only admitted the idea of God as a regulative principle, and not as implying an objective reality, yet *morally* he indicated the grounds of natural religion with a power with which scepticism could not very easily cope. In the practical reason, consciousness has an entire authority; its word must here be taken as law. And to make these conclusions more certain, Kant shews, in the "Critique of the Judging Faculty," that there is a perfect harmony between the moral consciousness of man and the whole purpose and design of the universe.

From the whole of this view it will be seen that Kant, though avoiding the *ultimate* conclusion both of scepticism and pure idealism, yet stood on a narrow point between both. "Kantism," says M. Remusat, "is not exactly idealism, nor scepticism. His doctrine is eminently a rationalism, with a tendency to idealism, and a risk of scepticism, through the idea of a universal subjectivity. But the idea of a universal subjectivity is not of itself exclusive. Universal subjectivity might be true in the sense that everything is subjective, that is to say, that everything is *thought* by us, even the absolutely unknown under the form of the possible. But from the fact that everything in this sense would be subjective, it would not follow that the subjective is everything; for in the subjective we find the objective, for

example, the non-consciousness of the origin of experience, and this is a point which Kant accepts as a starting-point for his philosophy."

Such is the species of philosophical finesse, which must be practised in order to save Kantism from the abyss which yawns on each side it. The grand error is the want of faith in reason as the revealer of eternal verities. Admit the non-personality of reason, place it on the same footing as consciousness, mould the Kantian philosophy to this idea; and it would evolve, in all its different movements, a mass of abstract truth, which no scepticism could ever shake. As it stands, however, it has given occasion to the re-separation of the empirical and *à priori* elements, which it strove to unite into an indissoluble synthesis. Of this the subsequent history of the German philosophy is one perpetual and living proof.

Note B., Vol. I., p. 240.

The possibility of any inquiry into *causes* and existence, we are aware, is denied by many philosophical minds in the present day, who would have us bound our investigation *entirely* to *facts* and *laws*. We are happy, however, to find that the view of the case we have advocated is strongly supported by many of the first thinkers of our age. Frederick von Schlegel remarks upon the English tendency to empiricism in the following terms:— "The negative philosophy of the English remains true to its character, in as far as, shunning carefully all objects of a higher nature, it has for the most part made it a principle to limit its views entirely to man, without attempting to dive and penetrate into the profound mysteries of the Deity, or into the internal secrets of nature. To this a high philosophy will object; man is no isolated being; but as he was originally placed by his Creator in nature, it is only in that connexion with God and nature that the mysteries of his inward being and the history of his outward progress can be fully understood and explained."

Again, M. Remusat, in the report he has made of the Memoires sent in to the French "Academie des Sciences," on the nature and merits of the German philosophy, remarks:— "Il est temps d'oser lever les yeux sur le but, qu'ils (les Alle-

mans) se sont posé, et d'entrer dans la région, où ils ont marché, sans cependant y suivre leurs pas. Il faut les imiter en gardant ces garanties precieuses de méthode, d'erudition, de langage, d'experience, qui sont comme le fond de notre sagesse philosophique." After pointing out the reserve and caution with which fundamental questions in philosophy should be pursued, he adds, "Mais cette réserve ne doit pas aller jusqu' à la suppression de toute haute métaphysique, la science de l'être ne saurait nous être absolument interdite; si l'esprit humain n'en pouvait rien atteindre, il faudrait cesser de croire en Dieu; car Dieu est déjà une vérité métaphysique. Oui, sans métaphysique il y a nécessairement scepticisme; mais dans cet essor suprême de la pensée spéculative, une conscience éclairée de la limitation de la connaissance humaine est indispensible."

The whole of the present eclectic school of France adds the weight of its authority to the possibility there is, within certain limits and with due caution, of entering safely and intelligently into the peculiar field of metaphysics or ontology, *i. e.*, into the investigation of *cause* and *existence*.

Note C., Vol. I., p. 259.

Many glimpses into the real nature and tendency of quietism are to be gained from a work which we are far from recommending otherwise, namely, Michelet's "Priests, Women, and Families." While the author, we fear, is far from doing justice to the lofty virtue and spirituality of Madame Guyon and of Fenelon himself, yet the character of the quietist mysticism is often pourtrayed by his pen in a very striking manner. Take the following passage on Fenelon's Quietism as an example:— "If he differs," says the author, "from the absolute quietist, whom he affects to condemn, it is less in any fundamental part of doctrine than the *degree* in which he admits that doctrine. He thinks he goes far enough in saying that the state of quiet, in which the soul loses its activity, is not a *perpetually* but an *habitually* quiet state. But, in acknowledging inaction to be both superior to action and a state of perfection, does he not make us *wish* that the inaction might be perpetual? The soul habitually passive, according to him, is concentrated above,

leaving beneath her the inferior part, whose acts are those of an entirely blind and involuntary commotion. These acts being always supposed voluntary he avows that the superior part still remains responsible for them." The peculiarity of the French quietism seems ever to have been the absorption of the *will*, in passive feeling and ecstasy; a doctrine which may imply a lofty state of spirituality, but which is too apt to degenerate into fearful immorality.

NOTE D., VOL. I., p. 422.

M. Peisse, an ingenious French author, in confuting the intellectual system of Dr. Gall, puts the whole question of the *uniform* relation between the cerebral development and the power of the mental faculties to the test, by adducing the instance of a young Indian girl, who possessed a most monstrous configuration, but who never shewed mentally the least peculiarity. After having attested and described the facts of the case, he proceeds to reason with the phrenologists as follows:—"I do not see how, on your principles, this difficulty can be surmounted. You would not be able to believe, on the one hand, that a sound intellect could dwell in a brain so monstrously deformed, without abandoning your fundamental principle, which expressly subordinates the mental manifestation to certain physiological conditions, determined by yourselves. You are not able, on the other hand, to allege, that the malformations of the cranium have not had any influence upon the constitution of the brain, without taking away from your own system its one and only basis, its only guarantee, its only demonstration, namely, *cranioscopy*. If, in fact, you agree, that in this case, disease or original disposition have produced such considerable deviations upon the cranium, without the brain participating in it, then all your classifications, distinctions, and localizations are destroyed; for they rest upon a prior supposition of the perfect and continuous correspondence of the cranium with the brain. What would then become of all your observations on the statues of the ancients, —upon the heads of living men and animals,—if this correspondence does not exist, at least, within the limits which you

have determined * * *. The fact which I now discuss is in direct contradiction with your principles, for it demonstrates the one or the other of these two propositions :—

"1. Either, that the integrity of the intellectual and moral faculties can subsist with a monstrous brain ; or,

"2. That the cranium can be monstrous without the brain participating in its deformation.

"And you cannot admit either the one or the other, without reducing to a nonentity all the organology of Dr. Gall."

NOTE E., VOL. I., p. 480.

The philosophy of M. Azais may be in some measure comprehended from the following extract :—

"The universe is the whole sum of existences and of their relations : these existences and their relations change and unceasingly renew themselves: *action* is then necessary to the existence, and to the preservation of the universe.

"Matter, the substance of beings, is the passive subject of the universal action. God impresses the action—matter obeys.

"The universal action has received from the Creator one unique mode of exercise : on this condition only, it can be a source of order and at the same time of production. *Expansion* is the only mode of universal action ; that is to say, that every material being by the simple fact, that it exists, is penetrated in all the points of its substance with an inward action, which tends incessantly to dilate it, to divide it, to augment indefinitely the space which it occupies, and, consequently, to dissolve it.

"Thus, a material Being, of any kind whatever, if it could for a single moment be alone in space ; if, during one moment, it could form of itself a universe ; would only have need of this moment to enter into an eternal and absolute dissolution.

"But every material being, of whatever kind, and occupying whatever space, is surrounded with material beings, like to, or different from, itself ; which are all likewise penetrated with a continual expansive force ; which, consequently, repress or prevent its dissolution, by struggling against it ; and the expansion of every one of these bodies is itself repressed,

retarded, and modified by the concurrent expansion of all the bodies with which it is surrounded; so that *generally*, in the universe, the act of repression or of conservation, is the immediate effect of universal expansion."

The author next goes on to account, upon these mechanical principles, for the phenomena of heat, magnetism, electricity, and all the more subtle agents in nature. From thence he proceeds to deduce all the different attributes of material existence in its solid, liquid, and aeriform character. The phenomenon of *elasticity* is peculiarly important in his theory, as accounting for the vibrations by which sound, light, &c., are produced. Without dwelling upon these points, however, we must shew his explanation of the principle of organized life.

"Organized Beings are elastic beings, in the bosom of which vibrating globules are especially collected in particular focuses: having relations between them sustained by the aid of fibres or channels; this provision does not exist in *unorganized* elastic beings: their vibrating expansion proceeds indifferently from every point towards the surface.

"In plants, the organic relations are very simple, because the channels which establish them do not fold back upon themselves and have no connexion with one another: there is, in a word, no *circulation*. In animals, the organization is so much the more elevated, as the circulation of the vibrating globules is more multiplied, and by this means the general correspondence more rapid and more intimate. Man is the most perfect of organized beings. Every organ, or focus of vibration, in an organized being, of whatever nature, executes its particular vibration: there is *health* or *harmony* in the whole of this being, when all the organs execute concordant vibrations among themselves, when they form a true *concert*. There is, on the contrary, disease when the vibrations of the different organs are discordant among themselves: in organized beings of the superior classes this discordance manifests itself by *fever*."

Having explained the phenomena of organization, our author proceeds to philosophize upon man in his mental, moral, and social capacities. "Man," he remarks, "experiences both a want

and a repression alike; but of a much more multiplied character, because it is of a nature much more rich, much more lofty. Each one of us is desirous of prosperity, of well-being, of extension, of pleasure, of renown; each can only rest satisfied and peaceful, inasmuch as he moderates the expansion which animates him: if he abandons himself to his ardour, he soon meets with the resistance of his fellows — a resistance which proceeds from *their* expansion, and which, if it is repulsed with violence, rallies, becomes in its turn hostile, rude, oppressive. Human laws of whatever kind — the laws of administration, the laws of justice, never do anything but regulate the reaction of the common expansion against the usurpations of individual expansion: every human law is a social form given to the single and universal law, to the law of compensations.

"In fine, every people is a federation of expansive beings; a federation which unceasingly tends to the improvement and to the increase of posterity, of territory, of celebrity, of all kinds of enjoyment. This expansion, as long as it is limited by wisdom, remains a principle of force and of harmony; but favoured by imprudence and heated by ambition, it excites the reaction of surrounding peoples; it provokes their union and energy. People, ambitious without moderation, only call forth catastrophes. The earth has resounded with the violence of their movements, soon it is frightened at the noise of its fall: if it is not raised by a firm and conciliatory hand, it is crushed and annihilated."

Note F., Vol. II., p. 97.

Most of Fichte's works consist of somewhat small treatises; in which his thoughts, however, are developed at once with great brevity and great distinctness. The following, we believe, is a correct list of them, with the exception of short pieces or articles, which appeared in the periodical literature of the day:—

1. "An Attempt at a Critique of all Revelation:" published anonymously in 1792, and, then, generally attributed to the pen of Kant.

2. "Lectures on the Destination of the Learned;" written on his first appointment at Jena—1794.

3. "On the Idea of a Doctrine of Science." Weimar, 1794.

4. "Principles of a Universal Doctrine of Science." Weimar, 1794.

5. "Sketch of the Peculiarity of the Doctrine of Science." Jena, 1795.

6. "Principles of Natural Right." Jena, 1796.

7. "A System of Moral Philosophy." Jena, 1798.

These are the works, in which Fichte's first views on the subjective philosophy were embodied. From this point we find a somewhat modified spirit introduced into all his speculations, as we have indicated in the text.

8. "On the Destination of Man." Berlin, 1800. Recently translated into English, by Mrs. Percy Sinnett.

9. "Sun-clear Intelligence, offered to the Public at large, on the peculiar Nature of the newest Philosophy." Berlin, 1801.

10. "The Features of the present Age." Berlin, 1804.

11. "On the Nature of the Scholar." Lectures delivered at Erlangen, in 1805. Also translated.

12. "Directions for a Happy Life: or, the Doctrine of Religion." Berlin, 1806.

13. "Addresses to the German People." Berlin, 1808.

The following were published posthumously:—

14. "On the Facts of Consciousness." Stuttgard, 1817.

15. "Doctrine of Government." Berlin, 1820.

16. Three volumes of Miscellanies, edited by his son.

Several small controversial pamphlets are here omitted. The above list contains the works, which shew the development of his philosophical ideas.

The most distinctive feature, and far the most interesting, of Fichte's philosophy, is that which refers to man's moral action, and high destiny in life. However extravagant we may consider his theoretical science, yet it is impossible to read his noble sentiments on human duty, and to see them exemplified in his own eventful life, without feeling our moral weakness reproved, and our moral strength invigorated.

NOTE G., VOL. II., p. 130.

To give anything approaching to a correct list of all Schelling's writings, is a matter of no small difficulty. His ever restless mind continued, for some years, to pour forth its productions, in treatises, pamphlets, and journals, in such a manner, that the only possible way of getting a connected view of his literary life, would be to arrange these articles in due order, as they appeared before the public. Instead of doing this, we shall give a classification of his writings, according to their general characteristics.

The first period in Schelling's philosophical life, is that in which he discussed the grounds of metaphysical science, as seen from Fichte's subjective principles. To this period belong his articles—

1. "On the Possibility of a Form of Philosophy generally." Tübingen, 1795; and,

2. "On *the Me*, as Principle of Philosophy; or on the Unconditioned in Human Knowledge."

3. "Philosophical Letters, on Dogmatism and Criticism," in the "Niethammer Phil. Journal," 1796.

The second period is that, in which Schelling developed his Natur-Philosophie in its original form. The chief works belonging to this period are—

1. "Ideas towards a Philosophy of Nature." Leipsic, 1707.

2. "On the Soul of the World; an Hypothesis of the Higher Physics." Hamburgh, 1798.

3. "Sketch of a System of Natural Philosophy." Jena, 1799.

4. "System of Transcendental Idealism." Tübingen, 1800.

5. "The Journal for Speculative Physics." Jena, 1800—1803.

6. "Bruno; a Dialogue on the Divine and Natural Principle of Things." Berlin, 1802.

7. "Lectures on the Method of Academical Study." Tübingen, 1803.

In the third period of his philosophical life, Schelling began to feel that he had confined himself too much to the objective

point of view, and lost sight of the powers and freedom of the individual *self*. We find, therefore, in the following works, a tendency backward to the subjective principle. These are,

1. "Philosophy and Religion." Tübingen, 1804.

2. "Representation of the true Relation of Natural Philosophy to the improved Doctrine of Fichte." Tübingen, 1806.

3. "Yearly Journal of Medicine." Tübingen, 1806.

4. "Memorial of the Work of Jacobi on Divine Things." Tübingen, 1812.

The last period of Schelling's life, is that in which he has come round to the Theosophic point of view, and merged his former ideas into a comprehensive system of religious mysticism. To this belong—

1. "Researches into the Essence of Human Freedom." Tübingen, 1812.

2. The Philosophy of Mythology; in a work on "The Deities of Samothrace." Tübingen, 1815.

3. "Preface to Cousin's Philosophical Fragments." The only thing which the Author wrote, after his work on Mythology, for twenty years.

4. His Lectures at Berlin, in the year 1842, on the "Philosophy of Revelation," of which a few only have been printed.

Note II., Vol. II., p. 155.

The writings of Hegel are comprised in a much smaller number of independent works, than those of Fichte and Schelling. We have to thank the zeal of his followers in Berlin, for giving us a complete edition of them, edited in a most masterly style. His publications appeared in the following order:—

1. A Dissertation "De Orbitis Planetarium." Jena, 1801.

2. A small work, "On the Difference between Fichte's and Schelling's System of Philosophy." Jena, 1801.

3. Many Articles in the "Critical Journal of Philosophy." 1802, 1803.

Up to this period, Hegel was not distinguished from the ordinary school of Schelling, but worked in conjunction with him.

4. The first work, in which he decidedly took up his own

independent position, was that entitled, "Phenomenology of Mind." Würzburg, 1807. (This work Hegel used to call his Voyage of Discovery.)

5. "Science of Logic." This is comprised in three volumes, which appeared successively, from 1812 to 1816, at Nüremberg.

6. "Encyclopædia of Philosophical Sciences." Heidelberg, 1817.

7. "Principles of the Rights of Nature." Berlin, 1821.

In addition to these, Hegel delivered many courses of Lectures at Berlin, on almost every subject connected with philosophy and its history, many of which have been published posthumously, from a collation of his own Notes with those taken by his pupils, at their delivery. The most interesting of these are, the "History of Philosophy," and the "Philosophy of History."

Note I., Vol. II., p. 517.

In the course of our "Historical View," we have said nothing respecting the philosophy of any of the European nations, beyond England, France, and Germany. We would not have it inferred hence, that philosophy has been entirely neglected amongst all the European people except those three. The reason why they hold no particular place in the history of philosophy is, that they have attached themselves to some of the systems we have explained, rather than originated any new methods or theories. In Italy, Giov. Batt. Vico, about the close of the last century, gave a sketch of the History of Philosophy, which has occupied a prominent place in Italian literature. In the present century, App. Buonafede has also written on the History of Philosophy. In Holland, Denmark, and Sweden, several authors have been incited to metaphysical investigations, by the study of the German philosophy. And even Portugal has produced one or two works worthy of notice. As these all, however, have a reference to some of the systems we have explained, we have not thought it worth while to give any distinct account of them in the present volumes.

Macintosh, Printer, Great New Street, London.

00059899

Digitized with financial assistance from the
Government of Maharashtra
on 17 February, 2016